Only 40-50 Rafales will be bought, if at all; rest MRFA Su-57E

[Ceremonial welcome for Modi in Nice, France]

Earlier today, the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the French President Emannuel Macron in Nice in southern France did not result in the usual giveaway deal — a characteristic of Indian foreign policy in the new millennium. That there was no mention of Delhi plonking $43 billion for the useless Rafale, came as a relief.

May be, Modi finally understands that using arms buys as a foreign policy means of winning small consideration from the US and states in Europe, exacts really high costs, beggars the country, and in no way helps India technologically in any meaningful way.

But old habits of mind die hard and Rafale may still be bought but not in the numbers the IAF wishes. Indeed, it seems the advice from the highest levels of the joint military was heeded by the PM, and it is that if Rafale must be bought then only 40-60 more of the 4.5 generation Rafale combat aircraft — the same generation as the indigenous Tejas, be purchased. The argument ostensibly made was that if the full complement of 114 aircraft is obtained from Dassault, it’d mean dividing the cost between buying the platform and buying exorbitantly priced weapons such as the Meteor air-to-air missile, each of which costs Rs 60 crore! A fully loaded Rafale’d cost a head-turning Rs 1,000 crores!!! And given the Indian Air Force’s dubious record to-date of losing aircraft on the very first day of any operation, several thounds of crores of rupees could be lost in the first half hour of any conflict. It’d appear a case made this way is not easy to refute. How many Rafale will actually be bought depends on whether France relents on “source codes”, which are software instructions for the design know why. In the case, of the avionics suite, for instance, the source codes are contained in the Interface Control Document (ICD).

The reason Delhi has stiffened its stance and is pushing Paris on this issue is because two other offers are on the table — Russia’s complete with tech-transfer, including source codes, for its 5th generation fighter — Su-57E, and Sweden’s for its Saab 4.5 gen Gripen E. The Gripen is being peddled as a cost-effective and cost-efficient alternative and, in utility terms, as falling somewhere between the Rafale and the Tejas. Indeed, the differences in the figures provided by Saab regarding the comparative unit price and the operating cost are staggering. According to the Swedes, a single Gripen may cost anything from $85 million to $140 million compared to $300 million for a Rafale, and while the Gripen costs between $4,000-$10,000 per hour to operate, the counterpart expenditure for Rafale is $14,000 per hour! Do your arithmetic and you find the lifetime cost of having Rafales in the fleet, could well send the country into the poor house.

Not sure what the operating cost of the Su-57 is, but it is nowhere near Rafale’s. Besides, India can purchase as many as three Sukhoi-57 multi-role fighters for the price of one Rafale. But none of these foreign aircraft can beat the Tejas on any metric were its production to be scaled up and, as recommended by this analyst over some 15 years now, the private sector given a parallel contract for its production to rival the one given the defence public sector unit, the hopeless HAL, which can’t produce a thing on time or at cost.

Combat aircraft are pricey items and, in this age of drones, an unaffordable luxury. But the Indian government which is otherwise fiscally responsible, apparently gets into a brain freeze when confronted by the hardware demands of the IAF in particular — or why else would it approve previous payouts for Rafale?

Here’s the secret why, gleaned after soundings at the highest levels of the military. Modi believes France and Israel are the countries India should tap for military goods, that this will help “diversify” the sources of military supply, and as alternative to the US and Russia. In our system, what the PM wants the country gets, even if it is manifestly the worst option!

And further, it also matters what Modi’s two ministers with some say in such purchases believe. The Defence Minister Rajnath Singh is the “old time politician” who thinks Russia is a reliable supplier and the country should stay with it. Hence, we have the Su-57 that is in the running. And external affairs minister S. Jaishankar — surprise! surprise! pleading for US-sourced stuff — the F-35 (?) and for endless buys of P-8Is, and the C-130Js and C-17s transporters.

Then there’s the fact of Rajnath Singh beginning to command respect in the military also for his siding with and supporting the armed services in their endless tussles with the Defence Ministry bureaucrats. No small thing! A senior officer reflecting the prevailing sentiment, said this: Rajnath may not be a Parrikar, but he has our back. The late Manohar Parrikar, an IIT engineer with a problem-solving mindset and forensic skills in evaluating comparative offers of expensive foreign armaments leaned, incidentally, towards augmenting the numbers of the Su-30MKI (that I had advocated and still do) rather than going in for the Rafale. Parrikar was by far the best defence minister India has had and, for his cost-saving efforts, was shifted back to Goa as chief minister!

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About Bharat Karnad

Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, he was Member of the (1st) National Security Advisory Board and the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and author, among other books of, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy', 'India's Nuclear Policy' and most recently, 'Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)'. Educated at the University of California (undergrad and grad), he was Visiting Scholar at Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
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