Carrier aircraft muddle (augmented post)

Posted on September 2, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

(Navalised Rafale)

[This blog post re-published by BloombergQuint Sept 18, 2017 as “Personal Feud or Technical Flaw, why was Tejas rejected?” at https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2017/09/18/personal-feud-or-technical-flaw-why-was-tejas-rejected

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Trust the Indian armed services to make it difficult for themselves and the country at every turn. There’s a big muddle ahead, this time because the Indian Navy decided to issue an RFI (Request for Information) from suppliers for 57 twin-engined aircraft for its indigenous carriers, thereby shunting out, and deprioritizing in its plans, the naval Tejas. This because the naval brass decided that the weight problem — some two ton over mark — couldn’t be solved in time for it to grace the deck of  the IAC-1 Vikrant by when it is commissioned in 2021-22, and that this requirement has, therefore, to be met by imports.

The two aircraft in the fray are the Boeing F-/A-18 E/F Super Hornet — the main carrier plane with foldable wings of the US Navy until it is progressively replaced by the F-35C, and the Maritime Rafale Dassalt has been pitching for with SAAB’s Sea Gripen as a distant third, and not in the reckoning for reasons adduced below. SAAB’s offer to jointly develop with India was made in December 2015 at a time when the Navy was committed to the Tejas. Two years later the Rafale and F-18 are being pushed hard, the navalized Gripen prototype is ready, and the Indian Navy has soured on the home-grown LCA.

If there’s a problem with a new aircraft what do more advanced, strategic-minded, navies not habituated to the easy import option do? Well, take the F-35C. After repeated take-offs, the US Navy discovered a serious design flaw that made the catapult-assisted takeoffs so rough, and so disoriented the pilots just when the aircraft is getting airborne as to potentially prove fatal. The redesign, it is estimated will take several years, and the rectified plane won’t be available until 2020 or later. The US Navy tasked its ‘Red Team’ to work on the design modification and get the improved aircraft for trials fastest. Couldn’t the Indian Navy have constituted its own Red Team to work intensively with the LCA design team to trim its weight?

This was not feasible for many reasons, among them : (1) A personal mountain of a reason — bad blood between the lead test pilot in the naval LCA program, Cmde Jaydeep Maolankar, and Rear Admiral Surendra Ahuja, Assistant Controller Carrier Project and Assistant Controller Warship Production and Acquisition at NHQ. By all accounts, Maolankar is a top rated flier dedicated to the Tejas but Ahuja, with no flying experience, is nearer the seat of power and who, perhaps, to spite Maolankar, a batch mate, whose failure to make it to the next rank — however that was managed — was the talk in naval circles, convinced the naval brass that the LCA was no-go, and that its prospects are bleak.

[ ERRATA — My Wrong. Rear Admiral Ahuja is a certified test pilot, cleared for catobar flying from carrier deck, and among the first to operate the MiG-29Ks, as well as a number of other combat aircraft and even transport planes. This was a grievous error on my part of not researching more fully into RADM Ahuja’s career. Apologies.]

Many senior Admirals claim such skulduggery in promotions is not possible because there’s an Appraisals Board, etc. to prevent abuse at the level of promotion boards. In that case, how to explain the Armed Forces Tribunal in July this year holding Vice Admiral PK Chatterjee guilty of passing over many officers with excellent career records — all from the nuclear submarine arm, including Cmdr SS Luthra who had approached the Tribunal, to clear the upward path of his son-in-law Captain A V Agashe? (See http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/tribunal-slams-nepotism-in-navy-imposes-rs-5-lakh-as-fine-on-vice-admiral/articleshow/59851886.cms ). Whence the Navy’s formal rejection of the Tejas. On such personal rivalries hang the fate of nations striving to be self-sufficient in armaments! And (2) It would mean giving up on a chance to import another foreign aircraft and forego all the goodies in train. Easier then for the Indian Navy to give up on the Tejas.

Having desperately hunted for excuses to reject it, Ahuja, possibly driven as much by institutional impulse as personal animus, finally found it in the aircraft’s excess weight and, rather than proposing remedial measures and doubling on the navy’s commitment and investment in an Indian designed and developed carrier aircraft, recommended ditching the naval LCA. Should the Modi government and MOD, assuming Arun Jaitley tomorrow takes over fully as Defence Minister, not instruct the Navy to rethink the import decision? Nah.  Jaitley doesn’t know the business end of an aircraft if it bumped him, even less the business end of aircraft development or the value of fostering indigenous aircraft design and development capability. Then again, when have the military services caviled from tilting always and every time toward expensive foreign imports and pushing the nation deeper into the military hardware import hole?

Why expensive? Because 57 is not a large enough number of aircraft to interest profit-driven foreign suppliers, and certainly not Boeing, especially not if in trying to service PM Modi’s flagship ‘Make in India’ program it is also required to make it in India which, in terms of economies of scale makes no sense to anybody. And buying this small lot of aircraft will mean the country paying through its nose for them.

The reason the Swedish SAAB Company will be happy to produce the Sea Gripen in India is because it is also very confident about selling some 200 of its air  force variant in competition with the F-16 in the new single-engined aircraft sweepstakes to equip the IAF, with attractive talk of fully transferring to India “all source codes” — the design-wise know-why element. But there’s yet another problem. Assuming the Sea Gripen is generally of the same size as the air force variant, then this aircraft, as stalwart naval persons will tell you, will barely fit on the lifts in the IACs that carry the planes on to the deck. Except, Sea Gripen is single-engined, doesn’t fit the 2-engined NSQR, and is not acceptable to the Navy. Boeing would be interested too if the IAF picked the F-18 for its fleet, except Boeing is unlikely to onpass source codes and other ‘black box’ technologies to any Indian private sector company or public sector firm, like HAL. Besides, it will be the 2-engined oddity in a single-engined aircraft buy by the IAF. But this plane too suffers from structural features that make it unfit for the Indian carriers — the wings of the F-18 do fold but at the wingtips when, to be accommodated in the elevator, the fold would have to be at the fuselage end.

The joker in the pack is Dassault, which’s hell-bent on selling its ‘Maritime’ version to the Navy to complement the initial sale of Rafale to IAF as a means of beefing up its wedge in the door strategy to sell in piecemeal lots at progressively higher prices more and more Rafales to the Navy and air force without having to go through the rigmarole of transfer of technology under ‘Make in India’ obligations. Senior naval persons inform that teams from Dassault and Boeing have visited Vikrant, taken measurements, and may come up with some solutions. Such as tilting the aircraft just a bit to get them onto the elevator and the hangar below-deck, for which purpose some re-engineering of the hydraulics in the elevators may be needed. So Rafale will be configured, equipped  with foldable wings if Dassault espies any chance of selling its naval variant.

All said and done, the fact of the matter is the entire race is going to be reduced to a two horse field. Here’s how. Washington will turn the tourniquet to prevent the Swedes from bagging the IAF deal. Ashley Tellis, of Carnegie Washington, the prime mover of American aircraft to the Indian armed services, Indian MOD and the only foreigner (albeit of Mumbai origin) — as I revealed in a piece I wrote last year and on this blog (look it up!)  to have the readiest access imaginable to Prime Minister Modi, has made this plain. In a recent article, he mentioned the fact that between 40% and 60% of the Gripen is composed of components, sub-assemblies and assemblies, including the power plant, sourced from America, that will need US government clearance! Does anybody in Stockholm or in Delhi really believe Gripen has an easy run into the IAF fleet, leave alone the run of the Vikrant deck?  But bring the canny French in with their Rafale and the competition becomes more interesting, less predictable.

But the Modi govt, having taken flak for the 36 aircraft Rafale buy and with the 2019 elections looming, will not allow the sourcing of the F-18s without the “make in India” component. This option could become available if India is willing to pay a horrendous price for it. So, it’s ruled out. The one and only solution then would be the default option of buying more improved MiG-29Ks for IACs 1 through 3 at enhanced cost — improvements in the aircraft, as Admirals reveal, that have been made at India’s expense, on the basis of enormous and invaluable 4 years’ test flying data accessible to the Russians.

But why blame the Russians, the Americans, the Swedes, the French and anybody else selling military equipment for taking advantage of India? That’s the logic of the armaments business. What is hurtful though is how the military services do next to nothing to correct the situation other than justify “immediate”/”urgent” need to line up the next series of imports and, absolutely incomprehensible why the Govt of India — whatever the party in power — is loath to implement drastic measures to end such abject dependency. Such as laying down a ‘No Imports’ Iron Rule which alone will compel the armed services seriously to turn to making indigenous projects successful because they’ll be bereft of other options. To make such decisions will take quite stupendous political will, but that’s what Narendra Modi was supposed to muster. No?

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Losing the perception war at Dok La

Posted on August 28, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

Image result for pics of doklam clash

(Indian and Chinese soldiers milling around on the Doklam plateau)

At around a quarter-to-two in the afternoon today (Aug 28), a joint statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi and the Zhongnanhai in Beijing announced the “expeditious disengagement” by troops eyeballing each other on the disputed Bhutanese border with China on the Doklam plateau that India is treaty-bound to protect. So far so good. Except, the Chinese spokesperson Hua Chunying also said Chinese troops would continue to patrol the Doklam region, thereby giving the impression that while the Indians had withdrawn, the PLA unit hadn’t. She then gave the rhetorical middle finger to India by adding that “China will continue to exercise sovereignty rights to protect territorial sovereignty in accordance with the rules of the historical boundary” and, by way of turning the knife, gratuitously declared that “China hopes India respects the historical boundary and works with China to protect peace along the border on the basis of mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty.” ( http://in.reuters.com/article/india-china-doklam-idINKCN1B80IC )

Did PMO/MEA/South Block not have the faintest expectation that having painted itself into a corner Beijing would like to end up scoring rhetorical points to save face? If not, then it reflects poorly on MEA and Indian diplomats that some 70 years of dealing with  China hasn’t taught them a thing. Whence, the PMO did not not think it necessary to instruct the MEA to make public the agreement, which was in the works for the last several weeks that refers to the SIMULTANEOUS withdrawal from Dok La, so as to leave no wiggle room for Beijing? Far from gaining Modi traction at the BRICS summit in China next month by allowing President Xi Jinping to “save face”,  it will only shore up the resolve of the Chinese to keep pushing the Indian govt.  This is so because Beijing is aware that whatever the reality on the ground and whether or not any of their threats and arm-twisting tactics ever work, they are assured of success — at least in the war of perceptions because Delhi simply lacks the savvy. So now MEA will be on the defensive, and involved in a cycle of claims and counter-claims that it cannot win of who withdrew first, and which side is still “patrolling” the heights.

It was a very big thing for the Indian army to reduce the “mighty” PLA — or that’s the self-pumped up image Beijing likes to project to the world — to school-boyish pushing and shoving and throwing stones, and fulminating in the media, which about is the most the PLA could do in the circumstances it found itself in. MEA/Delhi have lost in the perceptions realm what a resolute army won in Dok La.

After all, the huge emanations of hot air and gas — from Beijing and its Global Times mouthpiece did spook a lot of people in the Indian government. It convinced mostly the innocent, naive and the nervy — the bulk of them in the PMO and MEA, alas, that hostilities were only a matter of the local PLA commander choosing his time to kick the intruding Indians out. This notwithstanding the assurances by the army that it was, in fact, well positioned to weather any PLA action and give back some, which is what the army chief Gen Bipin Rawat, in effect, said to the media yesterday when he talked of the army not letting down its guard because it expects the Dok la-type of incidents to be the new normal on LAC.

So, to get back to the question — why was there such urgency on the part of the Indian government to reach an agreement when, plainly, the forward PLA unit’s situation at the trijunction would very soon, weather permitting, have become unsustainable? Was Modi’s attendance at the BRICS meet all that important? Wouldn’t it have been better for India to show displeasure at China’s aggressiveness by sending a minister of state, or someone of even lower stature instead to Beijing? Xi is keen to forge BRICS solidarity now that things are hotting up with the Trump helmed-US, and Modi’s absenting himself would have sent a powerful message that this dual policy of Beijing’s of turning up the heat on the disputed border and turning it down at will, has its costs. But will the PM’s keenness on logging more frequent flier miles — this time east to Beijing, beget India much of anything? Let’s wait and see but it is highly unlikely Modi will return with anything at all.

When will Modi/Delhi/MEA ever learn that being nice to China when Beijing is hostile and determined on showing India down, hurts the national interest?

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Bhutan, China, China military, Decision-making, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, MEA/foreign policy, Military/military advice, South Asia, United States, US. | 45 Comments

10 days to fueling the Aridhaman

Posted on August 25, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

Image result for pics of the arihant SSBN

(Arihant, underway)

The second indigenous Arihant-class SSBN, INS Aridhaman, is completely outfitted and ready — the production time of some 10 years from the time when the special steel was first cut at the Vizag special projects facility. It doesn’t quite match the time needed to produce the Ohio-class SSBN rolling out of the General Dynamics Electric Boat facility at Quonset Point, Rhode Island, and Groton, MA, which complex has by now manufactured over a hundred SSBNs and SSNs for the US Navy. But  India is well embarked on the SSBN manufacturing front.

Aridhaman will be fueled up ten days from today, i.e., around September 5, and the more powerful nuclear reactor in it (than in the Arihant) will be fired up soon thereafter. The vessel will then be ready to undergo harbour trials and conduct shallow dives before the trials take to the open sea.

Not too long ago, the Chinese Navy launched its Liaoning-class aircraft carrier with much fanfare. It will take PLAN 15-20 years to integrate the carrier into fleet ops. India’s more strategic riposte with the Aridhaman, especially with the continuing eyeballing situation in the Doklam area of the trijunction, is a perfect reminder to the Central Military Commission headed by the recently anointed “Supreme commander of the  people’s army”, Xi Jinping, that it won’t do his regime any good exercising the intimidation techniques of threatening, huffing and puffing, feints, etc. recommended by the ancient Confucian strategist Suntze in lieu of actual action. If the hope is that a sufficiently cowed adversary will back down, India’s posture to-date will have belied it.  India is not backing down. So Beijing has a choice of withdrawing as gracefully as it possibly can, and lose face partially. Or, stick on and lose face totally.

The Aridhaman, moreover, has 8 tubes to launch the K-4 2,500 km SLBMs — twice the number of tubes as the Arihant, and can carry some 24 land-attack K-15 missiles as well. The twin SSBN set will by end-2018 be able to drop a whopping nuclear load on Shanghai and the coast line to the east and west of that metropolis — the main wealth-generating region of China. Not a bad thing for the 2nd Artillery Strategic Forces to keep in mind. Meanwhile, with the second Akula-II SSN — the agreement for its lease from Russia is at the stage of crossing the t’s and dotting the i’s — entering IN service, the Liaoning will be well advised  to stay clear east of the Malacca Strait.

There’s general relief in the ASEAN states and the now Brahmos-armed  Vietnam as also in the Far East, particularly Japan, with the recent developments in South Asia. India’s firm handling of the Doklam issue, which together with the second Indian SSBN soon showily taking to the waters, will increase manifold the confidence of the states on the Chinese periphery in India, and help douse the dragon’s fire. And its ‘tianxia’ ambition.

Posted in Bhutan, China, China military, Decision-making, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Japan, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Missiles, Northeast Asia, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Vietnam, Weapons | 44 Comments

Indo-US 2×2, etc.

Posted on August 23, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

The Rajya Sabha television panel discussion on the “2×2” forum (involving the Indian defence and external affairs minister and the US Secretaries of Defence and of State) as a new vehicle to advance Indo-US relations below.

Posted in Afghanistan, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Australia, China, China military, Decision-making, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, MEA/foreign policy, Military Acquisitions, Military/military advice, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, russian assistance, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Vietnam, Weapons | 1 Comment

Jihad to the finish in Afghanistan?

Posted on August 22, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

Image result for pics of Trump giving afghan speech

 

The US will hereafter forego foreign adventurism and wars to “rebuild countries in our own image”. But in Afghanistan, American forces, the US President Donald Trump announced, will fight on and finish the job of eliminating the terrorists. He would not make the mistake he said of his predecessor Obama’s of withdrawing the American military prematurely because that will lead to the al-Qaeda and ISIS filling the vacuum as happened in Iraq. Moreover, his strategy he said will be dictated by “the conditions on the ground” not “arbitrary timetables”. This could mean interminable war except, Trump contrarily asserted, that “our commitment [to Afghanistan] is not unlimited, and our support is not a blank check.” The conclusion then is that the US commitment to the Abdul Ghani regime in Kabul is in fact limited.

In the event, should the Taliban be prepared for rapid attrition of its leadership ranks with precision US kills, and manage to wage a sustained drag out fight to wear down the US fighting capabilities, deplete the US Treasury of its wealth, and test Washington’s patience and increase its frustrations with “a war without victory”, they may still end up winning against America as they had done against the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. This is enough of an incentive for the Taliban and assorted Islamic terrorist groups that will now be attracted to its standard, one would assume, to engage in a jihad to the finish against America. Trump has indicated that because “Micromanagement from Washington, DC, does not win [faraway] battles”, the US military commanders will be given a free hand to devise battlefield strategies, hunt down and kill the Taliban, and to call in more forces if necessary to bring the fight to a conclusion. So Afghanistan may soon witness a dizzying pace of US military operations once the build-up is completed and, as reaction, heightened terrorist activity inside Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the mean time, Pakistan will get it in the neck. As part of his multi-pillared strategy, Trump means “to change the approach and how to deal with Pakistan”. “We can no longer”, he declared, “be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond”. While acknowledging Pakistan’s role in the past as “a valued partner”, he accused Pakistan of “housing the very terrorists that we are fighting”,  and warned that Pakistan “will have to change, and that will change immediately”. Trump also hinted at the possibility of Pakistani “nuclear weapons and materials…coming into the hands of terrorists and being used against us, or anywhere in the world for that matter.” And then came the implied threat: “No partnership”, Trump averred, ” can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target US service members and officials. It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order, and to peace.” Or else.

Modi’s hugs apparently paid off. The US President referred to “another critical part of the South Asia strategy for America is to further develop its strategic partnership with India…a key security and economic partner”, appreciating its “important contributions to to stability in Afghanistan” especially in the economic and development fields, and reiterated his commitment to pursue “our shared objectives” in the subcontinent and “the broader Indo-Pacific region”. But amidst expressions of goodwill, Trump couldn’t resist holding out a veiled threat to Delhi. “India makes billions of dollars in trade” with the US, and “we want them,” he affirmed, “to help us more with Afghanistan” with regard to economic and development assistance. [I thought I heard him say “help us war with Afghanistan”!! and checked the print text to be reassured.]

More economic aid and programmatic assistance is manageable. But, what happens to the Taliban factions  cultivated by RAW that have so far helped keep the Pakistan-supported Taliban of the Haqqani Network and ISI off-balance and about whom GHQ Rawalpindi keeps complaining incessantly to Washington about? There’s also the likelihood, if the fighting gets difficult, for Washington to request a more direct Indian military role. The Modi government better begin strategizing and preparing for this eventuality and on how to say NO to Trump without getting him all worked up. And finally, does Trump’s anti-terrorist stance include the India-targeting terrorist outfits patronized by the ISI — LeT, JeM, and that lot of scruffians? I doubt it.

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Culture, Decision-making, Defence Industry, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Intelligence, Iran and West Asia, MEA/foreign policy, Military/military advice, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Pakistan nuclear forces, SAARC, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Terrorism, United States, US., Weapons, West Asia, Western militaries | 11 Comments

Finally, Vietnam has the Brahmos

Posted on August 18, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

Image result for pics of indian- vietnam military links

The Vietnamese Government today confirmed that it is in possession of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile armed with conventional warheads that the Indian government has taken an age to transfer to Hanoi. Vietnam is the one country China fears most — because invading Chinese PLA units got badly mauled in northern Vietnam in 1979. It is a hiding Beijing won’t easily forget, more so because it was given, not by the regular Vietnamese Army, but by the force of irregulars then guarding the border!

For the last 15-odd years, Delhi has pussyfooted around giving the Brahmos to Vietnam, limiting security cooperation to Kilo sub crew training, maintenance of Vietnamese MiG-27s/29s, and recently even offer of  the Akash SRAMs, etc., when what the Vietnamese really wanted was the Brahmos. They apparently appreciated better than Delhi/PMO/MEA  the strategic value of this missile in their armoury.

This for me is a particularly satisfying development because I first began advocating arming Vietnam with the Brahmos since before joining the first National Security Advisory Board in 1998 and then when I was there. When I originally officially made this pitch it ran smack into the then Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath’s rather dismissive response in his meeting with NSAB that this was “not practicable” thing to do — a phrase that has ever since remained etched in my mind and reflects the MEA’s strategic myopia!! In other words, China could arm Pakistan with nuclear missiles but for India to return the favour by equipping states on the Chinese periphery was not right. When Delhi fears even to do a strategic tit-for-tat, small wonder India has counted for so little for so long. The Brahmos-to-Vietnam move instantly changes the Asian geostrategical situation that one only hopes the Indian government understands. But it will need other follow-on measures spelled out below to derive the fullest advantage.

Hopefully, the Vietnamese will use the Indian Brahmos as shore battery to protect their offshore oil rigs and other infrastructural energy assets in the South China Sea, prevent the relentless Chinese bullying in the waters off its coastline, and to contain the Chinese Navy’s powerful South Sea Fleet out of the Sanya base on Hainan Island. This last is a particularly hard-hitting aim because once the maritime threat from that PLAN Fleet is denatured, there’s not much left for China to wag in anger in Hanoi’s face. Consider this: A broadside of two Brahmos can sink the Laoning-class aircraft carrier with China, and a single missile striking smaller vessels — missile destroyers and frigates and the like, will sink them.

One really hopes that after holding one’s ground in Doklam and onpassing the Brahmos missile to Hanoi, the Modi government will now be motivated to shove China even more onto the strategic back foot by transferring on a priority basis this same cruise missile to the Philippines and Indonesia, which last long ago expressed a serious interest in having the Brahmos in its naval arsenal. Duterte is a prickly character — who routinely cocks a snook at Trump and the US — and has had to make peace with Beijing because he does not have the wherewithal to fend off the Chinese. Manila would like to have more options and latitude in tackling Beijing. And Duterte will jump at the chance to pump up his own image at home and abroad by getting the Brahmos to hold off China.

This will mandate a much larger and continuing demand for the Brahmos missiles. The Brahmos Aerospace  (BA) DPSU simply doesn’t have the capacity to ramp up its production by a factor. Time the government immediately ordered the BA to transfer technology to the private sector for opening of two or more additional Brahmos production lines.  Larsen & Toubro is presently the only private sector firm with the capability to begin producing Brahmos on a war footing. No time should be wasted in moving the supersonic cruise missile technology to the private sector companies, and doing India’s strategic interests some real good for a change.

 

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DARIN – AESA coupling, and Brahmos ALCM

Posted on August 15, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

Image result for pics of the brahmos missile

Informed that the entirely indigenous DARIN-III navattack system is now integrated with an AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar with the Israeli 2052 computer, on a Jaguar. This is great news. The slight uncertainty about the AESA radar is whether this is a product of the DRDO-Israeli collaboration, or purely Israeli equipment. The Indo-Israeli AESAR item was built around the 2032 computer, because our good friend, the US, wouldn’t clear the 2052 for Indian use. In any case, 2052 is more powerful, can track more targets and make for better target definition. Hope the 2052 is driving the indigenous effort and the Indian competence built up in this project in terms of learning the placement of TR (transmitter-receiver) nodes for optimal performance, etc hasn’t ben wasted.

Incidentally, the DARIN system was conceived and put together by the technical/engineering officers of the Indian Air Force. But neither IAF, and even less the MOD, had the wit, when drafting the original contract for the Jaguar DPSA to ensure that any improvements in the original French nav-attack system would be Indian IPR. So the French company has used the Indian reconfiguration without any payment but, mercifully, did not charge the IAF for IAF’s own tech innovation! But then not retaining IPR on technologies suggests IAF and MOD are simply not sensitized to the IPR imperatives. To drive home the point, I’d bring up two other instances of India/IAF/ MOD not benefiting monetarily from IPR from IAF derived technical solutions to difficult problems, both relating to the Jaguars. (1) The Jaguars in Indian employ were detected early on as suffering from the problem of a fuel cutoff in flight. This was rectified by IAF engineers, but this rectification was not patented and brought within IPR ambit. So when the RAF, the supplier company British Aerospace’s host air force, also complained about the same cutoff problem the BAE was unable to solve, the IAF just handed over the solution to the British without any financial recompense! (2) The innovation of the 2 above-wing tip weapon stations is also an IAF technical innovation, which the RAF also adopted.

The larger more emphatic point to make is that the IAF has enormous engineering/technical talent that it has so far used sparingly, and then only in improving its imported aircraft. It is time the IAF marshaled its talented manpower to propel the home-designed and developed Tejas Mk 1A, Mk-2,and AMCA off the ground and flying as service’c commitment to finally and decisively go desi. That, perhaps, will be the finest, most significant thing the IAF could do to raise its own stature and that of the country.

——–

Errata: Informed that the correction of the faulty design was due to the solution provided by an HAL expert for a Jag in flight who, working in tandem with the pilot, safely landed the plane, albeit with the nose wheel not fully extended and locked in place. The more permanent remedy too was owed to HAL experts rectifying the design mistake which, as the following youtube video on this subject  indicates BAE would not own up to but incorporated in the British Jags, of course w/o any Indian IPR recognition.

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The weapon with the forwardly deployed Indian forces on LAC the PLA is most apprehensive about is the Indo-Russian Brahmos cruise missile, especially the Block-II & Block-III variants capable of near 90-degree dives to targets with the two artillery regiments armed with the Brahmos now on the eastern front. It is an uninterdictable missile homing in at supersonic speeds. If tasked to take out forward and rear area communications and logistics hubs, it can make a mess of the PLA’s best laid offensive plans, including anything they may have in mind to do on the Doklam plateau.

One so wishes the Modi PMO had shown the foresight and the initiative to start  2 or 3 additional production lines — all in the private sector, with only L&T presently having the capability to get the entire production off  and running very fast, and to ramp up for exports — because this the one thing every friendly state on China’s periphery is asking for. Leaving it to the Brahmos Aerospace is to, well, consign the Brahmos option to the leisurely, laggardly production pace of a DPSU, and when has that really worked?

Incidentally, the combination of the Brahmos Mk II & Mk IIIs and the air-launched variant fired from the Su-30 would be a one-two punch any prospective PLA onslaught will reel back from. Except the Brahmos ALCM project is limping on — no urgency evident  here! It has so far completed two separation tests (the process of the fired missile separating very fast from the Su-30 carrier).

 

 

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The Realpolitik Thrust of Nehru’s Foreign Policy

Posted on August 14, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

Below is the videographed lecture of mine on this topic on Augst 8, 2017 at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, uploaded to youtube.com.

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Time of the greatest danger is now!

Posted on August 10, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

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Acting defence minister Arun Jaitley said yesterday in Parliament that the country had learned the 1962 lessons well and the Indian armed services were well prepared for a border war. That may be so, but the capability to fight is also dictated by when China will take the initiative to open the first round, and where.

Not sure if the Modi Government is primed to the fact that the 1962 hostilities were started by China just as the October missile crisis got underway and the US was preoccupied by the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in that near end-of-the-world crisis. It was evidence of “strategic boldness and tactical caution” that Shivshankar Menon  claims, ironically, as the leitmotif of Indian foreign policy! In any case, a ’62 type of international situation is again in the offing — a nuclear crisis now involving the US and North Korea. With an unrestrained Trump warning of “fire and fury of a kind the world has never seen” should Pyongyang again issue a threat to the US — very Chinese Global Times-speak! — to which Kim Jon-Un replied almost instantly with tripling down on another graver threat, this time directly against the US island of Guam, major military station mid-Pacific — boy, this guy is ballsy!! — Northeast Asia is set for a strategic humdinger. It will be interesting to watch how this pans out, but I am happy to predict and prophecy that it will be Washington that blinks first. The in your face attitude and policy carried out with panache always wins in international affairs, something the Indian government and MEA in particular have been too timid to even contemplate.

Xi Jinping is desperate to save face in whatever small way he can, and considering how far out on the rhetorical limb his regime has gone in incessantly beating the war drum, there WILL be action. Beijing has mentioned armed intrusion into “Kashmir”, which has enough Indian forces in situ,  but it may be a way to divert the Indian military’s attention from the LAC. In any case, a North Korea-US fracas will provide Beijing with just the cover to precipitate an incident, use it to escalate to big unit action and then blame the forward Indian units and India for starting the war, forcing the PLA to react. This is what China did in 1962. And then, after some level of hostilities is attained, announce a ceasefire, claim due punishment has been meted out and that a sobered up India has been “taught a lesson”. Except, this time whatever territory the PLA captures they will keep. This is standard Chinese modus operandi, which MEA and the govt’s main China policy advisory arm — the China Study Circle, I am sure, has not warned Modi about.

If the above scenario holds and Chinese initiatory action is imminent, it is “all hands on deck”-moment, but this time the Indian armed forces have to ensure that should PLA start an affray anywhere, the Indian Army will not just fight back at that geographical location but retaliate by opening up fronts in other sectors for operations where PLA is disadvantageously placed with the idea of keeping the captured territory on the LAC for good. Once the army goes into action, the IAF should join right away, and plan on taking out forward Chinese assets as  preliminary action, leaving it to PLAAF to escalate if it chooses to. It’d be fun to see the IAF Su-30s slaughter the high-altitude constrained PLAAF fighters taking off from Tibetan bases. The Navy should likewise get right into it and, may be, sink a smaller warship — there are some dozen-odd Chinese navy ships in the Indian Ocean right now. That will draw PLAN subs affording the Indian Akula the opportunity to tail them for a shoot. It is only such disproportionate response that will prove to Beijing that it is not 1962, not all the speechifying by Jaitley, et al.

So far, Modi has done well to talk little, hold firm on the ground. But I sense complacency creeping in with things having gone well, so far. Hope he pulls the govt out of any such stupor and musters the confidence and the guts to expressly task the Indian armed forces for rapid and intense counteraction across the LAC, in the air, and the Indian Ocean. Passive defensive-mindedness has been the bane of the Indian govt and military to-date. Time to correct this impression, hence also time that Gen Bipin Rawat, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, and Admiral Sunil Lanba put their respective forces on high alert, because something is going to happen. If Beijing behaves the way it has always done, hostilities are round the corner, and they better be absolutely ready to respond aggressively. The Prime Minister will be well advised to, perhaps, hint at another Himalayan rumble in the offing in his Independence Day speech if not earlier , and thus prepare the people and the apparatus of state for the “war” coming down the pike.

Simply put, China should NOT be permitted under any circumstances to save face and get away with claiming it has taught India a lesson. Because that will mean Modi having egg on his face. The Indian government and military should ensure that it is Beijing that takes home the lesson that this is, in fact, the “New India” they are now dealing with, not the same old, same old.

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Oust Yameen from Male before it is too late

Posted on August 6, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

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(Yameen with Modi in April 2016)

President Abdulla Yameen of Maldives is in political trouble, having lost his majority in parliament. He is however preventing the elected reps who have abandoned him from joining up with the opposition party MPs in parliament. He has utilized the Maldivan National Defence Force (MNDF) to physically prevent the opposition from convening for a  ‘no confidence’ vote against him, and there’s now a standoff in Male.

Yameen has skillfully navigated three separate sets of policy imperatives. He has to have Delhi on his side because losing its favour would result in his displacement, especially if India supports his political opponent, the former President Mohammad Nasheed of the Maldivan Democratic Party (MDP). Nasheed had been imprisoned by Yameen, was released on Indian government’s pressure, spent a while in exile in London, and is back, dogging Yameen and the ruling Progressive Party of the Maldives (PPM).

China has been eager to have a Maldives gateway for its Indian Ocean plans and Yameen is playing ball. Keen to have China play a role both as counterweight to India and because it has the money to invest and to build infrastructure, Yameen has been tempting Beijing with offers of whole atolls in return. And then there’s Saudi Arabia, the fount as I have long maintained of the monies lubricating the spread world-wide of the hard salafi brand of Sunni wahabbi Islam of the desert, but is given a free pass. Yameen has permitted the wahabbis to flourish under cover of charitable Saudi funds until now when Maldivans comprise a conspicuous part of the foreigners’ s contingent fighting with the Islamic State which, with the fall of Mosul, is being run out of Iraq. So there’s a radicalized Islamic element in Maldivan society that’s inimical to India’s interests but whom Yameen has nursed as fall-back muscle in case MNDF deserts him. Riyadh is being paid back by, yea, you guessed it, with offer of an atoll to set up God knows what — a wahabbi nursery, perhaps?

Yameen dutifully entertained two visits by MEA minister Sushma Swaraj in Oct 2014 and again the following year, and made his pilgrimage to Delhi in April 2016 where PM Narendra Modi feted him. “The Maldives is among India’s closest partners,” Modi said after the bilateral delegation-level talks. “The stability and security of the Maldives are in the interest of India. He added that “India understands its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean and is ready to protect its strategic interests in this region.” There was a hint of the mailed fist that the Indian government would not tolerate any deviant behaviour by Yameen or any attempt by him to pull Maldives away from India. Modi virtually demanded “The prompt implementation of a concrete action plan in the defence sector [to] strengthen our security cooperation” to involve “Information exchange between security agencies and training and capacity building of Maldives Police and security forces [as] an important part of our security cooperation.” So, what’s the problem?

In a nutshell, Yameen is playing Delhi, even as the India-friendly Nasheed has been crying himself hoarse, warning about the perfidious Yameen and his design to perpetuate his rule by ridding the country of any and all opposition. The surest sign of this was Yameen’s decision in October 2016 to quit the Commonwealth because it hauled up his regime for its undemocratic practices. Nasheed has been in India trying to drum up support but apparently without much success.

The Indian government believes that whether it is Yameen or Nasheed, Male cannot afford to alienate India. Except, over the past several years Yameen has let the Chinese and Saudis strengthen their presence in his country. Rather than nipping this threat in the bud, Delhi is letting it grow, and it will, even as it remains blissfully inattentive.

It is time India acted. There are contingency plans for armed intervention, which will need activation. The last time India nearly intervened was in 2012 when Nasheed’s removal by Mohammad Waheed Hassan precipitated a crisis. But Waheed was quickly replaced by Yameen and turmoil abated, until now when the Maldives is once again on the boil. But some years back, it may be recalled, that in response to Yameen’s moves to lease out islands to China just 19 kms from the Indian Lakshadweep chain, Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, then FOCINC, Western Naval Command, Mumbai, deployed a warship to the Maldivan waters. Yameen got the message and that initiative with a Chinese group fronting for Beijing, was dropped.

It is time for Modi to order a variant of “Cactus” and have an SF unit first expeditiously secure the Male airport, have a warship with MARCOS embarked as backup, and then clear the Parliament gate off the complicit MNDF members, arrange for a free and fair vote of ‘no confidence’ to proceed against Yameen without hindrance from any quarter, and thereafter keep Yameen out of the Male scene.

If Modi continues to trust Yameen despite every evidence to merit extreme distrust of this slippery character, and doesn’t act very soon, we’ll see the Saudis with the extremist Islamic threat, and the Chinese — the source of the more conventional naval danger not just to mainland India but to India’s access to the East Africa coast, and the embryonic India-Japan maritime corridor to Africa, ensconced off India’s southern tip. The question will then be asked when it is too late to do anything: “Who lost the Maldives?”

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