Indian Air Force — the most luckless air force in the world

[Rafale]

The Indian Air Force is the most luckless airforce in the world and its leadership is to blame for it. Once marked out as the leading force of an “Icarian India” with its span stretching from the Maghreb to Australasia, it is now reduced to something that is repeatedly beaten by so puny a thing as the Pakistan Air Force. What a fall! To pretend the IAF can take on the PLA Air Force, is to dream! But dream on!

In a pattern of longstanding, the IAF has been led by persons apparently determined to steer the force into the ground, much like the hot-dogging pilot with deficient flying skills, who destroyed the export potential of the Tejas by flying the plane into the desert sands at the UAE airshow a few months back.

It is nevertheless a mystery — the kind of hook Paris has into the Indian government. It is as if the Quai d’Orsay can make the Modi regime, the latest in the line, to do virtually anything it wants it to do. Forget about how French defence companies keep tabs, nurture support for the wares they peddle by courting promising military officers, Wing Commander level up, with all kinds of comfy attention, and by conducting lavishly hosted trips to Paris with all its allurements for the flagrank, and even media persons. And one hears too tid-bits of information pertaining to monies diverted into accounts of the ruling party of the day. But these are secondary factors. The real reason for France’s success lies elsewhere — in its promises relating to nuclear technology that it does not intend to ever deliver on, but means to use to successfully string India along. Our Prime Ministers, who are as inncocent of any technical knowledge as their generalist civil servants they rely on for advise, are seduced by such promises.

At the top are the twin nuclear promises relating to the transfer of miniature nuclear reactor technology to power submarines and aircraft carriers, and to provide Indian nuclear scientists access to the French Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) chamber — the Laser Megajoule facility near Bordeaux. The ICF creates extraordinarily high temperatures by firing lasers at nuggets of fusion fuel to create miniature thermonuclear explosions that help refine Hydrogen Bomb designs, something sorely needed because the Indian thermonuclear device tested in 1998 was a dud. What with the late, little lamented, Dr R Chidambaram, the greatest disaster to befall the nation’s nuclear weapons project, singlehandedly ensuring the capping of the Indian arsenal at the low yield fission level with his argument that India needed no additional testing beyond the 1998 tests, and then seeing to it that the small ICF facility in Indore was run into a state of such disrepair as to render it non-functional.

Hence, the importance of the French carrots dangled before the donkey of an Indian government that made Delhi successively buy the Mirage 2000, the scorpene diesel submarine, and now the Rafale — all incredibly wasteful deals that because of time and cost overruns have ended up costing the exchequer a third more than their original price tags of tens of billions of dollars — totaling hundreds of billions of dollars, and all because the Indian government never applied its mind, because it has no mind to apply.

The IAF’s procurement priorities are realised, aided and abetted by the apparatus of state that does not know its arm from its elbow where air warfare or any other military or mil-tech issue is concerned, and relies on advice from the very source — the Chief of the Air Staff who, personally, has the most to gain from it. Isn’t there a conflict of interest here? I am referring strictly to the metric the military services informally use to evaluate their chief of the day — whether he acquires for the service a prized foreign fighter plane, an aircraft carrier, or an imported tank, helicopter fleet, or artillery system. To be fair, the navy and army are no different — but these services are less egregious, less in the public’s face, in their acquisition objectives. The IAF keeps cawing about such deals enabling the service to reach its 42.5 squadron strength, that was recommended by the JRD Tata Committee post-1962 War. Technology has since moved on, but not so the IAF — it is sticking to that figure to cover up for its ills.

Because, performance-wise, what has the IAF, outfitted with the latest Western aircraft as per its wishes, done in war? In the 3-day farce — Op Sindoor, for instance, it managed to get one or more of its Rafales — supposedly the most advanced plane in its inventory, shot up on the very first day, and just like that over a billion dollars went down the drain. It matched the 1999 Kargil conflict record, when again, it lost two aircraft on the trot on the very first day.

What the IAF has done magnificently well, however, is burnish the reputation of the Pakistan Air Force and its indigenously assembled ex-Chinese JF-17, even though it was the J-10Cs that secured for the PAF its IAF Rafale kills. So much so, that combined with the IAF piloted Tejas mishap, countries like Indonesia that had seriously considered buying the Indian aircraft begged off, bought the Pak-built JF-17s instead and then, by way of spillover beneficial effect, also bought the drones the Pakistan defence industry produces! Bangladesh, Iraq, and Libya have lined up to buy the Block II version of the 4.5 generation Pakistan-made Chinese aircraft complete with an AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and a Chinese off boresight air-to-air missile from a family of PL missiles that brought down the Indian Rafales, all available for a paltry $30 million.

India excepted, there are no Third World countries around anymore for Western countries to rip off. They have all wisened up. Why would they go in for a 4.5 gen Rafale — Iraq and Libya are also where the French feverishly pitched this plane, that India is paying $337 million per piece for when, for the same amount, they can buy ten JF-17s? Or, the $337 million could have bought 2-3 Tejas Mk1A, an aerodynamically and otherwise far superior aircraft to the JF-17. So, India remains the lone village idiot who gets fleeced left and right!

However, the math indicates an even more ruinous outcome: With Rs 3.2 lakh crores, or US $38.4 billion (at the conversion rate of INR 83-84 for a US dollar) committed for 114 Rafale, where’s the money for the Modi government to spare for any indigenously designed and developed aircraft? And, mind you, this sum only accounts for the platforms, all the weapons — the A2A Meteor and the A2G Hammer mssiles cost a whole deal of extra, again in the billions of dollars! But comfortingly for HAL, the deal will only have it do what it has ever done — screwdriver 96 Rafales from semi-knocked down kits at its assembly lines, as it did the MiG-21s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and Su-30MKIs without, in the process, gaining for the country even an iota of combat aircraft design and development capability.

Further, the Rafale draft-contract stamps India as the go-to country for any Western government keen on having its defence industry subsidised by the Indian taxpayer. Not to miss out out on the feast, the German Chancellor Merz too came hither, happily flew kites with Modi and, for his troubles, pocketed a multi-billion dollar contract for the HDW 214 diesel submarine. This when the country makes nuclear-powered submarines for God’s sake!, and needed only to buy a conventional sub design and few select technologies, like optronic masts, which the Germans would have happily sold for a fraction of the cost of the entire, and entirely redundant and useless, HDW 214 package!

To return to the Rafale, the French were so brazenly confident that they could force the issue that Dassault did not concede a millimeter, and the final contract involves no transfer of source codes. This means that integrating every little Indian designed and produced ordnance or avionics tech, will necessitate going to the French company which will charge a hefty sum to do the needful — talk of bleeding a customer to death, and this will be for the duration of the aircraft’s 35-year service life. Moreover, indigenisation of the Rafale production starting at 30% will never exceed 60%! The negatives of such deals are many, and have been publicly raised for years and years now — mostly, I confess, by me in my writings. But these issues are not unknown to Indian defence ministry negotiators. In the event, the price negotiation team, involving IAF brass, should be held accountable for defalcation. May be a future government will investigate these deals.

Then again, official Indian negotiating teams are the darlings of Western governments for a reason — they play the perfect saps and suckers, and can be sold any bill of goods. Go ask the American negotiators how surprisingly easy it was to get the Jaishankar-led MEA team to agree to non-resumption of nuclear testing as condition for “civilian nuclear cooperation” in the 2008 nuclear deal with the US!

But for Air Chief Marshal Aman Preet Singh the Rafale purchase will prove a boon, cementing his reputation within the air force, at least. But it will just as surely relegate the IAF to the category of a third rate, foreign-dependent force — a status it was sliding towards for some time now, and fully deserves. In comparison, PAF is a second rate air force because it does more with less, even as the IAF, in contrast, is habituated to doing less with more. And, of course, the Rafale deal, as expected, will sound the deathknell for the Tejas Mk1A, Mk 2, and the advanced medium combat aircraft programmes — starved of funding so that the French firms led by Dassault can prosper.

But what does Aman Preet Singh care? Like his army and navy counterparts, he has specialised in talking up atmbirbharta to please the ignorant political bosses while plonking for imported goods. Predictably, Singh is in the running to replace General Anil Chauhan as CDS! If his record as CAS is any guide, Good Bye theaterisation!

The Prime Minister ceaselessly lectures the people about taking pride in swadeshi, and asks young talent to contribute to India’s startup-nation credentials, but his government still ends up getting pressured into buying imported weapons systems even as the military services chiefs pay no end of lip service to the desirability of arms self-sufficiency! But the record is irrefutable that, other than impoverishing the country, none of these exorbitantly priced Western armaments have done much of anything in actual military operations other than failing.

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About Bharat Karnad

Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, he was Member of the (1st) National Security Advisory Board and the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and author, among other books of, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy', 'India's Nuclear Policy' and most recently, 'Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)'. Educated at the University of California (undergrad and grad), he was Visiting Scholar at Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
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23 Responses to Indian Air Force — the most luckless air force in the world

  1. Raj Yadav's avatar Raj Yadav says:

    Government thinks of these purchases as way of generating warm ties with EU, partly that is the reason they don’t stop Air Force from these purchases plus they don’t have much hope in private sector. When is the long awaited book going to make its debut?

  2. V.Ganesh's avatar V.Ganesh says:

    @BharatKarnad You say that with regards to the IAF, the GOI relies on advice from the CAS.

    But the GOI wouldn’t like to receive advice regarding the IAF from anyone in rank below the CAS and the CAS too wouldn’t allow anyone below him in rank to advise the GOI about the IAF.

    I base this on the understanding of mine that militaries and governments are hierarchy and rank-conscious.

    Then, what should India do?

    • Look, what’s missing in the Indian system is what’s present in most other advanced polities, including Russian, where there’s an interface of civilian experts separate from line bureaucrats. Indian political leaders do call in outside civilian experts when needed but they have no official role, and there’s the rub.

      • Lonestar Indian's avatar Lonestar Indian says:

        Or a DARPA like agency with a strict vision and Program Management capability – that contains a mix of Civilian strategic thinkers, Industry experts with the armed forces providing Requirements, Design Participation and Joint Oversight?

        ADA is too much of an old workhorse saddled with their own designs to serve this role, so no way.

        HAL’s gotta be semi-privatised and handed to over to Private players to have hopes of creating a IDI / Nothorp / BAE / Lockheed like company in the distant future. Because right now, it’s a cushy government job for anyone without any accountability.

  3. V.Ganesh's avatar V.Ganesh says:

    @BharatKarnad Is it true that the Sino-Pak JF-17 is an upgraded Chinese variant of the Soviet/Russian MiG-21?

    Is it true that the JF-17 is the successor of the US F-16 that the PAF has? This is because JF means Joint Fighter and 17 is the next number after 16 and therefore it is the successor.

    Is the Russian Klimov engine of the JF-17 its weakness due to its alleged emission of black smoke?

    Why are the Russians selling these for the Sino-Pak JF-17? Just for more money or some other reason?

    Because both aren’t known to be exactly friendly towards Russia, including its predecessor, the Soviet Union.

  4. V.Ganesh's avatar V.Ganesh says:

    @BharatKarnad I hope you forgive me for this comment unrelated to this blog post of yours.

    I came across a YouTube video of yours from 6 years ago titled India’s Missing Kootayuddha: Ancient Covert Warfare vs Modern Strategic Failures | Bharat Karnad, on the Sangam Talks YouTube channel at https://youtu.be/l8MzHkuvU_Q

    It was a pleasure watching it and hearing you speak.

    In this you mentioned a person who could get an instantaneous meeting with the PMO. You didn’t mention his name. I got a feeling that you were referring to the Indian-American, Ashley Tellis who is now under arrest in the US. Was this person, Ashley Tellis?

      • V.Ganesh's avatar V.Ganesh says:

        @BharatKarnad I thank you for replying to my comment about Ashley Tellis.

        I appreciate it.

        I must say I have no hesitation in saying that I feel a sense of schadenfreude with regards to his arrest.

        As far as I know, he was entrusted by the Americans to ensure that the IAF bought the US F-16. Thankfully, it didn’t happen.

        But, the Americans didn’t give up. I think after S. Jaishankar retired as the Foreign Secretary, the Tata Group gave him a job as a President due to his MEA background and also to ensure through him that the IAF bought the US F-16 which the Tata Group planned to manufacture in India, if the IAF selected it.

        Thankfully, before this could happen, he became the EAM.

        If he hadn’t become the EAM, God only knows, apart from the F-16, what else the IAF and the IN and the IA would have bought from the Americans!

      • F-16 didn’t go through, not because Jaishankar became EAM but because GOI is not so daft as to also have an American noose round its neck!

  5. Vikram Singh's avatar Vikram Singh says:

    “Luckless” or “inept”? Barring the flashes of brilliance in the 1971 war, IAF has sub-performed relative to PAF in every other war.

  6. Aditya Mishra's avatar Aditya Mishra says:

    @BharatKarnad

    A little bit correction Professor

    It was the J-10Ce that shot down a rafale and Not Jf-17

    And the fact is even PAF admitted this .

    Pls Correct this if possible from your side

  7. umayrh's avatar umayrh says:

    I confess I often disagree with your analysis but I absolutely love the diatribe: there’s red-hot passion behind your prose that’s just contagious. (from a fan in Lahore, PK).

  8. Lonestar Indian's avatar Lonestar Indian says:

    Hello Dr Karnad,

    am not an expert in air warfare or any warfare, for that matter.

    you mentioned in some of your earlier posts that the PAF fired at the Rafales while flying in passive mode, with their AWACS spotting the IAF bogeys as soon as they took off and feeding it to their JF-10s and 17s using network centric capability. This gave the IAF bogeys very less reaction time for evasive manoeuvres.

    Question #1 – Did the IAF not have its very own AWACS scanning the skies and spotting the PAF package? If they did, surely the PAF missile ranges, passive / active mode attack tactics would’ve been factored in, when IAF attack plans were drawn up? This feels like a basic risk management planning in any profession, let alone serious war games.

    Question #2 – assuming they were picked up, were they not engaged at the very onset? After the Abhinandan episode, the PAF intentions were very clear i.e. they won’t let an opportunity to take on the IAF go waste. So why were they let off or not engaged at all?

    Is it what the defence attache meant ‘by political will’? But I would expect the IAF to draw this up in its Rules of Engagement, rather than just deferring to the political masters.

    if the Day 1 attack had gone India’s way without any planes being lost, the subsequent wave of Brahmos attacks would’ve burnished the IAF’s reputation as a force not be messed around with. Their case for expensive Rafales could’ve been tolerated.

  9. Shivam's avatar Shivam says:

    Professor

    Inferiority complex is your answer. These people be it bureaucrats, military leadership have a deep ingrained inferiority complex.

    Clearing an exam can put you in position of power but not take away the cultural disorientation these folks have.

  10. Rituraj Rao's avatar Rituraj Rao says:

    India’s ‘Imported Air Force” !!

  11. Aditya Mishra's avatar Aditya Mishra says:

    @BharatKarnad

    Professor Karnad, sir i have a few questions

    you strongly advocate prioritising indigenous platforms such as Tejas and AMCA over imported fighters. Given their long development timelines and repeated delays, how do you reconcile this position with the very real operational risks created by capability gaps during their gestation period?

    At what specific point measured in force levels, threat escalation, or deterrence credibility does insistence on indigenisation cease to be strategic foresight and instead become strategic recklessness?

    In other words, who should bear responsibility if a conflict occurs while indigenous programmes are still maturing and the IAF lacks adequate numbers or capability?

    • Sorry, these issues involve lengthy replies. But I address them in my book. So, you’ll have to await it!

      • Aditya Mishra's avatar Aditya Mishra says:

        @BharatKarnad

        Absolutely, Sir, I would greatly appreciate a detailed, comprehensive reply rather than a brief one.

        I am also one of the correspondents on this blog, along with several other readers, eagerly awaiting your book.

        May I kindly ask if you have an anticipated timeline for its release perhaps

        Summer 2026?

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