Plan for Partial Theaterisation is Unsatisfactory on Many Counts

[CDS Gen Anil Chauhan with CAS, ACM VR Chaudhari, CNS Adm Hari Kumar, COAS Gen Manoj Pande — left to right]

Earlier this year in June, in an hour-long session with the Chief of Defence Staff in his South Block office, General Anil Chauhan, was forthcoming on many issues I raised. Regarding theaterisation, he seemed pleased when revealing to me that approval for it had been secured from the then three armed services’ chiefs of staff — General Manoj Pande, Admiral Hari Kumar, and Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari. “They have signed off on it”, he informed me. Pande and Hari Kumar have since retired. Chauhan then outlined the theaterisation blueprint with some of the details that were officially made public in Lucknow at the Joint Commanders’ Conference on September 4.

Among the proposed purportedly transformative changes is the restructuring of the current 17 separate commands under the three services — 7 with army, 7 with IAF, and 3 with navy, plus the two “integrated” commands — Strategic Forces Command (SFC), and the Andaman-Nicobar Command into three “theatre commands” — Maritime or Peninsular Command, China Front Command based in Lucknow, and the likely-Jaipur HQed Command for Pakistan contingencies, each to be headed by a 4-star rank officer. It means the elimination of the Thiruvananthapuram-based Southern Air Command and the Jaipur-based army’s South Western Command. Chauhan also clarified that his predecessor, the late General Bipin Rawat’s interest in fast-forwarding a single command for the air defence of the country had been de-prioritised. Perhaps, because of the complexities involved. (On this see my my blogpost of July 10, 2021 — “Maddening CDS-cum-Military Theaterisation Muddle (Augmented)” at https://bharatkarnad.com/2021/07/10/maddening-cds-cum-military-theaterisation-muddle/)

The Press has reported on how the political-bureaucratic circles may baulk at creating three new 4-star billets in the military who, like the armed services’ chiefs of staff, will outrank secretaries to the Government of India, and why such a step is necessitated by the fact that the theatre commanders will have operational control of fighting formations and units from all the three services.

Chauhan, in his quiet way, has achieved something quite spectacular — in that no one quite believed that he would be able to get theaterisation over the Air Force hump! IAF was the unmoveable barrier that frustrated all efforts at “jointness” in the past, arguing, in effect, that ceding any control over aerial fighting assets to a non-flier (from a sister service) would imperil India’s air power because only a professional combat fighter pilot sufficiently appreciates and understands the demands and vagaries of air warfare.

IAF had its way until now only because of lack of political will, even though the Kargil Committee and the Defence Higher Defence Reorganisation committee under the late KC Pant recommended theaterisation. Previous Prime Ministers having at best only a passing interest in matters military, did not care enough about more effective and efficient use of military resources via jointness and theaterisation. It was this political disinterest that an officer cadre of ignoramuses, domain expertise-wise — the generalist civilian bureaucrats, clogging up the Defence Ministry MOD who have long viewed putting the clamps on the military as part of their remit, stoked.

Chauhan, who was recalled from retirement to serve as the 2nd CDS, may have succeeded where Rawat failed maybe because he was expressly tasked by the Prime Minister with realising theaterisation and assured of every assistance to move the process along. There’s little doubt that the Chief of Air Staff was prodded by the PMO, or Chaudhari thought it prudent not to stick his neck out once he recognised the lie of the land. The only good thing about a military system where all the powers are vested in the Service Chief is, that with the bureaucracy falling in line with Narendra Modi’s wishes, any institutionalised reluctance would be at the cost of the Service chief himself and this rendered him more persuadable. Chaudhari, it is apparent, had no stomach to go up against the PM/PMO. Whatever the reason for the CAS’ playing ball, it smoothed the way for Chauhan to draw up his “blueprint”.

The plan for 3-Theatre Command setup, however, is problematic mainly because it amounts to partial theaterisation and has nested problems. To sketch a few of them:

  1. A military reorganisation plan is likely to be successful if is geared to a total makeover, and its actual implementation is in steps. But if all that’s proposed, in this case, a 3-theatre command structure — then given the bureaucratic tendency — military and civilian, to tolerate as little change as possible, that’s where the jointness may, willy-nilly, terminate, assuming the 18-month timetable for establishing these Commands works out.
  2. One obvious reason why theaterisation has been limited to 3 Commands is because there are three Armed Services and each can have a Theatre C-in-C, it simplifies the distribution of the loaves and fishes of office — Army takes the China Front Command, Air Force the Pakistan Front Command, and the Navy takes the Maritime Command.
  3. This is bad news, because all the other other capabilities that would benefit from centralisation may be left out of the theaterisation programme for good, or postponed to the never-coming tomorrow! Thus, there will be no separate Joint Planning Command, no Joint Procurement Command, no Special Forces Command, no Joint Logistics Command, no Joint Transport Command, no Joint Training Command, no integrated Air Defence Command, no centralised Tri-Services Military Intelligence Command, and no Support Services Command. And the proposed theaterisation that is only partial will become an end-state, permanent. Meaning baby steps will result in stunted theaterisation.
  4. And for the purposes of coherence, why has the maritime ANC (Andaman-Nicobar Command) not been folded into the Maritime/Peninsular Command, rather than have it hang out by itself awkwardly outside the ambit of the Maritime C-in-C? Won’t that lead to needless confusion over turf, and command and control?
  5. And, finally, what’s the guarantee that this theaterisation schemata will not stumble when it comes up before the Cabinet Committee on Security for approval, considering the civilian bureaucrats in MOD will be trying desperately to torpedo the 3 extra 4-star rank posts under the guise of strengthening civilian control of the military? Recall that MOD babus manoeuvered for years to prevent SHFJ Manekshaw from getting the remuneration due his rank until an appalled President APJ Abdul Kalam visiting the old Field Marshal in his hospital bed in Coonoor (Nilgiris), ordered it.
  6. Talking of ‘Field Marshal’, does it not make sense for the Theatre Commanders to be 4-star, and to salve the egos of the Services Chiefs, who will be stuck only with administrative roles, having lost their most prized operational control of forces to the Theatre Commanders, to elevate them to the active Field Marshal/Marshal of the Air Force/Admiral of the Fleet rank, making it easier for them to swallow the theaterisation pill? After retirement, these Field Marshals can go on half-pay. The small British Army — a fraction of the size of the massive Indian Army, for instance, has other than the 4 “Royal Field Marshals”, eight FMs on “half pay”.
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About Bharat Karnad

Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, he was Member of the (1st) National Security Advisory Board and the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and author, among other books of, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy', 'India's Nuclear Policy' and most recently, 'Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)'. Educated at the University of California (undergrad and grad), he was Visiting Scholar at Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
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44 Responses to Plan for Partial Theaterisation is Unsatisfactory on Many Counts

  1. Khaat paeyy Jaat's avatar Khaat paeyy Jaat says:

    https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/in-us-rahul-gandhi-claims-chinese-troops-occupied-land-the-size-of-delhi-in-ladakh-a-disaster-101726012825809.html

    Mr. Karnad what’s your opinion about the aforementioned?

    Why does the BJP over hyped Congress party’s 2008 pact with CCP? I am sure that CCP must have signed such a pact with BJP as well.

    A reliable source told me that Ram Madhav of BJP is a regular visitor to China.

    • Khaat@ — Madhav’s foreign trips visits are frequent, and perhaps, to China as well. But that would be because of Modi’s policy of not alienating that country.

      • Chattora Chamaar's avatar Chattora Chamaar says:

        Surprising to see you defending Modi unnecessarily.

        Why doesn’t he send someone to Pakistan then?

        Fact is Modi remains scared of China. We all know why but you won’t publish it here.

        ho…..ot

      • My books and writings have been very critical of the Indian govt whosoever is leading it. Re: Modi you maye care to see my 20218 book “Staggering Forward: Narera Modi and India’s Global Ambition”.

  2. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    Great post sir

    @BharatKarnad Sir in your [Why India is not a great power yet (pg332-pg333)] you mention Taiwan targeting three gorges dam. Won’t it be suicidal for them. Does Taiwan really have such guts and the weapons in their arsenal to do such a mission?

    And as per all the details available three gorges cannot be taken out with conventional munition Chinese claim that it can even withstand nuclear strike but that’s a little bit exaggerated.

    What effect will it have on the Chinese mainland if three gorges is taken out by India or United States. Nuclear radioactive tsunami i guess.

    Would love to know your opinion.

    • Patrol@ — In the said pages of my book, I discussed India taking out the Three Gorges Dam and the ancillary dam system downriver and described the potentially devastating effects. There was NO mention anywhere of Taiwan.

      • Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

        Excuse my professor please correct me if i am wrong

        on page 333 of why India is not a great power yet (line number 14,15,16) you have said and i am quoting you” Taipei has this dam under its crosshairs and is convinced that posing a serious threat to this dam will detter Chinese coercion and follow up invasion ” Taipei means Taiwan right?

        Detterence is a mind game the statement said by you only so if that detterence fails for Taiwan then can it really take out this dam do they have the guts and weapons to take it out that is my main query

        and sir off course this dam itself is a rich strategic target for any adversary of China are their no air defenses here

        sir a final question regarding missiles are do the chinese keep their dongfeng missiles always on launch on warning unlike us and our agni missiles?

      • Patrol@ — Sorry, you are right. I brought up Taiwan as a sidebar to India’s prime-targeting the Dam, as countries with motivation. Look, right now Taiwan does not have 2 weapons, I have argued, it should get — and I said it in Taipei at a govt-hosted conference several years back — nuclear weapons and missiles with range to reach Three Gorges. Taipei will, sooner rather than later, acquire them. Once it does, Three Gorges will be a prime non-Beijing target (to hit which Taiwan already has missiles for) and that calculus surfaces if Taiwan’s survival is at stake.

  3. shibashishbehera049's avatar shibashishbehera049 says:

    .@BharatKarnad, professor, do you have any written articles or blog related to Theaterisation with explanations like as follows:-
    1. What is Theaterisation?
    2. Advantages and requirement in current scenarios.
    3. Command structure and elimation of unnecessary bureaucracy.
    4. How Theaterisation differs from current structure of indian army following from inception?
    5. Any example of countries adopted Theaterisation?

    Please share your opinion regarding above-mentioned topic.

  4. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    Sir in your books you have repeatedly mentioned the importance of SSBN boomers

    what is the overall quality of Indian boomers Arihant class like are they stealthy and lethal as compared to French, British and American SSBN many American analyst have claimed that the Chinese SSBN type 094 are unusable as they produce large quantity of sound unfit for long distance detterence patrol .Is that also a problem with Arihant class .

  5. typhoonmaximum254b0f9a4f's avatar typhoonmaximum254b0f9a4f says:

    Dear Dr Karnad, should India showing solidarity quit QUAD in case US strikes deep into Russia using long range missiles from Kiev ?

  6. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    @BharatKarnad professor if the indian military is restructured and rebuild into commands where will the nuclear weapons command be will it be handed over to one of the three services ,command or a separate entity will be formed for managing nuclear weapons or the strategic forces command will still continue.

  7. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    @BharatKarnad professor was just reading your India’s nuclear policy(2008)book i observed that if SSBN are so crucial for detterence and they are least vulnerable and if a adversary can take out India’s land base missiles and airbases why not concentrate all of India’s nuclear arsenal on SSBN like UK does with vanguard class submarines offcourse building SSBN takes time but eventually after 15 years. Do you see it beneficial to only operate SSBN and eliminate land based and air weapons.

    what do you think about this??

    • Cannot limit the deterrent to only SSBNs. But my advocacy in Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security of mountain tunnel complexes for storage and launch of longrange Agni IRBMs and later true ICBMs to make them near invulnerable, is also being implemented.

  8. typhoonmaximum254b0f9a4f's avatar typhoonmaximum254b0f9a4f says:

    Dear Dr Karnad, thanks a lot for another wonderful article of yours. Should I conclude that India’s 3 theatre commands mean that one permanent command based at Jaipur for Pakistan, another permanent command based in Siliguri, West Bengal for China and the Maritime command based in Orissa or Andhra ?

  9. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    @BharatKarnad professor the realpolitik mindset that you talk about in your books and interviews is it inspired from people like Henry Kissinger or Robert McNamara?

    If you had to use some suitable words to describe bureaucrats like Kissinger and McNamara what would refer to them as selfish, evil, ruthless or patriots. And how you compare them to Indian bureaucrats.

    • Kissinger and Indian babus — poles apart.

      • Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

        agreed specially after reading why india is not a great power ig lt gen hamid gul was right “aap buzzdil hai”

      • Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

        is there any/was there any Indian bureaucrats in MEA any NSA or PMO official for whom you have/had high regards who is Aggressive, bloody minded and knows well about Indian interests or at the end of the day all are in the league of being babus only. Do these people realize we have lost so much in past in every sector be it defense or research. It seems they just to do care that “chalta hai walla attitude” .What is the best solution for cleaning this mess professor

        Have you lost hope in Indian bureaucracy

      • The system needs drastic overhaul — top to bottom. Modi could have done it starting in 2014, as I argued in my 2018 book — ‘Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India’s Global Ambition’. But he did not, now it is too late.

  10. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    @BharatKarnad in your lectures at vaad youtube channel and books you talk about bombing kahuta. Now what if pakistan had bombed trombay in retaliation .Professor this is my thinking that it was a 100 percent know fact that if we develop nuclear weapons the pakis will also start doing the same even if we had bombed kahuta don’t you think they would have still gotten the bomb maybe after 15 years or 20 years . Because pakis would eat grass but would do everything to get the bomb as they cannot live with fear of india having the bomb and was a strike on trombay a possibility.

    Would like to know about your opinion.

  11. futuristically365ae7e3c0's avatar futuristically365ae7e3c0 says:

    Sir interested in reading Nuclear Weapons and Indian security can you provide contacts of any publisher who can ship in delhi

  12. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    @BharatKarnad professor i was just listening to a lecture in which shivshankar menon was present you said that pakistan is not a threat because it does not have the matrix of being a credible threat. What are those list of matrix from which you came on the conclusion that it is not a threat?

  13. Rohan's avatar patrolfortunately5e6026f043 says:

    Sir in why india is not a great power yet you say nuclear missile arm vietnam and phillipines what if china also acts like that and nuclear missile armes bangladesh and sri lanka then we would be in a much worse situation.

    • there are more countries fearful of China on its periphery than there are states afarid of India in South Asia. so let’s nuclear arm all states bordering China. For more detail read my books!

  14. typhoonmaximum254b0f9a4f's avatar typhoonmaximum254b0f9a4f says:

    Dear Dr Karnad, You seem to be of the opinion that India should encourage all countries which are bordering China to be having nuclear weapons. I believe the USA (alongside China) will oppose any state in China’s vicinity going nuclear as that would erode the US military build up in the region. This is precisely the reason the US has successfully prevented Japan or South Korea going nuclear for last seven decades. How can India ensure US will be neutralized in this regard ?

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