[Rafale]
The Indian Air Force is the most luckless airforce in the world and its leadership is to blame for it. Once marked out as the leading force of an “Icarian India” with its span stretching from the Maghreb to Australasia, it is now reduced to something that is repeatedly beaten by so puny a thing as the Pakistan Air Force. What a fall! To pretend the IAF can take on the PLA Air Force, is to dream! But dream on!
In a pattern of longstanding, the IAF has been led by persons apparently determined to steer the force into the ground, much like the hot-dogging pilot with deficient flying skills, who destroyed the export potential of the Tejas by flying the plane into the desert sands at the UAE airshow a few months back.
It is nevertheless a mystery — the kind of hook Paris has into the Indian government. It is as if the Quai d’Orsay can make the Modi regime, the latest in the line, to do virtually anything it wants it to do. Forget about how French defence companies keep tabs, nurture support for the wares they peddle by courting promising military officers, Wing Commander level up, with all kinds of comfy attention, and by conducting lavishly hosted trips to Paris with all its allurements for the flagrank, and even media persons. And one hears too tid-bits of information pertaining to monies diverted into accounts of the ruling party of the day. But these are secondary factors. The real reason for France’s success lies elsewhere — in its promises relating to nuclear technology that it does not intend to ever deliver on, but means to use to successfully string India along. Our Prime Ministers, who are as inncocent of any technical knowledge as their generalist civil servants they rely on for advise, are seduced by such promises.
At the top are the twin nuclear promises relating to the transfer of miniature nuclear reactor technology to power submarines and aircraft carriers, and to provide Indian nuclear scientists access to the French Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) chamber — the Laser Megajoule facility near Bordeaux. The ICF creates extraordinarily high temperatures by firing lasers at nuggets of fusion fuel to create miniature thermonuclear explosions that help refine Hydrogen Bomb designs, something sorely needed because the Indian thermonuclear device tested in 1998 was a dud. What with the late, little lamented, Dr R Chidambaram, the greatest disaster to befall the nation’s nuclear weapons project, singlehandedly ensuring the capping of the Indian arsenal at the low yield fission level with his argument that India needed no additional testing beyond the 1998 tests, and then seeing to it that the small ICF facility in Indore was run into a state of such disrepair as to render it non-functional.
Hence, the importance of the French carrots dangled before the donkey of an Indian government that made Delhi successively buy the Mirage 2000, the scorpene diesel submarine, and now the Rafale — all incredibly wasteful deals that because of time and cost overruns have ended up costing the exchequer a third more than their original price tags of tens of billions of dollars — totaling hundreds of billions of dollars, and all because the Indian government never applied its mind, because it has no mind to apply.
The IAF’s procurement priorities are realised, aided and abetted by the apparatus of state that does not know its arm from its elbow where air warfare or any other military or mil-tech issue is concerned, and relies on advice from the very source — the Chief of the Air Staff who, personally, has the most to gain from it. Isn’t there a conflict of interest here? I am referring strictly to the metric the military services informally use to evaluate their chief of the day — whether he acquires for the service a prized foreign fighter plane, an aircraft carrier, or an imported tank, helicopter fleet, or artillery system. To be fair, the navy and army are no different — but these services are less egregious, less in the public’s face, in their acquisition objectives. The IAF keeps cawing about such deals enabling the service to reach its 42.5 squadron strength, that was recommended by the JRD Tata Committee post-1962 War. Technology has since moved on, but not so the IAF — it is sticking to that figure to cover up for its ills.
Because, performance-wise, what has the IAF, outfitted with the latest Western aircraft as per its wishes, done in war? In the 3-day farce — Op Sindoor, for instance, it managed to get one or more of its Rafales — supposedly the most advanced plane in its inventory, shot up on the very first day, and just like that over a billion dollars went down the drain. It matched the 1999 Kargil conflict record, when again, it lost two aircraft on the trot on the very first day.
What the IAF has done magnificently well, however, is burnish the reputation of the Pakistan Air Force and its indigenously assembled ex-Chinese JF-17, even though it was the J-10Cs that secured for the PAF its IAF Rafale kills. So much so, that combined with the IAF piloted Tejas mishap, countries like Indonesia that had seriously considered buying the Indian aircraft begged off, bought the Pak-built JF-17s instead and then, by way of spillover beneficial effect, also bought the drones the Pakistan defence industry produces! Bangladesh, Iraq, and Libya have lined up to buy the Block II version of the 4.5 generation Pakistan-made Chinese aircraft complete with an AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and a Chinese off boresight air-to-air missile from a family of PL missiles that brought down the Indian Rafales, all available for a paltry $30 million.
India excepted, there are no Third World countries around anymore for Western countries to rip off. They have all wisened up. Why would they go in for a 4.5 gen Rafale — Iraq and Libya are also where the French feverishly pitched this plane, that India is paying $337 million per piece for when, for the same amount, they can buy ten JF-17s? Or, the $337 million could have bought 2-3 Tejas Mk1A, an aerodynamically and otherwise far superior aircraft to the JF-17. So, India remains the lone village idiot who gets fleeced left and right!
However, the math indicates an even more ruinous outcome: With Rs 3.2 lakh crores, or US $38.4 billion (at the conversion rate of INR 83-84 for a US dollar) committed for 114 Rafale, where’s the money for the Modi government to spare for any indigenously designed and developed aircraft? And, mind you, this sum only accounts for the platforms, all the weapons — the A2A Meteor and the A2G Hammer missiles cost a whole deal of extra, again in the billions of dollars! But comfortingly for HAL, the deal will only have it do what it has ever done — screwdriver 96 Rafales from semi-knocked down kits at its assembly lines, as it did the MiG-21s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and Su-30MKIs without, in the process, gaining for the country even an iota of combat aircraft design and development capability.
Further, the Rafale draft-contract stamps India as the go-to country for any Western government keen on having its defence industry subsidised by the Indian taxpayer. Not to miss out out on the feast, the German Chancellor Merz too came hither, happily flew kites with Modi and, for his troubles, pocketed a multi-billion dollar contract for the HDW 214 diesel submarine. This when the country makes nuclear-powered submarines for God’s sake!, and needed only to buy a conventional sub design and few select technologies, like optronic masts, which the Germans would have happily sold for a fraction of the cost of the entire, and entirely redundant and useless, HDW 214 package!
To return to the Rafale, the French were so brazenly confident that they could force the issue that Dassault did not concede a millimeter, and the final contract involves no transfer of source codes. This means that integrating every little Indian designed and produced ordnance or avionics tech, will necessitate going to the French company which will charge a hefty sum to do the needful — talk of bleeding a customer to death, and this will be for the duration of the aircraft’s 35-year service life. Moreover, indigenisation of the Rafale production starting at 30% will never exceed 60%! The negatives of such deals are many, and have been publicly raised for years and years now — mostly, I confess, by me in my writings. But these issues are not unknown to Indian defence ministry negotiators. In the event, the price negotiation team, involving IAF brass, should be held accountable for defalcation. May be a future government will investigate these deals.
Then again, official Indian negotiating teams are the darlings of Western governments for a reason — they play the perfect saps and suckers, and can be sold any bill of goods. Go ask the American negotiators how surprisingly easy it was to get the Jaishankar-led MEA team to agree to non-resumption of nuclear testing as condition for “civilian nuclear cooperation” in the 2008 nuclear deal with the US!
But for Air Chief Marshal Aman Preet Singh the Rafale purchase will prove a boon, cementing his reputation within the air force, at least. But it will just as surely relegate the IAF to the category of a third rate, foreign-dependent force — a status it was sliding towards for some time now, and fully deserves. In comparison, PAF is a second rate air force because it does more with less, even as the IAF, in contrast, is habituated to doing less with more. And, of course, the Rafale deal, as expected, will sound the deathknell for the Tejas Mk1A, Mk 2, and the advanced medium combat aircraft programmes — starved of funding so that the French firms led by Dassault can prosper.
But what does Aman Preet Singh care? Like his army and navy counterparts, he has specialised in talking up atmbirbharta to please the ignorant political bosses while plonking for imported goods. Predictably, Singh is in the running to replace General Anil Chauhan as CDS! If his record as CAS is any guide, Good Bye theaterisation!
The Prime Minister ceaselessly lectures the people about taking pride in swadeshi, and asks young talent to contribute to India’s startup-nation credentials, but his government still ends up getting pressured into buying imported weapons systems even as the military services chiefs pay no end of lip service to the desirability of arms self-sufficiency! But the record is irrefutable that, other than impoverishing the country, none of these exorbitantly priced Western armaments have done much of anything in actual military operations other than failing.
Security Wise 
Government thinks of these purchases as way of generating warm ties with EU, partly that is the reason they don’t stop Air Force from these purchases plus they don’t have much hope in private sector. When is the long awaited book going to make its debut?
The book — you’ll have to wait some more, alas. Sorry!
@BharatKarnad You say that with regards to the IAF, the GOI relies on advice from the CAS.
But the GOI wouldn’t like to receive advice regarding the IAF from anyone in rank below the CAS and the CAS too wouldn’t allow anyone below him in rank to advise the GOI about the IAF.
I base this on the understanding of mine that militaries and governments are hierarchy and rank-conscious.
Then, what should India do?
Look, what’s missing in the Indian system is what’s present in most other advanced polities, including Russian, where there’s an interface of civilian experts separate from line bureaucrats. Indian political leaders do call in outside civilian experts when needed but they have no official role, and there’s the rub.
Or a DARPA like agency with a strict vision and Program Management capability – that contains a mix of Civilian strategic thinkers, Industry experts with the armed forces providing Requirements, Design Participation and Joint Oversight?
ADA is too much of an old workhorse saddled with their own designs to serve this role, so no way.
HAL’s gotta be semi-privatised and handed to over to Private players to have hopes of creating a IDI / Nothorp / BAE / Lockheed like company in the distant future. Because right now, it’s a cushy government job for anyone without any accountability.
@BharatKarnad Is it true that the Sino-Pak JF-17 is an upgraded Chinese variant of the Soviet/Russian MiG-21?
Is it true that the JF-17 is the successor of the US F-16 that the PAF has? This is because JF means Joint Fighter and 17 is the next number after 16 and therefore it is the successor.
Is the Russian Klimov engine of the JF-17 its weakness due to its alleged emission of black smoke?
Why are the Russians selling these for the Sino-Pak JF-17? Just for more money or some other reason?
Because both aren’t known to be exactly friendly towards Russia, including its predecessor, the Soviet Union.
@BharatKarnad I hope you forgive me for this comment unrelated to this blog post of yours.
I came across a YouTube video of yours from 6 years ago titled India’s Missing Kootayuddha: Ancient Covert Warfare vs Modern Strategic Failures | Bharat Karnad, on the Sangam Talks YouTube channel at https://youtu.be/l8MzHkuvU_Q
It was a pleasure watching it and hearing you speak.
In this you mentioned a person who could get an instantaneous meeting with the PMO. You didn’t mention his name. I got a feeling that you were referring to the Indian-American, Ashley Tellis who is now under arrest in the US. Was this person, Ashley Tellis?
It was
@BharatKarnad I thank you for replying to my comment about Ashley Tellis.
I appreciate it.
I must say I have no hesitation in saying that I feel a sense of schadenfreude with regards to his arrest.
As far as I know, he was entrusted by the Americans to ensure that the IAF bought the US F-16. Thankfully, it didn’t happen.
But, the Americans didn’t give up. I think after S. Jaishankar retired as the Foreign Secretary, the Tata Group gave him a job as a President due to his MEA background and also to ensure through him that the IAF bought the US F-16 which the Tata Group planned to manufacture in India, if the IAF selected it.
Thankfully, before this could happen, he became the EAM.
If he hadn’t become the EAM, God only knows, apart from the F-16, what else the IAF and the IN and the IA would have bought from the Americans!
F-16 didn’t go through, not because Jaishankar became EAM but because GOI is not so daft as to also have an American noose round its neck!
“Luckless” or “inept”? Barring the flashes of brilliance in the 1971 war, IAF has sub-performed relative to PAF in every other war.
@BharatKarnad
A little bit correction Professor
It was the J-10Ce that shot down a rafale and Not Jf-17
And the fact is even PAF admitted this .
Pls Correct this if possible from your side
Thank you, text corrected. It was PAF’s JC-10 that I mentioned in my Sindoor posts
Sir J-10c * not JC-10
Oh, right, J-10C!
I confess I often disagree with your analysis but I absolutely love the diatribe: there’s red-hot passion behind your prose that’s just contagious. (from a fan in Lahore, PK).
Hello Dr Karnad,
am not an expert in air warfare or any warfare, for that matter.
you mentioned in some of your earlier posts that the PAF fired at the Rafales while flying in passive mode, with their AWACS spotting the IAF bogeys as soon as they took off and feeding it to their JF-10s and 17s using network centric capability. This gave the IAF bogeys very less reaction time for evasive manoeuvres.
Question #1 – Did the IAF not have its very own AWACS scanning the skies and spotting the PAF package? If they did, surely the PAF missile ranges, passive / active mode attack tactics would’ve been factored in, when IAF attack plans were drawn up? This feels like a basic risk management planning in any profession, let alone serious war games.
Question #2 – assuming they were picked up, were they not engaged at the very onset? After the Abhinandan episode, the PAF intentions were very clear i.e. they won’t let an opportunity to take on the IAF go waste. So why were they let off or not engaged at all?
Is it what the defence attache meant ‘by political will’? But I would expect the IAF to draw this up in its Rules of Engagement, rather than just deferring to the political masters.
if the Day 1 attack had gone India’s way without any planes being lost, the subsequent wave of Brahmos attacks would’ve burnished the IAF’s reputation as a force not be messed around with. Their case for expensive Rafales could’ve been tolerated.
lonestar@ — Re: Q1. Asked the same Q in my Sindoor posts — where was the IAF Netra?
Q2. Why risk engaging when the unsuspecting adversary can be picked off BVR
I dare say that the IAF’s Early Warning Capabilities and Implementation of a Network centric ecosystem is not complete yet. It will be even more challenging with different platforms from different vendors.
Professor
Inferiority complex is your answer. These people be it bureaucrats, military leadership have a deep ingrained inferiority complex.
Clearing an exam can put you in position of power but not take away the cultural disorientation these folks have.
India’s ‘Imported Air Force” !!
@BharatKarnad
Professor Karnad, sir i have a few questions
you strongly advocate prioritising indigenous platforms such as Tejas and AMCA over imported fighters. Given their long development timelines and repeated delays, how do you reconcile this position with the very real operational risks created by capability gaps during their gestation period?
At what specific point measured in force levels, threat escalation, or deterrence credibility does insistence on indigenisation cease to be strategic foresight and instead become strategic recklessness?
In other words, who should bear responsibility if a conflict occurs while indigenous programmes are still maturing and the IAF lacks adequate numbers or capability?
Sorry, these issues involve lengthy replies. But I address them in my book. So, you’ll have to await it!
@BharatKarnad
Absolutely, Sir, I would greatly appreciate a detailed, comprehensive reply rather than a brief one.
I am also one of the correspondents on this blog, along with several other readers, eagerly awaiting your book.
May I kindly ask if you have an anticipated timeline for its release perhaps
Summer 2026?
I used to tell people the day this happens, even after what when down during OP Sindoor I will leave this Country.
Looks like I should start planning. With a PM refusing to reform and a Donkey communist in op. waiting to be next. I am losing hope.
@BharatKarnad
sir i totally agree with majority of the article and i honestly disagree with some sections
but please don’t say this
“much like the hot-dogging pilot with deficient flying skills, who destroyed the export potential of the Tejas by flying the plane into the desert sands at the UAE airshow a few months back”
i mean straight insult of a dead IAF pilot someone posted this article on reddit it got some 20000thousand views . Instead of discussing the real problem people there were saying that BK is insulting an dead IAF pilot. He shouldn’t do that
Please consider this
Sorry, I hurt the sentiment of many. But to speak the truth is not to insult the dead pilot and is, in any case, inescapable. Satyamev jayate!
@bharatKarnad
totally got your frustrations, i am frustrated too.
a few questions if you please
Sourabh@ — 1) Admission of the initial tactical errors suggests, IAF went in without gaming and planning for Pak response
2) As I have been ceaselessly advocating : Resume thermonuclear testing, let the US end civilian nuclear cooperation
of which there’s no evidence anyway, and begin limiting the foundational accords to let Washington know what India can do
3) What is F4/5?
Mr. Karnad you unnecessarily target the Foreign Minister. Jaishankar has no real power in the Modi government as excellently proved in this article;
https://www.indiatoday.in/opinion/story/india-foreign-policy-decisions-jaishankar-bangladesh-kkr-mustafizur-rahman-row-2852693-2026-01-16#google_vignette
An excerpt from the aforementioned link;
Five years later, the BJP-RSS leadership is hosting a visiting Chinese Communist Party delegation, treating the engagement as routine politics. When the Congress engaged with Beijing’s political class, their leadership was accused of betraying national interests. Now, it’s business as usual. The hypocrisy is staggering.
Good, India Today is finally reporting what this Blog has been saying about Jaishankar for the past 2 years!
@BharatKarnad What should one as an Indian make of the two conflicting reports about the Rafales as mentioned below.
First is in The Tribune as read at https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/top-headlines/indian-weapons-must-on-all-114-rafale-jets-govt-tells-dassault/, this reports about non-negotiable things like Indian weapons on the Rafales, the level of Transfer of Technology [TOT] which also brings in the suppliers Thales and Safran within the ambit of TOT, secure data links, changes to the software of the on-board computing system and expected indigenous content to name some.
This also answers your question about “What is F4/F5?” in response to the commentator @SourabhSharma’s comment. F-4 is a version of the Rafale and F-5 is an upcoming version of the Rafale, the IAF uses the F3R version of the Rafale, according to The Tribune. I must say I had a feeling about knowing that F4 and F5 were related to the Rafale, but wasn’t sure and this feeling about knowing got confirmed through The Tribune report.
Second is in the Indian defence website Indian Defence Research Wing as read at https://idrw.org/rafale-source-code-reality-india-will-get-access-but-not-the-level-the-iaf-ideally-wanted/, it says that the IAF won’t be getting the ideal Rafale source code access that it wants. But, it also says even the European allies haven’t received unrestricted kernel-level source code access for the Rafale. It also says the IAF will receive API-level integration access which Dassault is expected to offer, but, not kernel-level control/software sovereignty.
I also want to ask you regarding the IAF Mirages [I’m not saying the IAF lost Mirages in the 1999 Kargil War] and India losing two aircrafts on the trot on the very first day of the 1999 Kargil War.
The PAF too uses Mirages III and V [which as per Wikipedia are older than the IAF Mirages] and whose ROSE retrofit/upgrade program which began in 1992 had to be terminated in 2003 due to high costs and aging airframes [again as per Wikipedia].
How do the IAF Mirages fare against the PAF Mirages with the former’s full retirement expected by 2035 and the latter’s plan to replace them by 2030 [retirement and replacement information as per Google]?
Mark my words: Dassault will stick to its no-no position and win out in the end ‘coz IAF wants the Rafale so much and Dassault knows it. India will get next to no high-value tech, and no source codes.
@BharatKarnad Now, I wonder, who is the bigger Indian Idiot [borrowing from Green Day’s album, American Idiot], the IAF or the IN, due to the latter buying the naval variant because the former has bought them already!
I hope both the services and the GOI put a full stop to this and focus on the Tejas and the AMCA.
@BharatKarnad Gayi bhains paani mein.
As you predicted, the no-no position has won.
Please see, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/defence/defence-procurement-board-okays-proposal-to-acquire-114-rafale-jets-from-dassault/.
The DPB has okayed the 114 jets, it seems the IAF, the IN, and the GOI are now completely in the thrall of the Rafale.
Like I’ve said in my earlier comments on Security Wise, even God can’t save India now.
@BharatKarnad I don’t know how the sources in The Tribune report, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/defence/defence-procurement-board-okays-proposal-to-acquire-114-rafale-jets-from-dassault/ are saying that this deal won’t impact the Tejas and the AMCA.
Either India has become a very rich nation due to some generous blessing from Lord Kuber or the Modi-led BJP/NDA is hell-bent on making a point to the opposition, Congress/Rahul-led UPA/INDIA bloc, that where the latter failed in the MRCA deal for 126 aircrafts, the ruling government has succeeded, including in the count, by now having 150 [of which 114 will be delivered after this deal is signed] and also got 26 naval variants for the IN.
Anyways, the GOI seems to have given the opposition a new stick with which it can be beaten, especially due to the secrecy surrounding Rafale losses in Operation Sindoor.
The IAF, the IN and the GOI are now like Gandhiji’s three monkeys. The only difference is, these three don’t listen to anything/anyone good, they don’t see anything good and they won’t say anything good.
This also proves what you said earlier about the IAF being a foreign aircraft junkie, and the Defence Ministry and the PMO acting like indulgent parents of a dope addict at https://bharatkarnad.com/2025/09/15/iaf-sold-out-to-french-defence-industry/.
@BharatKarnad
Man an advise kindly don’t trust IDRW
its not at all a reliable source specially not at all for defense
@AdityaMishra I know I’ve been told by my fellow commentators on Security Wise [I’m not able to recall the person/their name] in the past that the IDRW is not a good source of information.
The reason why I still went ahead and referred to it along with The Tribune is due to the conflicting reports by both of them about the Rafale.I didn’t know what to believe and it was difficult for me to make sense out of these.
Note: I rarely read the IDRW. I saw the IDRW link only due to the Discover feature in Google Chrome.This feature shows news links on its own based on one’s usage/history/behaviour in Google Chrome.
@V.Ganesh
oh sorry instead of tagging @V.Ganesh i tagged professor @Bharat Karnad
My bad!
@AdityaMishra No problem.
Everyone, including me, at some point or the other, unknowingly makes mistakes.
Dear Sir,
This sounds so frustrating! Do we have any hope left now in indigenisation?
Is it the case that beginning from now Tejas production, AMCA program and other home grown ones would slowly cease to exist?
(btw would like to see responses of some of those retired generals & air cmdrs who read and comment in your blogs).
(None so far!)
Buying 4.5 gen rafale or Su57 in 2025 is suicidal
That too in this much price…
If J10c or jf17 can shoot down rafale then imagine what will J35 do.
cancel 114 rafale/SU57, buy 300 tejas mk2 in its place
NO MORE IMPORT.
buy 5th gen F35, 50 in numbers.. only and only if its super necessary
And complely focus on AMCA
The IAF picked the Rafale over several other fighters in the MRCA tender. They wanted this. They know their needs better than angry old bloggers like you.
What would you rather have them do? Fly MiG-21s for another 50 years?
Gautam@ — The reason the IAF and the country are in the straits they are in is because India has an imported military that can’t sustain hostilities. This is a unique situation, in particular because the IAF, pining for foreign aircraft, never took ownership of indigenously-designed and developed aircraft starting with the HF-24 in the ’60s, the HF-72/73 in the ’70s and now Tejas, and the government which could have compelled it to do so, did not.
Prof, I have been lately revisiting the proceedings during the ill-fated Kargil war, when so many brave, young Indian lives were (needlessly) lost, including that of 21-year old Arun Khetrapal. At that time a clique of generals leading the op were working at cross purposes by ignoring intelligence, pursuing quixotic interests (like building at zoo!), redirecting the best units from the action, removing capable officers (like Brig Surinder Singh), etc. It would now appear that a similar faction has taken hold at the IAF, whereby their actions could be questioned from the country’s best interests. Are you going to address such matters in your forthcoming tome?
Vikram singh@ — The specific issues you mention, perhaps not, but the larger cognate issues, yes. But, the leadup to the Kargil conflict was the usual fiasco you hint at that the Indian army, like the IAF, is prone to.
By The way, fresh out of NDA and IMA, 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetrapal, posthumous
winner of the Param Vir Chakra (PVC), commanding his tank in a squadron of the Poona (17) Horse,
was killed in action on the Basantar nullah in the 1971 War. He kept firing his main gun after
his tank was disabled until a direct hit finished him. Perhaps, you are
referring to Captain Vikram Batra, another young hero of 13th J&K Rifles, also a posthumous winner of the PVC, who was killed in action in the 1999 Kargil conflict, leading his unit’s charge uphill to capture Point 4875.
The article presents a sweeping indictment of the Indian Air Force and India’s defence procurement system, but it is heavily shaped by polemical bias, selective evidence, and unsubstantiated claims. Its argumentative style relies more on ridicule and moral outrage than on verifiable data, which weakens analytical credibility. Several central assertions—such as Rafale aircraft being shot down in recent operations, or specific corruption linked to French defence deals—are made without official confirmation, independent verification, or documentary proof. Cost comparisons are methodologically flawed, as comprehensive lifecycle packages are contrasted with bare platform prices of rival aircraft, creating false equivalence.
The article also conflates peacetime accidents, airshow mishaps, and wartime performance, an analytically invalid approach. Its portrayal of the Pakistan Air Force is selectively positive, overlooking structural dependencies and operational constraints while exaggerating Indian failures. Claims regarding nuclear technology access, inertial confinement fusion, and the 1998 thermonuclear test are speculative and ignore classification, legal limits, and technical nuance.
Institutional complexity in defence decision-making is reduced to personal motives of service chiefs, ignoring multilayered civilian, financial, and political oversight. Finally, while the piece criticises imports and leadership sharply, it offers no coherent alternative force-structure or transition strategy. Overall, the article raises legitimate concerns about self-reliance but does so in a manner that prioritises provocation over evidence-based analysis.
Sanjay Gahlot@ — This is a Blog meant to provoke as a means of highlighting troubling issues. It is NOT an academic forum. For the kind of analytical rigour and analysis based on evidence you seek, I suggest you peruse my books and writings in professional journals here and abroad
Bharat Karnad Whats lacking in IAF pilots is it training or lack of professionalism .Before also you had said once that PAF pilots are superior to IAF
is it because they adopted NATO standards and our training is outdated?
jketh@ — It is a combination of time and resources expended on combat flight training, the quality of such training, and motivation.
No wonder why our political leadership hesitates in using militiary option.This video sums up the attitude of our armed forces.I mean who are they fooling?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CO7dr7HWbfg
Prof. Karnad,
Out of context, but I believe
I recommended your articles/lectures at BJYM Mumbai Youth Parliament. Hope it shines a light in the heads of the present BJP leaders. Thank you.
@BharatKarnad Since the IAF has used a mix of aircrafts from the UK, France and the erstwhile USSR and now Russia, with the USSR/Russian ones being a major part, were the IAF fighter pilots trained in USSR air combat doctrines, including in VWR?
They don’t believe in much of BVR/Stealth like the USA .
The first lot of pilots on any new type of Soviet/Russian aircraft inducted, were trained in Russia
@BharatKarnad Do you think this https://www.news18.com/amp/india/india-may-buy-this-5th-gen-fighter-jet-in-addition-to-rafale-decision-soon-report-ws-kl-9842490.html is just an another way to kill the Tejas and the AMCA in order to preserve the DPSU vote-bank or is it a case of the GOI now coming to its senses?
@BharatKarnad Is there a lesson to be learnt by India from this https://www.vinylone.co.uk/19-171362-france-rafale-lose-a-e3-2-billion/?
Is it true that before Operation Sindoor, the Rafale’s combat experience [as a French combat aircraft worldwide] was only in Counter-Terrorism and not against any enemy/peer Air Force[s]?
@BharatKarnad
Professor karnad sir i would like to draw your attention on a less discussed topic I would like have your candid view on what has increasingly become a mockery of Republic Day’s core purpose. The motorcycle brigade stunts and choreographed theatrics men and women forming human pyramids on bikes.This nonsense may entertain television audiences, but they do nothing to project deterrence, discipline, or hard power.
Republic Day is not a circus; it is a strategic signaling opportunity. When China parades Intercontinental and intermediate range missile forces, mechanized units, and command discipline to send a clear message to adversaries, we choose acrobatics and symbolism that invite ridicule rather than respect. They laugh at us.
In your view, does this obsession with optics and inclusivity dilute the seriousness of national defense, and does it undermine India’s attempt to be seen as a credible military power? Shouldn’t the parade primarily communicate strength, preparedness, and intent rather than crowd-pleasing spectacle. I think its enough and this should go away now
Would like to know your views on this less discussed drama
Very true!
Fully agree with Aditya Mishra’s comment above about Republic Day parades. Aside from the acrobatics he mentions, in recent years we see soldiers of our vaunted and storied army regiments dressed in colourful, oversized turbans and have napkins on their belts like some “wedding party band”. Moreover, they are asked to register an exaggerated goose-step before the salute which frankly looks ridiculous. Contrast these scenes with how the army contigents dressed and marched in the 1950-1980s, where their bravery and gravitas were in full display. Wouldn’t surprise me if these fancy dresses have been suggested to them by certain politicians who are fond of wearing fancy costumes themselves.
@VikramSingh
Absolutely well man the Indian Army of the 1950s–1980s did not rely on costume or theatrical drill to project confidence. Its restraint, sobriety, and precision conveyed an institution that knew its purpose. Today’s increasingly performative displays suggest civilian interference driven by branding, symbolism, and an obsession with spectacle priorities alien to professional military culture.
Civilian control of the military is non-negotiable in a democracy. But civilian aesthetic control where politicians and bureaucrats reshape military presentation to suit narrative, inclusivity quotas, or personal taste—is a corruption of that principle. It reduces soldiers from instruments of deterrence to props in a televised pageant.
External observers are not impressed by colour, choreography, or stuntmanship. Adversaries assess seriousness, discipline, and intent. When India chooses theatrics over gravitas on its most important military showcase, it communicates confusion about its own strategic identity.
Republic Day should project one thing above all else: a state capable of organized violence, exercised with restraint and purpose. Anything that dilutes that message however well-intentioned undermines credibility.
@V.Ganesh
Hey man, I’d genuinely like to know your views on the Republic Day parade especially the motorcycle brigades and the increasingly theatrical elements associated with them.
I’ve noticed you participate actively in discussions on Professor Karnad’s blog, and I admire the seriousness you bring to those conversations. I honestly believe this topic deserves more thoughtful debate than it currently gets.
To me, Republic Day should primarily be about strategic signaling discipline, deterrence, and military credibility (parading missile forces and armoured forces like the chinese do in Tiananmen Square )rather than crowd-pleasing spectacle. The emphasis on stunts and choreography feels increasingly disconnected from that purpose.
Would be interested in hearing your perspective on whether this trend strengthens or dilutes the message India should be sending, especially to external observers.
@BharatKarnad
I don’t Remember when was the last time when we had paraded our Agni missiles the crown jewel of our detterence as you say because of their low CEP .
Rather only some tactical missiles like brahmos or prithvi which are already well know are shown every year repeatedly.
Have a look at this footage this was from 1988 when Gen Sundarji was the army chief he literally paraded an entire armoured brigade on the rajpath .
Our present parades are nowhere close to this. What a joke
Do you even watch republic day parades sir?
They have paraded Agni’s
Mr Karnad,
The fate of Tejas was sealed with choice of engine. The temporary test engine became the only choice because investment in the indigenous engine was starved. Going with a less capable Russian engine would have been much better for India. No arm twisting by Mr Trump would have worked if Tejas was not on the line. Availability of western tech is double edged sword that lead to the current situation.