India’s submarine production

Posted on August 23, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The Sindhurakshak tragedy raises many issues, among them, the danger of close-berthing of warships and submarines in the crowded Mumbai docks and the need urgently to commission the Karwar base to host most of the Western Fleet and take the pressure off Mumbai harbour and, given the dangerous depletion in submarine strength, the urgency to lease Kilo subs from, say, Vietnam, which has acquired six of them and whose submarine crews are being trained here, and move quickly on Project 75i – the supposed final step before full indigenization of diesel submarine design and production.

Strangely, while the navy’s strategic-minded leadership has a firm grip on issues relating to surface combatants, confidence deserts them when it comes to in-country production of conventional submarines (SSKs). This is perplexing considering the expertise the navy has gained in designing, project management, and system integration in the programme to produce nuclear-powered submarines. As follow-on to the three Arihant-class ballistic missile-firing boats (SSBNs), a bigger, more advanced, SSBN is in the pre-production phase, and a design for nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSN) is nearing firm-up. Navy’s plan was to learn from and absorb the best attributes of the western and Russian submarines and to gain from their differing design philosophies and manufacturing techniques, and to use them to come up with a wholly new design and indigenous production regime for a diesel hunter-killer submarine (SSK) to constitute the navy’s bulk sea denial force. The concept of parallel production lines realized with the selection of the HDW 209 German submersible quickly unravelled with the financial scandal attending on that deal struck during the Indira Gandhi-imposed Emergency of the mid-1970s – a fore-runner of defence scams that have blotted defence acquisitions ever since. Its local production proceeded with the customary delays and cost-over-runs the defence public sector units (DPSUs) are habituated to until it was abandoned. The corpus of hard-gained production competence and industrial skills by the Mazgaon shipyard in disciplines such as high-pressure welding to achieve micron tolerances, were thus wasted because successor governments, including those headed by the Congress party, distanced themselves from the taint of the original scandal. In the meantime, the Russian Kilos were acquired to fill the breach.

Some twenty years on another western submarine was chosen, Scorpene from France. A deal was finalized in 2006 by yet another Congress government and, once again, allegations of illegal payoffs surfaced. But just when the aspect of alongside production of a Russian boat came up and the Amur-class SSK identified as appropriate to the country’s needs, global tendering was introduced. Russia discovered it had to compete for the Project 75i contract with a number of western suppliers, and needed to provide incentives/sweeteners to surpass whatever the competition can muster. In the event, it has made a clever offer the Indian Navy cannot refuse and which consolidates its presence.

This offer is rumoured to have the following features: Russia will lease for $1.5 billion a second nuclear powered Akula SSN – Irbis, lying mothballed in Severodvinsk, to be delivered by end-2014; both INS Chakra and Irbis will be upgraded to Akula-III standard by incorporating the latest technology, including hull-mounted sensors to, for instance, detect thermoclines – thermal layers in the Indian Ocean that make sonar detection difficult and enable submarines to “hide” in them. These sensors will be retrofitted on the Arihant, and equip the two follow-on sister ships. Irbis SSN will moreover come equipped with the Shtil (Storm) torpedo (to also equip Chakra) that can close in on targets at uninterdictable speeds touching 280 knots, and a vertical launch system “plug” accommodating a mix of 40 K-15 land attack missiles and the first of the Indian submarine-launched K-4 ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It will in effect convert the Akulas from exclusively warship and submarine hunters into more versatile platforms able also to reach deep hinterland targets and take out littoral sites with land attack cruise missiles.

The new 75i design will boast of similar weapons profile with Indian naval designers and engineers invited to work alongside their counterparts in the Russian design bureau right from conception all the way to design and delivery stages, thereby enhancing the Indian Navy’s all-round skills and competence to handle submarine design and oversee submarine production generally. In the wake of the Sindhurakshak mishap, moreover, the additional safety of a double hull (permitting high reserve of buoyancy) and platform versatility enabling a single boat to carry out multiple missions – central to Russian design philosophy, have obvious appeal.

It is, in fact, the differences in the western and the Russian design philosophies that have seriously divided the Directorate-General Naval Design-Submarine Design Group at the Naval Headquarters (NHQ), stalemating for long the crucial decision on standardizing the diving depth and delaying indigenization. These differences persist, according to Vice Admiral K.N. Sushil (Retd.), an experienced submariner and former head of the Southern Naval Command, who personally prefers the western single hull design, despite the fact that Western suppliers will not transfer sensitive technologies (such as optronic masts) or do a “lot of hand-holding” that diffident Indian production companies still require, which only the Russians are prepared to do.

The indecision has prevented, he maintains, the establishing of other standards such as for “the operating pressures of the hydraulics and high pressure air systems, pressure hull materials, weld normative, hydraulic and high-pressure air pipelines, manifolds, valves, etc.” common [to nuclear and conventional submarines] and deterred the build-up of local capacity. Were it otherwise, the “scale” of work would prompt investment in the latest tooling and other manufacturing wherewithal to produce different types of submarines by private sector companies, such as Larsen & Toubro, Tata, and Pipavav without whose participation fully indigenized production, Sushil believes, will languish at the elementary level of assembling from imported CKD (Completely Knocked Down) kits the DPSUs are stuck at. The under-utilization of the more capable and efficient private sector, as the regressive-minded defence production department in the ministry headed by the leftist A.K. Antony would have it, means the country can kiss self-reliance in armaments Good Bye.

[Published in the New Indian Express’Aug 23, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Indias-submarine-production/2013/08/23/article1746951.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Weapons, Western militaries | 17 Comments

VADM KN Sushil (Retd) on Sindhurakshak incident

Posted on August 18, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Reproduced below are some thoughts of importance on the Sindhurakshak incident emailed me by a veteran submariner, VADM KN Sushil, who retired as Flag-Officer-Commanding-in-C, Southern Naval Command:

1 On the night of 13/14 just before midnight two explosions rocked the submarine and a huge ball of fire escaping from the conning tower hatch, the only hatch that is left open in harbour, lit the night sky. Briefly thereafter the submarine sank alongside. The 18 crew members who formed the duty watch were missing. The nature of the incident would immediately suggest that of the 18 only few who may have been in the aft-most compartments would have had any chance of survival. Normally, in harbour nobody goes to the aft compartments except for periodic rounds. The nature of the incident, the loss of the submarine alongside and the tragic loss of lives of those eighteen ill fated crew members makes it vital for the Navy to find the exact cause which triggered the accident.

2. It is very easy in such incidents to jump to conclusions and air some pet theories. Sabotage, problems with the modifications, hydrogen explosion or some handling accident that set off the chain of events are some of the pet theories floating—the most appealing being the sabotage theory because it makes this incident an open and shut case. To find the truth is vital because the navy needs to determine for itself not only the causes of this incident but put in place procedures and precautions that would ensure that such incidents never recur. The men also need to know that we can determine the fault lines and set them right so that they have the confidence to continue to work in the potentially dangerous environment that exists on board any submarines.

3, From available information, the submarine was being prepared for an operational deployment and was expected to sail early in the morning. The entire crew was scheduled to arrive on board at about 0300 hrs to prepare the submarine for sea. The full outfit of 18 weapons consists of a mixture of missiles, oxygen torpedoes and electric torpedoes with 6 stowed in the tubes and 12 on racks in the torpedo compartment. Normally weapons kept on the racks are not “armed”. This means that mechanisms and devices that are required to cause the High Explosives in the war heads to explode are not placed thus rendering them safe. If we take into consideration that only two explosions were heard it would be apparent that the remaining 16 warheads each containing approximately 250 Kgs of HE did not explode. This inherent stability and safety of warhead design played a vital role in mitigating collateral damage. Of the two explosions heard the first or the “trigger” could not have been a warhead explosion. Taking into consideration that heat and flame intensity would have been considerably higher after the second explosion and that 16 explosions were not heard the second explosion also could not have been a warhead explosion. Therefore prima facie the trigger explosion appears to be from the weapon fuel—i.e. either oxygen from the torpedo or the booster of the missile. Anyhow what is important from a professional stand point is that apparently damaging explosions were caused only from the trigger source and the adjacent weapon. Other weapons do not appear to have contributed to the damage. The Board of Inquiry I am sure, will concentrate on these issues.

4. Normally an investigation will have recourse to various materials, log books and eyewitness accounts . In this incident the flame travel from the forward compartments to the control would have incinerated everything. Reconstructing the events that led to the accident would be difficult to say the least. Therefore the board will have to depend on advanced forensics to help it analyse the incident. Essentially this would entail chemical analysis of various materials to see if we can determine the nature of fuel that caused the burn. A lot of valuable evidence will lie in the debris of the fore ends. Much of this will be diluted by the sea water and most of it will be lost in the pumping out that will have to be done to bring the submarine to the surface. The board of inquiry will need to take advice from experts in forensic chemical and accident investigation to chalk out and plan a course of action to collect samples before it is too late.

5. The damage control design basis of the submarines provides for survival and maintenance of sufficient reserve of buoyancy when the pressure hull is breached and one compartment is fully flooded and two adjacent ballast tanks are destroyed. This is when the submarine is trimmed for neutral buoyancy. The submarine puts on a diving trim by flooding various tanks at sea to avoid the tanks from having dirty water that obtains in harbour. Therefore the submarine would have been 100 tons lighter than its normal diving trim. Despite this the submarine sank alongside. Nobody can provide a design basis that would allow floatation under conditions that existed on Sindhurakshak on that fateful night. What is worrying is that had the accident occurred any time later or at sea the death toll would have been devastating and the submarine would have been lost. The Navy does not have any submarine rescue capability. The Navy would have had no moral force to explain why the DSRV programme did not fruition even after 13 years. A lot of moral hot air was blown after the Kursk incident but we still do not have the capability.

6 . The Chief of Naval Staff said we will hope for the best and prepare for the worst. It is high time that we equipped ourselves to prepare for the worst but teach ourselves to ensure that we have the best.

Posted in Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, South Asia, Technology transfer, Terrorism, Weapons | Tagged | 6 Comments

Some developments re: Sindhurakshak

Posted on August 16, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Despite the CNS ADM DK Joshi’s rejecting the possibility of sabotage, stories are swirling around about just such possibility as the cause for the sinking of Sindhurakshak early morning Aug 14.

For such stories to bear out necessarily presumes one of two things: That one or more of the 18 crewmen who died were saboteurs, suicide-bombers if you will, who had been recruited to its cause by a foreign country. This doesn’t seem right because each of the dead crewmen was an experienced hand, vetted by the navy for submarine service and with family members to care for on shore. Or, that a weapon was configured for a timed blast, which also presumes the collusion and culpability of some naval personnel in the logistics and ordnance loops.

More likely, it was a misstep, a genuine accident, perhaps– a momentary overlap between weapons loading and battery charging — the latter process emitting combustible hydrogen gas, which two procedures are prohibited from being conducted simultaneously. Or, the mishap could have happened, as Ilya Kramnik, the military commentator for the ‘Voice of Russia’ has speculated, because of “careless handling of ammunition” which requires “a specially reinforced control” designed for “tropical conditions” — something, incidentally, he rules out because of the high level of training of the Indian submarine crews.

VOR also reports that the Russian submarine specialists from the ‘Severodvinsk-based ship repair centre Zvyozodochka” responsible for the recent refit of the Kilo-class boat have not been permitted to visit the site of the mishap. (See the VOR story at http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_08_16/Russian-specialists-not-allowed-to-sunken-submarine-site-in-Mumbai-6833/ ) These Russian experts are in town to probably meet contingencies during the warranty period.

But no negative inferences ought to be drawn from the fact of the resident Russian experts being kept out of the mishap site and the work of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) for the obvious reason that they are a vested party and, if exposed to the site and the damaged submarine before the BOI gets to examining the remains of the submarine after it is dredged up, have an interest in putting a spin on events leading to the explosion in the weapons section of the sub to minimize the Zvyozodochka’s liability in the warranty period. Indeed, it is the proper thing to do. The Russians can always be allowed access after the BOI investigation is over to come up with a separate report if they wish, in order to compare the two reports to see if there are any convergences. And to rectify technical weaknesses in the refit program that the Russian centre can then resolve and correct, while also owning up to the liability.

Posted in Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, South Asia | 2 Comments

Babu Vs. Leader

Posted on August 15, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Juxtaposing the addresses of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from the Red Fort and the Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi in Bhuj on the occasion of Independence Day, the differences and sort of leadership they provide could not have been any starker. That Modi had in fact set up this comparison was at once great political theatre and a straight forward invitation to the people of the country to judge the quality of competing BJP and Congress party leaderships on offer come the next general elections.

On one side was a weary lifelong bureaucrat and, by his own definition, än “accidental prime minister” hoisted and retained in the post by Congress president Sonia Gandhi owing to ten years of leadership drought which, considering that the designated dynastic heir Rahul Gandhi has not used to flesh out his creds, will continue with another appointee — possibly Finance Minister Chidambaram filling in for Manmohan should the Congress somehow return to power, however unlikely the prospect. Chidambram replaces a frustrated Pranob Mukherji who chose a tenure in Rashtrapati Bhavan than fight the losing fight of trying to convince Sonia that his show of prime ministerial ambition on the death of Indira Gandhi was an aberration, on the Congress totem pole!

So one saw Manmohan Singh with his trademark but understandable hangdog look reading mechanically from a speech written by PMO underlings, tiredly mouthing the same uninspiring phrases he has regularly repeated from his first speech in 2004 from the red fort ramparts — the usual “ÿeh karna hai, woh karenge” which raises the question “bhai, aap ne kiya kya hai in nau salon me?”. Indeed, Manmohan acted as if he was not the steward of the country’s destiny responsible for doing if not nothing than achieving very little of any note in the past decade. The speech by, in the words of a vapid TV program host, “one of the greatest economists in the world”!, delivered in his usual monotone, was boring to the point of pushing a national audience into depression, and the shoal of captive schoolchildren herded into place, to distraction.

In contrast, Modi, with his record of over 10 years of Gujarat governance in tow, openly mocked Manmohan with his flowing oratory and targeted attacks on the Congress PM’s flawed and failed agenda. Modi’s substantive critique of the Food Security Bill the day before highlighted his ability to marshal facts and figures w/o referring to notes, and to offer substantive policy alternatives. It segued in with his ringing slogan — a good one for the next elections — “Naya soch, nayi umeed” (New thinking, new hope) of the BJP. In fact, his demand that the Congress govt define the “limits” of tolerance with respect to the Chinese and Pakistani violations of the Line of Actual Control and the Line of Control respectively, is clearly an attempt to draw the “lakshman rekha” transgressing which, he hinted, would elicit a strong response from a Modi-led BJP govt post-next elections, and clearly roused a military community that has had enough of the Manmohan govt’s pussyfooting. Of course, Modi will need more carefully to delineate his set of options. He’ll do well to be more aggressive with China, while being more covert vis a vis Pakistan, for the obvious reason that kutayudh (covert warfare) can more competently and beneficially accomplish objectives against the Pakistani state, while the Chinese menace requires a mix of more direct military treatment and agile regional and international coalition-building.

Anyway, the differences were evident between a govt apparatchik and nominated Member of Parliament who hasn’t in his career ever been elected even a dogcatcher (to use an American idiom) and a genuine mass leader with strong roots in grassroots politics with his fingers on the political pulse of the nation who understands how to inspire people and, more importantly, how to deliver on political promises. To every new problem, Manmohan has the same old kneejerk solution — a new govt committee or commission giving employment to retired babus, even as Modi has a practicable solution — whether it is reaching the Narbada River water to hinterland farmers, or enabling the remotest villages to access electricity. It is talk and slogans backed by deliverables versus more sloganeering (more “Garibi hatao” anyone?), dynastic politics, and corruption. Where’s the contest?

Posted in China, China military, civil-military relations, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Politics, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Terrorism | 2 Comments

Fire in weapon/weapon fuel downs Sindhurakshak

Posted on August 14, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The explosion on board the Kilo-class Russian submarine with the Indian Navy, Sindhurakshak, in Mumbai last evening, according to a veteran submariner, was due to fire in the forward weapons section of the boat carrying the Klub-S anti-ship missile and a land attack missile launchable from torpedo tubes. The villain may be faulty weapons engineering or, more likely, the highly unstable and combustible missile fuel that caught fire, igniting a larger explosion in the weapons hold that ripped through the submarine and sank it with 18 crewmen on board at the time. It could have been lot worse. The explosion could have happened at sea, with the boat underway on patrol. The naval source couldn’t hazard a guess as to why it happened, saying it shouldn’t have, and there’s no obvious reason for it.

This is speculation on my part but it is possible a small leak of the fuel in the proximity of an electric shortcircuit or some other small fire, blew up into an uncontrollable conflagration. Considering the vessel had just returned after an expensive Rs 480 crore refit in a Russian shipyard, this incident is even more puzzling. After all, such a refit would have involved a thorough going over to identify wear and tear and rectification. This only
makes the event curiouser, and calls to mind the devastating fire, again in the weapons hold, of the Russian nuclear attack submarine, Kursk, in July 2000.

Necessarily, all Kilos will have to be called in and “benched”as it were, until expert diagnosis pinpoints the source of trouble, or the shortfalls in this submarine’s refit program. Until then, the navy’s sea denial capability will be considerably thinned out in the Indian Ocean. Damn!

Posted in India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, russian assistance, South Asia | Leave a comment

Danger from Hong-10

Posted on August 13, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Following up an earlier blog about China buying the entire Tu-22M Bacfire production line lock, stock and barrel from the Russian Kazan facility for a mere $1.5 billion (when our redoubtable air force has spent more than that amount on a propeller trainer aircraft!), the Chinese discovered that some of the manufacturing jigs secured from the Ukraine (which was part of the Tu-22 assembly line) simply fell apart. This the Chinese, working 24/7, have sought to get around by setting up their own jigs, and otherwise to get the aircraft project underway. The Tu-22 that will emerge — designated Hong-10 — is what a source said was a souped up “M ++” version. It will come complete with an AESA air-to-air and surface attack radar, and ability to fire surface-attack long range cruise missiles from its rotary weapons platform nestled within the H-10 fuselage, etc.

Apart from helping realize the Chinese defensive/offensive design of using the Backfire in tandem with the Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles to attack US carrier groups, and force them out of the second island chain and push them to the line of the “third island chain” of the Hawaiian islands, the Tu-22 poses a mortal danger to India. The PLA will not anymore be hampered by the problems of embarking ordnance-loaded aircraft from the high-altitude air bases on the Tibetan plateau on attack missions. These can now be launched against even Indian peninsular targets from deep within the Chengdu MR.

It is a capability this analyst has been advocating IAF should have, but is something the determinedly sub-strategic-minded air force leadership has time and again passed up, preferring planes with lesser range instead. India was first offered Tu-22 in mid-1971 but the mission to Moscow under Air Marshal Sheodeo Singh chose the MiG-23 BN, despite a squadron of the Tu-22s with IAF roundels painted on them being parked at a military air base outside the city ready to fly to India. Worse, as I have detailed in my book “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security”, IAF played dog in the manger and prevented the more strategically-oriented Indian Navy from acquiring this aircraft! India could have bought up the Tu-22 production line anytime in the last two decades — it being so offered by a cash-strapped Russia. It would have provided India with a manned option for strike sorties against targets in deepest China and anywhere in the extended Indian Ocean region. When, oh God!, when will our air force, operating in an open strategic medium acquire a strategic mindset?

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, South East Asia, Technology transfer | 3 Comments

Unforgiving take on past

Posted on August 11, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

(Review of Lt Gen V.K. Nayar’s book, ‘From Fatigues to Civvies: Memoirs of a Paratrooper’, Manohar, 2013; Rs 1395/-)

Lieutenant general V K “Tubby” Nayar (Retd) is among a rare breed of military officers. Despite being outspoken with his seniors in service and wearing his inability to suffer fools gladly on his sleeve, he made it to the top ranks of the Indian Army which in recent years has, unfortunately, begun to resemble other government services where flattery and sycophancy earn good “Çonfidential Reports” and ensure career dividends.

Originally a Signals officer, Nayar, after persistent pestering of his bosses, managed a transfer to his desired regiment — the elite Maratha Light Infantry (MLI), securing a billet with 2 Para (3rd battalion, MLI, converted to paratroop infantry). 2 Para was dropped over Tangail in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, less than six months after Tubby, to his eternal regret, had handed over command.

But thereafter Nayar missed nothing, being in on the anti-Sikh riots in the capital when, as additional director-general, military operations, he pleaded futilely with then chief of the army staff, general Arun Vaidya, to appoint him the general officer commanding Delhi area in order quickly to show force and deter the rioters; Operation Bluestar; and, the 1987 Operation Brasstacks. As the Western Army commander, he was tasked by army chief general K Sundarji to write and conduct the massive exercise, without being made aware that Brasstacks was to be a cover for an armoured thrust into Pakistan — Operation Trident, which II Corps was supposed to execute after peeling off from Brasstacks. It was a complicated deception manoeuvre to facilitate Trident, except it was so bungled by Sundarji that the commander of II Corps, the estimable Lt Gen Hanut Singh, was surprised by this new plan requiring his large formation to wheel around mid-exercise and rush pell-mell into battle on the hoary Rahim Yar Khan axis — something he was entirely unprepared for! Nor did the Western Air Command have any hint of war, with its head, air marshal M M Singh, confessing to Nayar that his fleet of Jaguars was low on droppable ordnance!

It helps that as a memoirist he has a sharp memory and can recall details of conversations and incidents from 40-50 years ago involving his colleagues and seniors. While he has nothing but praise for the men and officers he commanded, his unvarnished take on his seniors is refreshing for its withering honesty. The late General Arun Vaidya is described as lacking in “moral courage” and General K Sundarji is dismissed as “big talking and blustery”— more show than substance who, Tubby fears, set a bad example for junior officers to emulate. And he reveals the self-aggrandizing tendencies routinely realised by IAS officers at senior levels of government. There was P K Kaul, for instance, who as defence secretary opposed the establishment of the National Security Guard (NSG) as redundant to the need, as the finance secretary rejected it on the basis of paucity of financial resources, but as the cabinet secretary approved the NSG because it would be controlled by him!

The biggest impression Nayar made, however, was as general officer commanding 10 Division in Manipur and Nagaland where his commonsensical approach, sense of fairness, and respect for the tribal folks and their traditions won him respect of the people and leverage with the underground leaders. On one occasion when prime minister Indira Gandhi was to make a public address and the intelligence bureau and state police had warned they couldn’t guarantee her safety, Nayar approached Zuevo Sema heading the “Naga National Army” to sanitise the area! In fact, Nayar’s impact on the northeastern states was such he was appointed governor of Manipur, and given additional charge of Nagaland, after his retirement. But true to his record and reputation, he resigned, unwilling to do the dirty political work of the Congress party-led central and state governments.

Nayar’s memoirs, moreover, engagingly evoke the camaraderie, and sense of honour and duty that still drive the Indian Army.

[Published in the New Indian Express, Magazine section, August 11, 2013
at http://newindianexpress.com/lifestyle/books/Unforgiving-take-on-past/2013/08/11/article1725009.ece

Posted in civil-military relations, guerilla warfare, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian para-military forces, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, South East Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | Leave a comment

Failure-bound maritime strategy

Posted on August 9, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The public perception of the Indian army being smacked around on the border by China needs correction. Actually army units with the Leh-based XIV Corps do “power patrolling”, matching the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) move for aggressive move, including active use of drones, something not publicised by an incomprehensibly reticent Indian government. Thus, while it is known, for example, that the camera installed in the post on the Chumar heights was destroyed by intruding PLA troops, what isn’t is the fact that it was quickly replaced by the Chinese with a new surveillance system once they were told that five of their cameras in similarly exposed sites would be destroyed in retaliation.

The negative impression of a lax and unready army has gained traction, leading to murmurings of a 1962-type of disaster in case of war with China, which’s wrong. An indecisive Indian government has constrained the Indian army with its delayed decision on the offensive mountain corps and the painfully slow construction of border roads and military-use infrastructure. But notwithstanding China’s advantages in these and other respects, the PLA is in no position to overwhelm India’s defensive formations arrayed in depth, even less maintain an attacking force in the field in the face of sustained Indian aerial strike power. It has only 11 Ilyushin-76s for heavy airlift, relies on the antiquated Yak-7 variant of An-32 — the staple of the Indian transport capability as well and, unlike the Mi-26 in Indian employ, has no heavy lift helicopters for tactical support.

The problem is fundamentally of a strategic nature. With China clearly utilising its repeated provocations to benchmark escalatory steps — from push to shove to widespread hostilities to limited war to however improbable, general war, the question is what is the most appropriate Indian strategy if the violence is ratcheted all the way up? The Indian government seems persuaded by the “theatre-switching” maritime strategy of a naval riposte to Chinese aggression in the mountains. According to the estimable Rear Admiral (Retd) K Raja Menon (“A mountain strike corps is not the only option”, The Hindu, July 28, 2013), the ` 60,000 crore sanctioned for an offensive army mountain corps is a waste of money, which ought to have been spent on beefing up the navy’s Sea Lines of Communications “interdiction capability” instead in order to obtain “a stranglehold on the Chinese routes through the Indian Ocean”. Threaten a cutoff of energy and natural resources from the Gulf and Africa, put its exports-driven economy and prosperity at risk and, voila! goes this argument, Beijing will pull its punches landward.

Convinced about the efficacy of “maritime strategy for continental wars” — a subject he has fleshed out in a book — Menon builds his larger case on Britain’s historical experience of utilising the Royal Navy to contain European continental powers. Except, as empirical evidence shows, a maritime strategy can overcome only island nations (such as Japan in World War II) but by itself can at most seriously discomfit, not stifle, major land powers enjoying interior lines of communications. Even Britain had to rely ultimately on Marlborough, master of the forced march and tactical maneuvering, to settle the early 18th Century Wars of the Spanish Succession in the decisive land battles at Blenheim, Ramillies and Malpalaquet, against the condominium of France and Spain, both boasting formidable navies which, along with the Royal Navy, did little during this period than indulge in “cruising wars”.

An exclusively naval response by India to a conflict in the Himalayas initiated by China is problematic for a host of practical reasons. In a “limited war” launched by PLA, sinking a few Chinese warships found east of the Malacca Strait, or sinking or capturing Chinese merchantmen on the high seas is surely not enough recompense for loss of valuable territory in Arunachal Pradesh and elsewhere along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and from which the Chinese forces are unlikely to withdraw as they did in 1962. So, the status quo ante will not be restored on land as it will be on the seas. There’s, moreover, the little matter of India’s ability to impose a “total exclusion zone” on the entire Indian Ocean to prosecute an unbridled guerre de course (war on commerce). Alas, a navy of 50-odd capital ships by 2030 will be inadequate for this mammoth task. Then there are the lesser issues of identifying Chinese carriers and targeting them and other ships, possibly under friendly flags plying the China trade. If the latter are to escape the torpedo and only quarantined, eventually to be released, it’ll mean even less cost to Beijing.

Secondly, while a few Indian ships could almost instantly get underway, an all-out effort will require four-to-six days of hectic preparation as stores and assets are marshalled, battle groups constituted and, based on intelligence, an interdiction grid established, during which time the PLA could rack up singular, irreversible, successes in the mountains. Indeed, the Chinese could well achieve their limited war aims before many Chinese naval ships and merchant marine can be found and sunk, and the Chinese economy impacted. The time factor could be further distended if, as is likely, the conflict begins with the usual border incident or two before the PLA chooses to escalate. At what point in this escalation sequence will the Indian government, notoriously timid in using armed force, decide the country is in a war situation necessitating implementation of the maritime strategy? Thirdly, unlike India, China has built up strategic reserves of oil and minerals; these will last longer than the limited war will endure and before India’s maritime counter can have effect.

Any military campaign against China will perforce be land-based with a maritime strategy as subsidiary. India, therefore, has a desperate need for capability to mount offensives on the Tibetan plateau provided by specially-equipped mountain corps. At a minimum, India requires three such corps, not just one. However, Menon’s suggestion that the rugged American A-10 Warthog fixed-wing aircraft, rather than armed helicopters, be considered for close air support is more interesting.

Published in the ‘New Indian Express’ Aug 9, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/Failure-bound-maritime-strategy/2013/08/09/article1725052.ece

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Micro-wars as murderous business on LOC

Posted on August 8, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

With the media-generated mass boo-hooing attendant on the killing of the five jawans of the Bihar Regiment on the LOC in J&K, some core issues are being lost sight of. Firstly, as I have mentioned in a previous blog, such murderous attacks are virtually the norm followed by both the Indian and Pakistani forward deployed army units. Indeed, such strikes on targets of opportunity are encouraged by unit commanders to showcase the offensive-mindedness and battle-readiness of troops under their command, to give the troops otherwise bored by routine patrolling and similar tasks something aggressive to do to keep their fighting spirit stoked, and to earn merits for the ‘paltan’ and self with the higher command. There’s no point in mass hysteria and political frothing at the mouth every time there’s such an incident.

Secondly, pointing fingers at Pakistan is useless because there’s no knowing which side initiated such grisly acts in the first place long many years ago that set in motion the action-reaction sequence and has become a form of on-going, undeclared, war on the LOC. Call them micro-wars, almost guerilla actions, in a time of ostensible peace between the two countries, the waging of which, clearly, has the sanction of the Headquarters of the two Armies and, indirectly, of the two governments. These micro-wars involve not just mainline units but also often, Special Forces units, penny-packeted as army reserve, Northern Army.

Thirdly, if this is a pattern of violence on the LOC, shouldn’t the Indian Army by now have modified their patrolling procedures to prevent stragglers, to have the troops not strung out over an area, and create patrols of critical size so they cannot be easily ambushed? Shouldn’t units on notice for deployment on LOC be trained in such tactics and patrolling regimes? The Army has obviously been remiss in not modifying the attitude and mode of operating on the LOC of the forward units, despite the frequency of such incidents.

And finally, why should the larger peace process with Pakistan be derailed on account of this atrocity? As in the case of China, it shows up this country’s linear mindset when the complex reality demands a different policy tack. We can have trade, cultural exchanges, even military hotlines but also continued acts of border frictions, tyargeted intelligence operations, and strategic posturing with China as much as with Pakistan. We all better get used to it. The pity is neither the Indian people nor the government and military seem up to the task.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Pakistan, Pakistan military, satellites, South Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | 14 Comments

Creaky MiG-21 bison, weakened air defence

Posted on August 7, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The near-antique MiG-21 bison (not bis! updated correction, sorry folks) still perform frontline service with the Indian Air Force, except the creakiness of these short range air defence combat aircraft is telling. The air frames are beginning to fray. Mindful of this situation, an order has gone out to pilots in the six to seven squadrons in the IAF featuring this aircraft not to pull stressful maneuvers lest these flying machines fall apart in the skies. The MiG-21 bison, it may be recalled, underwent an upgrade. The trouble is the upgrade does not replace the air frame — the same old air frame is retained, only new rivets are inserted, the rust wherever accumulated is removed, and other cosmetic changes made. Thus, we have a nearly fifty year old air frame in employ in its various versions, including — it is hard to believe — according to one source the FL version. Pending induction of the Tejas LCA, MiG-21 bison is the bulk air defence aircraft. If the bis isn’t able anymore to fight in a meaningful way it is disadvantaged against newer planes the adversary can muster — and here I am not talking about the Fizaya (Pakistan Air Force) which is in far more difficult straits, but the PLAAF elements China can readily mobilize in the Chengdu MR. Unless the Tejas program is fast-forwarded, India will be in trouble.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Military Acquisitions, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia | 3 Comments