[The standing COAS aspirants]
The surprising extension in service of a month afforded the incumbent army chief General Manoj Pande has scrambled the calculations about who his successor will be. The race that was supposedly between the current Vice Chief, Lt General Upendra Dwivedi, and the next senior most officer — the GOC-in-C, Southern Command, Lt General AK Singh, is now more open. All the other theatre commanders, by their seniority — Lt Generals MV Suchindra Kumar (Northern Command), NS Raja Subramani (Central Command), Manoj Kumar Katiyar (Western Command), Dhiraj Seth (South Western Command), Manjinder Singh (Training Command), and Ram Chander Tiwari (Eastern Command) have been brought back from the paddock, to the gate.
There is something fundamentally unfair about the seniority principle dictating promotions in the military, and a very good thing that the Narendra Modi government, is giving it a burial. It had earlier jettisoned seniority considerations when elevating General Bipin Rawat as army chief, Admiral Karambir Singh as the navy chief, and established a precedent by bringing General Anil Chauhan out of retirement to fill Rawat’s spot as Chief of the Defence Staff. Its decision to extend Pande’s service came a trifle late in the day it is true, and suggests that the PMO had a last minute epiphany, realising that restricting the choice of candidates for the COAS post did not serve its interest-qua-national interest.
Let’s be clear about one thing. All appointments to the armed services’ Chiefs of Staff positions are political, have always involved political calculations.
Indira Gandhi had had enough of being overshadowed by her flamboyant army chief, General SHFJ Manekshaw, who effortlessly took away a lot of the credit for cleaving Pakistan/liberating Bangladesh from her, and did not want him succeeded by Lt General Premindra Singh Bhagat, a combat engineer (Bombay Sapper) and the first Indian to win the Victoria Cross in the Second World War (for personally clearing 15 minefields in Ethiopia over 55 miles in four days and, for his troubles, having his ear drums punctured, among other injuries). What made him even less attractive was the fact that alongwith Lt Gen Henderson-Brooks, he was tasked with inquiring into the 1962 War fiasco. The Henderson-Brooks Report, still classified, honestly deconstructed the Indian army’s greatest humiliation and operational breakdown, and pointed to the calamitous political failure that presaged it. The finger was pointed squarely at Indira’s father and first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and his responsibility for it. Nehru first misassessed the China threat, then did nothing to build up the army to take on the PLA, leave alone enable it to preempt or reverse the steady encroachment early 1950s onwards into the Aksai China area of Ladakh. Why have a genuine war hero as army chief daily reminding her of her father’s culpability for that pol-mil disaster?
She arranged for Mankeshaw to stay on for an additional fortnight just so Bhagat retired, and she could install the nondescript General GG Bewoor as COAS. But conscious of Bhagat’s credentials and that she had done him wrong, she appointed him Chairman of the Damodar Valley Corporation — the single biggest source of (hydro) electricity in the country at the time. Likewise, she overlooked the seniormost officer, Lt General SK Sinha, and hoisted the more pliable Arun Vaidya as army chief in July 1983; sure enough, the latter delivered on Operation Blue Star a year later.
Seniority, in principle, is a fundamentally flawed, unfair, and abysmal standard for deciding who becomes Chief of Staff of an armed service. It is the lazy government’s way of appointing someone, involving no political vetting of the candidates, no requirement for the top leadership to apply their mind. The country using this system might occasionally luck into a great officer, just right for the particular service. But this is rare. The element of automaticity and determinism, is appalling for various reasons.
While it is the merit lists at the NDA stage, actual commissioning stage, etc. that gets an officer his baseline seniority, to go up the ladder, it helps to refine and deploy the courtly arts — chaploosi, ji huzoori, and flattering the boss to secure good CRs at every stage. There is quite too much of this, and it has reached such levels as to truly become a military liability. Those who simply are not constituted to bow and scrape get winnowed out. The result: Among the really competent, only a few manage to rise to the very top, and then more because of luck than by the dint of their own effort and the glow of their achievements.
At the stage of COS selection, as in the instant case, for seniority to emerge as the decisive metric presumes that all the contending Lieutenant Generals — Dwivedi, Singh, Kumar, Subramani, Katiyar, Seth, and Manjinder, are equally acceptable in political terms, which presumption may be wrong. By way of shortlisting, it is logical to conclude, for example, that Pande’s extension rules out Dwivedi and AK Singh. Among the rest, seniority becomes irrelevant. There’s a minimum line of political acceptability the final selectee will have to meet. But that said, the dossiers on each of these officers will doubtlessly be perused, and a subjective judgement made by Modi, possibly Shah, Rajnath and Doval, in the main, about who among the remaining Lieutenant Generals can be trusted more dilgently to pursue the goals of “de-Britishing” the senior service, solidfying the Agniveer/Agnipath programme, etc., and not impeding the CDS General Chauhan’s assigned task of securing jointness and theaterisation.
This is not “politicising” the military, but getting it to align itself to the norms and values of the ruling party — a perfectly legitimate exercise in a representative democracy. Should the Congress party return to power, it can just as legitimately revert to the old regimental recruitment patterns, end the Agniveer programme, etc as promised by Rahul Gandhi. Of course, too much of such to-ing and fro-ing may institutionally tie up the armed services in knots, and not be such a good thing for the country.
Security Wise 
Email from
Lt Gen JS Bajwa, former Director-General, Infantry, & editor@indiandefencereview.com
Wed, 29 May at 4:16 pm
For once I seem to be on your side!!
Regards
The seniority system has it’s own merits. Almost all govt departments and the judiciary follow it. Are they all wrong? Why make an exception for the Armed Forces? At the level of VCOAS and GOC-in-C there is little to choose in terms of experience and competence. Invariably all of them are fit for the top job.This bogey of deep selection is only to get the most pliable man in the chair.
Email from Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
Wed, 29 May at 10:09 pm
Sir,
The names of all Army Commanders with relation to the Commands that they head, are all wrong. Takes away the authenticity of the article.
Best wishes
Ata
Incidentally, lifted the names and their commands off a Hindustan Times report of 25 May: Rahul Singh, “In a rare move, Gen Pande given 1-month extension as Army chief”
And, in any case, what has getting “The names of all Army Commanders with relation to the Commands” wrong got anything to do with the “authencity” of the thrust and conclusions of the post?
Come on, Ata!
It is just the rest is unsubstantiated – it is like someone’s view on a fundamental issue for the nation. It reminds of the disastrous state the Indian military plunged into in the late 1950s when Lt Gens J N Chaudhury and Sam Manekshaw were sidelined and superseded by the then PM Nehru, and others appointed to helm. The 1961 Chinese aggression brought every malaise in the army in that era to light and saved the careers of Chaudhury and Manekshaw. It is same Nehruvian policy that Modi-Rajnath will bring back in the military structure.
Ata, sorry, my bad! Rahul Singh’s report had it right. I got it wrong. Post-text is corrected. But the rest of my reaction stands.
Email from
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
From:atahasnain@gmail.com:bharat karnad
Thu, 30 May at 9:09 am
Sir, the article remains excellent as always but when basic facts are wrong it dilutes the Perception. That is all.
Next time please fact check with me. Will promise early response.
Warm regards
Dear Sir
1. Are you saying that not one not two but most army cdrs (who have risen thru the ranks in close to 40 yrs service) could be unfit or incompetent? Which would require deep selection for appt of COAS. Bcoz you haven’t given any valid reason against the seniority priniciple.
2. And if the govt indeed finds all unfit, will it go further lower to select one from say Corps Cdrs?
3. Do you, like most Indians feel that we lost 62 primarily bcoz JLN chose senior officers close to him in imp posns? If yes then how will this be different.
4. Linked to Q3 is the definite possibility that officers as they rise in service, become more political in outlook and association. Would that be good for our apolitical AFs
5. I guess you know that such deep selection is the way in Pakistan. And see where this has taken that country.
Regards
Brig S Thapar (retd)
Brig Thapar@ — Did not say they are unfit and incompetent; just that “Among the really competent, only a few manage to rise to the very top”. The other related reference is: “The country using this system might occasionally luck into a great officer”. The emphasis is on the qualifiers “really competent” and “great”. How many memorable army chiefs has India had? And, how come a bunch of brilliant field commanders, thinker-innovators did not make it beyond corps command — Lt Generals Sagat Singh and Hanut Singh, for instance? (I know a little about Hanut’s lateral demotion to armoured school, Ahmednagar, because I was close to KC Pant, then defence minister.) Politicians don’t like to “deep select” because it is hard work, and the “senior most” principle usually throws up officers — the majority — who have risen without creating a ripple! The result, let’s be honest about it, is a generally middling Indian military, not a terrific force.
The fact of all COAS appointments being political apart, a non-seniority based selection makes the army chief more accountable to the government of the day. If the selectee doesn’t care for the political agenda of the government, he is free to turn down the appointment.
By the way, the difference between Pakistan and India is that the COAS in Pakistan does his own successor selection — a pattern established by Ayub in 1958 when he selected Musa Khan to succeed him overlooking his seniors, among them, Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi (uncle to Mansur Ali Khan ‘Tiger’ Pataudi — India cricket captain of the 1960s).
Professor,
Given the two to three years of tenure of a COAS, it is doubtful anyone can be called great in peacetime operations. It’s too little time to show greatness while managing and leading a million plus organisation. Anyone who takes this post in peacetime is operating on the momentum of previous leadership. One could be disastrous, but it’s hard to be great!
Only in wartime or crises will there be an opportunity for greatness as decisions taken in short periods of time can lead to major differences in outcome.
I just don’t think there will be much difference whether one goes with the seniority principle or deep selection. This is a political choice. The risk with politicians choosing all the time is that a non expert is choosing an expert. Maybe such a choice can lead to a great selection only during a crisis – when the political class is competent. But who can tell who will be great? It can only be determined post facto!
The American military industrial complex irrespective of the President in that country has been minting Billions since the end of Second World War in 1945 by following the principle of “wars are not meant to be won but supposed to be continuous”
India Pakistan friendly fixed games have been found out at the global level after the Pulwama Balakot drama in 2019.
China doesn’t want any resolution of the border conflict with India. Indian establishment has learned to use this situation to its advantage.
The deployment of additional 50,000 Indian troops at the Ladakh region is estimated to cost Rs. 100 Crores per day which translates into INR 36000 Crores a year, out of this figure how much adjustment is done and how much is the real figure?
If this is not politicisation of the Armed Forces, what is? This will only encourage “chaploosi, ji huzoori, and flattering the boss”, culture even more. While you yourself feel that Indira Gandhi superceded capable generals due to personal likes and dislikes, how do you imagine any other political dispensation to be fair in appointing Chiefs? Therefore, while the seniority criterion has some flaws, the deep selection by political powers is more flawed.
Indian army is the most hyped up institution in the country.
The officers here spend most of the time in non-serious activity. Pakistani army is much better, at least all the Pakistan politicians are mortally scared of it, and it runs the country. In India, all faujiis stand with folded hands and fall on the feet of the politicians.