Don’t talk Charlie Browne, act!

COAS and chairman, chiefs of staff committee, ACM “Charlie” Browne, for no reason that makes sense, thundered that stronger actions may be resorted to to maintain the sanctity of the ceasefire. For god’s sake, if the military or GOI mean to do something by way of hard retaliation for the mutilation of the bodies of Indian soldiers, please, please, please don’t talk about it. Just do it! But Indians indulge in big talk — it is free!, but don’t follow up with action, as the US does. Act first and don’t talk at all, should be India’s motto — that is what true karm yogis, such as the Israelis do. If as I mentioned in my preceding blog, it is army’s issue to avenge Pakistani misdeeds — well, why are the Special Forces not doing anything? There better be something brewing at the SF-end.  And someone needs to quiet the terrorist loudmouth, Hafiz Saeed.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, India's Pakistan Policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Terrorism | 4 Comments

Pakistan army’s penchant for mutilation and how to deal with it

It is either a serious breach of discipline, or it is implementation of a considered policy by the Pakistan army High Command. In either case, it reflects poorly on the Pakistan Army that, until Partition in 1947, was part of the Indian Army that has exalted personal ‘honour’ above all other virtues. It seems to be a deliberate policy because there’s a discernible pattern to the beheadings, the gouging out of eyes, the cutting off of genitals dating from the Kargil skirmish, which evidenced the extreme brutality visited upon Captain Kalia, by the Northern Light Infantry intruders, revealing a regression to primitive warfare.  In the latest incident in the Sona Gali area of Poonch, variously the 22 Baloch, the 29 Baloch, and the Special Service Group commando, have been held responsible for the barbarity. (There is even talk of the terrorist LeT being part of the raiding party working under Pakistan Army aegis that actually committed the atrocity, though this story seems to be a belated Pakistani attempt to distance the army from this heinous act.) That several different regiments are talked of as having engaged in such inhumane practices suggests that a policy of mutilation was carried out by Pakistan Army soldiers  under orders. May be, the Pakistan Army action was in retaliation for one of its jawans killed in the Uri sector two days previous. But that does not justify the post-death horrors inflicted on the bodies of the slain Indian troopeers.

Islamabad certainly jumped on the opportunity to get the UN involved in a Kasmir-related issue, setting a trap by getting India to agree to the UN Military Obesrver Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)  investigating and judging the veracity of what Pakistan claims are mere allegations of mutilation. Fortunately, GOI did not fall for this ruse. India has paid a heavy price for involving the UN in 1948 when it could easily have taken back all of J&K, including the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) under Pakistni occupation, but Nehru sought UN intervention instead in the expectation of a fair verdict requiring Pakistan to vacate all the areas previously part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K that had acceded to the Indian Union. That didn’t happen, and India has been discommoded ever since.

That leaves the Indian Army to mete out condign punishment in any manner it chooses below the bilateral relations-diplomatic radar. This the Indian Army, hopefully, will do. After all, what is the Special Forces commando, penny-packeted as force reserve with the GOC-in-C, Northern Command meant for other than to mount, among other things,  severe punitive missions on such occasions? Meanwhile, Indian TV comperes frothing at the mouth should wipe the foam of their lips, calm down, and the GOI get back to the normalization talks. This is an issue between the armies — a bit of intra-mural blood sport the two forces have been indulging in since the Line of Control came into being in J&K. The Indian Army will do whatever it has in mind to do, in its own time, to exact a heavy enough cost on its Pakistani counterpart for the latter to rethink its policy of excess.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, India's Pakistan Policy, Indian Army, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Special Forces, Terrorism | 16 Comments

No Churning on China

No churning on China

Situation awareness is a prime tactical, operational and strategic level military attribute and also, one assumes, a quality equally prized by politicians who need to be sensitive about every fold in an unravelling situation. In the military sphere, situation awareness has hardware and software components. Sensors of all kinds on land, sea and air-borne platforms and satellites, such as radars, infra-red and high resolution photo-imagery, etc. comprise the hardware. Common sense accounts for the basic software and demands nothing more than an awareness of the world around us. The year 2012 ended with evidence of the different levels of this awareness at which the Indian government and the individual armed services find themselves.

But first let’s set the context. In 2009, the defence minister issued an operational directive to the three services headquarters stating, reasonably, that China was the country’s main security threat. The directive thus issued required the military to now wheel their big guns, ships and aircraft China-ward. Three years on this hasn’t happened. The Army and the Air Force continue to concentrate their effort on the Western border; the Navy likewise, but less conspicuously, justifies its “North Arabian Sea” tilt, except it now touts piracy as an operational consideration. In effect, the Indian military’s effort and capabilities are majorly tuned to dealing with the inconvenience posed by Pakistan, which in reality is more a nuisance than a genuine military threat. (True, a militarily inferior adversary can effectively utilise terrorism, but to squash a pestiferous fly an elephant gun may be inappropriate, given the potential collateral damage, when a rolled-up newspaper — targeted intelligence operations — may serve the purpose better.) It means that the military is willfully ignoring a straightforward order from the government perhaps because it finds it hard to tear away from the rationale that the Pakistan threat provides for the plains warfare-heavy weapons profile — in particular, vast armoured and mechanised formations and an inventory full of short-legged and medium-range aircraft — of the services. But also because when the armed forces look around, they see a government that, far from walking the talk, seeks desperately to placate Beijing, striving at every turn to remove from the official Chinese mind even smidgeons of doubt about New Delhi’s “peaceful” intentions. Zhongnanhai (the complex of building in central Beijing housing the Chinese policy establishment) has only to raise its eyebrow for the Indian government to fall to its knees, ready to kowtow to China.

But reality has to be faced and, much as everybody would like to keep bashing the Pakistanis, there’s China to be reckoned with. Rapidly enlarging itself, its political role, its military capabilities, its presence in the extended areas far from its home shores, China now demands attention. The question is not whether or not to appease China because India’s record in the last few years is damning enough. Going back in history, reacting to the first calls by Hitler for amalgamation of Czech Sudentenland into Germany — a brazen grab at lebensraum (territorial space for the natural expansion of a vigorous nation) — was deemed prudent politics in the mid-1930s but tipped over into unacceptable appeasement at Munich in 1939 by Neville Chamberlain, who promised “peace in our time”. Nobody now contends that Munich was anything else than abject surrender. Historical parallels are often loosely discerned, but the similarities between the Sudentenland crisis and the Chinese claims on almost all of the free seas off the southern Chinese coast, a pitch for a maritime lebensraum no less, cannot be missed. The best spin one can put on New Delhi’s China policy is that the Congress Party is too scared to spell out India’s strategic stakes, and too blinded by its desire to buy time with an authoritarian-state capitalist system in Beijing to consider the costs of doing so.

It is in this setting that the year-ending incident involving the two service Chiefs makes for stark evidence of appeasement at work. Naval Chief Adm. D.K. Joshi’s warning that any attempt by Chinese vessels to board Indian warships would be thwarted with counter-actions that the Indian Navy has been practising was instantly negated by New Delhi attempting to first compel Adm. Joshi to backtrack, failing which for national security adviser Shivshankar Menon, in Beijing at the time, to emphasise cravenly the need to respect Chinese “sensitivities” and to issue a curious statement saying Adm. Joshi was “misled” by the press. Predictably, the ministry of external affairs piled on, urging “restraint” on the Indian military. The Army Chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, then stepped in helpfully with the kind of statement the government presumably welcomes. Disregarding geostrategics and the 450-odd trans-border military “incidents” that took place on the disputed India-China border last year, he pronounced Sino-Indian relations to be “absolutely perfect”, thereby revealing the senior service’s alarming lack of situation awareness. Gen. Singh seemingly bought into the government line, which is content with pointing faintly at the foe but not keen for the armed services to follow up with appropriate measures, like taking their main bearings from a manifestly more dangerous and challenging enemy, China, and moving away from the near-idiotic military preoccupation with Pakistan, an idée fixe that has over the years reduced the regional and international reputation and standing of the Indian armed forces.

Governments come and go, but the great Indian military is the nation’s constant guardian and in lieu of a strategic mindset of the government, it is the armed forces that need to develop one and order their priorities accordingly. Because when push comes to shove with China, the Indian politicians and bureaucrats will not be there to take the blame.

[Published January 4, 2013 in the Asian Age at www.asianage.com/columnists/no-churning-china-401 and in the Deccan Chronicle at www.deccanchronicle.com/130104/columnists/commentary/no-churning-china ]

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Cyber & Space, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East | 19 Comments

Chandigarh Meet downloads

The Seminar organizers are having some difficulty uploading viodeo on YouTube and have given the sites below for the feeds for those interested.

Part One  http://www.adrive.com/public/ET74vh/IndiaChinaNov2012A.mpg

Part Four http://www.adrive.com/public/DYR7g7/IndiaChinaNov2012D.mpg

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia | 5 Comments

Chandigarh Meet — Malik, Karnad, Tipnis, Madhav

For those interested in a video, I believe,  (or, it may just be audio) record — the first part — of the Nov 25, 2012 Seminar hosted by the Centre for Strategy and Security, Chandigarh, on ‘Ïndia and China:  Five decades after the 1962 Sino-Indian War’ featuring General Ved Malik, Air Chief Marshal Anil Tipnis, Bharat Karnad, and Ram Madhav available at www.adrive.com/public/BESTeB/IndiaChinaNov2012A

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia | 1 Comment

India’s daily billions

Admiral Fasih Bokhari, former CNS, Pakistan Navy, and Chairman of the country’s National Accountability Board, is set to release a report December 14 that’s expected to reveal that Rs 6-7 BILLION rupees are DAILY lost in corruption — bribes, payoffs, commissions, etc.  Supposedly astounded by this figure the Pak cabinet lost no time in rejecting the report. That’s not however going to make reality go away.

Now do the arithmetic: If India’s economy is eight times as large as Pakistan’s, and our politicians, bureaucrats and every agent of government –from the beat constable to the water-metre wallah – right up to cabinet ministers, and political party heads are no less larcenous, venal, corrupt, and having a hand in your pocket rifling for change, a simple extrapolation would mean Rs. 48-56 BILLION being lost to the economy EVERY DAY! (the fact that the Pakistani rupee is roughly only half as strong as its Indian counterpart  is of little account in indicating the scale of corruption.) It is the result of the minders of the state turning predators. The people of South Asia need the greatest good luck to survive the systems of misgovernance they have created!

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, South Asia | Leave a comment

Tu-22 M3M line for China, Admiral Joshi, General Bikram

Holidaying from blogging for the month of December, except three things steamed me up, enough any way for me to write this.

1) A knowledgeable friend called to say China had bought off the entire production line of the  Tu-22M3M — the latest variant of of the ‘Backfire’ strategic bomber from Russia for $1.5 billion, just $500 million more, as he reminded me, than what India will be paying to acquire the Pilatus propeller-driven trainer aircraft from Switzerland. This little snippet for anybody who doubts that India is getting things strategically so horribly wrong!!

2) One can’t but admire CNS, Admiral DK Joshi, for standing his ground and not backing down when NSA Shivshankar Menon called him out on his forthright statement to the press that the navy had practised actions to thwart the Chinese Navy acting as if South China Sea was China’s sea and boarding Indian warships plying those waters on duty protecting Indian energy assets owned jointly with PetroVietnam, and that the navy would carry out those actions if bothered in any way.  This when NSA was playing the usual Indian sap talking of how such statements hurt “Chinese sensibilities”. Boo-hoo!! No doubt the Admiral was pressured to retract his statement or at least to say what he had said was distorted by the media — which he didn’t do but which was Menon’s position in Beijing that the Press had “misled” the Naval chief, as if Joshi is some babe-in-the-woods. MEA, followed up by wagging a school-marmish finger urging the military to show more restraint!  And the NSA and MEA are tasked to protect Indian national interest?!!!

3) In contrast to the CNS there was the army chied, General Bikram Singh, around the same time exulting about India-China relations being “absolutely perfect”. OH!!! May be the rest of us are missing out on a crazily unobvious development! It seems he was trying to compensate for Joshi’s straight talk with the normal mealy-mouthedness  expected of military-men. What’s with Bikram Singh? Was he punch-drunk when he said it? Or, distanced from reality? Or, most likely embellishing an MEA script given him to read? In the event, one wonders if Bikram Singh remains the Public Relations colonel at heart that he was during the Kargil border conflict?

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, India's China Policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Military Acquisitions, South Asia | 30 Comments

Gujral, last of the wagah candle-lighters

Inder Gujral’s demise removes the last of the stalwarts of the 70s-80s era. He was an accidental prime minister — being there at the right time, the right moment, for the concatenation of political forces to hoist him on to the gaddi. His ‘Gujral Doctrine’ was inspired more by sentiment — he was born in Gujerat, in northwestern Punjab, and hence was received in Pakistan always as a returning son — rather than by realpolitik. Realpolitik considerations, I have always argued, are better basis for strong relations with Pakistan. If you cut out sentimentaility, the picture is less clouded by personal experiences and emotional pull. The means Gujral suggested actually are the very things that can work — having asymmetrical trade and commercial relations with all neighbours including Pakistan will immediately give the states in the near-abroad a stake in India’s wellbeing and future, and vice-versa — as I have argued in all my books. But, vis a vis Pakistan there’s a need to address that country’s insecurity on its terms. This will essentially require denaturing the Indian army’s strike corps element by recomposing it as I have suggested in my writings the armoured and mechanized forces and the three strike corps establishment — and using the manpower and financial component thus freed up to raise, eventually, three offensive strike corps for the mountains against China, and by taking such measures as removing the liquid-fueled Prithvi missiles from their forward-deployed stance (which would neither compromise nor weaken Indian security, because India has the 700km Agni-1 to cover Pakistan). This is the hard kernel of rapprochement with Pakistan. Whether Gujral appreciated this military aspect or not, is unclear to me despite my having talked with him a number of times. It is, however, fair to say as a short-term PM of a ragtag coalition regime he lacked the political punch to implement such a military policy. Hence, his Doctrine was toothless and achieved little, as I rfemember writing at the time.

But as a person, he was delightful. Indeed, the first time I interacted with him in any meaningful way was in December 1982 when he, K. Subrahmanyam, and I were invited by the Pakistan Govt to partake of än event billed as the ‘First International Conference on Peace and Security in South Asia’ under the aegis of the then recently founded Institute for Strategic Studies, Islamabad,  run by Brigadier Noor Hussain.  Subbu was the ‘clever Tamil brahmin’ the mainly military and foreign office audience were wary of — their apprehension turning into anger as Subbu lampooned their pretensions as a ‘martial race’. I was the young, smart-alecky type invited, presumably, because of my views about how to deal with Pakistan that differed from that of the Indian establishment (which difference in views still persists). But it was Gujral who was the centre of attention, always surrounded, engulfed in waves of West Punjabi warmth, speaking thir lingo, joking, pumping hands, and backslapping his way through the two-day affair.  He was the last of the Wagah candle-lighters — in spirit, for sure — in the political class.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, India's Pakistan Policy, Indian Army, Indian Politics, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia | 13 Comments

More on Tipnis

Sorry, should have mentioned in my previous post something specific that ACM Tipnis mentioned to elaborate on the correct procedure which he stressed.  He said the request to the IAF was communicated through Vice Chief of the Army Staff, who was officiating Chief with Malik on a foreign trip to Poland. Tipnis asked VCOAS to ‘sign off’ on the army request for AF intervention, the army Vice Chief demurred on the first occasion, and again the second time around they met. The hint here was that the VCOAS was in touch with Malik, still in Warsaw or where ever, but the army was sensitive about seen to be asking for IAF help, perhaps, because of the stand taken by the incompetent Kishen Pal, 15 Corps cmdr, who insisted his forces alone would be able to clear out the enemy encroachment, little realizing the extent, size and quality of Pakistani intrusion. This still doesn’t explain, leave alone excuse, Tipnis’ insistence on the procedural/bureaucratic correctness of wanting the army to sign off, etc.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, India's Pakistan Policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Pakistan, Pakistan military | 2 Comments

Tipnis seeking exoneration

Last Sunday (Nov 25) at a seminar called by the Centre for Security & Strategy in Chandigarh, was on the panel alongwith ACM(ret) Anil Tipnis, Gen. (ret) Ved Malik discussing China and how to deal with it. Except Tipnis used the occasion to correct the misperceptions of IAF’s role in Kargil in 1999 that, he believes, have marred both his and the Service’s reputation. The non-response by IAF when called on by the army for attack helicopter support has been the subject of much speculation, all redounding to the disbenefit of the air force’s unwillingness to go into action. I am not fully conversant with the details of the “rules of business” that the armed services are supposed to follow in a situation where one service finds itself in a jam — with the completely wrong assessment and inept handling of the situation by Lt Gen Kishen Pal, GOC 15 Corps once the intrusion was detected — by grazers, not the army field intelligence, and finds a sister service  reluctant to rush to its rescue. Tipnis made much of the fact that some parts of the Kargil report were blacked out, censored, before it was published — which he claimed was the crucial evidence the public didn’t get to see exonerating him of the charge of command failure or at least failure of nerve. He cited various rules, etc. but the thrust of his remarks was that as  IAF chief he needed an express directive/permission from the government to enter in support of army operations to evict the Pak Northern Light Infantry from the heights. Much of what Tipnis said and the way he said it was to goad the then army chief, Malik, to respond. The General refused to rise to Tipnis’ occasion because as Malik said to me, sotto voce, as the ACM was walking to the lectern — ”Oh, there he goes again” or exasperated words to that effect, which suggests such interaction had happened earlier. There was, of course, a distinct cold-correctness between Tipnis and Malik, reflecting the strained relations between them and their respective services during the Kargil crisis. It still leaves the main question unanawered — should Tipnis have not responded thus: Will asses the situation pronto and get back to you on what actions the IAF proposes to take to assist the army ops, rather than talk bureaucratese about directives, etc.?

Posted in Asian geopolitics, India's Pakistan Policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Pakistan, Pakistan military | 2 Comments