Show dogs vs pit bulls and tension in the army

The unprecedented phenomenon of the carefully planned and orchestrated succession (I railed against) that fetched General Bikram Singh his promotion as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) is coming home to roost. There’s enormous tension between the army chief and his field commanders, who have little respect for a “political General” and resent his being hoisted on them and the fighting forces. The last such general, it may be recalled, was the little lamented BM Kaul appointed by his uncle and PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, to lead the newly constituted IV Corps during the short China War in 1962, and the next one too, Lt Gen Suhag,the present eastern command head who, in the Bikram manner, has been emplaced in line for shoehorning into the COAS-ship (this despite a vigilance case not hindering his elevation as GOC-in-C, Eastern Army) once Bikram finishes his tenure.

This has been particularly evident in the strained relations between the Northern Command and Bikram Singh. The issue came to a boil, and has been simmering ever since the April 2013 PLA armed intrusion into the Depsang Bulge. The army headquarters (AHQ) did nothing to temper the impression created of Indian army units being smacked around by the Chinese when the reality was that units of the Leh-based XIV Corps were all the time countering the Chinese, move for move, with “power patrolling” of their own. It came to a head when, even tho’ the Northern Army commander Lt Gen Parnaik was in Delhi, he was not asked to brief or even to assist in the briefing of the Defence Minister AK Antony and NSA Shivshankar Menon that COAS Bikram himself undertook to do, and from which Parnaik was entirely frozen out. So Bikram hogged the limelight, showcased his supposed grasp of the unfolding situation which the relevant army commander actually understood far better. Post-Parnaik, a reluctant Chachra, abruptly moved by Bikram from the Western Command chieftancy in Chandimandir to helm the Northern Army, bad blood between Udhampur and AHQ has continued. An additional reason for Chachra’s ire, it is snidely said, was his unhappiness with being moved to the hotspot from his Chandimandir perch, where he was happily passing time doing little other than supervising the completion of the construction of his bungalow in Gurgaon!

The problem of an army chief who isn’t respected by his commanders is a serious problem that will continue for several more years with Suhag in train. Indeed, there are disturbing parallels between Bikram and Kaul — both of them loquacious to the point of distraction, specializing if in anything than public relations — Kaul handled publicity material for the Eighth Army in the Maghreb; Bikram was army spokesman during the Kargil imbroglio — more show dogs than pit bulls. More on that some other time. It is a problem that’s seriously affecting the army. The seams are showing.

Posted in China, China military, civil-military relations, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army | Leave a comment

French frankness and Defence hard-sell

The French Defence Minister Jean Yves Le Drian at a talk in IDSA straightforwardly presented some of the points in the ‘Defence and National Security White Paper 2013’ (the last such document was issued in 2008). He emphasized the fact that both India and France prized “sovereignty” and “Strategic autonomy” as a strong basis for “convergence” of values, etc. He hard pitched the Rafale MMRCA (how Dassault Avions has had an India connection since the sale of the Ouragon fighter in the Fifties), and highlighted joint projects with DRDO on the anvil — scorpene SSKs, and short range missiles, and promised more such joint development and collaboration projects, but expressly ruled out any cooperation in the cyber war field which he said has to be done on a “national” basis.

The talk became fairly convoluted, however, when he sought to draw personal linkages with India — he was born, he said in a port-side district in Brittany called India, where a ship christened ‘Orient’ was being built for trade with India! This mercifully came at the very end and the connection sought to be made was bit of a stretch. More interestingly, he drew attention to the defence cooperation connection in the 18th century when the Anglo-French war in Europe had its repercussions in India where the French colonialists led by Dupleix clashed with their British counterparts — with the French naturally supporting native kings (Tipu Sultan) fighting the British, or who relied on French military advice and training (Ranjit Singh).

Le Drian sounded almost rueful about a lost “älternative world” had the French lorded it over the English. Of course, like the Pondicherrians, or is it now Puducherians (which sounds like an abuse!), instead of the English language, we’d all be speaking French and been a part of the Francophone cultural universe. The problem is would the French have not been more reluctant to let go of India than Britain, and how hard would they have resisted? The record suggests that like in Indo-China and Algeria, Paris would have been loath to let go of India and the parting would likely have been violent. On the plus side,the post-independence Indian leadership would not have been infused with the nonsense of Gandhian nonviolence and pacifism and general complacency that has so crippled Indian foreign and military policies post-1947, and we’d have had the satisfaction of winning freedom the hard way — not handed us by the Brits on a platter. This last was not because of Gandhi’s satyagraha and other myths, but because of the vulnerability of the Raj from a politically more alive Indian Army, which during WWII was being subverted by the pull of Netaji Subhas Bose’s militant nationalism.

But back to the present, to a direct question about whether France, unlike in the past, would help India develop its armaments design capacity — yea all the pesky things like source codes, flight control laws, and stuff like that, the French minister replied that Paris would be happy to help India acquire “command of manufacture” of weapons! In other words, France would be damned if it was going to set India up as an independent and autonomous producer of whole weapon systems. At least he was frank, because elsewhere in his address he added that “India’s security supported French economic interests”. In other words, the inter-governmental mechanism that the French have mooted is essentially to ensure transfer-of-technology only for manufacture. Thus, as far as France is concerned it’s business as usual, the same old “client-supplier” relationship Le Drian promised to overturn, staying firmly in place!

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, South Asia, Special Forces, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Western militaries | Leave a comment

Need to harden China policy

It is possible the Chinese may have bitten off more than they can chew. Beijing has rubbed three main countries of the Indo-Pacific region — Japan, the United States and India — the wrong way. This new triple entente constitutes a formidable coalition in the Indo-Pacific region to keep Chinese aggressiveness in check and will be difficult for Beijing to fend off.

China’s historic bogeyman, Japan, has sent Beijing a clear signal. The Japanese people have just given, perhaps, their most nationalistic post-War prime minister, Shinzo Abe, a majority in the upper house to go with the two-thirds majority his Liberal Democratic Party enjoys in the lower house, mainly because of his strong stance against a bullying China. To add to recent provocations in the Senkaku Islands area, Beijing ordered most of its flotilla, which had taken part in a massive joint exercise (“Joint Sea 2013”) with the Russian Pacific Fleet involving 19 warships, to return from the north by deliberately cutting west through the Soya Strait separating the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido and the Russian Sakhalin Peninsula, steaming round the Japanese archipelago and crossing the Tsushima Strait between the southern Kyushu Island and the Korean peninsula.

China exploited Japan’s limiting its sea territory (from the 12km) in the Soya narrows to 5.6km to facilitate the passage of nuclear-armed ships of the Yokosuka-based US Seventh Fleet. In the context of growing tensions, Tokyo’s Defence White Paper pointed to China’s attempts to “change the status quo by force based on its own assertion [of territorial claims]” — don’t we know it! It was followed up with Japan “nationalising” some 400 small, outlying islands and rock outcroppings that almost doubled its sea territory to 4.47 million sqkm and hinted at a deliberately proactive defence policy.

In the process of decamping from Afghanistan, the United States is seeking to implement its “rebalance” strategy involving a military build-up in the Far East. Indeed, with the extant Chinese maritime disputes with Japan and the countries of the Southeast Asian littoral, especially the Philippines in mind, the commander of the Seventh Fleet, vice admiral Scott Swift, recently warned China against succumbing to “the temptation to use coercion or force in an attempt to resolve differences between nations”.

Two of the three pillars of the Indo-Pacific security architecture that can stabilise the evolving “correlation of forces” are solid. The third is India — the confused laggard in all matters remotely strategic. As usual, New Delhi is thrashing around clueless, despite being repeatedly smacked around by China. The incident in April this year in Ladakh’s Depsang Valley was not a one-off thing. Mid-June the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units again crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC), ransacked the Chumar observation post the Chinese at the time of the earlier event had wanted dismantled. Except, this facility is actually a strategically-located post at a height affording a panoramic view of the PLA disposition in the valley below, and which the Indian Army had rigged up for remote 24/7 photo-imagery. The PLA intruders destroyed this surveillance system. As if to prove that such armed intrusions are going to be a monthly occurrence, on July 15-17 and again last week, and then on July 21, PLA troops violated the LAC.

What was most worrisome about these developments were the Indian Army’s initial reactions. It supported the ministry of external affairs’ (MEA) contention of the Chumar post as a “tin shed”, dismissed the June incident as “minor”, and passed off the first July PLA intrusion as “banner drills” — an innocuous unfurling of banners. It is as if the Army Headquarters (AHQ) was trying hard to avoid a rumble with the PLA in the face of the Chinese military’s determined bids to rub India’s nose in the dirt. Elsewhere, at the same time, Beijing was detected funnelling fake Indian currency through the Pakistan ISI gateway to destabilise the Indian economy. And still the Indian government believes China plays by Queensberry Rules.

AHQ’s “shrinking lilly” stance may have been due to the MEA’s insistence that Chinese feathers were best left unruffled with the talks on July 23-24 to negotiate a “border defence co-operation agreement” (BDCA) on the anvil. However, responding with alacrity and in kind to aggressive Chinese patrolling of LAC would have signalled a more forceful Indian posture and provided Indian negotiators leverage more than MEA’s girly policy of complaining, and sobbing in our sleeves. New Delhi may not have agreed to China’s condition that as part of the deal for peace and tranquillity Tibetans trying to escape their PLA-occupied homeland and into India be rounded up and handed back to Chinese authorities — the sort of understanding Beijing extracted out of the Nepalese government. But where else has the MEA stood its ground? Adding more sites for “border personnel meetings” and “hot lines” between AHQ and PLA command, or between the theatre commanders, etc. will not stop the Chinese troops violating the LAC at will. The only counter to PLA incursions is aggressive and like provocative actions by Indian units up to the Indian claim line but with adequate force-surge capacity, which Army needs to build-up, pronto.

Such an approach, however, goes against the callow policy of the Manmohan Singh regime. While the MEA minister Salman Khurshid in the run-up to the BDCA talks stated that the government was working “for peace as much as for tough times”, in practice it seems inclined to achieving peace the easy way — by appeasement. Instead of instituting them against China, tough, punitive, measures are used to cow down small states. With Khurshid expressly helming the effort reminiscent of Rajiv Gandhi’s economic blockade of Nepal in the late 1980s, Bhutan was brought to heel by threats of ending a gas subsidy. Rajiv succeeded in alienating Nepal then, Khurshid has upset Thimpu now. It is certain Bhutan too will nurse a grudge, which Beijing will exploit. Acting cowardly where China is concerned and as a bully with our other neighbours has resulted in geostrategic opportunities the Chinese quickly capitalised on to shrink India’s regional profile, relevance and standing.

[Published in the ‘New Indian Express’ July 26, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Need-to-harden-China-policy/2013/07/26/article1701926.ece

Posted in Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Indian Ocean, Japan, Northeast Asia, Russia, russian military, South Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Western militaries | 1 Comment

India – America’s 52nd State?

The pull on Indian legislators of “planet America” (in Christopoher Hitchens’ words) is so strong that some 65 Members of Parliament — 40 of them from the Rajya Sabha, have allowed themselves to be sucked into that planet’s orbit and have, apparently, recruited themselves into a campaign to make India a subsidiary to the United States! How else to explain these worthies signing a letter on the parliamentary letterhead addressed to the current US President Barack Obama, in effect, pleading with him to continue denying Narendra Modi an American visa and entry into the US? The letter dated November 26, 2012 marshaled by a Rajya Sabha JD(U) member, Mohammad Adeeb, made the argument for such action by detailing an entirely Indian domestic issue — the Gujarat riots of 2002, an internal matter that is of no concern to any outside power. Unsurprisingly, among the signatories is the CPI MP Sitaram Yechury. It puts me in mind of the anti-imperialist poseurs, who are dime a dozen, whom Jairam Ramesh lampooned with a tweaked Communist Party slogan — “Yankee Go Home and take us with you”! This Indian political “initiative” set up the American head of state as judge and adjudicator on an issue that establishes the US President as the sovereign over India! And this, mind, was instigated by member of Indian Parliament, that represents this country’s sovereignty. They might as well have petitioned the White House for consideration of India as the 52nd state of the American Union! These are the depths to which the so-called secularist forces are willing to plunge this proud country.

Consider the domestic political impact of the revelation of this letter had those signed this missive not had the misstep of Rajnath Singh, as I called it in my last blog, to point to. However unfortunate the BJP president’s enterprise (in trying to secure Modi an American visa), what needs to be kept in mind is the chronology — the letter by the MPs was mailed late last year. It would have come to light some time or the other in the runup to the general elections, and the sh..t would have hit the fan in any case. So Rajnath’s faux pas will be seen in retrospect as a mindlessly executed self-goal.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Indian Politics, Internal Security, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US. | Leave a comment

BJP Rajnath’s wrong steps

Bharatiya Janata Party President Rajnath Singh has taken a few missteps. The first one was his unthinkingly parroting the line that education in the English language medium is a measure of retrogression when, whether any body likes it or not, it is now the universal lingua franca. This is something Hindu cowbelt politicians seem unable to grasp when the contrary proof is all around them. In the remotest villages of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh may be espied schools advertising themselves as “convents” named after some Saint or the other promising “English education”. It is an aspirational thing. why otherwise would the supposedly ‘samajwadi” (socialist) leader such as Mulayam Singh — whose English language skills are nonexistent, send his son Akhilesh (CM, UP) for further education to Australia? The people see competence in English language as passport to better life which all the socialists, including Sonia Gandhi and her Congress gang running the country, are determined to deny them by insisting pitiable education in any language at all local levels even as their own progeny go abroad for their academic degrees. Hopefully, Narendra Modi will have no truck with this kind of attitude and will go public with an educational scheme that will have local language as medium of instruction up to the junior school level, with English language as compulsory language, so that high school and education thereafter in the English medium is something these children can ease into. China is often cited as that great success story in retaining Mandarin, except Beijing finding itself hindered in the science and technology streams has fast-paced English language instruction even as India with a beneficent legacy of “English education” is out to destroy what remains of a once fairly strong education base.

The second wrong step of Rajnath’s is his intention to plead with the US authorities in Washington and elsewhere to ease up on the visa restrictions on the BJP standard-bearer Narendra Modi, so far denied him on account of pressure from human rights groups, spearheaded by many Indian minority organizations of NRIs in that country, for his non-role in the 2002 riots. Such pleading is the wrong tack to take for a party that expects to helm the next govt in Delhi. Indeed, if anything and for reasons of personal self-respect conflated with the nation’s, Narendra Modi should refuse to visit the US as Prime Minister other than for the customary annual trip to New York for the UN General Assembly meeting in October. It will signal Washington that it cannot treat an Indian leader with disdain and then expect him as the head of the Govt of India to forget such inexcusable behavior.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Indian Politics, Internal Security, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US. | 3 Comments

Biden trip and the issue of “rebalancing in Asia”

US Vice President Joe Biden will be in Mumbai and Delhi, July 22-24, and is expected to reinforce the message sent by American trade and commercial interests who hope to gain greater traction in the Indian market, by reiterating the issues last raised by the visiting Secretary of state John Kerry. On the basis of Finance Minister Chidambaram’s and Commerce minister Anil Sharma’s Washington trips, GOI has already eased up in certain areas. But no grand concessions will be made in the context of the US government not easing up on the issue of the mobility of skilled labour in IT and other sector and the vexed matter of H1B visas.

This only highlights the differences within the US policy circles about just how to deal with India without also dealing with Pakistan. These differences were emphasized by the public disagreement between two recognized experts — Steve Cohen of Brookings and Ashley Tellis of Carnegie. At a recent launch of the former’s book — ‘Shooting for a Century’ (nice play on words) — a pessimistic take on the future of Indo-Pak relations, Cohen called if not for re-hyphenation than to treating South Asia as a single policy unit, without considering the complications arising out of falling back on the old ways of thinking that do not take into account the quite enormous and widening disparities in every respect between the two main subcontinental states. Tellis, more realistically, affirmed that that the United States has ‘no intrinsic interests’ in South Asia beyond ensuring India and Pakistan do not come to nuclear blows — which, as I have argued, is about as plausible as present day UK having a nuclear exchange with France for very different sets of reasons, of course!

Indeed, the evolving US rebalance to Asia substantially washes its hands off South Asia in particular, and the Indian Ocean in general — a case I have detailed in my forthcoming book — ‘India’s Rise: Why It’s Not a Great Power (Yet)’ to be published in Sept/Oct (2013) in Washington by Potomac Books (formerly Brassey’s). It is therefore left to India as the central power in the Indian Ocean region to decide whether it wants to continue being tethered to the small-weak-but-great-nuissance of a Pakistani state, or act the big power in the extended Indian Ocean region (encompassing Central Asia on the landward side) and largely shut out China from straying to west of the Malacca Straits.

Power vacuum is being created by the US pulling out of Afghanistan, more fully than earlier indicated by Washington. The skeletal US Special Forces presence in that country and the perpetuation of the ‘drone war’ against the Taliban is neither here nor there, subject as these will be to US calculations of short-term gain.

Whether Biden will explore these kinds of topics of salience to India and the other countries of the region is doubtful. That they will not be resolved to anyone’s satisfaction is a certainty.

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, Central Asia, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Ocean, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Special Forces, United States, US., Western militaries | Leave a comment

Unprepared for anything

There are three unalterable constants when natural and man-made disasters strike in India – there is almost always a prior alert or intelligence report that is ignored, local administration and police and government generally at all levels (local, state, and central) disappear from the scene, and the army fills the breach — the only orderly presence engaged in saving people and restoring a semblance of order. The recent Uttarakhand floods featured the three constants as had the earlier natural disasters, such as the horrid cyclonic storms that lashed the Odisha coast in the late 1990s. The question is two-fold: Why are alerts and prior intelligence invariably disregarded by the government – as evidenced, once again, in the Bodh Gaya bombing — and why do official organizations dematerialize from the impacted areas at just the point in time when they are most needed?

The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is, of course, a bad joke. Previously housed in the rundown public sector Centaur Hotel (near the airport) but now occupying a swanky blue glass building in South Delhi, it does little other than provide sinecures for politicians and post-retirement jobs for superannuated bureaucrats and the like. NDMA also guzzles public funds — to the extent of Rs. 864 crores in the last fiscal, makes paper plans for managing disasters, but once disasters actually happen, there is nary a hint on the ground of plans having been implemented, and the usual helter-skelter recovery efforts, ensue leaving the NDMA trawling for excuses. In the Uttarakhand case the NDMA Chairman, Shashidhar Reddy, a Congress Party honcho, blamed the agency’s failure on not getting the Doppler radars to detect the formation of cloud-bursts! There being no system of accountability, excuses and finger-pointing is the norm in the wake of diasters.

Some disasters are wholly the product of the way the government system routinely (mal)functions. The 1999 hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu to Kandahar by way of Amritsar was preventable. Indeed, the military, para-military forces, and various civilian outfits had practised pre-empting just such an incident, including stationing a truck in front of the aircraft to prevent it taking off, and thereafter mounting action by commando to infiltrate the aircraft and rush the hijackers. This training exercise was codenamed ‘Sour Grapes’. But when the plane landed for refuelling in Amritsar, the predictable happened. The lessons of the exercise were forgotten, and the emergency committee commandeered by the then National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra couldn’t communicate with Amritsar, the only order getting through was to the Army formation surrounding the Raja Sansi Airport to stand down, do nothing as the plane was refuelled and flew off with the Islamic extremists cocking a snook at the country.

The response to every new uncontained disaster is the same old bureaucratic solution – new committees and organizations to add to the layer upon layer of bureaucracy piled up over the years that gum up the works and complicate authority lines and decision-making. Thus the 26/11 episode was followed by the mooting of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (of the kind the CIA has) as the apex body to coordinate, collate, and process intelligence data streaming in from a plethora of agencies. Except the National Grid (Natgrid) was already established for this purpose.

It leads one to ponder the worst — the horrendous consequences and the aftermath of, say, a nuclear attack. Over the last 15 years, when addressing military audiences on nuclear doctrine and strategy, I have made it a point to bring up the little matter of the “No First Use” (NFU) principle embedded in the country’s nuclear doctrine. It elicits knowing laughter when I tell the officers that for a country that is unable to handle a seasonal phenomenon, such as “a Monsoon strike” that can be predicted to the hour and reduces Indian cities to extended lakes, to imagine it can absorb a nuclear first strike, and retain its wit and wherewithal to launch a retaliatory counter-strike as decreed by the Indian nuclear doctrine is, beyond fantastical to, in fact, be delusional!

And yet, the NFU is one of the central pillars of India’s nuclear strategy requiring that, notwithstanding any intelligence of an adversary planning a surprise nuclear attack, Indian strategic forces will have to bide their time, wait patiently for the enemy to first vaporize an Indian metropolis, say, at his convenience, before a nuclear missile salvo is permitted to be fired in retaliation. The country’s institutional/systemic weaknesses and the government’s inability to keep its head and nerve in a crisis of any kind, should have been factored into drafting the nuclear doctrine, and NFU discarded at that stage, but it wasn’t. The NFU, incidentally, was hotly debated by the doctrine drafting group in the National Security Advisory Board and incorporated any way for all the wrong reasons and without reference to an absent civil defence system and infrastructure.

NDMA, incidentally, is tasked with drawing up plans for dealing with nuclear bombed Indian cities or, more plausibly, the triggering of radiation diffusion devices (“dirty bombs”). Hopefully, NDMA has stocked up on the anti-radiation potassium idodate pills and, perhaps, has made plans for evacuating people and, in case of alerts being available, of removing large parts of the population, for instance, to the tunnelled portions of the track on which the Metro trains run – such tunnels being perfect underground nuclear shelters. Except, such evacuation/safety measures will have to be repeatedly practiced by the people and conducted by NDMA, with the tunnels being provisioned with sufficient food, medicines, etc.

But civil defence exercises to train city folk on what to do, where to go, and why to avoid mass hysteria, panic and pandemonium have not so far been undertaken by NDMA in any city, and the first time its plans will be rolled out is only post-nuclear attack. Then, it will be discovered that everything which works well on paper, in actual practice, will go horribly wrong. In the event, people will be left free to deal with this cataclysm the best they can, mostly on their own.

[Published in the ‘New Indian Express’ July 12, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Unprepared-for-anything/2013/07/12/article1678942.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian para-military forces, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism | 1 Comment

America’s trump card in the subcontinent

The Four-man “Abottabad Commission” to inquire into reasons why the US Special Forces could hunt down Osama bin Laden, swoop down all the way from Jalalabad on his safe-house just outside the gates of the Pakistan Military Academy, kill him, and spirit his body away for disposal without the Pakistan Army, intel services, and state and local police being any the wiser, submitted its report. What it has to say is unimportant because it was predictable. After all, with the Pakistan govt’s first reaction immediately after the raid having been that no agency of state and not the military had any hand in this operation, it would have been silly to expect this commission to actually hold anyone responsible, least of all the ISI. Though it was the DG, ISI, Lt Gen Shuja Pasha’s understanding with the Americans that US govt agencies could prosecute their drone war inside Pakistan — apparently, the paper-thin diplomatic instrument Washington used to send in its SF raiders into Pakistan, which included the Pakistani commitment to standing-down its radar units. How else to explain US helicopters even if with stealth rotary features, etc negotiating some 200 kms of Pakistani territory from the Afghan base to Abottabad and back — a mission that lasted over three hours, going entirely undetected by any Pakistani ground- and air-based sensors? Moreover, however stealthy, the helicopters still make an infernal amount of noise which nevertheless still didn’t alert anybody in the PMA compound and nearby Divisional HQrs?! If the Paki intent was to put up a fight — which of course was never intended — the land forces in and around Abottabad had enough time — nearly half an hour from the time the first SF troops landed in the bin Laden compound to one of the copters going down to raiding team egressing — to engage the US SF. The most important aspect of the Commission’s report, however, is elsewhere in Pasha’s reporting to the Commission about what he was told by a US intel official: “You are cheap…you can be bought for a visa.” Ouch! But, isn’t that the trump card the Americans always play in India as well — the VISA?

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Special Forces, United States, US., Western militaries | Leave a comment

More on ASMP-A, Brahmos, HCM MIRV-ed warheads

Missed a zero! With hypersonic cruise glide MIRVed warheads (not glide-bombs) on A-5 and successor A-6, the range actually is increased by 2000-3000 kms (not 200 kms as mentioned in my previous blog on the subject). So, an 8000 km A-5 becomes a near ICBM with 11000 km range (tho’, strictly speaking, 12000 kms range defines ICBM).

Further on ASMP-A, it can go supersonic at low altitude but isn’t maneuverable at these heights because its MiG-25-type air-intakes would be pulled sunder. At tree-top height it, in fact, becomes a “dumb bullet” that a mobile target can avoid, rendering ASMP-A vulnerable to interception. Brahmos, on the other hand, can pull an S-maneuver at very low altitudes. This was proved in the 2nd Brahmos test in the desert, destroying a target 20 kms away with pinpoint accuracy after relying on the Russian Glonass GPS. (The first Brahmos test failed, it may be recalled, because the US GPS it was using to cue to target “blinked” at a crucial moment in time in its flight path.)

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Cyber & Space, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian para-military forces, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US. | 2 Comments

India’s nuclear amateurism

Secretary of State John Kerry reminded New Delhi that the United States expects India to toe its line on non-proliferation and get a move on in signing the Missile Technology Control Regime, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. One hopes New Delhi will not give way on any of these issues even if membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is the prize because, as it is, the Indian nuclear deterrent is grievously handicapped. First, by untested, unproven, thermonuclear weapons with design flaws no amount of simulation can correct, whence resumption of testing becomes imperative, and secondly, matching this hardware deficiency are the “software” problems – doctrinal weaknesses and inadequate understanding in government circles of nuclear weapons and strategy.

The latter aspect was illustrated by Shyam Saran, Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former Foreign Secretary holding forth last month (May 3) on nuclear issues and, predictably, making a hash of it. Considering a Chinese military unit was holding Ladakhi real estate then, Saran went off on an anti-Pakistan tangent instead! It confirmed the suspicion that the government is unable to differentiate issues of strategic importance from lesser concerns and, as regards nuclear security, is all at sea. Informed Pakistanis promptly dismissed it as “bluster”, deeming India “a blundering nuclear power”.

At the heart of Saran’s talk was the wrong take on nuclear matters that has calcified into a strategic gospel in official quarters, courtesy the late K. Subrahmanyam, starting with the belief that nuclear testing is incidental to the credibility of the deterrent, evident in his canvassing for India’s signature on CTBT in 1995-96 which Saran rightly said “would have permanently foreclosed [development of] a credible and fully tested nuclear deterrent”. Except, the problem of untested hydrogen weapons persists owing to the no-testing predicate of the India-US nuclear deal supported by Subrahmanyam and Company, and negotiated by Saran. It reflects the cavalier disregard for nuclear testing which is particularly stark in the context of the Field Director of the 1998 tests, K. Santhanam recommending the re-testing of a rectified thermonuclear weapon design because the one that was tested failed.

Saran’s plea to “make public” the official nuclear doctrine, which he said was virtually the draft produced by NSAB in 1998, was of a piece with his asking for an annual numerical accounting of the country’s nuclear forces. He didn’t pause to wonder why no other nuclear weapon state to-date has disclosed its nuclear doctrine, and why China and Pakistan are unlikely ever to reveal their weapons inventory details. The public release of the draft-doctrine to win points for transparency with America and gain traction for the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), was an appalling mistake by the BJP government that the Congress regime converted into the wrecking ball of the Indo-US nuclear deal, which destroyed the integrity of the country’s dual-use nuclear energy programme.

Ambiguity is at the core of nuclear deterrence and dissuasion. It isn’t advanced by making the doctrine an open document, even less by revealing weapons strength. Having disclosed the doctrine, however, the strategic initiative passed to the adversary states with the good sense to divulge nothing. China increased the “daunting uncertainties” for India by bringing conventional missiles under the control of its Second Artillery nuclear forces, and Pakistan developed the 60 km Nasr (Hatf IX) guided rocket.

The dense fog of ignorance of nuclear deterrence matters blanketing Indian government circles has eventuated in a hollow strategy emphasizing “massive retaliation” as response to tactical first use of nuclear weapon by Pakistan (on Indian armour, say, inside Pakistani territory). Promising massive nuclear destruction as retaliatory action, in the circumstances, only undermines the credibility of the Indian deterrent as it violates the principle of proportionality, which is the essence of “flexible response”. A version of this concept — “punitive response” was central to the original NSAB draft-doctrine. Owing to the usual mix of abominable advice and mindless attitudinizing lashed with deep illiteracy on these issues, “punitive response” was replaced by “massive retaliation”. All it did was spur accelerated production of weapon-grade plutonium, warheads, and missiles by Pakistan which an India, fixated on Pakistan and “minimum” deterrence, finds unable to match, what to talk of China! Truth is massive retaliation cannot doctrinally coexist with the “minimum deterrence” notion the Indian government seems wedded to. That is common sense but try telling it to the glib talkers in official quarters.

Much was also made by him of commentaries concluding India acquired nuclear weapons for status and prestige, not for reasons of security. But why is this conclusion wrong considering India reached the weapons threshold with its plutonium reprocessing capability in early 1964 but did not weaponize after China exploded an atomic device in October that year, and with the military humiliation of 1962 as backdrop? Contrast this with the single-minded, no-nonsense, threat-propelled, Chinese and Pakistani programmes to obtain meaningful nuclear arsenals fast, even as the Indian weapons programme meandered, its progress hampered by dreams of disarmament last manifested in the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan.

That the Indian government has time and again veered off into the murk of nuclear power politics without being equipped for the task is due to the generalist diplomats and civil servants playing at nuclear strategists. Saran admitted that the country had suffered from bad advice to “defer the acquisition of a nuclear weapon arsenal as long as there was still hope that the world would eventually move towards a complete elimination of these weapons”, and that it was “undeniable” that “mistakes [were] made, sometimes opportunities [were] missed or our judgements were misplaced.”

The cumulative debilitating effect of such rank bad, and amateurish, counsel is reflected in the manner India is strategically handicapped today. It indicates a fool’s world our diplomats (especially, denizens of MEA’s Disarmament Division that Saran served in), senior civil servants, political leaders and increasingly senior military officers hewing to the government line, live in. Elimination of nuclear weapons, really?

[Published in the New Indian Express, June 28, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/indias-nuclear-amateurism/2013/06/28/article1655987.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Politics, nonproliferation, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Pakistan nuclear forces, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Western militaries | 29 Comments