[PM with his war council]
It is as if the Indian government and its media/commentariat echo chamber, have only now — post-Operation Sindoor and, apparently, for the very first time, discovered that it is a cruel, unforgiving, harshly transactionalist world out there! Not a single friendly leader that Modi hugged and cultivated and, to please whom he bought billions of dollars worth of exorbitantly priced armaments from for the Indian armed forces and rescued their defence industries from insolvency at the expense of the indigenously designed and developed weapons systems and a funds-starved Indian defence industry, returned the favour by standing four-square behind him and India.
Or, offered to join in campaigning internationally to put Pakistan in the dock! The fact is MEA will be hard pressed to collect a political consensus to push Pakistan once again into the ‘Grey List’ of the Financial Action Task Force tracking the funding channels benefitting terrorist gangs. Just for context, at, no time, was Pakistan ever in danger of making the ‘Black List’ — not even at the height of the US-led “Global War on Terror” in the wake of 9/11. Because, that would have permanently damaged Pakistan economically, which the US and Western camp will, under no circumstances, permit.
In the event, other than lending a polite ear, it is unlikely the seven Parliamentary teams sallying forth to the various capitals of the world will be able to convince any country of note — but of what?? That Pakistan harbours/nurses Islamist terrorists? No one doubts that. That India was in the right to strike at Pakistan in retaliation? Who contests that? So, what’s this public relations exercise about, other than affording the selected MPs some time in more salubrious climes?
But let us define the setting.
From the moment the Indian missile attack went in and the Muridke and Bahawalpur targets were hit on May 7, and the latest round of India-Pakistan hostilities was on, the main thing that happened was that Pakistan’s nuclear bluff was called. It proved what I have maintained for over three decades in my books and writings — that Pakistan is in no position to trip a nuclear exchange, and that there was a vast nuclear overhang for India to exploit conventionally. But the Indian government and military — listening to the nonsense of nuclear flashpoint and what not emanating from the US and the West, have stayed their hand and encouraged the Pakistan army to believe it is more powerful than it really is, and that it could freely indulge in costless needling of India.
Still, all any body heard from abroad once Indian missiles hit home, were calls for restraint by New Delhi, but there was zero international political support for the job India had undertaken to suppress Islamist terrorism originating in Pakistan. And this mind you, when New Delhi believed it had a cut and dry case — Pakistan-sponsored terrorists killed Indian tourists in Pahalgam after ascertaining their religious identity, and India retaliated with a view to imposing penalties on the Pakistan army for running the terrorist show.
Restraining India seemed to be the objective of almost all Western countries that Modi had hoped would hurrah him along on his mission to snuff out Islamist terrorism. Foreign minister S Jaishankar’s preparing the diplomatic ground in the interim period between Pahalgam and Sindoor for the Indian military reaction, met with no success, only borderline moralising! It goaded a plainly upset Jaishankar, who saw his diplomatic handiwork of several years of a policy of clever-talking unravel in Europe, to reject such official standoffishness on the Pahalgam issue. India wants “partners, not preachers” he harrumphed, missing out on the delicious irony that not too long ago, it was Modi sagely advising Presidents Vlodomyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin, about this not being “an era for war” — a message fecklessly conveyed also to Israel with Gaza on its hands.
Far from securing any backing from Kyiv and Moscow for Modi and India, now it was New Delhi’s turn to get the mealy-mouthed treatment from everyone in sight! Should we be surprised? Such are the perils of being sanctimonious about war. Not appreciating that war is only another instrument of statecraft and that India, in fact, has used it in the past to advance its interests, can result, as in this instance, in its coming back to bite us in our collective arse! Every country that has had to put up with India’s “moral high ground” pronouncements, is enjoying this moment of India’s discomfiture. If this is not schadenfreude, I don’t know what is.
It raises the bigger question: Why did the Indian government act as if it was entitled to international support, to universal accolades, for attacking terrorist strongholds inside Pakistan? After all, everyone is aware that India always shies away from delivering a decisive blow as it did in Sindoor, that it does not really have what it takes to subdue even a minor foe, what to talk of terrorism. And that India and Modi are more talk than action. This being the case, is India worthy of respect from anybody? Manmohan Singh was far worse — he sat mumbling, and did nothing after 26/11 in 2008.
The lamentations in print and on television — boo hoo! — by the lot of high-strung TV hosts and media commentators about India’s abandonment by the big powers, and the world not really giving a damn about what India was doing or not doing vis a vis Pakistan as long as New Delhi did not escalate matters, mask an unpalatable truth. The international community has about had it with the periodic eruptions in the subcontinent, featuring the same tired cycle of terrorism, blood-curdling rhetoric followed by military actions and reactions with negligible effect that the jingoistic press and media on either side, hyperbolise with unbelievable claims and counter-claims, followed by an abrupt end to hostilities, and a return to the status quo ante, with the original problem remaining largely unaddressed!
How is any of this serious stuff? Because even as a pantomime a 3-day “war” amounts to silliness.
Having taken the offensive, India should have done something hefty as a follow-up to hitting Muridke and Bahawalpur. Like permanently wrenching the Haji Pir Salient and/or Skardu from Pakistan’s grasp, and promising more such territory-grabbing ventures in the future as response to terrorist incidents, until little is left of PoK with Pakistan. Because India did not opt for an intense land war and failed to cut off big slices of Pakistani territory, the Pakistan army gloried in India’s incapacity to do any such thing or even to impose huge costs. It has, in fact, incentivised General Asim Munir to persist with his policy of deploying terrorists in Kashmir — the next terrorist incident is not far round the corner, daring India to do its worst — which GHQ, Rawalpindi, believes it will be able easily to handle as it has done so many times in the past. On the other hand, India’s campaign of taking out the terrorist leaders residing in Pakistan one or two at a time, is obviously not a deterrent enough.
But given its institutional tendency to do everything by half-measures, the Indian government finds itself once again between and betwixt — and in something of a military and political jam. Why?
Firstly, because Trump — with whom, according to foreign minister Jaishankar, Modi has a “personal relationship”, turned rogue and the tables on India. Unbidden, he intervened as a “peace maker”, and decreed an end to the India-Pakistan clash. Such tactics ran into a wall on the Russia-Ukraine Front. With India, predictably, Trump had instant success. Modi buckled under immediately and, just like that, New Delhi accepted a 3rd party — US — role in the affairs of India. And, 30 years of Indian diplomatic effort — a good part of it managed by Jaishankar with the 2008 nuclear deal as its crowning achievement, to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan in the policy matrices of a whole bunch of Western countries New Delhi considers important, went down the drain.
The Modi government tried to wipe the egg off its face for succumbing so easily to the barest American pressure, by futilely challenging the Trump thesis that Modi and Sharif had approached him to mediate — a blatant lie, of course. The MEA pointed out, with chronological referencing, that it was the Pakistan army’s Director General, Military Operations, who called his Indian counterpart on May 9 about a ceasefire, which was not formally accepted until the next day. Even if Trump was irrelevant to the situation, the question is, why was the Pakistani offer of ceasefire accepted at all?
Because even then India could have restored some self-respect by insisting, that its military would stop when New Delhi decided Pakistan had been punished enough, that is after, say, Haji Pir was in Indian hands — however long it took to accomplish that, and that it was not for the US or any third party, without any locus standi in the matter, to dictate anything. The end-state of this to-ing and fro-ing suggests the ceasefire was accepted because of the firman from Trump, which incidentally fits in with the timeline!
The issue then is Trump’s firman to stop firing, which Shehbaz Sharif speedily accepted. Why was it issued when it was? Was it because by May 9, it became clear to Washington, as it did to Munir & Company, that with their amply depleted stock of missiles, if India continued with the pace of missile firings that peaked on May 10, Pakistan would have no option other than to wave the white flag? Indeed, according to Dr Moeen Pirzada, one of the better informed telejournalists, that point of surrender would have been reached by Pakistan by May 12 at the latest. (See https://youtu.be/gLt6MFzLdkQ). If Dr Pirzada had this information, how come RAW or Air Intel/Military Intel did not? And if they did, and had conveyed it to the Modi regime, then things turn darker. But the Indian military’s calling it a day just when the enemy is on the point of giving up, is also part of an old pattern. Recall that India announced a ceasefire in the 1965 War when Pakistan had run down their stocks of spares and stuff to one week’s supply and the Indian military still had 14 days worth left (according to the Indian Official History of that war).
In this context, it is not clear what to make of Rajnath Singh’s statement that the stoppage of hostile actions is just a pause. If this means India suddenly igniting another round, hey, …. we’ll wait and see. For my money, it means nothing — just another emission of hot air.
By May 9, however, the international media line was established by the maddeningly impulsive Trump who, displayed the special brand of viciousness he reserves for his supposed friends. He not only repeated his claim that he had engineered the ceasefire by invitation, but embarrassed Modi some more by doubling down on his revelation that he had used trade as lever to get Modi in line, with nary a mention anywhere of the Pakistani terrorist incident that had sparked the Indian response in the first place, which would have laid the blame for Pahalgam at Islamabad’s door. So, this is the story our circumambulating MPs will try and squelch. Except, these trips are not worth the money being spent, because their arguments will sway no government.
All this is significant only because Modi, now in his 3rd term as PM, has put so much store by intimate relations with America as a means of displacing Pakistan in Washington’s affections and in the US’ security architecture in Asia — a ridiculous venture considering Pakistan, as I keep pointing out, is indispensable to America — its selling points being its comprehensive weakness and manipulability — qualities that Islamabad has, time and again, cashed in on. Until now when it is not the nuclear overhang that saves Pakistan from condign Indian punishment but Washington standing in the way. And India has lacked a strong leader to ward off American pressures.
Does Modi want to make India bend to Washington’s every whim, as Pakistan happily does? Not that the Indian government has not done so repeatedly in the last 30 years, but it will have to become more conspicuously subservient, in the manner Islamabad is. That is how Trump likes it. This is surely not what Modi desires for India.
In that case, Modi has, for starters, to reverse what Piyush Goel, the Commerce Minister, has done by agreeing to all sorts of provisions in the draft Free Trade Agreement with the US inimical to Indian national interest, that is replicating the disastrous FTA he has obtained with the UK, where British companies will be allowed to bid for all Government of India contracts amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars annually, and is a deathknell for Indian industry. Modi should simply junk the proposed FTAs with the US, and with its sidekick, UK. And take it from there.
And Modi has to begin straight talking with Trump and without the usual frills. This has so far not happened. May be the PM has to bear the late Henry Kissinger’s warning in mind when dealing with the US, and especially Trump, that to be America’s enemy is dangerous, to be America’s friend is fatal!
Then there’s the Indian military’s performance.
The “three day” war, besides its joining the annals of military absurdity, has brought into question the lead service in Op Sindoor, the Indian Air Force’s competence in air operations. IAF’s coordinated effort with the army to put up an air defence wall against Pakistani missiles, however, was a great success and immensely laudable. In contrast, the radars attached to the Chinese HQ-9 and HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) on Pakistan’s side proved a damp squib — they picked up no Indian incoming.
However, in air ops, it was a different story. In the very first hours of the operation a number of IAF combat aircraft were shot down — the question is: Which aircraft and how many? Pakistan claims downing five Indian fighter planes — 3 Rafales, 1 Su-30 and 1 Mirage 2000. The IAF/GOI have been quiet on this subject, suggesting that the claims may not all be a figment of Fizaya’s imagination. The IAF’s operations in-charge, Air Marshal AK Bharti, cannot brush of such catastrophe as the usual “losses” in war. Rafales were shot down for sure, otherwise the Rafale squadrons would not have been grounded after that first awful day apparently for fear of losing more aircraft.
Much worse, the IAF is so fixated on manned aircraft, it did not foresee the exorbitantly priced French Rafale as a fading asset in the coming age of longrange missiles. And, much, much worse, it did not anticipate how the Pakistan Air Force would innovatively use its Chinese and Swedish assets — the J-10C medium multi-role fighter, its consequential longrange weapon — the Chinese P-15E air-to-air (A2A) missile, and the Saab Erieye AWACS. Why did no one in IAF focus on such use of Chinese assets by PAF? Isn’t it the Air Intelligence’s job — assuming it has any sources in Pakistan independent of other intel agencies, to intimate what the PAF was up to, and for the Ops directorate to factor in this intel for action with adequate countermeasures before sending up the Rafales to do Beyond Visual Range combat, or did everybody really expect that there would be the old style dogfights?
Moreover, high attrition rates seem by now to be an IAF standard — recall the first day of the Kargil conflict — 2 aircraft went down — a helicopter and a Mig-21. And we were told then that, that was because the IAF had not practised combat operations in the mountains! With one of the two live fronts entirely mountainous, what air war actually was the IAF preparing for?! What excuse will Air HQ come up this time around for losing however many high value aircraft in Sindoor. Will they at least show some slight humility, even professionalism, and conclude, albeit belatedly, that Rafale was redundant to need, and that the indigenous Tejas would have done just as well as a weapons carrier — and what matters is the A2A radar-guided Meteor missile. And that, this missile integrated with Tejas would form a more cost-effective combo than the Rafale-Meteor tandem. And if the French missile firm, MBDA, is reluctant to mesh the Meteor with Tejas, France can be told to take their 36 Rafales and shove it. And, in any case, one would expect the IAF to terminate importing this over-hyped plane to meet its so-called Medium Fighter Aircraft requirement, when Tejas is available.
Not sure why the IAF and the Indian government are so squeamish about cornering a supplier country-France/company- Dassault Avions, and demanding they — the sellers — do what we — the buyers, customer — want, and have us routinely take dictation from them, as is the case at present.
If the air chief ACM Amar Preet Singh doesn’t initiate such professionally necessary moves, one hopes there are enough sensible people in the Prime Minister’s Office to put an end to India buying more Rafale for any reason — the least of them to meet the IAF’s extremely questionable medium fighter aircraft requirement. Especially, with the home-made Tejas, also a 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, that will fare better as well in war and can be mass produced by parcelling out big Tejas production contracts, as I have been pleading for years, to private corporations to compel the defence public sector unit — HAL, known mainly for shoddily screwdrivered aircraft to, for the first time, face competition. In a fair competition, HAL will be beaten to a pulp by L&T and/or Tata. (I am not mentioning the Defence Ministry under Rajnath Singh because as defence minister he has revealed himself as too much in thrall to the babus to push anything genuinely strategic for the country.)
And, no, Lockheed’s salivating at replacing Rafale in the IAF fleet with the F-35 with Trump’s help, and the assistance of many serving IAF officers and a load of retired Air Marshals, will hopefully only remain an American dream. Because the F-35, an even more calamitously bad combat aircraft, will be the worst sort of nightmare in Indian service. The IAF’s reputation, already in a dive, will be impossible then to rescue — what to talk of the hit the Indian treasury will take. Modi should tell Trump — No, thankyou, keep the F-35 to yourself. The trouble lies in Modi’s inordinate desire to please America, to be in Trump’s good books, and that’s the joker in the pack.
There are many in the higher reaches of the government and the military, who disrespect Russian military hardware. The effective layered air defence provided by the S-400 must has rattled them a bit. Along with the locally-produced Akash surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the air wall shut out the Pakistani missiles — reason why Indian airbases and military facilities were not hit in any big way, and not for want of Pakistani forces desperately firing off ordnance at them.
Not too long ago, an insufferable NRI type visiting India — Mukesh Aghi, “President” of some non-government entity called “US-India Strategic Partnership Forum”, declared that India should “play a pivotal role in rebuilding America” and to “Align yourself with what Trump is trying to achieve, which is America First”!!! One can but pray that Aghi’s agenda is NOT Modi’s agenda.
Perhaps, the PMO, MEA and every other agency of the Indian government should hang big boards in their offices saying “AMERICA IS NO ONE’S FRIEND, TRUMP IS NO ONE’S BUDDY” — a line from one of my posts after Trump’s election in November last year. And to craft India’s foreign and military policies accordingly.
A sidebar: Two more interviews that may be of interest: (1) a podcast on ‘Op Sindoor: India signals new war doctrine to Pakistan’ on the May 16, 2025 podcast — ‘The Federal’ conducted by Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLUyfOcq640, and (2) an interview by Rashme Sehgal, INTERVIEW: ‘India Should Never Fight Indecisive ‘Wars’ With Pakistan’ published in ‘Newsclick’, May 16, 2025, at https://www.newsclick.in/interview-india-should-never-fight-indecisive-wars-pakistan
Security Wise 
@BharatKarnad
greetings professor karnad
just watched your latest podcast on vaad. I am not very strategic minded like you but if you could tell
during the last part of the podcast you refer to the exchange ratio of loosing Delhi,Bombay and Inreturn Pakistan get’s extinct
any specific reason why you stopped your argument till 2 cities i mean Pakistan has some 160 odd warheads before getting decimated by indian forces won’t they take out some 20 big cities of india.
No comment!
Sir , how do you view ongoing worsening of India – Bangladesh relations ?
Bad news! We’ll have to do something. Hope Doval is on the job!
Email from Dr V Siddhartha, former Science Adviser to Defence Minister
V Siddhartha
Mon, 19 May at 11:41 am
“… an insufferable NRI type visiting India..”
NRI =Non Responsible Indian.
But, in the post you forwarded, this was redundant;
“… In a fair competition, HAL will be beaten to a pulp by L&T and/or Tata. (I am not mentioning the Defence Ministry under Rajnath Singh because as defence minister he has revealed himself as too much in thrall to the bureaucrats to the babus to push anything genuinely strategic for the country.)”and needlessly detracts from the rest of your post.
HAL is what it is not because it is in the Public Sector, but because it is “Air Force (passed-over for promotion) sector”. Shortly after he resigned from the Board of HAL, Satish Dhawan remarked to me: “Bus drivers cannot be bus builders, much less bus designers”.
All the radar and ECM systems in the integrated air defence architecture that were central to Op Sindhoor were built, and majorly designed by, BEL — a defence PSU.
VS
Sid,
There’s no reason to believe the private sector cannot do better than any DPSU in any sphere of activity. Who is to say a private sector permitted to bid for the ECM systems contract could not have produced better goods, faster? We will never know until competition is introduced — and that’s the point I have been making all along.
private sector is only loyal to their super profits for capitalists and never loyal to security of nation and society.
Absolutely untrue. It is the lack of the profit motive that has made DPSUs a drain on national resources.
And who in the Private sector would be up for this challenge, Professor? If the contracts end up going to the same old mercantile castes(Khatris, Baniyas, et al), wouldn’t they follow their time-tested practice of rapacious capitalism, that is, to make exorbitant profits in order to fund their Big-fat weddings !! So far, the Indian private sector owned by these communities just does majdoor-maar and no innovation…
sowl@ — That is old baniya stuff — you are living in the past. Even the Birla’s and Bajaj’s have updated themselves. And L&T, Tata, Mahindra, Godrej Aerospace, Bharat Forge, etc are world class industrial corporations and tech innovators, not to mention a bunch of MSMEs at the cutting edge of technology.
With all due respect Sir, the piece is laced with a lot of self deprecation and is unidimensional in its criticism of the civil administration. Just to clarify, I am no Modi supporter (nor do I salivate at the prospect of listening in to the puerile chest thumping by the Arnabs and Aroors of the Indian media) but to say that the Government merely caved in immediately following US intervention, and that India should have pushed the envelope by slicing in POK territories, is foolhardy at the very least. We should be under no delusion that doing so, is more than likely to upon up the LAC front as well (thanks to vital PRC assets and proximity to Aksai Chin) which we can I’ll afford at any moment.
Prophetic words of Prof Karnad.The good thing is it is an incremental improvement over our previous response of strategic restraint advocated by Former NSA Shivshankar Menon.Hope the govt resumes the thermonuclear testing because India is on its own its critical that we have strong nuclear deterrent against China if we get scared of Pakistan nuclear weapons our political leadership will be very hesitant in case China rattles its nuclear weapons besides it will give us a phycological edge and confidence stand up to external pressures.Seeing the way China is trying to poke us its necessary to pursue both nuclear and conventional deterrence like you have advocated having a separate budget.
@bharatkarnad
What are your views on the three policy statements made by PM.
On point 3 why should more serious sanctions not be placed on companies doing business with Pakistan if terror and trade cannot happen together?
There’s very littl direct trade. The bulk of Idian goods reaches Pakistan via Dubai. That’s no skin of our backs, and in any case we earn hard currency taken from the very small $ reserves with Pakistan. It leaves that many $ less for the Pak military to spend.
Dear Sir, good analysis by you. No matter what those 7 teams try to convince the world about pak sponsored terrorism it is of no use because west needs them for doing their dirty work as admitted by pak defence minister.
Time and again we need validation by west, muslim countries show we are not confident that we are doing a right thing by punishing pakistan.
when will our diplomats realize our problem is not their problem.
Trump or Us has nothing good to offer for India other than useless F35’s.
To contain China, India has to play its own long game not being used as a pawn by US in geopolitical chess board.
Unless India comes out of the shadow of US it will never rise to become great power.
Email from Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (Retd), former DG, Military Operations
Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia
Mon, 19 May at 9:45 pm
Thank you. Par excellent, However, with China knocking on the North, our forces deployed. Do we really have the combat power to address Hajipir or Skardu? Add manpower deficiencies of over 200,00, and Agniveers
Regards
Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (retd)
Respected Sir, my question is a bit selfish.
I work in a company which supplies auto ancillary parts to the automakers ie likes of Mahindra, force ,Maruti,Tata, etc and all foreign brands viz Hyundai, Kia,BMW ,VW etc.Salary is good, CSR activities are good,there is a lot of scope to learn, the factory is near my home, seniors guide very clearly and helpful, the only issue is the company is owned 75% by Chinese enterpreur and the rest is owned by Indian investors.Is there any risk of such companies getting kicked out of India , should I be searching for alternative job then? please help me in this regard.
Thank You
Sorry, Omkar, the nut & bolt details of commercial/trade issues not my field.
One can trust karnad to always be his wicked extreme far right self, by painting a rosy picture of what happened.
Both sides have their versions of what really happened. We are led to believe that karnad’s version of stories are bereft of jingoist masala.
Does karnad really think that China would simply let Paki go under from the perspective of war?
Dr Karnad, I wonder what makes you feel bad about the UK India FTA ? “where British companies will be allowed to bid for all Government of India contracts amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars annually, and is a deathknell for Indian industry.” You mentioned last week that you are a Burkean conservative then how come you support protectionism and a lack of competition within the Indian private sector? If UK companies can bring better technology and services to GoI contracts , I believe it will be good for India in the long run. I would love to know your reservations in this matter.
I am not a Burke-an conservative to a fault! It isn’t fair competition, and because no major country allows foreign companies to bid for government contracts.
@BharatKarnad
Greetings professor karnad . What are your views on this?
https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/russia-proposes-joint-production-of-s-500-air-defense-system-to-india-again
This article is of 2024 but After seeing the impressive performance of S-400 in the recent missile and drone exchanges across the border both India and Russia are likely discussing about joint production and procurement of S-500 to india
Do you welcome this move unlike rafale or predator drones.
also this is my personal opinion through your books and writings I noticed your policies and recommendations kind of tilt towards Russian weapons rather then American or European
Thank you
Nukegeneral@ — All for co-production of the S-500. Yes, re: Russian mil hardware because, as I have argued, the systems are more rugged, and better suited to extreme climate milieux, unlike the delicate Western systems. Example: MiG-29s and Su-30s are parked out on tarmac in the high tropical Indian heat; the Mirage 2000s and Rafales need airconditioned hangars! But the trouble with Russian items is with their design philosophy — intense use for shorter periods, more frequent replacement of engines, etc. And that’s a problem we have faced.
@BharatKarnad
yeah sir couldn’t agree more
also to add the Russian T90 tanks that india has you in one of the podcast you quoted that the corps commander told you half of them don’t start at the first instance.
one more thing and you are the best person to ask this
What about the American sanctions CAATSA?
turkey too had purchased s400 they were insulted and thrown out of the the f35 program by Trump and sanctions were imposed. They had given a waiver to india and we were made an exception.
can this happen this time too will we get waiver or Trump who has completely gone mad will impose sanctions for s500 or hypersonic brahmos procurement
would love to know your learned views
If Modi fails to kowtow to Trump in the manner asked on any of a host of outstanding issues, India will face punitive US CAATSA measures.
May 19, 2025 msg from Col. Gautam Das of the Institute of Chinese Studies
Great article of yours on Op SINDOOR! One of your best! Congratulations!
Gautam Das
A Rejoinder to the Lamentations of a Fallen Oracle: Dissecting the Dirge
The diatribe masquerading as high-end commentary on Op Sindoor is a curious blend of sanctimonious outrage, selective memory & hyperbolic despair. Its author, once a venerated voice…, now seems to revel in the role of a disgruntled prophet, wielding vitriol as a substitute for cogent analysis. While the piece rails against the Indian government, its military & the global order, it conveniently sidesteps the complexities of geopolitics, the realities of war & the nuances of statecraft. Let me dismantle this exercise in rhetorical excess with the sobriety & precision it so conspicuously lacks.
First, the author’s premise – that India’s Op Sindoor, a retaliatory strike against Pak-based terrorist strongholds, was met with universal apathy – misrepresents both the intent & the outcome. Wars, as the author grudgingly acknowledges, are not won by international applause but by strategic outcomes. The missile strikes on Muridke & Bahawalpur were not public relations stunts; they were calculated acts to degrade terrorist infrastructure & signal resolve. To expect a global chorus of approval is to misunderstand the nature of international relations, where self-interest reigns supreme. The absence of effusive support from Western capitals does not negate the operation’s necessity or efficacy. It merely reflects the transactional pragmatism of nations, a reality the author decries but fails to contextualise.
The charge that India’s diplomatic efforts, led by FM S Jaishankar, unravelled in the face of Western “moralising” is a gross oversimplification. Diplomacy is not a linear path to universal consensus but a labyrinth of competing interests. Jaishankar’s reported frustration – his call for “partners, not preachers” – was not a petulant outburst but a calculated rebuke to sanctimonious posturing by states with their own strategic agendas. The author’s mockery of India’s diplomatic outreach, including parliamentary delegations, ignores their purpose: to reinforce India’s narrative & maintain pressure on Pakistan, even if incrementally. Diplomacy is a long game, not a theatrical sprint, & dismissing it as a “public relations exercise” betrays a shallow grasp of its mechanics.
The author’s fixation on Pakistan’s nuclear bluff being “called” is both misleading & dangerously reductive. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, while a deterrent, has never been the sole axis of its strategy. Its reliance on asymmetric warfare – terrorism as a low-cost tool – has long been India’s primary challenge. Op Sindoor’s success lies not in provoking a nuclear response (which no serious strategist anticipated) but in exposing Pakistan’s inability to shield its terrorist proxies from precise, punitive strikes. The author’s claim that India’s restraint has emboldened Pakistan ignores the broader context: India’s calibrated escalation, from surgical strikes to Balakot to Op Sindoor, has steadily raised the costs of Pakistan’s terror sponsorship. The absence of a full-scale land war, which the author inexplicably champions, is not a sign of weakness but of strategic discipline. Seizing Haji Pir or Skardu, as suggested, would risk a broader conflict with questionable strategic gains, potentially alienating even neutral global players. Wars are not won by territorial bravado but by achieving objectives without overextension – a lesson the author seems eager to ignore.
The critique of India’s military performance, particularly the Indian Air Force (IAF), is equally myopic. The loss of aircraft, while tragic, is an inherent risk in high-intensity operations. The author’s fixation on the Rafale’s alleged vulnerabilities – while praising the indigenous Tejas as a panacea – betrays a selective narrative. The Rafale, with its advanced avionics & Meteor missile, was chosen for its technological edge, not as a symbol of foreign subservience. The suggestion that the IAF should pivot entirely to Tejas ignores the complexities of force modernisation & the need for a balanced inventory. The author’s call to “corner” France & Dassault over integration issues is a populist flourish, not a policy prescription. Defence procurement is a delicate balance of capability, cost, & geopolitics, not a platform for jingoistic posturing. The IAF’s layered air defense, bolstered by S-400 & Akash systems, effectively neutralised Pakistani missile threats – a fact the author concedes but quickly buries under a pile of grievances.
The most egregious overreach is the author’s portrayal of India as a hapless pawn in America’s geopolitical chessboard. The claim that Prime Minister Modi “buckled” under President Trump’s pressure is a distortion that ignores the timeline & context. The ceasefire, as the author reluctantly notes, was initiated by Pakistan’s military, not Trump’s fiat. India’s acceptance of a pause in hostilities was not capitulation but a pragmatic decision to consolidate gains & avoid escalation traps. The author’s obsession with Trump’s intervention – couched in conspiratorial tones – ignores the broader reality: no major power, including the US, has ever fully endorsed India’s or Pakistan’s position in their bilateral disputes. This is not a failure of Modi’s diplomacy but a reflection of global realpolitik, where strategic ambiguity serves powerful nations’ interests. To suggest that India’s de-hyphenation from Pakistan has been undone by a single episode is to exaggerate Trump’s influence & underestimate India’s growing global heft.
The author’s call to “junk” free trade agreements with the US & UK is another exercise in reckless hyperbole. Trade agreements, however imperfect, are tools for economic integration, not symbols of subservience. Dismissing them outright risks isolating India in a global economy where interdependence is a fact, not a choice. The suggestion that Modi’s outreach to Trump reflects a desire to “bend to Washington’s every whim” is a caricature of a leader who has consistently balanced relations with the US, Russia, & China to India’s advantage. The invocation of Kissinger’s aphorism – “to be America’s enemy is dangerous, to be America’s friend is fatal” – is a rhetorical flourish that adds little to the argument. India’s foreign policy has never been about blind allegiance but about navigating a multipolar world with strategic autonomy.
In the end, the author’s dirge is less a critique of India’s actions than a lament for a world that never was – one where global powers rally behind India’s every move, where military victories are bloodless & decisive & where geopolitics follows a linear script. The reality, as the author unwittingly acknowledges, is circular, unpredictable & driven by unseen levers. To castigate India for failing to bend this reality to its will is to misunderstand the nature of power. Operation Sindoor was not a pantomime but a calculated step in a long war against terrorism – a war India fights not for applause but for its own security. The author’s vitriolic prose, draped in the guise of high-end commentary, offers no solutions, only noise. India’s path forward lies in strategic clarity, not in the self-indulgent despair of a once-respected voice now lost in its own echoes!
CDR V Srivatsan@ — I welcome this opportunity to debate the issue.
For a person who laments the “fall of an oracle” you are remarkable in mistaking a blog — an informal, provocative shorthand opinion piece, for other than what it is. From your tone, I assume you are aware, if not have actually read, any of my numerous books that have championed realpolitik and hard power, and decontructed precisely “the complexities of geopolitics, [and] the realities of war & the nuances of statecraft” you charge I have “sidestepped”. I urge you to read my books because then the literary flair you display would be yoked to more substantive articulation of your disagreement with views, such as mine, of India’s foreign and military policies. In the event, it is almost too easy to refute the points you have laboured mightily to make. But I will do so in short form because, frankly, I lack the patience to do it at length.
1) The absence of a ready “instant retaliation” force — that I have written about as a political liability after earlier terrorist events, and I did so again in my post of April 30, meant that the sympathy that poured from international quarters after Pahalgam was exhausted by the time Sindoor rolled around. Thereafter, Pakistan controlled the narrative with the Indian discourse meeting with “universal apathy”, which apparently surprised the Modi government, and prompted the daily briefings by FS, Misri, et al, and the decision to deploy the teams of MPs.
2) You missed my juxtaposing Jaishankar’s “partners, not preachers” with Modi’s preaching about the supposed obsolescence of war — an irony evident to all, except you
3) “nuclear bluff” is serious deterrence business and the fact that India, by striking Muridke and Bahawalpur, called it, is no small development. It evidences the large space available for conventional ops that I contended (in my 2002 tome “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security”) has always existed but a risk-averse Indian govt and military has not exploited. Perhaps, now there will be an attitudinal change.
4) “Seizing Haji Pir or Skardu” would have departed from the usual pattern of indecisive and inconsequential India-Pakistan “wars” that resemble “communal riots” — the late Major General DK Palit’s memorable insight. Indeed, I used Palit’s description as an analytic template to parse I-P conflicts and found them to fit the riot metrics (Refer my piece in The Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs of June 1996). And it’d have established the principle of India hereafter diminishing POK territorially, whatever it takes, after every terrorist incident, and would have been a genuine deterrent against ISI’s asymmetric warfare option.
5) As an ex-Commander, IN (?) I am a little astonished you missed the obvious point I made of aerial platforms being far less important than the weapons and, in the event, that the indigenous Tejas would have done just as well as a weapons carrier but without all the bells and whistles that airmen so crave and the nation pays through the nose for. What is the marginal value you reckon for the doo-dahs on the French item? And you missed out on the glaring fact that PAF was tactically far more innovative than the IAF — the reason for all the Indian aircraft kills. And aren’t you a bit cavalier about the five aircraft losses worth, what, nearly a billion $? And that, in all the “high-intensity operations” you mention, combat aircraft were mostly missing after the first day of downed IAF planes.
6) The “India First” concept that Modi utilised in his election campaigns and to justify his foreign policy — was first articulated by me in 2001, and I was the first in the commentariat to talk up Modi in 2011 as good PM material for his Edmund Burke-an view of “Less government, more governance”. And I have written my last two books around the absence of trust in relations with the US and America’s unreliability as a friend and strategic partner, and in my 2018 book on the perils of having Trump for a friend — a conclusion now borne out. You may hold on to the view that Modi held his own against Trump. But it is not supported by facts. (Refer stories of Rubio’s involvement, etc)
7) My peeve against FTAs has to do with allowing foreign Cos. to bid for GOI contracts — this is unprecedented. Try selling a pencil to the US govt! It is not about free trade — there’s no such thing. It always benefits the stronger parties.
8) On “strategic autonomy”, read my 2018 book — Staggering Forward, on why India has not done too good a job of it.
9) Talk of ” rhetorical flourishes” — “In the end, the author’s dirge is less a critique of India’s actions than a lament for a world that never was – one where global powers rally behind India’s every move, where military victories are bloodless & decisive & where geopolitics follows a linear script.” What is this, where have I said anything to merit this?? The trouble is you seem to have inverted your thesis on itself! (Strange also, because I am accused by many to be an “ultra realist” — whatever that is!)
10) My views are backed by extensive research and books, other writings, and even the Security Wise Blog that have won national and international renown and a dedicated readership in govt and military circles, with a former naval chief and chairman chiefs of staff committee calling by book “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security” the “bible’ for the Strategic Forces Command. On the other hand, you, Sir, seem to be winging it.
Your response, Mr. Karnad, bristles with zeal but leans on credentials & insinuations, dodging my critique’s core. You label me “cavalier” about billion-dollar losses & jab at my Navy Commander rank, flaunting your admiral’s praise as if operational grit pale beside your academic renown. As a founding member of a strategic think tank, feted by admirals & generals worldwide, I rest my arguments on evidence, not past encomiums. With respect, I’ll dismantle your points, grounded in Op Sindoor’s realities, the pulse of India’s people & the absence of confirmed losses. Forged in naval command & strategic discourse, my analysis isn’t “winging it.” Let’s clear the deck.
Your concerns – Pakistan’s proxies, procurement woes, global limits – are real but drowned in despair. Op Sindoor met India’s call with clarity, not bravado. My naval & think-tank experience, like my analysis, values outcomes over ego. I invite evidence-based dialogue, free of rank games or rhetorical fog!
Yes, Commander, when I write it is with zeal. And, yes, I am harshly critical of the Indian foreign and national security policies, and of the military services because there is no tradition of challenging the government policies in the main because there are no academic programmes in the country to prepare analysts for critical thinking on the military, in particular. And military veterans with the talent and inside, practical, knowledge, who can substantively and critically dissect issues, such as yourself, end up being apologists for their parent service, the military generally. and the official line of the day, in that order. In the event, I have found very little research and writing along original lines of thought. It is in this context, I suggest, my oeuvre offering alternative policies and military options, be viewed. But I readily confess my rising frustration — apparent in my writings, with policies that, at most, may eventuate, as I argued in my 2015 book Why India is not a great power (yet), in an India as only a “great power lite”
My message over the last nearly 40 years main-themed on realpolitik and effective uses of hard power, has been nothing if not consistent. So, assuming you are familiar with my writings, I am surprised that what you earlier found “oracular” you now deem contentious. To reiterate, a blog is not a dissertation, and if every point made on a blog-post is to be footnoted then, I am afraid, no blog will meet your high standards. And, in any case, I have better uses for my time. My blog writing, incidentally, is at the expense of my work on my next book which, at 77, I am struggling to finish. This leads me to my referencing my lack of patience to respond to your demand for details, etc. Do the research on the timeline yourself, and tell me where I erred.
Just one thing, it is curious that immediately after the successful Muridke-B strikes, it was, as DGMO LTG Ghai revealed, he who approached — at GOI’s behest, no doubt — his opposite number for a cessation of hostilities, an offer that was rejected. Did that meet the popular expectations raised by the PM’s promise of “unimaginable” consequences for Pak? And, if that was all that was intended by way of retaliation for Pahalgam, why did it take so long to mount? And, if so, was it enough as a deterrent? If not, what was the point of so meagre a breach of a major operational threshold that has taken India so long to cross?
I had no intention of hurting your amor propre by mentioning your rank — great generals have learned from mere captains (Heinz Guderian from Liddell-Hart, say). I am, however, remiss in being unaware of the thinktank you represent, or of your writings. This is my bad! (But do help me by emailing me references of your research papers that I can look up and, hopefully, learn from.)
“Such are the perils of being sanctimonious about war” –
In one sentence the essence of India’s Statecraft and the glaring limitation of Modi Raj in the international political stage has been encapsulated!
Great analysis indeed. I have grave doubts any lesson will be learned by Delhi.
@Prof Karnad.
Initially I was dismissive of the idea of taking territory (Haj Pir etc..), but not so much now.
For it seems like no matter what the outcome; and despite India potentially destroying 20% of Pak air assets; Having the bombing video all over the internet ; Even hitting their nuclear weapons storage; Getting their terror camps destroyed; or otherwise their sovereignty seriously violated by India – They still seem to celebrate the outcome.
And Asif Munir just promoted himself as Field Marshall! So seems like there is no easy way of imposing cost on the pakistani leaders? Because in any other country the army leaders would have lost their jobs for letting such a serious transgression to transpire.
Do we know that even taking over parts of land will impose any meaningful costs on their generals? Seems like grabbing the entire Pok might be the only option left! Thoughts?
Email from Vice Admiral KN Sushil (Retd), former FOCINC, Southern Naval Command
On Wednesday 21 May 2025
Very well articulated. It would appear that the message that we are targetting only the terrorists, and have no desire for escalation was taken as the limiting aim of our action. It would of course have been stupid to believe that there would have been no retaliation.
Our eagerness to cease fire can be interpreted in many different ways. One could well ask ” Was there a lingering doubt that we were on the threshold of the Pak threshold?”. If so are we convinced that we have called their “Nuclear Bluff”?.
An interesting question that arises is Did NTRO or other agencies detect the prep and launch of their ballistic missiles? ..
More importantly what do we know about Nuclear Surety organisation,that is understanding how a launch order is finally executed. What if any are their checks and balances?
I had, whilst in service, argued that Pak nuclear threat was a bluff, especially their lack of strategic depth imposes existential questions. This situation could cause Nuclear Surety chain being compromised, and create a path for power shift in the military hierarchy.
As Schelling put it a deterrent remains a deterrent if it is not used.
If, as pointed out in your previous article, the AWACs could transer fire control data to the fighters, (they have solved the integration problem) did the IAF factor such a capability?.
Regards
Re: last point — apparently not.
Don’t worry Professor. India has enough internal enemies in the form of religious, caste, color and langauge divides to keep our nation shackled. External enemies just need to watch us unfold.
I am not sure if you are from the GSB community but I am and have after due research seen that this one community has so much infighting that it is sooner than later become an extinct.
Now extrapolate the infighting in this small community to the rest of India and I am sure you will get to understand what I am saying.
Greetings professor karnad
I hope you are reading this. I have 2 questions regarding nuclear deterrence
1)If we had a official first use policy way back in 1999 after testing would we have seen territorial aggression like we saw in Kargil and later on galwan.This question has always bothered me if you could give an answer to this
2)After reading your books i totally agree with your strategy of placing SRBM and ADM on the Chinese border to stop any incoming advances from the enemy.
But you advocate FU against China isn’t it better if we change it too strategic ambiguity like US and UK. Let them guess that whether we will use it or not.
Considering the fact that Chinese themselves have made many exceptions in their doctrine to use first(like if the chinese territory in this case arunachal is in enemy control)
but one thing is clear and I learned through your books that acting as good guys in international affairs will be detrimental for india.
would love to know your learned opinions
thank you
nukegen@ — NFU was Vajpayee-Brajesh Mishra’s call; it was not in the doctrine we drafted in 1st NSAB. I doubt — as I have extensively argued — that nuclear weapons are even relevant vis a vis Pakistan.
It was a very risky operation against a first rate airforce. It required stealth fighters, which the IAF does not have in its inventory. The Israelis used F35’s against Iran and so did the US Navy against the Houthis.
Rao@ — Actually, no, stealth ac were unnecessary had IAF been more attentive to Pak tactics
Fully correct about the ill-thought foreign junkets to attempt to bend the narrative to our will; do we harbour such presumptions that foreign governments do not have their own eyes to see (i.e. their intelligence agencies) so that we can spin the story the way we want? One wonders which sage brain conceived these exercises in futility.
On a related note, my read is Jaishankar’s stock is down post-Singoor and he may well be shown the exit.
You and Praveen Sahwney have done yeoman work during this whole affair in your balanced and dispassionate analyses. That counts as true patriotism, as conforming to the national motto: Satyameva Jayate.
@VikramSinghji:
Where is your reference for “… French are themselves saying ..” which you claimed in the previous ” Rafale failed in Sindoor! …” – in Paris Match or Le Figaro or Le Monde? I am very interested to go through that column.
Anyway, you must have French citizenship to hold a regular Faculty appointment in a Grande Ecole en France, or otherwise one of the floating Visitor Status there.
Et finalement, Monsieur le Professeur, vous n’avez pas expliquez moi qu’est-ce qu’on entend par “full-spectrum electronic warfare”. Veuillez le donner, s’il vous plait.
Sir, I admire your strategic mindedness. But I totally disagree with your view on Rafale, first of there is no evidence that Rafale has been downed, and I didn’t expect you, who has played such a critical role in indias nuclear doctrine, will believe articles published by CNN, referring to a revelation by a French intelligence official about a Rafale being downed. I would humbly request you to watch the podcast of Ram divedi with abhijit chavda. He is the first Indian to graduate from intelligence school of France, he clearly said that the French intelligence doesn’t have any official or head like we have it for our RAW and they directly to report to the president or their defense ministry. French agents don’t even talk to each other, do you think a French intelligence person will talk to CNN? If he had done so he would be severely punished and court martialed.
You also say the Indian govt is not supporting domestic defense industry, its not entirely true.
Rs 45000 cr deal to buy 156 lch prachand.
Rs 6900 cr deal to buy 307 atags (given to tata and baba kalyani in 60/40 ratio).
Last year 7.5 billion dollars, almost 65000 cr, were alloted by the govt for the upgrade of su-30 to make it super sukhoi and all the equipment which is gonna be used to upgrade it like virupaksha radar to drdo ew suite everything will be made in India.
I know you had seen problems in Indian defense industry in your time, but things have changed a lot from then. If you think i am lying you can check all the above facts on your own sir.
We also need to understand that India is still a developing nation with not so great manufacturing and R&D base, so if we need collaboration in certain critical technologies or we need to purchase them from abroad, there is nothing bad in it.
You talk about tejas. No doubt it’s a very reliable plane. 6000 flights and only one crash, but sir with all due respect please understand that it was primarily made to replace mig-21 which is an interceptor, the job of an interceptor is when an enemy air asset is coming in your territory you quickly go in air with speed and shoot it down and come back, it’s not made for offensive operations and it can’t carry as much payload as Rafale or su-30, but comparing su-30 or Rafale to tejas is like comparing apple to a pineapple there is no comparision. I stand firmly with Indian defense industry but we must know “Rome was not built in one day” these things take time. Look at American F-16, it took 20 years to build it. So I humbly request you, sir, again with all due respect please do a bit more deep fact checking. Thanks.
Suneja@ — There’s no point in avoiding the truth. The aircraft debris with serial number on the tail seen in photos, etc found in Aklian Kalan village, not far from the Bhatinda airbase leaves little room for doubt. It is the reason why I have stressed that in the new mode of aerial warfare, platforms do not matter as much as the long range weapons they carry. So Tejas, costing a fraction of the Rafale, would do just as well.
You must be new to my writings. Have been pitching the Indian industry for 2 decades now as far more sophisticated and tech capable than the DPSUs, and why GOI should trust Ind Cos. rather than keep importing armaments, and only buy select technologies the country is still deficient in. Such as optronic masts for subs, etc. — rather than the whole package. And, of course, by that and other metrics Rafale — like so much other foreign hardware, was an absolutely unnecessary and wasteful buy.
About French spooks, or any spooks, less said the better.
Dear Professor Karnad,Thank you for your thoughtful response. I deeply respect your long-standing emphasis on indigenisation and private industry’s role in India’s defence — a path we must pursue aggressively.That said, I respectfully disagree that the Rafale was an unnecessary or wasteful purchase. While long-range weapons are crucial, the platform still matters significantly. Rafale offers proven multirole capability, superior sensor fusion, and the SPECTRA EW system, all vital for survivability in modern combat.Regarding cost, Rafale’s pricing is in line with global standards. For example, the Philippines recently signed a $5.58 billion deal for 20 F-16 Block 72 aircraft, which are single-engine jets. India’s 26 Rafale-M deal is comparable, especially given its carrier compatibility.I fully agree that India must rapidly build indigenous capabilities. To that end, we should accelerate the AMCA program in parallel, under PMO oversight, to ensure faster and more accountable progress.Moreover, I believe India should seriously consider joining the FCAS (Franco-German-Spanish 6th gen fighter) program — a strategic move to gain cutting-edge technology while reducing import dependence.Warm regards
@Professor Karnad and Rao:
I am still not convinced Rafale downed by PAK PL-15. Here is a link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsW8tBQ_Pl8
The same source which claimed that initially have also claimed at the same time an IAF fighter pilot was in custody with PAK. They have backed off that part now.
Mishaps can happen in the air war. In the midst of Balacot operation an IAF helicopter with full load of high-ranking armed forces personnel was shot down by India’s own ground-based missile system which was on alert against PAK attack. IAF held an internal enquiry to find out what went wrong.
There could be umpteen other causes why a Rafale was lost, even if the documentary evidence of debris shown in the public are authentic. That could not imply that PAK succeeded in its claim.
In sum, this remains my position at this point of time, but I am open to correction to further confirmation of the event.
“ it may in time become desirable to critically review our concept that Pakistan’s destiny is or should be bound with India…There is reason to question whether solidarity with India will ever be achieved…The schism which led to the breakup of the old India was very deep…Moreover, the vigor and methods which have characterised India’s execution of its policy of consolidating the princely states, and its inflexible attitude with regard to Kashmir, may indicate national traits which in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan’s successor in Asiatic imperialism. In such a circumstance a strong Muslim bloc under the leadership of Pakistan, and friendly to the US, might afford a desirable balance of power in South Asia. ”
https://www.outlookindia.com/making-a-difference/india-pak-the-great-american-game-news-296670
The fact that BJP is incapable of comprehending the American threat shows the penetration that they have achieved. Our obsession with China – despite it being a serous threat – seems foolish when you put it against the behemoth.
There’s one more step to this analysis: The US (and West) keep supporting the ‘desert’ outside and inside of India to stop ‘H’ from consolidating (Reconquista). They want us to be in perpetual state of democratic paralysis and hesitancy, which, for them, is easier to manage and manipulate. A diverse(read: weak) country is easier to manage and keep down because it can always be kept busy with internal conflicts, whereas homogeneous one is internally secure and therefore outwardly expansive.
We either do the Reconquista of India(and later subcontinent) or remain in the perpetual state impotent whining and pleading!
@BharatKarnad
Recently DG ISPR again threatened that if India stops Pakistan’s water they will choke our breathe(like literally) and the same thing was echoed by Hafiz Saeed of LET a few years ago.
Now i am sound a little bit weird but some people in India including a few defense analyst are interpreting this as a possible threat for chemical weapons attack(WMD)(breathe and choking) by a non state actor on Indian population mainly gas attacks using chlorine bombs and yellow chlorine explosion i mean Pakistan has a sufficient arsenal of chemical weapons.
Do you consider this threat of a possible chemical weapons attack as serious because in one of your podcast if i remember you mentioned a biological weapons attack in (ig some kind of a plague) in Gujrat whose sources are still untraced and thousands of people died
And sir our nuclear doctrine is also kind of weird because it says any WMD attack chemical, biological will invite a nuclear strike from us which does not makes any sense
Would like to know your learned views?
To dig into the raging controversy (latest Suneja’s post) whether an Indian Rafale was shot down by Pak or not, I explored the web to find contradictory views. Here is one to note (in support of Suneja) https://observers.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20250512-india-pakistan-conflict-rafale-fighter-jets-shot-down-images-debunked
A few excerpts: Photos taken out of context
Several images taken out of context have been circulating online since the night of May 6. a picture allegedly showing a “completely destroyed” Rafale aircraft was shared by Pakistani online users. They claim that the fighter jet has been found near Bahawalpur, Pakistan.
However, our team ran this photo through a reverse image search (click here to find out how) and found the origin of this image. The picture was taken on May 21, 2021, after a Soviet-designed Indian MiG-21 fighter jet crashed near Moga, in the Indian state of Punjab!
Pro-Pakistan accounts also shared another photograph allegedly showing a Rafale jet on fire in Bahawalpur. Through a reverse image search, we were able to establish that it comes from an old video, which was filmed on September 2, 2024, after the crash of an Indian MiG-29 fighter jet near Barmer, India!
Aircraft debris with French writing? It’s a drop tank
Separately, Pakistani internet users shared other images, claiming they showed evidence of a destroyed Rafale aircraft. These images were indeed taken shortly after the clashes of May 6. According to these users, photographs released by the French Press Agency (AFP) on May 7 appear to show Rafale debris located near a school in Wuyan village, in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir.
These online users say the inscriptions visible on the wreckage found in Wuyan confirm the aircraft’s identity. They also say the writing includes the name of a French company, Le Bozec et Gautier, and the RFL acronym, commonly used to refer to Rafales.
But Xavier Tytelman, an aviation and defence consultant, says this interpretation is incorrect.
“[These images] are not proof that a plane was shot down. It shows a drop tank [Editor’s note: and not a Rafale wreckage.] When a jet goes on a mission, once it has used its fuel, it will lighten its load and drop its tank. It’s something planes intentionally release during their missions.”
…………According to a source within French intelligence quoted by CNN, at least one Rafale fighter jet was reportedly shot down by the Pakistani military during the clashes on the night of May 6. We reached out to the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, which said it did not want to comment on “rumours”.
And so on… Have your pick. But to my mind, as yet there is no conclusive evidence to back up Pakistani narrative which only the naive could fall for.
The alleged Rafale tail that was found was debunked by experts: the writing was in italics, inconsistent with a genuine Rafale; seam was running in the wrong direction. Besides which, there was no other debris consistent with a downed plane. BharathRakshak has many more debunkings and excellent analysis from several Western and Indian military experts, who were drowned out by the propaganda media. Sindoor was a resounding success, except for narrative control.
There is a typo in my previous post “@Pro… Rao” where it should be “Suneja” in place of “Rao” to make sense.
@BharatKarnad
I was Reading the official indian Nuclear Doctrine and there in point 2 sub section 6 it says
“However in the event of a major attack against India,or Indian forces anywhere ,by biological or chemical weapons , India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons”
you see this doesn’t makes sense and is not credible let’s say if there is a chemical weapons attack by a non state actor like lashkar How will india prove and justify a nuclear attack on Pakistan by saying that we were hit by a chemical weapon originating from pakistan?
Any logical answer to this scenario sir the doctrine is really messed up?
Also do we have stockpiles of chemical weapons in indian armed forces in case if an adversary(china) uses chemical weapons on us?
Thank you
“Retain the option” is fine, sanction for it just in case. Re: CWs/BWs –who knows
Our current CDS just released a book named ‘Ready, Relevant and Resurgent: A Blueprint for the Transformation of India’s Military’ sir. Hope you take a look. Wonder when yours will come to guide us commoners. BTW your comment duel with the Commander was as epic as Sindoor.
@BharatKarnad You mentioned in the comments, Modi, kowtowing to Trump and CAATSA sanctions.
If Trump and the USA can use sanctions against India, can’t Modi and India use sanctions against them and beat them at their own sanctions game?
You’ve mentioned in the past how India doesn’t use it’s geography/market as a leverage and how the USA needs India against China.
If like in the past, the late George Fernandes expelled the US MNC The Coca-Cola Company from India, if Modi and India were to expel all US MNCs from India including imposing reciprocal conditions [same as the USA] on US citizens seeking Indian visa as retaliation against any US sanctions on/interference in India, do you think then Trump will realise he’s met his match and back-off?
After all, he admires leaders like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un whom he considers to having stood up against him and the USA.
What do you think about a US senator’s recent comments about imposing bone crushing sanctions on India with regards to our purchase of Russian oil?
India has said it’ll continue to do so despite US pressure.
India can go fully reciprocal — that requires GOI with guts
@BharatKarnad Can we also go full reciprocal with the European Union too?
Because along with the USA they too are a bully and are prone to pontificating to India.
What about the recent threat from a US senator about bone crushing sanctions on India for our purchase of Russian oil?
Do they really have that power as a senator or as a senator if they’re a member of some committee in the US Congress Senate or is it just bullying?
Do you think India saying they’ll continue buying Russian oil despite US pressure is Modi and the GOI getting guts especially after Trump’s antics during Operation Sindoor?
Sure. If India goes reciprocal withUS, EU is lesser game