Walking Back Delusional Nuclear Policies

Research article by Bharat Karnad for the Special Issue of the Journal ‘Strategic Analysis’ 
Pages 181-193 | Published online: 08 May 2018


India’s ‘dual use’ nuclear policy has been strung out from the beginning between the peaceful atom and military atom as illustrated in Jawaharlal Nehru’s use of the phrase for the country’s nuclear energy programme—‘Janus-faced’. However, the Indian Government has been too influenced by its own rhetoric of peaceful use to equally emphasise the security aspects that the phrase implied.

While Nehru championed disarmament, he did so in the 1950s in the United Nations’ First Committee as cover for the military capability being developed under Homi Bhabha’s astute leadership. But the myth about disarmament leadership meant that even after Indira Gandhi refrained from signing the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty because it sought to freeze the ‘have and have-not’ divide, Delhi has been pusillanimous about weaponisation but gung-ho about beefing up its non-proliferation credentials by joining or seeking to join the very technology denial regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenar Arrangement, Australia Group) that have victimised the country. The desire to please the US and the West has to end and national security aspects prioritised as all weapons states are doing.

It is time for India to resume nuclear testing to equip the arsenal with proven, reliable and safe thermonuclear weapons/warheads, and limit damage and recover strategic space by ensuring that neither the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty happens.

North Korea conducted a successful underground thermonuclear explosion of a staged device on September 2, 2017, and test-fired three Hwasong intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on July 4, July 28 and November 29, 2017, emerging in the process as a credible threat to American allies in Asia and for the first time, to continental US. It is a threat made real by the reputation for unpredictability and ruthlessness that its leader, Kim Jong-un, has cultivated over the years. Jong-un burnished his image some more by boldly calling the 72-year-old US President ‘a mentally deranged dotard’, in response to Donald J. Trump mocking him as ‘rocket man’ and vowing to rain down ‘fire and fury’.1 To show his defiance, Jong-un communicated the possibility of implementing his army’s strike plan to take out the mid-Pacific island of Guam, housing a large US military base.2

Pyongyang used irrationality—an old trope in nuclear deterrence literature—to signal readiness for a nuclear rumble, to deter the US. Pakistan is equally vocal in emphasising its tactical nuclear weapons hoard both as means of absolute security and for quelling such conventional military threat as it believes is posed by the Indian Army’s three strike corps, pivot formations and their ‘Cold Start’ strategy. Islamabad has been equally open about developing warheads of various yields, other than the Nasr short-range rocket, for sea-based and air-launched cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.Whether the US armed services are cowed by Kim Jong-un’s bluster, or the Indian military impressed by Pakistani warnings of first use is not the point. What is, is the fact that these relatively small and weak states, out of desperation and instinct for survival, grasped the essence of nuclear deterrence which has completely escaped India that has had usable nuclear weapons since 1974 (and formalised by Rajiv Gandhi’s decision in 1988).4 The essence is that an overbearing adversary can be brought to heel if gall is shown, albeit in a declaratory sense, to go first, even if such nuclear initiation would eventually be a suicidal move. Projecting the readiness to give as good as one gets while going down is the obvious way of playing the mind game of strategic deterrence in a weak state–strong state conflict dyad in which nuclear weapons otherwise have no utility.

Twenty years after the Shakti-series of tests in Pokhran, there is little understanding in India about nuclear weapons, and even less about the uses they can be put to. There is no appreciation of the fact that strategic weapons are not for reduction of a tactical-level foe, Pakistan, but for strategically jousting with China and militarily holding off a power superior to India in every respect. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it never was, is not now and can never be a credible conventional or nuclear military threat to India. This much is self-evident, and a point that will not be belaboured here, notwithstanding great amounts of ink expended, metaphorically speaking, on exaggerating a paper-thin threat by think tanks and the academic industry in the West, particularly the US and imitatively, in India. These experts are mostly mis-adapting Cold War notions to the subcontinent and creating more alarm about ‘a nuclear flashpoint’ than clarity.5

India has been on the wrong track from the start, believing that its nuclear reticence is a political virtue that has created diplomatic leverage and somehow elevated the country as a morally ‘responsible’ state, a cut above the North Koreas and Pakistans of the world.6

The truth, however, is that the Indian Government has hobbled the country’s strategic deterrent by:

  1. not actualising a weapons capability when its ‘Janus-faced’ nuclear energy programme reached the weapons threshold in Spring 1964;

  2. not carrying on with open-ending testing, after the first test in May 1974 to obtain fully fledged nuclear weaponisation;

  3. repeating this strategic mistake 25 years later by announcing a ‘voluntary moratorium’ on tests in 1998 despite information available to the government that the weaponised thermonuclear device that was tested was a dud;

  4. fixating politically on minimum deterrence and No First Use;

  5. making public the draft nuclear doctrine and thereby exposing the Indian Government to increased US-directed international pressure to reveal more, be more transparent and to further minimise the nuclear deterrent;

  6. not periodically revising the doctrine in line with the country’s evolving weapons technology and capability;

  7. signing the 2008 civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the US predicated on India not resuming nuclear testing; and

  8. not using the ample provocations offered by China’s aggressive moves (pre- and post-Doklam) and the China-fuelled North Korean fusion test and Pakistani nuclear build-up as political cover for resuming hydrogen weapon tests. These tests are important, especially for the Indian military, to secure proven and tested thermonuclear and fission weapons of varying weight-to-yield ratios for different missions ranging from city-busting strategic to tactical weapons for battlefield use.

Rethinking the basic disarmament-non-proliferation thrust of nuclear policy is a must. To do so requires jettisoning strongly held but historically suspect views, puncturing a few delusional beliefs and walking back some of the less productive notions lovingly held and nurtured by the Indian policy establishment, military and the academe and more realistically reorienting India’s nuclear weapons policy and posture.

Pet delusions

India’s nuclear weapons policy is studded with unsupportable views that need debunking to free it of its disarmament-non-proliferation shackles: First is the view that Jawaharlal Nehru’s advocacy of a ‘standstill’ agreement on nuclear testing was instrumental in obtaining the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting atomic testing in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.7 The disarmament-non-proliferation slant of Indian foreign policy thus got linked to virtuous behaviour and to promoting a universal good that was its own best justification. The truth: it was President John F. Kennedy’s concurring with his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, that restricting the Soviet Union to underground testing would keep its weapons programme lagging behind America’s that did the trick. Russia had out-exploded the US. The 60-megaton ‘Tsar Bomba’ in October 1961 dwarfed the US’ 15 MT ‘Castle Bravo’ shot in the Bikini Atoll in March 1954.Second, it is often held that Indira Gandhi’s use of America’s ‘Plowshare programme’ as screen for India’s first nuclear test in 1974 was clever statecraft. After all, labelling the Pokhran explosion as ‘peaceful’ hoist the US with its own petard and retained for the Indian nuclear energy programme its connection to the idea of a ‘peaceful atom’. Western analysts argue that the idea that atomic devices could be used to dig canals, tunnels, etc. had a ‘pernicious’ effect because something so obviously of military utility was passed off as benign.9 Its negative impact on Indian policy was graver still because the nonsense about ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ got so internalised that it reinforced thereafter the supposed peaceful nature of Indian nuclear activity, undermined the deterrence value of the test and reinforced inhibitions against further testing that took 25 years to overcome. And it spawned nuclear regressivism in the nuclear community, throwing up leaders such as R. Chidambaram, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who as science and technology adviser to Prime Minister Narendra Modi minimised the need for testing and in effect, has saddled India with the pretensions of a thermonuclear weapon power without proven thermonuclear weapons in the arsenal.

Third is the view that Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 ‘Action Plan’ for time-bound disarmament created ripples when in reality it was generally ignored in international circles when not dismissed outright as a quixotic attempt at reviving the international movement to eliminate nuclear weapons. Its insistence that the Big Five draw down their nuclear arms stockpiles to zero within a negotiated time frame had as much chance of realisation as Nehru’s campaign for ‘general and complete disarmament’ of the 1950s. It encouraged the unreconstructed disarmers, mainly within the Congress Party, into righteous frenzy, even though ‘Ban the Bomb’, as Harold Macmillan, the British Foreign Secretary, noted in his diary in the early 1950s is ‘a syllogism’—‘If we abolish the nuclear bomb (which has abolished war) shall we not bring back war?’10It inflicted damage in terms of Indian foreign policy that was getting unmoored from an ideological interpretation of Nehruvian moralpolitik becoming schizoid. After all, Rajiv Gandhi that same year formally approved weaponisation.11

And, finally, the extraneous baggage of morality attached to Indian nuclear weapons and the confusion attending on it meant that when the country came out of the nuclear closet, its deterrence rationale was fated to be minimalist. The minimum deterrence trap is particularly insidious because it is premised on the fallacious belief that given the scale of destruction a few nuclear weapons are as effective as many nuclear weapons to deter even a powerful adversary. It permits the political class and government to have a hands-off attitude, leaving it to nuclear scientists, such as Chidambaram, with little knowledge of military deterrence and nuclear deterrence history and literature, to decide the country’s nuclear stance. Moreover, what also gets ignored is the fact that like any other technology, nuclear weapons and nuclear command, control and communications, too, need to be continually modernised to remain relevant. And, for this purpose, the country needs to have technology to refine weapons designs short of explosive testing, such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility, which has so far been deemed unnecessary.

In the new century, the three countries with the largest, most lethal nuclear weapons inventories—the US, Russia and China—are re-legitimating the Bomb as an instrument of military coercion and foreign policy leverage. Alexei Arbatov, the former deputy chairman of the Defence Committee of the Russian Duma, after surveying the international security landscape was the first to announce the ‘end of history for nuclear arms control’.12 The prevailing circumstances constitute a crisis and ‘may quite possibly result’, he concluded glumly, ‘in the total disintegration of the existing framework of treaties and regimes’.13 It is in this context that India’s support for the extant non-proliferation order makes so little sense and needs re-examining.

A brief history of the evolution of India’s nuclear policy and capability

Realpolitik is obviously the propellant of non-proliferation policies, treaties and regimes promoted by the five Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)-legitimated weapons states (P-5). Nothing has transpired and no initiative has succeeded in the non-proliferation realm that hasn’t safeguarded the P-5’s strategic interests. Nehru was on to this big power game before anybody else and accordingly fashioned his approach. While vociferously advocating a testing ban as a step towards nuclear disarmament, which kept the weapons states on the back foot, and muted suspicions about what India was up to in the nuclear field, he laid the foundations for a ‘Janus-faced’ Indian programme capable equally of producing nuclear power plants and bombs. It reached the weapons threshold in March 1964 with the commissioning of the plutonium reprocessing unit in Trombay. It was a remarkably nuanced and sophisticated foreign policy that used disarmament advocacy as political screen for nuclear weapons capacity building and reflected the realist precepts of international affairs mostly missing from Indian foreign and nuclear policy post-Nehru.14

The 1974 atomic test ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example, instead of leading logically to open-ended testing and speedy weaponisation ended in the follow-on tests she had approved being abruptly cancelled, leaving India to face the worst possible situation—economic and technology sanctions, no nuclear arsenal to fend off politico-military pressure and no means to force an entry into the nuclear weapons club. She took this decision to stave off termination of Western aid. Henry Kissinger later admitted that Washington was in no real position then to prevent India from securing a nuclear arsenal and forcing an entry into the nuclear weapons club had Delhi proceeded with nuclear force build-up.15 But loss of nerve, infirm will and the sheer ignorance about the political utility of nuclear weapons have, ever since, been the constant companions of India’s nuclear policy.

The non-proliferation peril became real during the Janata Party interregnum when, motivated by his Gandhian belief in nonviolence, Prime Minister Morarji Desai seemed intent on signing the 1968 NPT. His muddle-headed External Affairs Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, inadvertently assisted the prime minister’s moves, expertly orchestrated from the outside by the US Ambassador Robert Goheen, that almost sprang the non-proliferation trap on India. A mixture of luck, Desai’s bullheadedness and plucky rearguard action by M. A. Vellodi, secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), involving inspired bureaucratic flummery pre-empted a denouement the country would, in hindsight, have hugely regretted (on the same scale as Shah Reza Pahlavi’s signing this treaty is hindering present-day Iran’s crossing the nuclear Rubicon to pre-empt US arm-twisting).16

The demise of the Soviet Union and the approaching fin de siècle reignited the cause of a nuclear weapons-free world, this time spurred by the millennial hope that the better angels of our collective nature would dictate national policies. That, of course, didn’t happen. Rather, the hard calculations of advantaging national interest prevailed. However flimsy such a hope, it was reflected in Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 Action Plan for time-bound disarmament that was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. It was the last, flickering, attempt by the ruling Congress Party to reconnect India with the public activism for nuclear disarmament by Nehru, whose subsurface strategic purpose was largely missing from Rajiv Gandhi’s thinking. It was only the evidence of Pakistan reaching the weapons threshold seminally helped by Chinese nuclear materials, weapons design and Washington’s deliberate inattention—the price that General Zia ul-Haq extracted for helping the US fight the Soviet occupation troops in Afghanistan with the mujahideen—that convinced Rajiv Gandhi to go overt with nuclear arming India.

Another shot in exactly the opposite direction to the Action Plan, the Indefinite Extension of the NPT in 1995 succeeded, however, in legally cementing the unfair and unequal international nuclear order of the haves and have-nots for the new century dominated by the P-5.17 As a non-signatory to the NPT but as observer at the Review Conference (RevCon) in New York, India could have played the spoiler from the sidelines, and roused the non-nuclear weapons states on the issue of the P-5 failure over three decades to be in compliance with Article VI requiring substantive progress towards disarmament. Except a deal was cut with the US—India stood aside as the NPT was indefinitely extended in return for the lifting of the technology sanctions.

Tensions nevertheless increased after the Indefinite Extension agreement when the US and the West began ratcheting up pressure on New Delhi to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Thus, in 1996, India once again came perilously close to permanently shackling its weapons programme by sacrificing the testing option. Pushed by external powers and prodded internally by the leading lights of the Indian strategic policy enclave—the late K. Subrahmanyam, the late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd.) and Chidambaram, the then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission—the Indian Government inclined towards signing the CTBT.18 Chidambaram’s view that testing was unnecessary, as computer simulation would suffice for fashioning credible warheads/weapons was apparently persuasive. Fortunately, H. D. Deve Gowda, a prime minister with common sense, decided it was a bad idea strategically to hobble the country this way, and nixed the deal.

The contrafactual advocacy of crafting a nuclear arsenal without carrying out any tests disappeared from the public discourse, however, once it became clear that the incoming Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Vajpayee was bent on resuming nuclear tests. The same opinion leaders who had opposed testing, in the aftermath of the 1998 tests, now tom-tommed ‘minimum deterrence’, the need to keep nuclear forces small and to join the international mainstream by giving up testing—ideas subscribed to by the then National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. Thereafter history repeated itself, this time as tragedy. Additional underground tests to obtain fully proven and certifiable fission and fusion weapons of various yield-to-weight ratios and for different and distinct missions would have been the reasonable way to proceed. However, to pacify the US and the West and forestall the inevitable economic-technology squeeze, Vajpayee, like Indira Gandhi before him, shut down the testing option by announcing a ‘voluntary moratorium’. This was despite the initial evidence conveyed to the government by K. Santhanam, director (field tests) at the Pokhran test site, that the staged fusion device had fizzled, and that the country needed to test again.19  India’s show of ‘restraint’ resulted in the ‘strategic dialogue’ between Jaswant Singh and the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP).20 The NSSP paved the way for the 2008 civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the US promoted by the Congress party government of Manmohan Singh as the means to deliver ‘20,000 MW by 2020’ via imported reactors, and predicated on India’s sticking to its moratorium decision. It left the integrity of the country’s nuclear energy programme in tatters, with the surge production capacity of weapon-grade plutonium (WgPu) eliminated, and all but eight of the pressurised heavy water reactors finding themselves in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards net.

More worryingly, the Indian nuclear energy programme was diverted from the plutonium path promising energy sufficiency envisaged by the 1955 three-stage Bhabha Plan based on India’s thorium reserves—estimated as the world’s largest. This Plan emphasising pressurised heavy water reactors, breeder reactors and thorium reactors in the three stages to achieve energy independence was upended. Several downsides of importing low enriched uranium fuel-run reactors were pointed out in the public campaign against the Indo-US nuclear deal. Chief among them: the country would be converted into an energy dependency; its policies would become hostage to US whims and interests; and the in-built dissuader-mechanism of unaffordable economic costs would keep India from testing again. This last drawback was not fully understood, and has to do with Indian tests triggering (1) the cessation of fuel supply, spares and service support, and rendering waste tens of billions of dollars-worth of imported light water reactors; and (2) bringing the industrial zones dependent on this energy to a grinding halt with thousands of megawatts of electricity going off the grid. Such considerations did not apparently figure in the Manmohan Singh government’s decision to accept the nuclear deal.21

The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations meanwhile got stuck in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) on Pakistan’s insistence, unacceptable to every other country, that the current weapon states disclose the size of, and account for, their total fissile material production. Needing rapidly to enlarge its WgPu holdings to merely stay in place in the context of the rapid nuclear force modernisation/augmentation programmes underway in the P-5 states, Islamabad’s obstructionist tactics served, and continue to serve, India’s interests well, especially as Delhi bears no onus for the works being thus gummed up.22 In case Islamabad is coerced into abandoning its opposition to the FMCT, India should don the mantle and ensure this treaty does not get out of the CD.

The above riff on Indian policy indicates that in the nuclear weapons-related policy fields, balancing national security and the cost of opposing the big powers has too often led New Delhi to err on the side of pacifying the US and the rest of the NPT-ordained nuclear order. Rather than steadfastly advancing the country’s nuclear security and national interest, the Indian Government under alternating BJP and Congress party dispensations has sought to avoid confrontation, curtail the country’s latitude for action, and hew to self-imposed restraint on its nuclear weapons-making capability. This when a more assertive stance would serve the country’s strategic interests better by equipping India to face nuclear crises in which megaton weapons give China marked psychological edge.23

Moreover, the P-5 arms control measures only minimally affect their own weapons capability, and are geared to supporting actions and forging legal instruments to restrain adversary states, non-signatory states and threshold states. This record reveals why New Delhi needs to curb its lingering enthusiasm for nuclear non-proliferation, and adopt the position of shadow-boxing around the issue and agreeing on innocuous steps in lieu of genuine progress towards ‘nuclear zero’ while continually upgrading Indian nuclear weapon designs and production facilities, nuclear forces and associated infrastructure. And why the Indian Government ought to restrict the country’s exposure to imported nuclear reactors and recommit to the Bhabha Plan to restore its energy autonomy. In trying to balance the political and economic costs of importing reactors by approving in mid-2017 the construction of 10 indigenous 700 MWe pressurised reactors to nearly double the nuclear energy production, Prime Minister Modi may ensure that the indigenous stream is underfunded because there simply isn’t enough financial capacity to afford both.24 If the Indian Government still needed to be convinced to be, from here on, no part of any non-proliferation or regional arms control campaign, then the self-serving shenanigans of the P-5 at the 2015 RevCon would have provided proof.

The RevCon scene

The five-yearly NPT RevCon in New York, April 27–May 22, 2015, came and went without creating a stir, which about sums up the prospects for meaningful arms control, leave alone disarmament, in the new century. Predictably, the biggest rift at the meet was caused by two issues—the always contentious Article VI of the NPT and Egypt’s insistence on convening a conference to negotiate a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone within a specified time frame but without a prior conference to agree on a consensus agenda.25 The opposition to it by the US, Canada and other countries led for the first time to the absence of a consensus Final Document at the end of the conference.26 It will be a hard act to live down and may in fact be the beginning of the formal unravelling of the NPT regime.27 

In contrast, the so-called ‘Humanitarian Pledge’ submitted by Austria was endorsed by 109 states, supported by another 50 states, and polarised the conference attended by 188 NPT signatory states, as it demanded that the P-5 meet their Article VI obligations.28 The P-5 are unlikely to relent, however, thereby pushing off the prospect of verifiable disarmament to the indeterminate future, but will try and mollify the more technologically capable signatory states by other means, and continue pressing the non-signatory states, such as India, to refrain from testing just so the CTBT does not blow up and the NPT regime does not come tumbling down. In fact, the offline Western disarmament endeavours such as the ‘Canberra Commission’ study propagated just this line of action.29 In its 300-odd pages, it nowhere explains why Ukraine (or Iran, or North Korea or Pakistan) are wrong in believing that possessing nuclear weapons deters military adventures against them.

Weapons state shenanigans

As long as the Islamic State lasted, terrorists as nuclear menace held sway.30 Western nuclear policies began orientating against this presumed threat with missions conceived for precision nuclear weapon strikes to take out Islamic State strongholds and prevent terrorists from capturing and using nuclear devices and credibly mustering ‘dirty bomb’ threats.31 Russia sees value in refurbishing the Russian strategic forces and renewing military rivalry with the US to revive its international standing and status.32 Post-Crimea, the US–Russian tussle has taken a combative turn.33 The two big powers are racing to upgrade their nuclear weaponry under the rubric of disarming themselves, a lead that other nuclear weapons states—China, UK and France—quickly followed. Former US President Barack Obama extolled the world of ‘nuclear zero’ and proposed a decade-long US nuclear modernisation programme costing some $355 billion, and a trillion dollars over the next 30 years. The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), conveniently for the US and Russia, does not require them to actually get rid of any nuclear armaments but only to curb the numbers of missiles deployed on land or sea to 1,550 each by 2018. What the two powers actually decommissioned or destroyed in the past decades were old, unreliable weapons/warheads that for safety reasons would have been phased out anyway. The replacements are advanced warheads, missiles, nuclear submarines, new-generation strategic bombers and even nuclear torpedo. Not to be left behind, China has built up its Second Artillery Strategic Forces to the 250 nuclear weapons/warheads level.34 Further, the leading nuclear powers are fusing their nuclear arsenals with cyber warfare capabilities and unsettling notions of deterrence.35

Nearer home, Pakistan’s 130 nuclear weapons-strong and rapidly growing arsenal has for many years outpaced the Indian holdings of some 110-odd nuclear weapons.36 While New Delhi goes out of its way to downplay the danger from China, Beijing justifies the increase in, and modernisation of, its nuclear forces by referring to India’s supposed strengthening of its strategic wherewithal.37 ‘Supposed’ because all India has done is infrequently fire off Agni-5 missiles that the Indian media insists on mislabelling as an ICBM which, at 5,000 km range, it is not. Moreover, all the test launches of this intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) will not guarantee that the warheads with yields above the 20 KT level, which alone is tested and proven, will work. Short of a resumption of testing, doubts will continue to swirl around the thermonuclear warheads on Indian missiles. In the wake of the 1998 tests, Chidambaram had stated that India would need to conduct more tests within a decade. But in 2008, the Indian Government foreclosed the country’s testing option with the signing of the civilian nuclear cooperation deal.

Elsewhere, the pumped-up great power tensions legitimated the nuclear augmentation drives in Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, while other nuclear capable Asian states pondered nuclear weapons as the answer to their security concerns revolving around a relentlessly abrasive China. With Article IX of its ‘peace Constitution’ amended, a nuclear weaponised Japan may emerge, possibly followed by other Asian states.Taken in totality, the international arms control and disarmament scene today does seem like ‘an outdated charade’.39

The hopelessness of arms control

In the wake of the 2015 NPT RevCon it is hard to see any glimmer of light at the end of the disarmament tunnel. ‘The notion that we can abolish nuclear weapons’, noted the late James Schlesinger, former nuclear strategist and US Secretary of Defense, ‘is like the [1929] Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy … It’s not based upon an understanding of reality.’40 This is the big power view, whence no serious effort can be expected by the P-5 to disarm themselves to convince other states to do the same.

By any reckoning, the balance sheet on nuclear arms reduction is bleak with no real progress on the disarmament front but ample proof of P-5 backsliding. It should induce caution in the Indian policy establishment that is always ready to compromise to please the US in the guise of furthering the cause of a nuclear weapons-free world, which is a foolhardy thing to do.41 Prudence dictates that India emulates the P-5—say what they say, and do as they do. This is the way to vigilantly serve, protect and advance the national interest.

India’s path ahead

In hindsight, other than Nehru’s dual-purpose nuclear energy programme, the best decision the Indian Government made was not to sign the NPT, because that would not just have written finis to India’s self-reliant nuclear energy future but, by keeping nuclear weapons out of India’s hands, also ended India’s great power ambitions. It proves that not being part of the herd, going it alone if need be, is not a bad policy to follow. By the same token, the worst thing the Indian Government has done in the last decade is agree short-sightedly to the 2008 nuclear deal with the US. That this deal has, a decade later, not delivered on its basic promise of affording India ‘the rights and privileges of a nuclear weapons state’ should have given the Modi government pause. Instead, it joined the various technology denial regimes—Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenar Arrangement, and is seeking membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—thereby giving up the residual leverage that would have accrued from retaining the freedom to sell its indigenously developed nuclear and missile technologies outside the ambit of these accords. We know what is coming down the pike—the decision by the Indian Government to buy six units each of the French Areva light water reactor and of the Westinghouse AP 1000 light water reactor, which last the US Nuclear Regulatory Authority has had trouble certifying for safety reasons and will be a high-risk liability. Worse, Indian consumers will end up having to purchase exorbitantly priced energy from these imported reactors.42

The Indian Government should also make it plain it will not ratify the CTBT under any circumstances short of its own weapons inventory achieving a military-certified status, which will not be possible without open-ended testing, and of the P-5 delivering on the NPT Article VI commitments by zeroing out their nuclear arms inventories on a verifiable basis. And it should recommit to the Bhabha Plan, speedily bringing on stream the breeder and thorium reactors along with the 700 MWe PWRs, while skittering away from buying the French and US reactors. In parallel, it should begin exporting indigenously developed technologies in the three fuel cycles—uranium, plutonium and potentially thorium—it has gained proficiency in. It is incomprehensible that the Indian Government, by imputing too great a value to the NSG membership and seeking acclaim for its restraint, has failed to exercise its inherent right and freedom commercially to sell indigenously produced nuclear materials and locally developed technologies, such as the INDU reactors, which the IAEA has recognised as a new, different and more efficient genus of PWRs, to friendly countries of strategic import to India, such as Vietnam. There is nothing barring such transactions except New Delhi’s pusillanimity.

Indeed, an active programme of exports of nuclear goods will more quickly ease India’s entry into the P-5 club on the principle pithily enunciated by the US President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s that it is better to have a nuclear capable country, such as India, ‘in the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in’! All that India’s submissive attitude and pleadings and supplications have fetched it so far is diplomatic manipulation, finger wagging and counsels of patience by the US and other P-5 states. Why the NSG membership on US terms is so prized is unclear. China’s success in this arena points to success emanating from precisely the opposite policy tack, namely ‘bad boy’ proliferant behaviour. By challenging the existing global nuclear order with policies brazenly transferring nuclear material, technology and expertise especially to the so-called ‘rogue states’ (Pakistan, North Korea, Iran), Beijing has obtained the power to calibrate the resulting turbulence and turmoil, setting itself up thus as an inalienable part of both the problem and of the solution. It has gained enormous diplomatic leverage as mediator with North Korea, and has led to China vaulting into the great power ranks.43 On the issue of new tests to obtain safe and reliable thermonuclear weaponry, the Indian Government has since 1998 been paralysed, unable to summon the courage and the political will to resume testing despite China’s aggressive military posturing and the North Korean tests disrupting the international security situation, providing both strategic provocation and political excuse for such an Indian decision. Lacking boldness and gumption, Delhi can do the next best thing: prepare to resume nuclear testing at an instant’s notice because it is only a matter of time before something gives in the growing US–Russia and US–China military stand-offs, with all these parties racing to upgrade and technologically improve the strategic armaments in their employ. Once India resumes testing, it should be on an open-ended basis to reassure the military end-users that the fission and fusion weapons they fire will in fact work as advertised—confidence the Strategic Forces Command presently lacks!

The danger to the country in the arms control field is the Indian Government’s delusional belief that India is some kind of leader on disarmament issues. In any case, what Delhi decides to do or not do will have no great effect other than crippling India’s own strategic deterrent. Hence, it is foolhardy for the Indian Government to assume either a leadership role or be tempted into conceding more and more to prove its ‘responsible state’ credentials, as it has time and again been lured into doing. It does not strategically or diplomatically pay for a nuclear weapons state with, international law-wise indeterminate status, such as India, to take the lead on any arms control or disarmament issue lest, as the record shows, it redound to the country’s disbenefit. Recall that Nehru’s moralising on nuclear weapons in the 1950s was used to pressure India into joining the NPT and, in the case of the nuclear deal with the US, into accepting IAEA safeguards on most of the dual-use capacity.

The Indian Government should also bear in mind that technological developments relevant to its nuclear weapons have irrevocably changed the policy and negotiating baseline for India. Thus, even interim measures such as de-mating warheads and rockets/missiles are now defunct given the ongoing canisterisation of Indian nuclear missile systems, which requires hermetic sealing of ready-to-fire nuclear warheads. Whether anybody likes it or not, with canisterised nuclear weapons India has attained launch-on-warning (LOW) capability, and a secure, invulnerable second strike capability with the autonomously operating Arihant and Arighat SSBNs joining fleet service.44  The Indian Government’s thinking and the Indian nuclear doctrine stressing only retaliation have still to catch up to these developments.

With canisterised Agni missiles, canvassing for a de-alerting agreement and an international No First Use convention would be to set a trap for ourselves. The 2013 Congress Party government initiative in this regard should, therefore, be quickly and quietly buried.45 India’s qualified support for the draft FMCT is equally problematical. For instance, the Indian representative in the Conference on Disarmament stated that ‘without prejudice to the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament, we support the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of an FMCT that meets India’s national security interests’.46 Except, in this construction ‘disarmament’ and ‘national security interests’ undercut each other. It will serve India’s purposes better to issue a statement akin to Pakistan’s—asking only for a global nuclear order that is ‘equitable and non-discriminatory’. Such an anodyne position preserves maximum space to grow and qualitatively improve the Indian nuclear forces, and permits Delhi the freedom to shape the regional and international nuclear orders and agreements to, for a change, suit India’s strategic interests.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.



1. Abby Philip, ‘Trump Trades Insults with “Mad Man” North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un’, The Washington Post, September 22, 2017, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/22/trump-warns-that-madman-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un-will-be-tested/?utm_term=.7eae7908b4cb.

2. Katrina Manson and Bryan Harris, ‘North Korea Threatens Guam after Trump “Fire and Fury” Vow’, Financial Times, August 9, 2017, at https://www.ft.com/content/5564982c-7c6c-11e7-9108-edda0bcbc928.

3. ‘Pakistan Developing New Types of Nuclear Weapons, Warns US Intel Chief’, News18.com, February 14, 2014, at http://www.news18.com/news/india/pakistan-developing-new-types-of-nuclear-weapons-warns-us-intel-chief-1660067.html;Urooj Jawed, ‘Pakistan Has Developed Short-range Nuclear Weapons to Counter India’s “Cold Start” Doctrine: PM Abbasi’, Express Tribune, September 21, 2017, at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1512301/pakistan-developed-short-range-nuclear-weapons-counter-indias-cold-start-doctrine-pm-abbasi/.

4. Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, Second edition, Macmillan, New Delhi, 2005, ch. 3.

5. Bharat Karnad, ‘South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Deterrence Theory’, India Review, 4 (2), 2005, at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14736480500225640.

6. For a detailed analysis of the Beijing-primed rogue nuclear triad of China–Pakistan–North Korea, see Bharat Karnad, ‘Countering the Rogue Nuclear Triad of China, Pakistan, and North Korea’, The Wire, July 25, 2016, at https://thewire.in/53338/countering-the-rogue-nuclear-triad-of-china-pakistan-north-korea/.

7. Bharat Karnad, no. 4, pp. 227–228.

8. Ibid., ch. 2.

9. Michael Barletta, ‘Pernicious Ideas in World Politics: “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions” ’, Monterrey Institute of International Studies, 2001, at http://web.mst.edu/~rogersda/umrcourses/ge342/Miltary%20Geo%20Presentations/Nick%20Nazarko/Swords%20Into%20Plowshares/019013BarlettaMi.pdf.

10. Peter Caterall (ed.), The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years 1950–1957, Pan Books, London, 2003, p. 447.

11. Mani Shankar Aiyar, ‘Failing to Take the Lead’, Indian Express, October 27, 2016, at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/failing-to-take-the-lead-3104485/.

12. Alexei Arbatov, ‘Protecting Nuclear Sanity’, Defense News, June 15, 2015, at www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/06/15/commentary-protecting-nuclear-sanity/71262990/; Alexei Arbatov, An Unnoticed Crisis: The End of History for Nuclear Arms Control?, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, June 2015.

13. Alexei Arbatov, Unnoticed Crisis, no. 12.

14. Bharat Karnad, no. 4, ch. 3.

15. Ibid., pp. 278–331.

16. Ibid., pp. 332–340.

17. Ibid.

18. Bharat Karnad, ‘The Quality of “Expert” Advice’, Seminar, 444, August 1996.

19. See Ajaz Ashraf and Pranay Sharma, ‘The Myth Bomber: An Interview with K. Santhanam’, Outlook, October 9, 2009, at https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-myth-bomber/262027. And, more importantly, for a refutation on the basis of physics by Dr. P.K. Iyengar, former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), who initiated the thermonuclear programme of R. Chidambaram’s and the Department of Atomic Energy’s claims about the ‘success’ of the fusion test (S1) in 1998, see P.K. Iyengar, ‘Non-fissile Doubts’, Outlook, October 26, 2009, at https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/non-fissile-doubts/262331.

20. Ibid., pp. 92, 151. For an account of the Jaswant–Talbott talks, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, And the Bomb, rev. ed., Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2006.

21. P.K. Iyengar, A.N. Prasad, A. Gopalakrishnan and Bharat Karnad, Strategic Sell-out: Indian–US Nuclear Deal, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2009.

22. Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, Praeger Security International, Westport and London, 2008, pp. 93, 133.

23. Bharat Karnad, no. 4.

24. Anil Sasi and Amitabh Sinha, ‘Govt Clears 10 New Nuclear Reactors in Big Power Push’, Indian Express, May 18, 2017, at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/govt-clears-10-new-nuclear-reactors-in-big-power-push-4660869/.

25. Paul R. Pillar, ‘A Missed Nonproliferation Opportunity’, National Interest, June 9, 2015, at http://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/paul-pillar/missed-nonproliferation-opportunity-12967.

26. See Rose Gottemoeller, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, ‘Remarks at the Conclusion of the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference’, United Nations, New York City, May 22, 2015, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/2015/242778.htm.

27. The London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) called the impasse only a ‘midlife crisis’. See ‘NPT Review: Failure Underlines Challenges ahead’, IISS Strategic Comments, 21 (15), June 04, 2015, at https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2015-1f4d/npt-review-failure-underlines-challenges-ahead-2d2e.

28. See Rose Gottemoeller, no. 27.

29. Gareth Evans, Tanya Ogilvie-White and Ramesh Thakur, Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015, Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University, Canberra, 2015, p. ix, at https://cnnd.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cnnd_crawford_anu_edu_au/2015-02/printer_copy.pdf.

30. James Schlesinger warned in 2009 about ‘the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States’. See Melanie Kirkpatrick, ‘Why We Don’t Want a Nuclear-Free World’, Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009, at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124726489588925407; Adam Withnall, ‘Isis’s Dirty Bomb: Jihadists Have Seized Enough Radioactive Material to Build Their First WMD’, Independent, June 10, 2015.

31. The US, British and French governments expressly adduced the terrorist threat as rationale for their nuclear forces. See Bharat Karnad, no. 22, ch. 1.

32. Russia’s National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine and their Implications for the EU, Directorate General for External Policies, Policy Department, European Parliament, February 2017, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578016/EXPO_IDA%282017%29578016_EN.pdf.

33. ‘European War Games: Responses to Russian Military Drills’, Stratfor Worldview, May 5, 2015 at https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/european-war-games-responses-russian-military-drills.

34. John Mecklin, ‘Disarm and Modernize’, Foreign Policy, March/April 2015, pp. 54–59. On the modernisation imperative, see ‘Modernizing Nuclear Arsenals: Whether and How’, Development and Disarmament Round Table, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2015, at http://thebulletin.org/modernizing-nuclear-arsenals-whether-and-how7881.

35. Andrew Futter, ‘The Dangers of Using Cyber Attacks to Counter Nuclear Threats’, Arms Control Today, 46, July/August 2016, at https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_07/Features/The-Dangers-of-Using-Cyberattacks-to-Counter-Nuclear-Threats.

36. Ashley Tellis, ‘China, India, and Pakistan—Growing Capabilities with No End in Sight’, Testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2015, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/25/china-india-and-pakistan-growing-nuclear-capabilities-with-no-end-in-sight.

37. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Annual Report to Congress, Office of Secretary of Defence, US Department of Defence, Washington, DC, April 7, 2015, p. 31 at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf.

38. Bharat Karnad, no. 22, pp. 29–32. For a belated recognition of the emerging ‘nuclear crowd’ nuclear reality, see the recent National Bureau of Asian Research ‘Round Table’—‘Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future’, Asian Policy, 19, January 2015.

39. John Mecklin, no. 34, p. 55.

40. See Melanie Kirkpatrick, no. 30.

41. For a fuller exposition of the argument that disarmament has no future, see Bharat Karnad, ‘Banning Nuclear Weapons: A Hollow Exercise’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 10, 2014; Bharat Karnad, ‘Diagnosis: Tlatelolco-itis’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 25, 2014; Bharat Karnad, ‘Riding the Moral Hobbyhorse’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 15, 2014; ‘Ban the Bomb?’, Development and Disarmament Round Table, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July–August 2014, at http://thebulletin.org/ban-bomb7303.

42. Suhasini Haider, ‘Forging a New Nuclear Deal’, The Hindu, February 3, 2018, at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/forging-a-new-nuclear-deal/article22637628.ece.

43. See Bharat Karnad, no. 6.

44. Sandeep Unnithan, ‘A Peek into India’s Top Secret and Costliest Defence Project, Nuclear Submarines’, India Today, December 10, 2017, at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20171218-india-ballistic-missile-submarine-k-6-submarine-launched-drdo-1102085-2017-12-10.

45. ‘India Ready to Negotiate Global No-First Use treaty’, Economic Times, September 27, 2013; ‘India Ready for Nuclear No-First Use Agreements’, The Times of India, October 22, 2014.

46. Pakistan’s stand articulated in the United Nations General Assembly is for a non-proliferation system realised ‘through policies that are equitable, criteria-based, and non-discriminatory’. Ibid.

Posted in asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Culture, Decision-making, disarmament, domestic politics, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Japan, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Missiles, nonproliferation, North Korea, Northeast Asia, nuclear industry, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, nuclear power, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, russian military, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons, Western militaries | 8 Comments

Sochi for the right reasons

Image result for pics of modi and putin

(Modi and Putin at the Konstantinovsky Palace in St Petersburg)

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the  Black Sea resort town of Sochi May 21 in a “mini summit” sought by Delhi. There are a whole bunch of streams making up the background.

Modi is beginning to realize, in the penultimate year of his term, that all his foreign trips and jaw-jawing with the good and the mighty have produced little, and that his foreign policy achievements cupboard is pretty bare. More specifically, he is realizing how wrong he has been, and that as this analyst has long stressed by way of a reality check, that his US-centered policy is a near disaster. The realization has dawned that (1) he may have keeled over too much to one side and that his America slanted foreign policy according pride of place to the US for whom India is less important than it is for Russia, has curtailed India’s options and freedom of choice, a conclusion reached after seeing that Trump has dumped on precisely the issues that Modi has attached his ego to — H1B visas, increased exports to the US, etc., (2) this over-tilt prompted a strong Russian reaction that India cannot afford  — Moscow cooled off, began backing out of some critical projects (the hypersonic variant of the Brahmos cruise missile, the deal for the second Akula-II SSN, etc) while courting Pakistan, but not so seriously, with talk of arms sales at “friendship prices”, (3) with Washington acting up and India moving into the crosshairs of CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) aimed at Russia but indirectly targeting India owing to its arms supply tie-ups with Russian defence companies, Delhi suddenly finds it needs to renew a strong association with Moscow as leverage against the Trump Administration’s pettiness and bumptious attitude, (4) with the termination of the Iran nuclear deal and Tehran facing growing pressure, India finds itself confronting possible sanctions from yet another end of US policy, which imperils Delhi’s geostrategic design for Afghanistan and Central Asia centered on the Chahbahar port on the Arabian Sea just 70kms up the coast and outflanking the potential Chinese naval presence in Gwadar, whence the sudden appreciation of Russia providing political cover, just in case relations with the US and/or China go south, and finally (5) with Trump out-footsie-ing Modi where Xi Jinping is concerned, the imperative to have Putin and Russia on India’s side against a China that shows no sign of slowing down.

These worries animating Modi’s outreach to Putin also have a domestic context: Modi, Amit Shah & Co., knew well before May 15 that they would have to contend with a hung assembly in Karnataka, and that BJP is on its way to handily losing Rajasthan in April 2019, just a month before the general elections are due, and that despite hard slogging BJP may retain Madhya Pradesh with the greatest difficulty but Chattisgarh more easily. The loss of 2 states after a middling performance in Karnataka in the period preceding the big elections would sour the electoral landscape for Modi and BJP. In other words, just as Modi’s dream of “Congress-mukt” Bharat was becoming a reality, BJP and Modi’s slippage will find a rejuvenated Rahul Congress instead.

This needn’t have been the case had Modi concentrated on his agenda of economic growth and empowerment  that got him victory at the hustings in 2014. So while all the Hindu fringe groups will vote for Modi — because without him  in the PM’s chair, they would not dare unloose mayhem and violence that they are prone to, but lose large chunks of the urban middle class vote for sure besides whatever caste coalitions find themselves in adverse situation.

But that’s water under the bridge and time is nigh to marshal and mobilize the scarce financial resources for development and social welfare programmes to power a last sprint back to the gaddi a year hence. But here’s the rub. It means there are absolutely no additional monies to spare for “defence forces modernization”.

The trick therefore is to find and fund small bore military expenditure programmes — like the Rs 15,000 crore outlay to replenish depleted ammo stocks — to ensure the army in particular can deal with whatever small crises and contingencies may be precipitated on the LOC and LAC by Islamabad and Beijing respectively in the year ahead, and a successful Chinese or worse a Pakistani military operation doesn’t in this intervening time sink Modi’s chances altogether. The result of such inter se prioritization is that the big ticket items are off the table.  Rafale combat aircraft deal with France, for instance, is no go in the foreseeable future and, may be, trashed because Rahul Gandhi and the Congress Party are up for making this the big corruption issue to tie around Modi’s neck in the runup to the 2019 elections which is as I long predicted. This truth is something ACM BS Dhanoa and his cohort at Air Hqrs are beginning to reconcile to. The Navy meanwhile has accepted without demurring the government’s decision that there will be no third indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-3) and hence no American EMALS (electro-magnetic aircraft launch system) that costs the proverbial arm and leg.

This is a stunning denouement to add to Modi’s other political woes, because his nationalist rhetoric and implementation of OROP had created a potentially huge vote base. This has eroded because the discontent in the armed forces due to a pitiful defence budget that cannot be increased because the economy hasn’t grown because Modi didn’t undertake the kind of system transformation of less government, more free market  and entrepreneurship, he promised, will percolate down to the vast military family support and pensioner base in the countryside, and that the blame for this mess too will be laid at  Modi’s door.

Modi has a real huge problem and it may be a bit late, but his foreign policy worries and attached security concerns can still be worked out to an extent but only if he begins to regain for India the balance in its policy as between the US and Russia, Russia and China, and China and the US.

Whether Modi, and his sidekick NSA Ajit Doval, have the strategic nous for managing such an intricate power game is another matter. Their record to-date suggests they don’t.

Posted in arms exports, asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, Asian geopolitics, Central Asia, China, China military, corruption, Decision-making, Defence Industry, domestic politics, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Iran and West Asia, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons | 28 Comments

India’s sub-optimal nuclear weapons capability

Pallava Bagla’s ‘New Frontiers in Science and Development’ video, May 11, 2018

Posted in asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Decision-making, disarmament, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Missiles, nonproliferation, North Korea, Northeast Asia, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons | 19 Comments

India’s nuclear do-nothing policy

Related image

(At the 1998 Pokhran test-site, prime minister Vajpayee, defence minister George Fernandes, head of DRDO Abdul Kalam, and chairman, AEC, R Chidambaram)

The Shakti series of underground tests 20 years ago were the last, stifled, hurrah of the Indian nuclear weapons programme. Stifled because the thermonuclear device tested on May 11, 1998 was a dud, and the last hurrah because the weapons unit at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, thereafter, went into eclipse, its best and brightest abandoning it. After all what scientific and technological challenge is there when there are no advanced fission, fusion and tailored-yield armaments to design and develop? Worse, official Indian thinking on deterrence is contradictory. Mired in minimalism, it has relied on threats of “massive retaliation”. This mandates the use of a large number of nuclear bombs to dissuade Pakistan from nuclear “first use” and, therefore, an extensive nuclear armoury of our own. So, the nuclear deterrent cannot be “minimum”.

The confused nuclear milieu has been obtained by the Indian government under three Prime Ministers – Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra Modi. With the ‘no testing’ pre-condition of the 2008 nuclear deal with the United States in mind, it has decided that, the country’s strategic arsenal is perfectly adequate now and in the future with just the 20 kiloton (KT) weapon/warhead, the only tested and proven weapon in the inventory. Also, under American pressure, the Indian government has put the brakes on the 12,000km-range inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) project and the testing of the indigenous MIRV (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles) technology to launch several warheads from a single missile that’s been available for the last 15 years.

In this period, countries who prize their strategic security accelerated their capability build-up. North Korea shrugged off US pressure, answered American bullying with brinksmanship of its own, successfully tested a two-stage 250-350 KT hydrogen bomb, for good measure acquired the Hwasong ICBMs able to hit US cities, and silenced President Donald Trump. Nearer home, Pakistan, ahead of India with 130 nuclear weapons/warheads and counting, boasts of the most rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. It has four 50MW weapon-grade plutonium (WgPu) producing reactors operating in Khushab. Meanwhile, India has yet to build the second 100MW Dhruva WgPu reactor sanctioned in the mid-Nineties. North Korea and Pakistan are where they are courtesy the active “rogue nuclear triad” run by China which guarantees that Islamabad too will brandish thermonuclear weapons of Chinese provenance.

Delhi eschews anything similarly disruptive (like nuclear missile-arming Vietnam) because Indian leaders are more intent on polishing the country’s reputation as “responsible power” and winning plaudits from the US for showing “restraint” than in advancing national interest. So the country’s strategic options end up being hostage to the interests of foreign powers. India’s do-nothing policy has eroded its relative security, and its stature in Asia and the world as a strategically autonomous and independent-minded country.

India can recover its strategic policy freedom by taking several steps. It should fast forward the second Dhruva military reactor and ICBM development, and test-fire MIRV-ed Agni-5s. In lieu of nuclear testing, which Indian Prime Ministers have lacked the guts to resume, two things need to be done to configure and laboratory-test sophisticated thermonuclear weapons designs. The laser inertial confinement fusion facility at the Centre for Advanced Technology, Indore, needs to be refurbished on a war-footing, and a dual-axis radiographic hydrodynamic test facility constructed.

As regards the software of hard nuclear power, the nuclear doctrine has to be revised – something promised in the Bharatiya Janata Party’s 2014 election manifesto but so far ignored by the Modi regime. Without much ado the newly founded Defence Planning Committee should re-work the doctrine to stress flexible response, with ambiguity enhanced by publicizing the fact of doctrinal revision and the jettisoning of the “No First Use” principle, but nothing else. India will thus join the rest of the nuclear weapons crowd in keeping every aspect of its nuclear policy, doctrine and strategy opaque. There are good reasons why, other than in India, there’s no enthusiasm for nuclear “transparency”.

In keeping, moreover, with the passive-defensive mindset of the government and expressly to throttle aggression by a militarily superior China, technologically simple, easy-to-produce, atomic demolition munitions have to be quickly developed for placement in the Himalayan passes that the Chinese Liberation Army is likely to use, backed by forward-deployed canisterised Agni-5 missiles for launch on warning. The onus for India’s nuclear first use will thus rest entirely with China.


[Published in the Hindustan Times, May 11, 2018; in the net edition entitled “India must revise its nuclear policy and keep its strategy opaque”, at  https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/india-must-revise-its-nuclear-policy-and-keep-its-strategy-opaque/story-MRwcgzYXypIHf1j0V5iUoI.html







Posted in asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Decision-making, disarmament, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Missiles, nonproliferation, North Korea, Northeast Asia, nuclear industry, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan nuclear forces, russian military, SAARC, society, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons, Western militaries | 11 Comments

Craven Indian govt will bow down to Trump’s edict on Iran

Image result for pics of iran president

(Modi and Iran President Hassan Rouhani during the latter’s India visit)

Finance Ministry mandarins have been wringing their hands for a while, wondering just  how to carry on doing business with Tehran in case US President Trump nixed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), aka, nuclear deal with Iran, without getting targeted by America. That shoe has now dropped. Trump did it, he said, because he didn’t care for its “sunset provisions” that would leave Iran “on the verge of a nuclear breakout” and to avoid a “nuclear arms race in the Middle East” and economic sanctions are back on again. The Trump Administration expects that dealing harshly with Iran will also signal to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, whom Trump is scheduled to meet soon, that playing hardball will cost him and his country plenty. Except, unlike Tehran, Pyongyang already has proven thermonuclear weapons and ICBMs to reduce any US city to irradiated ashes, and  that’s a different game altogether where Messrs Trump & Bolton have less play than they assume they have.

But arms races are not scary. Have argued (in my Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security) that nuclear arms racing isn’t all bad and is, in fact, a kind of arms control. Whatever enthusiasm the countries initially start out with soon peters out once the concerned governments come to grip with the outlays demanded by limitless racing, at which point the situation stabilizes. Trump’s trashing the JCPOA may only hasten the initiation of this racing cycle between Israel and Iran.

Except, the European signatories of this deal and close US allies — UK, France and Germany, with China and Russia backing it, fear the costs of the US sanctions on their ongoing economic and trade relations with Iran, and how these would have to be terminated lest their own companies and official agencies come within the American sanctions penumbra. So they have long expressed their aversion to the ditching of this agreement because they point to its preamble wherein Tehran promised to remain non-nuclear even after the formal duration of the deal. Of course, trying to thwart the Trump move, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani threatened “vigorously” to pursue weaponization. It didn’t work.

America’s friends are unhappy because they will now be forced to choose between Washington and Tehran. It is clear that Trump, advised by John Bolton, his NSA, who sees in this action a means of imposing regime change, didn’t care about US allies’ pleas to cease and desist. Because he is convinced that the deal cannot stand once US sanctions are rolled out. And that the Joint Statement issued by Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and Theresa May as reaction stating that “Our governments remain committed to ensuring the agreement is upheld, and will work with all the remaining parties to the deal to ensure this remains the case, including through ensuring the continuing economic benefits to the Iranian people that are linked to the agreement” means nothing.

Rouhani is a moderate hemmed in on the one side by the ‘Pas Daran’ (Revolutionary Guard)-led nationalist group including the militant shia clergy, the conservative population in the rural areas, and is supported by the “bazaari” (small shop owners and traders) interests, who incidentally, crucially provided the financial muscle for the ayotollahcracy in that country, and on the other side by the large and disaffected youth, the middle class, and the intelligentsia who chafe under the restrictive Islamic regime and crave normalization.

The prospects of  the Iran deal staying depends on UK, France and Germany parting ways with the US. This doesn’t seem likely. Once all is said and done they will pay the price of the disrupted economic ties and crawl back into America’s corner. So the Modi government’s hope that India will be able to ride out the sanctions storm by siding with the Brit-French-German combine and doing what they do, won’t work.

That leaves Delhi to consider what Russia and China will do. Russia is already under US sanctions and now finds in Iran a fellow victim with which it can do business to their mutual benefit. One can expect, for instance, that Tehran will begin seriously to buy the most advanced warfighting paraphernalia that will make any serious military threat by Washington difficult to carry out, so Bolton’s option of kicking out the mullahcracy system goes out the window. China, like India, faces a dilemma. It can disregard the American sanctions but only because it can threaten the US with counter economic targeting if Chinese interests are hurt in this sanctions melee, and even with a trade war if Trump wants it. China has enormous economic resources and can so deploy them against America.

What does India do? With his US tilting policy that simultaneously distances India from Russia Modi has tried hard to please Trump, which so far has not prevented Trump from going all out with his moves to close the US as economic bolthole for the Indian middle class — H1B/H-4 visas and chain migration, put imposts on imported Indian steel and aluminium, and then muster the cheek to demand that India sign the remaining two “foundational accords” — CISMOA and BECA, with the former permitting the US formally to penetrate the Indian government and military’s communications net. This was opposed by the Indian armed services but per news reports these accords are on track to be approved by Modi. Other than pushing the old F-16 aircraft for IAF use, Trump has thrown another crumb — sale of Predator drone!

The fact is the fickle US hasn’t responded to Modi’s overtures, and Russia is alienated,  so what could have been a very strong quadrilateral of India, Russia, China and Iran to neutralize the effects of the US sanctions, is unavailable to Delhi. Still, no harm if Modi tries to cobble together such an issue-based coalition. Japanese PM Shinzo Abe has done just such a thing by calling a meeting of Japan, China, and South Korea as, perhaps, a body to pick up the pieces after Trump is done (though the South Korean deputy foreign minister justified it as a runup to making the Jong-un-Trump summit successful).

Consider what the US sanctions are about. The Israeli paper, Haaretz of May 8 explains: “The first batch of sanctions will be …in place in August 2018 [and] include, among others, sanctions on the acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by Iran’s government; sanctions on Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals; sanctions on direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of aluminum, steel, coal and graphite to Iran; and sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector…..The second batch of sanctions will be put back in place by November 2018. These include, among others, sanctions on Iran’s shipping sector; sanctions on Iran’s petroleum exports; sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, and broader sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.” The idea is to economically throttle Iran.

As mentioned, these sanctions would fail if US’ European allies and Russia and China stayed stuck to the JCPOA and frustrated the American sanctions regime. This won’t happen. Though, no doubt, starting tomorrow members of the US policy eco-system in Delhi headed by the Indian chapters of Brookings and Carnegie will begin churning out commentaries and analyses to show why India should stand by Trump, which line will be picked up and embroidered over the weeks by the usual op-ed writers in Indian dailies and talking heads on TV and other electronic media.

The question is this: Is India so bereft of leverage that it has no alternative? I have been pounding on this issue for long — but why doesn’t Modi manipulate access to the Indian market not just against the US  but even China to get what it wants? Trump will have to pause in his blundering ways if he is faced with restrictions on American companies operating in India. And why can’t Delhi have a meaningful exchange — the use of Indian military bases, for example, for advanced military technologies (instead of being fobbed off with predator drones and the like)? And why can’t India go back to using friendship  and intimacy with Russia to lever a more equitable relationship with America?

And this is just the opportunity, moreover, to replace the British, German, and French  companies in their the businesses in Iran, and open up that entire realm of economic possibilities by getting the versatile and capable Indian manufacturing sector to meet Iranian demands and requirements. At a more elevated level, India can be in league with Russia, China, Iran, southern and southeastern Asia, and Central Asian states to form an economic system to rival the one dominated by the US?

And, instead of despairing, Finance Ministry bureaucrats better begin exploring oil payments options routed through the Chinese renminbi or the Russian rouble channels. The promise of this alone will further steel Xi’s and Putin’s intentions to take on the US. These are the sorts of options that need fleshing out, rather than surrendering to the traditional way of conducting business the Western way. In an independent path lies India’s future. Surely, even Modi sees that giving in again and again to Washington is to erode self-respect and to strengthen the Western conviction of India as a country that can be easily pushed around. That’s the reputation Modi’s India is developing. Time we sloughed it off. India is nobody’s plaything, or is it?

Perhaps, Modi should bear in mind the primary lesson of Trump’s disowning the nuclear deal with Iran. It is that the United States is an unreliable partner and that, for very good reasons, India would be well advised to maintain a certain distance with the US and not sign any meaningful accords with it. Becoming too chummy with America can be a liability — never know when it will be thrown under the bus. And Washington can disavow any agreement signed in good faith at any time. Remember Tarapur?

Posted in asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, Asian geopolitics, Central Asia, China, Culture, Decision-making, disarmament, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Iran and West Asia, MEA/foreign policy, Military/military advice, nonproliferation, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons, West Asia, Western militaries | 5 Comments

DPC turning out, as expected, to be yet another bureaucratic pimple

Image result for pics of NSA ajit doval with indian military services chiefs

[PM and Doval]

The worst fears about the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) being yet another bureaucratic contrivance rather than an instrument for centralizing national security and defence decision-making were realized once the outcome of its first meeting became known.

One report talked about the DPC chaired by NSA Ajit Doval with the three armed services chiefs  — Admiral Satish Lanba, General Bipin Rawat, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, defence secretary Sanjay Mitra, expenditure secretary  Ajay Jha, foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale, and Lt Gen Satish Dua heading the Integrated Services HQrs as member-secretary writing up the minutes, surveying the “geostrategic landscape” and deciding to come up with an äction plan. Another reported that the stress was on the military services alighting on a coordinated plan to avoid developing duplication and triplication of capabilities that would be mindful of the financial constraints and keep in view rapidly advancing technologies and the likely nature of the wars of the future. In this context, the navy was asked not to push for the third indigenous aircraft carrier (that NHQ had hoped would have on board the prohibitively costly electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) that the US Navy is finding to be unaffordable.  All present also apparently agreed that the flab needs to be excised. That’s all that has come out in the public realm.

This is all very good, particularly the non-sanctioning of the EMALS carrier that this analyst has long suggested is a criminal waste of money and operationally will reduce the Indian navy’s footprint in the Indian Ocean, because the bulk of the not so very large naval forces will have to be deployed to protect its prized aircraft carriers — which however many ships are tasked as escorts will be unable to do given that the near future heralds the dawn of hypersonic glide weapons speeding to targets at Mach 7+ , superceding supersonic Brahmos-type missiles that had already rendered aircraft carriers obsolete as I have argued in my writings, and extensively in my last book, ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’.

But these are operational aspects of force planning that the DPC, perhaps, will deliberate on, hopefully with an open mind, in the months to come. The basic problem, however, is with the forces that the services HQrs have planned. I have long contended that the Indian armed services, considering their organization and history, are not transformation-minded and, therefore, not transformation-enabled. What they have in mind when talking future war capability is beefing up the force structure in place with modern versions of weapons already in the arsenal. So it is one-for one replacement, which is all that they are catering for as their force planning predicate. This defeats the entire notion of a transformed military based on genuine integration in line function and in terms of support logistics, full-spectrum command, control and communications, and procurement.

Moreover, with robotic, functionally autonomous, weapons now being experimented with in terms of man-machine interface by advanced militaries, and with cyber capabilities integral to the offensive and defensive plans  and generally warfighting, what the DPC should ideally do is design a future force guided by these defining metrics. This will necessitate configuring a singular future force with air, land, and naval elements that are slimmed down, and which will require the military’s “tail” to actually be lot bigger in size than “teeth”. This goes against the grain of the flawed understanding of trending military technology in govt and military circles, which is reflected in the illiterate Indian print and electronic media, and in DPC wanting “lean and mean” military forces. (Talk of banalities!)

Such force redesign is impossible without a military organization with a single head of the armed forces and one-point adviser to govt — Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). CDS is what the Modi government promised before it was elected in 2014. Four years later the country gets the NSA as CDS (as the previous post in this blog argued) and in Doval, a policeman fixated on Pakistan and smaller and weaker neighbouring states, not a strategist with the mental wherewithal for strategic thinking. All you have to do is listen to the speeches he has delivered to-date (and to be found on youtube.com) to know that not a single original idea has ever been uttered by him on national security issues in the flood of banal statements that he has mouthed over the years. Hard to imagine then that overnight he will become a tremendous intellectual defence resource for the country, and hence even less likely he will be able credibly to give imaginative guidance to the services chiefs and MEA, or instruct the defence and expenditure secretaries to fork out the monies (which task — allocation of funds for military planning being beyond his brief as NSA-cum-DPC head).

What he will end up doing is leave it to the military chiefs to draw up plans. Whence, he can be certain there will be no re-orientation of the armed forces from Pakistan to China, and no restructuring of forces to follow in train, involving the rationalizing of the armoured-mech heavy land forces into a single composite armoured-mech corps with materiel and monies thus freed up diverted to raising and forward deployment of three offensive mountain corps for rapid debouching on to the Tibetan plateau for war. This would mean paying only lip service to the “Wuhan consensus” that Modi and Xi agreed on and which the foreign secretary Gokhale is threatening to implement when the trouble is there was no consensus.

Jay Ranade, the Mandarin-speaking former RAW man on China ops, for instance, points out that two very different communiques were issued at the end of the Wuhan Meet. The Indian version mentions “guidelines” issued by the principals to their respective militaries to ensure there’s no Dokla La redux, but the Chinese version, typically, has no such mention. Consequently, while India will put out — as per China friendly MEA’s faulty appreciation of what transpired at Wuhan, Beijing will sit pretty and do nothing other than maintain its agro on the LAC and await the Modi govt, prompted by Gokhale and his ilk to, as usual, do its trademark tail-between-the legs routine!

Meanwhile the defence secretary will again get to play god, and play off the three armed services against each other — because the DPC does not in any way sideline the defence secretary’s role. And the expenditure secretary will report to Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, about the proceedings, allowing him to sit back  and do the normal thing when resources are scarce — fund programmes in drips and drabs to guarantee that India’s military has only limited capabilities for use against, weaker, smaller adjoining states, if that, leaving national security no better off after the DPC than it was before its founding. This is the reason why I had warned that the DPC will amount to nothing more than yet another bureaucratic layer gumming up the works, another bureaucratic pimple on the already pock-marked face of the Indian state.


Posted in asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, China military, civil-military relations, Cyber & Space, Decision-making, domestic politics, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Missiles, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Pakistan military, society, South Asia, United States, US., Weapons, Western militaries | 23 Comments

DPC: Doval’s Aggrandizing move?

Image result for pics of ajit doval and k. jaishankar with modi

(Jaishankar, Doval and the PM)

The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) as the apex institution to deal with national security was in the works for awhile with Modi’s original plan of splitting the NSA responsibilities between the external and internal and retaining the retired Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar for the external role, and Doval continuing with what he knows best as a police service veteran — intel and domestic security, being pushed out of contention by the man in place.  Doval succeeded in convincing the Prime Minister over time that such a move would be detrimental to national interest. Jaishankar’s retirement was the time Doval used to ensure the erstwhile FS did not get back in, whence the formation of DPC to function in effect as National Security Council (NSC) which, incidentally, has met just once or twice so far during Modi’s tenure, but with the three armed services chiefs as members.

Ideally, Doval would have wanted to be to Modi what Brajesh Mishra was to Atal Bihari Vajpayee — the person actually running the government. Except Modi is not the retiring, Scotch-loving, Vajpayee and Doval doesn’t have the personal relations with Modi that Mishra had with Vajpayee. Where Mishra could begin issuing directives, orders and instructions from  7, Race Course Road ere the clock struck eight (most evenings), Doval, as he told a Manmohan Singh-era senior official, only awaits “decisions by the boss” so that he can implement them. Doval knows his place in the Modi universe as someone who takes orders, not gives them. Were he to begin to act like Mishra did, Doval would be (1) ignored by people like the Additional Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, PK Mishra, who personally are far closer to Modi, and (2) out on his ears.

So, the new fangled DPC was a means of getting Jaishankar out of the picture, fobbing him off with the waiver of the one-year “cooling off” rule so he can join the Tata’s as head of “global operations”. According to Sanjay Ahluwalia, ex-IAS, writing his eminently readable newspaper column, this job will fetch Jaishankar a cool six crore rupees yearly. Jaishankar’s attributes meld well with Tata’s corporate plans, for instance, its decision to be the “strategic partner” to Lockheed Martin to produce the 1960s vintage F-16 in India — which project will require’s Jaishankar’s fervent pleadings with Modi to be realized. Who is to say that, in line with the Indian government’s penchant generally to give away a lot in return for little and Modi’s own leanings, Jaishankar won’t succeed?

It is a win-win arrangement for Modi as well, who mostly prized Jaishankar for his America connections, and now feels that he will be able to complement the BJP regime’s push of a US tilted foreign policy through private sector channels. Setting India up as Washington’s poodle the PM believes is the big foreign policy achievement he can go to the people with, come the next general elections.  On this front, as in much else, he may have miscalculated because his policy of appeasing Washington has not worked a bit. Far from relenting, Trump has particularly targeted India — after all when does a punching back punch back? — as a prime subject for his bullying tactics. So no give whatsoever on the H1B/H-4 visa issues, on trade, or on transfer of advanced tech — military and civilian, and threat of sanctions via CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanction Act) for buying arms from Russia. And when elections come around he will be hard put to indicate which among his many slogan-promises he has fulfilled, or to pacify an upset middle class who, other than the emergence of an illiberal state within, find their America dream (for their IIT and IIM-trained progeny) vaporizing without.

But, coming back to Doval’s nifty bureaucratic maneuver, what will DPC do exactly? And how? DPC would have had teeth had Doval also managed to get Modi to simply eliminate a whole bunch of agencies and organizations in the national security loop, entities like the Defence Acquisitions Council. But to centralize national security decision-making and render it more effective and efficient was never the intention behind establishing the DPC. All DPC does is add another layer to an already multi-layered heavy national security decision making apparatus of state, and will not do much, other than aggrandize Doval’s personal authority and power at the sub-PM level, assuming Modi allows any of it, other than as a bureaucratic contrivance to keep his NSA busy. For Doval it is yet another excuse for things not working, and for the boss’ decisions not getting implemented. So while aggrandizing bureaucratic turf he has distanced himself even more from accountability. Fancy babu footwork!

There may also be a still more intimate reason why Doval desires to be headman of DPC — it will enable him to lord it over the military chiefs. This is important because — and what a delicious insight from a former armyman, Colonel Ali Ahmed (Retd.), a Maratha  officer like his father Lieutenant General Mohammad Zaki (Retd) of 19 Maratha Light Infantry —   who speculates that Doval as a matriculate from the Ajmer Military School (formerly King George’s Military School), having failed or, perhaps, having never tried to enter the National Defence Academy as many graduating from KG Schools did, now sees a chance to play Commander-in-Chief, India! See Çol. Ahmed’s “A policewallah as proto chief of defence staff”, The Citizen, April 26, 2018, at http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/13644/A-Policewallah-As-Proto-Chief-of-Defence-Staff

[I should know — I passed out of King George’s, Belgaum, in December 1963 possibly around the same time Doval  got out of KGS, Ajmer, and what a yearning there is deep down for things military that one’s cohort was part of and one has missed out on.]

There may, however, be a bigger Constitutional problem with the Defence Planning Committee, which’s pointed out by the reputed Mumbai lawyer, Niloufer Bhagwat. She wonders if  the “National Security Advisory Board has any Statutory authority?  That  is [whether] this Advisory Board   is embedded in Law / Constitution or is it a creation [by] Executive Fiat , as this has Constitutional implications as such a body cannot overrule STATUTORY or CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES and cannot overrule the service chiefs or preside over any committee of the Armed Forces even of junior officers as the Armed Forces are bound by the Statute and the Constitution.  This is an important question which has arisen from the [establishment] of the Defense Planning Committee and has Constitutional Law and Administrative Law implications.”

Apparently, when Messrs Modi & Doval were creating the DPC they were not paying attention to Constitutional proprieties. I mean, did the DPC proposal pass muster with  the Ministry of Law and Justice under Ravi Shankar Prasad? Depending on who wants to take the Modi govt to court on this issue, the DPC may be racing towards a legal limbo.

Posted in asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Culture, Decision-making, Defence Industry, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Politics, Intelligence, Internal Security, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, SAARC, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons | 18 Comments