The Arms of Others

Image result for pics of the Indian quick reaction missile tests

(Test firing of the indigenous QRSAM)

In the defence sector, India’s import fixation is taking a toll

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As on some of his earlier foreign trips, Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised Israel, the host country, rich contracts for military hardware, in this case for joint development of medium range and long range surface-to-air missiles (MRSAMs and LRSAMs), and for off-the-shelf purchase of the Israeli Spyder Quick Reaction SAM (QRSAM) for the army.

Why do these deals stick in the throat? The Modi government approved them earlier this year even though it knew the indigenous QRSAM, for instance, was on track and would be tested soon. Both its first test firing on June 4 and the second, pointedly, on July 3, the day Modi left for Israel, went off without a hitch. A third successful test-firing and this locally made missile would be ready for series production and induction. Acting Defence Minister Arun Jaitley praised DRDO for the successful tests, but didn’t take the next, logical, step — scrapping the contract for the Spyder that would have saved the country in excess of $2-3 billion, and given a fillip to the local armaments design and development efforts at the heart of Modi’s flagship Make in India programme.

There was no need to go to Israel for 500 units each of MRSAMs and LRSAMs either. The Akash short range missile is already operational with the Indian Air Force. True, this missile’s performance is deficient owing to a sub-par Russian radar seeker, but there’s little else wrong with it. So, a sensible solution would have been for the indigenous Akash project to be tasked with developing scaled-up medium and long range versions of the missile within the timeline given to the Israelis. A more narrowly defined deal with Tel Aviv to co-develop a radar-seeker for the Akash missiles could then have been signed at a fraction of the $5-7 billion cost of MRSAM-LRSAM.

The Israeli contracts to win goodwill are like the PM’s announcement in April 2015 in Paris to buy 36 Rafale combat aircraft. These are too few in number to have any sustained impact in war and too costly not to divert scarce funds from the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which is technologically the same as the 4.5 generation Rafale. But because it is an Indian design, it can spawn a whole bunch of air force and naval variants in the future.

India’s purchase of the Rafale prevented the French company, Dassault Avions, from closing down its combat aircraft development complex, because until then no country had bought this inordinately expensive fighter plane. The Indian contract will fetch France Rs 1,750 crore per Rafale, for a minimum payout by India of Rs 63,000 crore.

Incidentally, this is about the cost of raising 17 Corps, the army’s first large offensive mountain warfare formation which Jaitley, wearing his finance minister’s hat, had earlier rejected as unaffordable. Now the Chinese are acting up in the Doklam area and India, as ever, is bereft of forces to take the fight to the PLA on the Tibetan Plateau.

And while in Washington, Modi promised US President Donald J. Trump consideration of the 1970s vintage F-16 fighter plane for assembly in India. Lockheed Martin will make billions of dollars from shifting the worn out F-16 production line to India. The F-16 has no realistic chance if the IAF has any say in the decision, but the Saab Gripen is likely to get in as the single engine aircraft choice of the IAF, again at the expense of the Tejas LCA.

Modi is not the first prime minister to be profligate with the country’s resources. In 1995-96, the Congress PM, P.V. Narasimha Rao, rescued the Sukhoi Bureau and manufacturing plant in Irkutsk from shuttering with a generous subvention of Rs 6,000 crore. In return, he did not contractually demand Intellectual Property Rights for the Su-30 technologies developed there, or that Sukhoi share the design work load with Indian aircraft designers in the Aeronautical Development Agency in Bangalore, who created the LCA, or that technology be fully transferred, including source codes, to Indian agencies, or anything else remotely to advance India’s defence industrial capability.

Between an imports-fixated Indian military and an Indian government that seems incapable of thinking straight, the country is fated to remain an arms dependency.

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Published in the Indian Express, July 17, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-arms-of-others-narendra-modi-israel-4753653/

 

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Culture, Decision-making, Defence Industry, domestic politics, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, indian policy -- Israel, indian policy -- Israel, Iran and West Asia, Israel, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Missiles, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons | 24 Comments

Making examples of the Adarsh military scamsters?

Image result for pictures of General NC Vij

It has been about a week since the report of the investigation ordered by former defence minister Manohar Parrikar and conducted by a panel including a serving Lieutenant General, Ravi Thodge, into the Adarsh housing scam, became public. As expected it damned in particular General NC Vij who as army chief and previously as GOC-in-C, Southern Command, had provided,  as this report says, the “protective umbrella” for efforts facilitating the “alienation of the land in question“, a very desirable piece of real estate in Colaba, Mumbai, in the face of Navy’s “serious security concerns”. The 31-storey apartment building overlooks naval installations. (Originally, the Adarsh cooperative housing society was set up to house the widows of the heroes of the Kargil border war.) But the Government has not reacted so far.

My concern is not with the bunch of politicians –four former Maharashtra Chief Ministers — Ashok Chavan, Vilasrao Deshmukh, Sushil Kumar Shinde and Shivajirao Patil and two former Maharashtra Urban Development Ministers, Rajesh Tope and Sunil Tatkare, and 12 bureaucrats, who too acquired some of the 124-odd flats that were up for grabs — politicians and babus are a soiled and useless lot any way, very few among them with even a shred of integrity, but the military officers involved in this fairly brazen attempt at illegal self-enrichment.

Among this latter sad group are other than Vij, two other retired service chiefs — General Deepak Kapoor, and Admiral Madhavendra Singh, and three retired Lt. Generals G S Sihota (ex-GOC-in-C, Southern Command), Tejinder Singh (ex-IDS) and Shantanu Choudhary (ex-VCOAS), and four Major Generals — A R Kumar, V S Yadav, T K Kaul and R K Hooda. Also fingered are two Brigadiers — T K Sinha and M M Wanchu, and Col R K Bakshi.  These dramatis personae had been mentioned in the 2011 internal Army inquiry submitted to the defence ministry as well.

So far there’s not a squeak out of the Modi government about how it means to deal with these military miscreants. There’s a view that because most of these officers are now retired nothing much can be done punitively against them. On the face of it that’s not quite correct. The Government of India has every latitude to make glaring examples  of these officers who were sworn to uphold the highest standards of propriety but didn’t.

Trivially, it is surprising, for example, that Vij has stayed on as head of the Vivekananda International Foundation, the thinktank NSA Ajit Doval presided over. He should be fired forthwith by the trustees of this institution, in case he refuses to resign.

So, what should exemplary punishment be?  Because they cannot be divested of the last last rank they held, this entire group of scambags should have their retirement benefits reduced by two ranks retroactively from the time they individually entered unlawfully upon the Adarsh deal. In other words, the pensions and all pecuniary and other benefits, etc, of Messrs Kapoor and Singh should be pegged downward to what’s normally owed a retiring Major General/Rear Admiral. For Vij, however, that should mean from the time he was a three star general and offering the protective “umbrella” to the deal drivers, which will require the pegging of his pension and benefits to that of 1-star Brigadier rank. Similar demotion should see Adarsh scam stained  Lieutenant Generals also getting pensions, etc., slotted at Brigadier rank, Major Generals at Colonel-rank, Brigadiers at Major rank, and the lone Colonel involved at army Captain rank.

Moreover, GOI should issue instructions that hereafter these scamsters are to be denied use of any military-run facility, including clubs, etc., as a means of formally stamping them as service outcasts.

This treatment should become the new normal to deal with military officers caught in the web of corruption of their own making when in service.

It is reasonable action for the Modi government to take considering it has made the elimination of corruption a central plank in its governance agenda. The armed services should, in theory, welcome such initiative to pillory senior officers for bringing their respective services into disrepute.   The question is can Prime Minister Modi muster the iron will to ram this measure down the military system and set a precedent for severely punishing military men who fail to maintain a high level of probity during their careers?

Corruption is spreading in the military, and if this trend is not arrested, and the wrongdoers not legally brought to book and saddled with the additional stigma of demoted pension and other benefits, and the bestowal of service outcast status, there’s no knowing how bad the situation can become.

 

Posted in corruption, Decision-making, domestic politics, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Politics, Internal Security, society, South Asia | 28 Comments

Another TV discussion

‘We, the People’ on NDTV had a discussion on Modi’s foreign policy.

Posted in Afghanistan, Africa, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Central Asia, China, China military, Decision-making, Defence Industry, domestic politics, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, indian policy -- Israel, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Iran and West Asia, Israel, Japan, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Myanmar, Nepal, Northeast Asia, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, russian assistance, SAARC, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, UN, United States, US., Vietnam, Weapons | 10 Comments

TV curtain raiser and Modi trip assessments

Several Rajya Sabha TV panel discussions — ‘Security Scan’ & ‘The Big Picture’ aired over the last three weeks, regarding PM Modi’s trips to the US, Israel, and the Astana summit of SCO.

 

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Eyeballing in Doklam or Free pass to China?

Image result for pics of chinese troops in sikkim border

(Doklam)

It is surprising to see the increasingly truculent, even provocative, statements being made by the Zhongnanhai (Foreign Office) in Beijing, with the line obediently parroted by the Chinese ambassador in Delhi, that — and this is the latest — that India should stand down from the stand-off with PLA on the Doklam Plateau, withdraw from the forward position held by the Indian forces, before the Chinese will deign to sit down and talk to the Indian side. In the context, moreover, of the previous statement reminding Delhi not to forget the lessons of the 1962 War, it almost amounts to a challenge.

Meanwhile, the silence from the MOD, MEA and the Indian government, generally, is deafening, with Foreign Secretary K Jaishankar in Jerusalem refusing to say anything about the unfolding events in Bhutan. Is this silence by design or because a fearful government has lost its wits?

General Bipin Rawat visited Sikkim, conferred with the XXXIII Corps senior officers, and especially with the GOCs of the Mountain Divisions on the Chinese forward line in the extended area. One wishes the COAS had said something to the effect that the Indian Army would welcome any opportunity to back defence minister Arun Jaitley’s contention that 1962 was a one-off fiasco. That disaster involved no more than a Division and a half in actual ops and, in hindsight, can be seen as nothing more than a fairly minor affray. Sure, PLA too has improved since then as Beijing reminded India, but the Indian military has enough forces to blunt the PLA group armies aggressing at full tilt. One assumes that, unlike in 1962, the IAF will go into action right off the bat.

But what’s the legal basis for the loud and cantankerous calls by Beijing to India to withdraw? None, whatsoever. The 1895 Anglo-Chinese Treaty that China keeps harping on has long been superseded by the 1998 and 1999 agreements Thimpu signed with Beijing that requires both sides to respect the status quo pending the delineation of the formal border in the underway bilateral negotiations.  If India has intervened on Bhutan’s behalf it is because, notwithstanding a similar understanding in another area, the PLA went ahead and constructed a loop road, and presented Thimpu with a fait accompli the Bhutanese could not overturn. This is precisely what the Bhutanese government doesn’t want to see happen again. Reason why the Indian army is on the Doklam high ground — at the express invitation of Bhutan, which is unable to protect its sovereign territory all by itself. Under international law, this is perfectly permissible — a weak country can call on military help and assistance from a friendly strong country to fend of the actions of a proven regional bully, in this case, China.

The problem though is this: China has publicly gone so far out on a limb, loudly threatening India with all kinds of retribution, with edgy statements being daily issued by some Chinese source or the other, that it has now engaged its national ego. Backing down would incur a loss of face, not doing so  could lead to a situation spiraling out of Beijing’s control. It will be interesting to see how China resolves this mess they have willfully created for themselves.

At one level, the silence from the Indian quarter serves the purpose of goading China into a shriller stance, which shows up that country’s essential inability to handle a crisis with a modicum of grace. On the other hand, the Indian government’s reserve could be interpreted by Beijing as diffidence that it could decide to exploit by trying to pressure India into doing its bidding. It is this last possibility that’s most troubling because there’s every reason to expect that as a result the Chinese PLA may opt to scale up the school-boy type shoving and pushing on display to some serious military hostilities. And it is hostilities the army better prepare for.

Some say MEA is using these incidents to gauge how its strategic partners, in the main, the US and Japan will react, whether they will show any signs of support. This sort of passive/defeatist thinking of the China Study Circle-influenced Indian government,  is what India can do without. Assuming such thinking is actually on, then may be MEA mandarins should be assured in the strongest terms that, as I have maintained over the last 25 years of writing, nobody but nobody — least of all India’s latest “true friend”, Trump, will join India in the possible fracas with PLA, and we will have to do the fighting, heavy or light, by ourselves.

The other reason some have speculated for this show of bellicosity is as a reaction to India’s turning down the OBOR invitation. This is even more nonsensical. How pray would badgering and threatening to beat up on India convince Delhi to toe the Chinese line?

But in the worst case, and the worst case may transpire, and shove comes to stomp, the army will be able to test how well its Mountain troops can pull off the mobile warfare tactics they have been practicing for many years now. The IAF has to get into the game. There was some chatter in China which hinted with a wink and a nudge that the crash of the Indian Su-30 in the border Kameng District of Arunachal on May 23 was due to offensive electronic measures mounted by a forward ground unit. This cannot be discounted because the PLAAF too flies the same plane, and has worked up its ground-based and airborne EW capabilities very well. It may also be no bad thing for the Indian Navy to aggressively tail the 13-odd warships — very, very far from their logistics base — being tracked by the Indian naval surveillance satellite, and make clear what could happen to them in case the PLA starts acting up in the hills. And ships out of Port Blair should begin steaming towards the Malacca Strait, just in case.

One hopes Modi will not back down and equally that he will not prevent the Indian army and IAF from responding in kind and with force should the PLA cross the Rubicon. The only way to react to a bully is to counter-punch him in the face. And India is surely well-placed to do that.

 

 

 

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Bhutan, Central Asia, China, China military, Decision-making, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian democracy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, indian policy -- Israel, Iran and West Asia, Israel, Japan, MEA/foreign policy, Military/military advice, South Asia, United States, US., Weapons, Western militaries | 33 Comments

Modi In Israel: Need For More Equitable Defence Collaboration

Published in BloombergQuint.com on July 1, 2017 in my  ‘Realpolitik’ column, https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2017/07/02/modi-in-israel-need-for-more-equitable-defence-collaboration


Image result for pics of modi and netanyahu

It was not too long ago when Israeli diplomats considered India a hardship posting. Those souls braving the pokey confines of the Israeli Consulate on Peddar Road in Mumbai, protected 24×7 by a contingent of armed Maharashtra Police, were incentivised by higher emoluments and career advancement. This was before diplomatic relations were “normalized” and the representation scaled up in 1992 to the ambassadorial level by the Narasimha Rao government. In the new millennium, Delhi is a much sought after station. Ambassador Alon Ushpiz, for instance, went from Delhi to an appointment as Adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in one fine leap and lost no time in urging his boss to establish a separate bureau in the Israeli Foreign Office to deal with India, which Netanyahu duly did two months back.

 

India and Israel have a uniquely close relationship. It dates back to trade in King Solomon’s time, and the first Jews seeking refuge in India after the razing of the Second Temple in Jerusalem by the Romans in 70 A.D.

The two countries share similar histories of birth as modern nation-states.

The departing British colonial power did its standard ‘cut and run’ in the Palestine Mandate territory in 1948, as it had done in the subcontinent the previous year, leaving behind the bloody partition debris for the peoples to build on.

 

Now, India seeks from Israel advanced military technology, agricultural techniques to turn deserts into orchards, and inspiration to be another ‘start-up nation’ in cutting edge technologies. The two countries, in other words, have experienced sort of Kondratieff Cycles in civilizational ups and downs, before settling into a steady state. In fact, in describing the prospective partnership between the two countries it is common to hear Israeli defence ministry officials use a phrase popularized by the Deputy National Security Adviser, retired Major General Amos Gilad – “the sky is the limit.”

Competing For Israel’s Attention

Other than arid land agriculture, Israel’s advanced military technology sector is at the heart of that country’s success story. This latter has three aspects – two of them that have negatively impacted India and may prevent really robust Indo-Israeli cooperation in the future.

Over 80 percent of the Israeli military research and development is funded by the United States, which endows Washington with a veto over what and to whom Tel Aviv can sell/transfer technology.

More often than seems good for India’s relations either the U.S. or Israel, deals have been nixed owing to caps on technology imposed by Washington. Thus, while Israel was eager to give its Elbit 2052 computer at the core of the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar India is building for its combat aircraft fleet (to enable fighter-bombers to switch mid-flight from air-to-ground to air-to-air roles), the US disallowed it, permitting the use of only the inferior 2032 version.

The second aspect is that the two best customers for Israeli military products are India and China. The Israeli defence industry cannot do without either because exports to these two countries virtually constitute all of its foreign sales. In 2015, for instance, of the Israeli arms exports worth $5.7 billion, China bought military hardware valued at $3.4, and India at $2.3 billion. But, here’s the rub. Beijing has looked askance at Israel helping India produce the ‘Swordfish’ variant of its Green Pines long range radar that can be used by the Indian ballistic missile defence system to detect incoming Chinese missiles 800 kilometres away.

Thus Tel Aviv has always to reconcile U.S. and Chinese concerns with Indian demands, and India loses out.

DRDO’s Grouse

The other bit of grit that has got into an otherwise well-oiled Indo-Israeli arms supply machine is the rising discontent evident in the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) with the Indian buys from Israel, which other than avionics, have been mostly in the missile field. Currently three large procurement/joint development projects are underway – the $2.5 billion deal for 50-70 kilometre medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) for the Indian Air Force and Navy, the $1.5 billion contract to produce the 15 kilometre short range SAM to replace the Barak system on Indian warships, and the $2.75 billion buy of the Spyder quick-reaction mobile air defence missile for army deployment on the border with Pakistan.

 

DRDO’s peeve is two-fold. One, that instead of the government and the armed services asking for variants of the indigenous 25 kilometre range and effective Akash surface-to-air missile already with the military to cover the medium and short ranges and giving a fillip to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ programme, money is needlessly expended on Israeli items. And, secondly, that in the joint development projects, India and DRDO agencies are stuck with the low-end work of making canisters and launchers, not the front end high-value stuff, such as warhead, guidance, and fire-control systems. The proprietary knowledge – design innovation and system algorithm – is retained by Israel, when rightly it should be Indian intellectual property because India has paid for its development.

 The suspicion is that Israeli defence R&D is being funded by India without the latter being given any ownership rights.
Admiral Sunil Lanba, Chief of Naval Staff, meeting with IDF Major General Udi Adam, head of the Israeli Ministry of Defence, in Tel Aviv, Israel, on June 12, 2017. (Photograph: Indian Navy)
(Admiral Sunil Lanba, Chief of Naval Staff, meeting with IDF Major General Udi Adam, head of the Israeli Ministry of Defence, in Tel Aviv, Israel, on June 12, 2017. (Photograph: Indian Navy)

These difficult issues need to be sorted out, lest the relationship begins to sour at the Indian end. Modi should ask for an equal share to India of the intellectual property rights created by high-value Israeli military technology development subsidised by Delhi. Whether he will do so remains to be seen, but the resolution of such contentious issues will brighten the prospects for meaningful future collaboration.

Modi could also, more productively, learn from Netanyahu how the Israeli government long ago transformed the socialist setup of its state-owned defence industry into a world class, cost-efficient, technology creator, with a view to replicating the Israeli model in India.

But the Prime Minister seems more intent on connecting with the section of the Israeli population that has India links at a planned mass reception of Modi in Tel Aviv (like those staged in Wembley Stadium in London, Madison Square Garden in New York, the Allphones Arena in, and more. It will not do much for India, but it is good theatre.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Culture, Decision-making, Defence Industry, domestic politics, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, indian policy -- Israel, indian policy -- Israel, Iran and West Asia, Indian Politics, Israel, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Missiles, NRIs, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons | 7 Comments

Score the physical for Modi, the substantive for Trump, and danger looming

Image result for pics of modi embracing trump

(Modi’s jhappi for an awkwardly unprepared Trump at the White House)

He did it. Prime Minister Narendra Modi did stride across to the other lectern and envelope US President Donald Trump in a hug. Now slo-mo that entire sequence and you’ll see that even when forewarned about the Indian leader doing precisely this, Trump was unprepared for the physicality of it, and with some awkwardness limply reciprocated by putting his arm around Modi’s shoulders. This was the PM’s way of imposing himself physically on his American counterpart, forcing him to react. This was no bad game play.

But this imposition did not extend to the economic aspects of relations in the joint statement, where the US had its way. Sure, the designation of Syed Salahuddin of the Hizbul Mujahideen as global terrorist (GT) must have satisfied the Indian side enough for it to hold back on injecting anything remotely related to the free flow of services and skilled manpower (H!B visa issue) in the public statement by Modi. Moreover, while there was mention about destroying “radical Islamic terrorism” — which phrase for Trump was a repeat from his Riyadh summit with the Saud-led sunni collective, there was none about Pakistan, its role in using terrorism against India or Afghanistan, or any pointed reference as was sought by Delhi.

The US State Department’s cleverness here must be noted. It played up to the Indians with the naming of Salahuddin without undermining its interests in Pakistan, which last would have happened had the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba chief Hafiz Sayeed earned the GT label from Trump as well, something MEA had lobbied for. Why was the fingering of Salahuddin, and not Sayeed, by the US clever from the American perspective? Because Salahuddin is a native of the Srinagar Valley, was a candidate in the 1989 state elections and crossed the LOC into POK only after his electoral defeat (assisted, unfortunately, by the Indian authorities), and labeling him as GT would not upset Islamabad as much as directly naming Sayeed would have done. Getting wind of what was in the offing, the Pakistan government quickly staged the terrorist incidents and rolled out the videos of Salahuddin ordering strikes on Indian targets in the last 2-3 days almost as if to prop up the US case against the Hizbul leader. This to say that Pakistan was quite happy to sacrifice Salahuddin, while protecting Sayeed.

For the rest, the American had the run of it. There was not even an indirect and remote reference to H1B-immigration issues and their cost to the Indian IT industry, nor any concern expressed in the PM’s statement about unwarranted pillorying of the Indian pharma industry juxtaposed against fulsome mention of unbalanced trade, and trade deficit that Trump stated needed correction by India requiring to open up its market to American imports of all kinds. Trump also was happy with the Indian side signing up for American shale gas.

But fortunately, Modi did not succumb to the trap set for him by those in Washington advocating that India buy the vintage  F-16 aircraft to merely update its combat aircraft assembly line technology, combined with the move by Lockheed Martin to precipitate a positive decision by securing an MOU with Tata Advanced Systems for assembling the F-16.

The fact is the US, notwithstanding its high-flying rhetoric about empowering the Indian military with cutting-edge fighting technology to keep the common threat, China, on its toes, not a single military high-tech collaboration has got underway from the time such talk was initiated by President Reagan’s Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger in the mid-1980s. There’s something really wrong here.

The US hesitation in exporting/selling to India some decisive miltech is evidenced, for instance, in Washington’s approving  the long-range, long endurance, Predator drone for maritime surveillance rather than the armed Predator India was keen to buy in fairly large numbers, because the US State Department fears these would be used against terrorist targets in POK, and upset the American apple cart in the Af-Pak Region.

Further, as I have consistently pointed out, it seems Trump’s government, in line with the previous regimes in Washington, has decided to impose a low lethality ceiling on the armaments/technologies the US sells to India. Whence the American eagerness to sell unarmed drones, obsolete F-16 type combat aircraft, and prohibitively expensive technologies that Indian platforms cannot cost-effectively integrate, such as the EMALS (Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System) for the 2nd and 3rd indigenous V-class carriers being built in Kochi.

Perhaps, the Modi government, aware of the limitations of the America connection, sent off part-time defence minister Arun Jaitley to Moscow to firm up defence ties with Russia (including the lease of the second Akula SSN, and investing in the FGFA) around the same time as the PM was taking off for the US.

Better to have the Russian bird in hand, than two American birds in the bush.

But there’s a great danger looming. There’s obviously a certain warmth in the Trump-Modi tango — they seem personally to like each other, each pressed the right buttons  — Trump by praising Modi’s leadership and his stewardship of India, etc, etc — something the PM craves as  personal endorsement; Modi in praising his opposite number, being over-effusive in expressing his gratitude for the reception by Trump,  inviting the President’s daughter Ivanka to lead the US investors’ delegation to Delhi, etc., etc. So what’s the problem? The danger is that Modi will nurse such warm feelings for Trump and in the wake of a “successful” summit in Washington impulsively approve/order the purchase of the extremely dated F-16 aircraft or the completely inappropriate EMALS, etc. After all, impulsiveness has its costs. The country will be paying for the Rafale folly for decades. To add the F-16 to this mess would be to sink the Indian Air Force.

 

Posted in Afghanistan, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Decision-making, Defence Industry, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Internal Security, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, SAARC, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Terrorism, United States, US., Weapons | 15 Comments

A non-disruptive Modi, surgical strike–the limit of Indian punishment, & subtle warning to NRIs in Trump’s America

Image result for pictures of modi arriving in Washington June 24, 2017

(Modi being greeted by a gaggle of NRIs on his arrival in Washington from Portugal June 24, 2017)

It is unfortunate that prime minister Narendra Modi, like his predecessors in office, reiterated that old saw — “all world is family” ( vasudhaiva kutumbakan) for an audience of NRIs at the Ritz-Carlton in Virginia June 25 evening. He further elaborated on this foundation of his policy, assuring everybody within earshot and the larger policy audience in the Washington Beltway that India would not, during his tenure, disrupt the global order even though it is entirely skewed against India’s national economic and security interests, but rather work within it. It is thinking that’s entirely contrary to the Trump Admin’s views.

The US National Security Adviser Gen. HR McMaster and White House senior staffer Gary Cohn authored an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017, showing up Mr Modi’s tired old idea as so much nonsense which, incidentally, is the thrust of my detailed argument against such vacuuous thinking that animates Indian foreign and military policy in my last book ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ . Trump, they wrote, “embarked on his first foreign trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a ‘global community’ but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors, and businesses engage and compete for advantage.” So Modi proposes that India keep fighting by the rule book while everybody else chucks it. Good luck then for getting any results!

The PM then compounded the problem by insisting that this everybody is family-concept  won’t hinder any actions he might order to counter terrorism and mentioned, in this respect, the so-called “surgical strike” he had ordered a while back. As revealed in my posts on this blog at the time, the surgical strike was a shallow penetration, counter-force measure that took out a few jihadis and possibly Pakistan Army support personnel and differed very little in its essentials from previous such almost routine strikes the Indian Army’s Special Forces conduct across the LOC. And as I predicted this strike has not in the least deterred or in any way dissuaded  GHQ, Rawalpindi, from using its terrorist proxies (Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad) to infiltrate Indian Kashmir at will and to create mayhem. This much is evidenced in the record of continued cross-border atrocities, including yesterday’s incident of the attack on paralmil soldiers by terrorists (who then holed up in some school premises and were shot). So, not sure why the PM keeps referring to this act of retribution as something unprecedented and stellar when plainly it has had no effect whatsoever and is considered by both sides as part of the tit-for-tat hit game. But it does indicate that the “surgical strike” — however it plays in his mind — is the limit of punitive action Modi is willing to risk for fear of upsetting the “international norms” he says India will not violate. Which is another way of saying that  the country cannot and should not expect any end to Pakistan-prompted terrorism.

There are two other takeaways from Modi’s much reduced exposure to NRIs this time around. His repetitive and effusive praise for the MEA and how, under minister Sushma Swaraj’s ministrations, it had become responsive, receptive, and attentive to NRIs’ concerns. It covered up the fact of the Foreign Office’s marginalisation in that it simply isn’t the source of policy ideas but is merely asked to busy itself with keeping NRIs in good fettle and doing consular work well. This may be no bad development considering  now we know whom to blame for foreign and military policy missteps.

More masterfully, in a roomful of contented and hurrahing NRIs, Modi subtly seeded a doubt about their own physical safety and well being in Trump’s America that could at any time turn against them as an alien, albeit prosperous, hence a more noticeable and targetable, minority. This was a delicate indictment of the extant socio-economic reality in Trump’s USA by Modi — though the audience seems not to have got it — in the context of his reassuring the NRIs of Delhi’s readiness at all times to fly any beleaguered India-origin Indians anywhere home to safety.

Given this curtain-raiser (and the by now standard meeting with the usual American CEOs whom the PM met with separately), it will be interesting to see how the White House Modi-Trump one-on-one pans out some nine hours from now, and especially whether our pradhan mantri will be able to resist buying the F-16 that the MEA may have wanted off the table but Trump may push anyway.

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Time to revive the Hasnain strategy in Kashmir is now

Image result for photographs of general syed ata hasnain XV corps commander

(Lt Gen Hasnain in the centre, at one of the “awami sunwayees”)

The murder of Lieutenant Ummer Fayaz (2RajRif) in May and the public killing of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Mohammad Ayub Pandit outside the main Srinagar mosque, Jamia Masjid, on late June 22 evening that Mirwaiz Umar Farooq did not even see fit to mention in his Eid festivities-related address, could constitute something of a turning point in the affairs of Kashmir. With the Muslim society of the Srinagar Valley now cannibalizing itself, it is the right time for the Indian government to embark on a far-reaching policy to finish off the separatists once and for all.

If Fayaz’s murder wasn’t, the lynching of Ayub could be the polarizing event that compels the Valley folks to take sides. The heart-wrenching scenes of the DSP’s relatives defiantly proclaiming their Indian-ness and challenging the extremists to do their worst is just the sort of thing needed to turn the people against the militants, and to collar them as well as the larger problem of separatism. This is how it can be done.

J&K Police have been for a while now chafing at the bit, demanding to be allowed to respond to the violent provocations of the separatist/extremist elements with force. This is significant. J&k Police comprises people from the Valley, of persons living in the lanes and mohallas of large towns — Srinagar, Baramulla, Anantnag, etc — as Aub did, not a stone’s throw away from the Jamia masjid, where he met his bloody end. The specialist counter-terrorist force in the JKP is the Special Operations Group (SOG) which is made up of motivated manpower from the JKP, who flow with the Valley social slipstream and can generate solid intelligence regarding militants and their wellwishers active in the towns and the countryside. SOG combining with the JKP forces should now be given the license to do whatever is necessary to end the separatist movement. Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has hinted at this. The JK government should now show steel and proceed with this line of action.

SOG will not require any outside prompting and will prosecute actions. They should be encouraged to show no mercy whatsoever to the militants, miscreants, and their supporters. A KPS Gill like cleansing of the Valley society is now in order, and Mehbooba should order it. with Delhi’s support. The army’s role in the operation will not be insignificant. Like rats scurrying out of harm’s way, the Ayub killers are trying desperately to get the hell out. Between the army and the JKP, they should be able to get hold of these vermin, even as SOG — acting as the Punjab Police Commando did in Punjab against the Khalistan-boosters — goes about physically eliminating the militants and Lashkar and Jaish members, ex-Pakistan. Army’s Srinagar-based XV Corps has its role etched out.

Indeed, it is a pity that the institutionalized habit of an officer appointed to a new post insisting on doing things his way by undoing/disregarding whatever his predecessor did even if it fetched results has so taken root, it is hurting the national interest and undermining security. Thus, the approach and innovative methods adopted by Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain as XV Corps commander, 2010-2012, were lost almost immediately after he moved to Army HQrs  as Military Secretary. Some blame the bad blood between Gen VK Singh, who was long involved in Kashmir ops ( as commander of the Victor Force) and had supported Hasnain’s efforts from the time the latter commanded the 12th Infantry Brigade, and his successor, Bikram Singh, who brought in Hasnain as his Milsec, for this discontinuity. It is such small and petty inter-personal frictions that also derail the army. In any case, what is it that Hasnain did that was worthy of the army making it a permanent template for XV Corps’ internal security operations?

Firstly, Hasnain (Garhwal Rifles) — a khandani fauji, his father was the late Major General Syed Mahdi Hasnain — instituted the periodic durbars, the  “awami sunwayees”, wherein the locals would publicly air their complaints and,  as Corps commander, Hasnain would just as publicly, try to deal with these and otherwise resolve their everyday problems on the spot. The Valley Muslims had never experienced such a cordial relationship with the army, and very soon developed an intimacy that helped Hasnain’s other prong — using the army, SOG, and intelligence –IB/RAW to go after cross-LOC militants and Lashkar/Jaish leaders who had infiltrated the Valley society, to work. What was significant was that all these agencies cooperated to eliminate,  and this is important, ONE militant leader at a time. Why was this “one at a time”-rule imposed by Hasnain important? Because it focused the minds and the efforts of all those involved wonderfully well, and cut down on the usual mad scramble of each unit acting on its own, obtaining in the aggregate a welter of haphazard efforts involving too many targets, and achieving nothing very much as a result. This, alas, is the case now. The Hasnain methodology evidenced the smooth working of the classical “hearts and mind” strategy in a counterinsurgency situation, except it lasted only as long as Hasnain’s posting in Srinagar. And that’s the pity.

The pity is that the Indian armed services are so centered on the unit commander of the moment  that any good the previous incumbent may have done is, as mentioned earlier, swept away as detritus by the new incoming head. This pattern is replicated at all levels right up to the top. At the highest armed services’ level, this has meant chief of staff-centred armed services, a liability the Indian government over the last nearly 70 years has done nothing to tackle. Such ridiculously counterproductive and wasteful approach in the military needs immediate correction. A simple directive that no new chief of  staff can trash, overturn, or negate any ongoing approaches, solutions, programs, and procurement priorities without first clearing it with MOD would have a salutary effect. This order can be appropriately configured for application at all levels of the armed forces, just so ongoing fruitful activity is not disrupted. This is a longstanding necessity, but something so commonsensical has been studiously ignored. Indeed, military does not even think of it as problem. Then again, in the prevailing Indian system, common sense may be as alien to the Indian armed services as it is to the Indian government.

True, Gen. Hasnain was fortuitously placed to carry out his strategy, not least because he is a Muslim steeped in the subcontinental Islamic culture, and could pick up easily on cultural nuances and empathize with the Valley Muslims. This no doubt helped him to eradicate their fears while stoking their optimism and hope. There’s no dearth of motivated Muslim officers in the Indian Army. Could the Army HQrs, perhaps, do some career management, and begin grooming the best among them for longtime posting in Kashmir as Hasnain enjoyed, in his case, by sheer luck and happenstance? This will take care of  the continuity problem.

For a start, a formal revival of the two-pronged Hasnain strategy is in order. If the army has no institutional memory of it, the COAS Gen Bipin Rawat, could call on General Hasnain — a Delhi resident — to help out. He could be specially commissioned to reestablish the modalities of the “awami sunwayees” and the army-SOG-JK forces-intel interfaces, so the army — and especially XV Corps, can get going independent of the politically floundering PDP-BJP government, which may be too constrained openly to help.

But a third prong should be added to make the Hasnain strategy still more effective. And that is the cultivation of the Liaqat-Kukka Parey option that I have long advocated in my writings. Yes, Liaqat grew a little too big for his boots and began hurting the locals’ interests, and Parey joined the political mainstream and was killed by the militants. But the groundswell against the Fayaz and Pandit murders should point out the more angry among the lot who are bent on vengeance. Like the young Jat Sikh lads Gill recruited to hunt down and rid the Punjab landscape of the Khalistani villains, young Kashmiris who feel done in and victimised by the militants should be helped in every way possible with training and other resources to be the irregular arm of the army and assisted to “do the dirty work”, and a well-oiled scheme for rewarding those showing initiative in this respect embedded with the GOC, XV Corps.

The Indian republic has been too lenient in the last 70 years with terrorists, militants, insurgents, Maoists, and ruffians of this ilk. How long does the Union have to suffer them? The time to act is now.

 

 

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Culture, Decision-making, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian democracy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian para-military forces, Indian Politics, Internal Security, MEA/foreign policy, Military/military advice, Pakistan, SAARC, society, South Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | 3 Comments

India’s China Policy — Rajya Sabha TV

‘Security Scan’, the Rajya Sabha TV programme, aired a panel discussion on “India’s China Policy” in the last few days, featuring fmr Secretary, MEA, TCA Rangachari, Jabin Jacob and yours truly, at

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