Defence Secretary misspoke or, revealed a glaring secret?

[Defence Secretary Aramane and CINC, PACOM, Admiral Aquilino at INDUS-X]

If one mulled the statement by Defence Secretary Giridhar Aramane at the INDUS-X (India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem) summit held February 21, and knows a bit of history of the 1962 War, it was hard to escape the sense of deja vu! Aramane’s spoutings reminded one, in a way, of Jawaharlal Nehru’s abjectly pleading letters to US President John F Kennedy of November 19, 1962, begging for American military help.

Of the two letters — the first is considered — 60 years later, to be so humiliating and self-debasing, the Indian government insists still that Washington not declassify it! The shaming quality of this letter may, however, be deduced from the bit more measured second letter — available in the public realm — that Nehru had Ambassador BK Nehru hand over to the White House the same day after the fall of Se La and Bomdi La. In this latter, equally infamous, missive he pleaded — and this is by way of information for readers of this blog — among other kinds of military assistance, for 12 squadrons of “all-weather fighters” manned by American pilots plus an additional two squadrons of B-47s to “neutralise” PLA bases in Tibet.

This is Nehru (2nd letter): “The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of…Asia…We are confident that your great country will…help us in our fight”.

This is Aramane speaking: “We are standing against a bully [China] in a very determined fashion. And we expect that our friend, the US, will be there with us in case we need their support. It is a must for [India], we have to [stand up to China] whether we can or we can’t…We have to [have] the strong resolve that we will support each other in the face of a common threat, [this] is going to be of critical importance to us”.

So, where’s the resonance? It is in the basic and fundamental presumption and belief underlying both that the United States will come readily to India’s help. This is usually the attitude of those who take Washington’s rhetoric at face value, have not deeply studied US history leave alone that country’s alliance dynamics, and to the extent they are familiar with the US it is only as tourists. As Narendra Modi was during his numerous visits to that country as an RSS pracharak and, now PM, as state guest, and short-term residents — diplomats/civil servants, such as Jaishankar, who have pulled career stints in Washington/New York/Chicago/Houston/San Francisco — the last four cities being the locations for Indian consulates, and come away duly impressed (as most foreign visitors from the Third World naturally are).

One of the themes I have repeatedly iterated in my books and writings, and in interactions with government officials and military officers over the past four decades, is just how infirm, unpredictable, and unreliable the US really is as an ally or strategic partner, or even just as a friendly state. And why it is downright foolhardy and extraordinarily risky to lean on Washington for assistance in a crisis, and factor this into India’s plans and policies for prospective hostilities with China. There is ample historical evidence for such a conclusion that I have adduced, and is the sort of thing one would expect a professionally-run government to bear in mind.

But this concern has apparently has not been paid heed by successive Prime Ministers and their Offices (PM/PMOs), or any of the line ministries — the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), even less the Ministry of Defence (MOD). So, with Manmohan Singh shaking his head, as Joint Secretary (Americas) Jaishankar negotiated that ignoble civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the George W Bush Administration which, because it bars India from nuclear testing, prevents the country from ever becoming a bonafide thermonuclear weapons power, in other words, this deal has fated India to remain permanently in China’s strategic shadow. And, here is Jaishankar, 15 years later, as minister for EA doing what his tilt US-wards from his time in the Washington embassy has inclined him to do — not advise caution to the PM when dealing with the US.

If proof were needed of America’s inconstancy as friend, ally or strategic partner, look no farther than Ukraine. President Zelensky began the fight with Russia on the basis of promises of sustained US military aid. So, how’s that going Volodomyr? Is there anything for New Delhi to learn from Kyiv’s predicament, Shri Jaishankarji?! No, nothing? OK, so much for diplomatic experience and persipience.

That makes Aramane — for no fault of his own — important in the scheme of things. What does Aramane, who as Defence Secretary is actually the PERSON responsible for the defence and security of the country — NOT the the military Chiefs of Staff, as armed services officers are only too fond of reminding anyone who will listen about the prevailing anamalous system of authority and responsibility in the Government of India, bring to the table?

Well, let’s see. An IAS officer of the Andhra Pradesh cadre, Aramane has never been within sniffing distance in his career of a posting in MOD. Naturally, that qualifies him to be Defence Secretary. But before getting to South Block he was Secretary, Roads & Highways. So, perhaps, he was brought in and has obtained an extension in service in MOD to oversee the programme of construction of roads and other infrastructure on the Line of Actual Control. He is a civil engineer by calling and road building is in his line of professional work (assuming he remembers anything from his engineering college days),. Even if can’t, he is nevertheless better off than the generalist counterparts gumming up the works in the rest of the government. As an engineer with, hopefully, a problem-solving mindset — the thing that distinguishes him from his civil service brethren, he ought to better comprehend defence issues (as the late Manohar Parrikar was able to do as a former mechanical engineer and defence minister). At a minimum, that’d require him to do his homework before mouthing off. This he did not do.

Did he know what he was talking about when he was extolling “interoperability” at INDUS-X? One could sense the satisfaction in the CINC, US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral John Aquilino, also sitting on the stage, putting away his own talking points, to let Aramane do the talking for him! Because, interoperability is the code word US officials and military officers have interminably used to flog their view since the American Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, first visited Delhi in the mid-1980s that India should buy more US capital weapons platforms — more aircraft, more Apache attack helos, more Chinooks, more ships, more artillery, more this, more that, and rest of the obsolete or fast obsolescing hardware — production of Apaches, Chinooks, C-17s, etc., for example has ended. These are all staple Indian buys that help unclog the US military inventories even as Delhi forks over hundreds of billions of dollars for them — but uhnn uhnn.. no submarines! — monies that could have been invested in indigenous design and development projects in the private sector for any chance of success!

Then agaion, may be Aramane did not get Jaishankar’s Memo because isn’t the EAM broadcasting — even if it is only for form sake, that Indian foreign policy aims at achieving “equilibrium”? And how pray is this equilibrium to be realised with the Defence Secretary, in effect, endorsing more capital arms purchases from the US — something the Kremlin has always preceived as forever a part of the Russian field?

Hasn’t Aramane thus given away the core secret of Modi’s disequilibrated foreign policy?

About Bharat Karnad

Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, he was Member of the (1st) National Security Advisory Board and the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and author, among other books of, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy', 'India's Nuclear Policy' and most recently, 'Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)'. Educated at the University of California (undergrad and grad), he was Visiting Scholar at Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
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27 Responses to Defence Secretary misspoke or, revealed a glaring secret?

  1. Amit says:

    Professor,

    I have a different take on Indian relations with the U.S. India has judged China to be its main security threat. Therefore, amongst the great powers, India needs to have good relations with the US AND Russia. Period. Indian actions with Russia on Ukraine, and the naval response in the Red Sea apart from how it has handled Khalistani extremists in the U.S. and Canada indicate India is neither naive about US behaviour, nor being subservient. So while Aramane might sound diffident and you might want to draw parallels to 1962, it’s just not the case. You are grasping for straws to portray such a picture.

    Even on the nuclear deal issue, things are not as negative as you portray. Due to the deal, India was able to join the missile regime, wassenar group, could import uranium more easily and has been able to export Brahmos to countries like the Philipines. Even on the issue of thermo nuclear weapons, after all the discussions on these forums, and studying articles, it looks like India has the capability for a 200-250 KT weapon. Yes more testing may be required, but that’s the one drawback against many benefits of the deal.

    Your comments about Indian MEA officials having a tourist like opinion of the U.S., is blatantly misleading! My assessment of facts indicates no such behaviour by Indian policy makers. On the other hand, in spite of the many irritants from the U.S., India maintains a friendly stance with the U.S. This is what REALPOLITIK dictates. So please Sir, understand what’s really going on!

    • The theory and practice of realpolitik, initiated in Germany of the1860s, is not at all understood well here, if it is understood at all! Tactical, short term, benefits are not the goals of realpolitik which is what you, like Modi, Jaishankar, et al seem to be fixated on. Further, your notion of gains from the N-deal with the US is, well, not right. Assuming you have some access, dig deeper and see what’s happening in BARC. What India is now pursuing, as I have argued, is a policy of short term maximizing. It is NOT realpolitik because the first principle of statecraft is whatever you do, do not harm the national interest — which is always seen in the long term. You seem to be OK with India never having a credible thermonuclear arsenal. And you seem not to be aware that India did not need MTCR to sell Brahmos missile to Philippines or any other country; if anything it has constrained India’s choices. And nothing stopped Delhi from onpassing indigenously developed N-weapon tech to states on China’s periphery as payback for Beijing’s missile arming Pakistan other than a weak will and absent strategic vision. All these policy ideas are what I have been advocating consistently and relentlessly from my time in the first NSAB in the late 1990s. That is hard realpolitik, not the pussy-wussy kind.

      • Amit says:

        Professor,

        Some hard facts. India cannot manufacture jet engines which it can source either from the U.S., UK, France or Russia, while its indigenous Kaveri engine languishes in bureaucratic delays – note the preponderance of NATO countries in the list. India does not have the capability to manufacture its own semiconductor chips, and even in five years it will have the capability of making only 28 nm chips. Who will it rely on if current military tech uses 5-9 nm chips? For god’s sake, there is no engine for tanks or drones or submarines. It is very much in the national interest to maintain good relations with the U.S., UK, France so that by chance or focused effort India can develop its own technologies in the next 10-15 years. So no, it is very much REALPOLITIK that India maintains a good relationship with the U.S. in spite of all the obstacles it throws.

        As for thermo nuclear testing, I have never been opposed to it. I have only questioned the timing. As it is in India’s NATIONAL INTEREST that it does not face further delays in developing its own indigenous capabilities which are essential for being a great power. I also think the priority for India is to develop its conventional weaponry – rockets, drones, satellites, cyber etc. – all areas in which India lags before going gung ho on thermo nuclear testing.

        As for passing on nuclear technology to chinas neighbors, yes, that is something India can do.

        But that does not take away from the fact that India needs to maintain good relations with the U.S. No brash moves required as the alternatives are not great. Of course you argue that India should create chaos, fire away thermo nuclear weapons and stand up to the U.S. and go Rambo on it. But no one can predict outcomes in such a scenario. It is not really required.

        India’s current policy is very much grounded in REALPOLITIK and very much takes into account its national interests. Open to better ideas if you can make them!

      • There are too many things, and I am tired of repeating ad infinitum the obvious. We absolutely are getting nowhere. So, we can agree to disagree.

        But a last word in this correspondence on the topic: Indians are good at making do, so much so we forget what got us there. For instance, have detailed in my 2015 book Why India Is Not a Great Power (Yet) the then over a decade long delay and policy procrastination within GOI over setting up fabs. Had that issue been prioritised and fabs erected w/o endless discussion between contending agencies, India by now might have been closer to 5nm level chips than is the case now.

        We better begin to appreciate that importing anything we can’t make at the first instance — and then by not involving the profit-incentivised private sector, is the real problem of an over-bureacratised state that Modi’s India hasn’t as yet even acknowledged. More the pity because Modi was the one leader who promised so much in his 2014 campaign.

      • Amit says:

        Professor,

        Couldn’t agree more on Indian bureaucratic delays. But the fact is India lags in many core technologies. And is dependent on foreign countries to develop its own tech, even if it does not import (assembly, TOT etc.). With a weak hand like that my point is that it does not make sense to openly oppose the U.S. and China together. Agree to disagree on this one.

      • manofsan says:

        Just as US eventually withdrew from the ABM treaty, just as Russia eventually withdrew from the INF treaty, likewise India will eventually have to withdraw from the Indo-US nuclear deal and test thermonuclear weapons. We can wait for the appropriate international crisis to do so.

      • What are we waiting for?! There have already been so many opportunities and provocations — but we haven’t done so!

  2. From Lt Gen (Retd(, Arun Sahni (RetdI, former GOC-in-C, South West Command

    Fri, 23 Feb at 3:56 pm

    Dear Mr Karnad

    Thanks for this very pointed warning.

    Being well aware and well read is something that needs to be appreciated, by all those oin high places in the country.

    I concur the Trust issue with the US will always be a big Question Mark.

    Best Wishes

    Arun Sahni.

  3. Email from Dr V Siddhartha, former science and technolgy adviser to Defence Minister

    Sat, 24 Feb at 11:31 pm

    If Aramane is not shifted-out on “routine transfer” before the elections, then he did not mis-speak. 

    VS

  4. rk says:

    Respected Sir, The USA already has robust defence R&D and innovation ecosystem that has helped the USA DoD & AFRL to establish collaborations with Indian startups under DTTI and INDUS-X. However, DTTI & Indus-X were created to also help India in developing an innovation ecosystem as well as leveraging US innovators and industry for building defence technologies. 

    The best outcome for India would be achieved when Indian defence forces collaborate with start ups, academia and industry of the USA. This would require creation of R&D verticals in HQ IDS and change in mindset of US stakeholders amongst other measures. The R&D vertical in HQ IDS will enable it to assess US innovation ecosystem, gauge potential of US start ups, academia and others, and formulate problem statements and connect them with Indian industry to develop futuristic and innovative technologies for India, USA and the world. Warm Regards Gp Capt R K Narang VM (Retd.) PhD

  5. Ayush says:

    I cannot care less about what babus have to say. This defense secretary either does not have an iota’s knowledge about geopolitics(wont be surprising given his background) or is simply trying to secure an Ivy league admission for his progeny. To be very honest, the Indian army, largely thanks to its own follies was importing arctic gear in emergency during 2020 from countries like Vietnam and even Sri Lanka(that has been indigenized now). In fact, these guys were using hand grenades dating back to 1945-Soviet era(now replaced by DRDO-EEL ones). Rhetoric aside, the MoD is silently and rightfully pulling the plug on the DTTI-IndusX partnerships with the US. It’s very clear to all now that the US isn’t going to share any critical technologies with India whatsoever(anything beyond the predator crap). The ISTAR and COMINT aircraft were supposed to be procured from the US under the DTTI. These things have silently been pulled out of it and going the desi way. The SCA(ELINT) aircraft has already received DAC sanction, the army is going, The ISTAR is expected to receive the same any day now. The signing of semiconductor fab deals and high power aerospace engines in the coming months will go a long way in ending the neocolonialism this country is still subjected to. And no, we don’t really need chips lower than 28nm for most military applications. If they are needed, they can be smuggled in the Russian fashion.

  6. Sankar says:

    Is anybody in Delhi listening? I am afraid no one. It reminds of the great observation (by George Santayana – the philosopher): “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

    Kashmir would have been lost by American hostility to modern India long time ago had there been no repeated Soviet vetoes in the Security Council in favour of India. Not to forget, that India fought the 1971 war standing on the shoulder of the Soviets. Amazingly, there is no provision of maintaining “institutional memory” in the External Affairs Ministry in Delhi as the ex-FS Shivshankar Menon pointed out recently – a disaster!

    May be there is an exception here who is listening – that is Modi! I do not think, he has forgotten the US denying him visa on the basis of Godhara. That was a trumped-up charge to pin him down in the international stage which became unsustainable when the rats (Teesta & Co) could only come up with concocted evidence in the Supreme Court appointed SIT!

    Modiji has some doggedness in his character that came out in the recent resurrection of Ayodhya. If convinced, he can stick to his guns. He can stand up for India’s strategic interest also defying all others.

    On an aside, the western military power has received a drubbing in the hands of Russian firepower in Ukraine as noted here:

    https://asiatimes.com/2024/02/dont-expect-a-ceasefire-in-ukraine/

    It is easy to surmise where India’s fundamental strategy needs to be anchored. Great credit to Professor Karnad to point that out once again.

  7. To repeat something I said before: the Indian government and its by now totally politicised military imagines that it will never have to fight a major war again. It can win “battles” that were never fought simply by using its tame media to create a narrative that anyone who disagrees with is called a “traitor” for opposing. This state of affairs, it fantasises, is a permanent situation.

  8. Sankar says:

    “… I have repeatedly iterated …, … , is just how infirm, unpredictable, and unreliable the US really is as an ally or strategic partner, or even just as a friendly state …” –

    This is crux of the strategic insight for India’s statecraft presented here and elsewhere by Professor Karnad.  No one could give credence to this better than Scott Ritter as he takes up the Ukraine war and the role of the US as a strategic partner for Ukraine as in here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4jMIV5cRAxA .

    I guess, thousand years of foreign subjugation is impregnated in the Indian psyche, which has resulted in a “cooley” mindset to serve others perceived as powerful.

  9. Vivek says:

    india has signed multiple civil nuclear agreements with other countries as well. Are those agreement were independent to US deal or binded with US deal?

  10. Amit says:

    Professor,

    I’ve been following your blog posts quite closely since 2019, and have read your book WIiNaGP,Y. In that book you don’t spend too much analysing Pakistan, but the crux of your argument is that India should focus on China as enemy number one, and ignore Pakistan, or at least minimise the military focus on Pakistan. You are also not in favour of a close relationship with the U.S., or trying to improve India’s relationship with the U.S. unless the U.S. makes major concessions (e.g., know why instead of know how etc.).

    In addition, you want India to be a lot more aggressive with China. Through your blogs and your book, it also seems like you are in favour of peace with Pakistan, by reducing the threat perception of the Indian military in Pakistan though unilateral Indian actions (one division facing Pakistan vs three etc.). Perhaps even more trade and normalising relations.

    You also acknowledge, correctly if I may add, that India’s own military capabilties require much improvement, and it’s not in a great position to do this. You emphasise the role of private industry in India to develop India’s military capabilities and for the Indian military to use Indian weapon systems even if they are not fully capable or are of lower quality.

    Please correct me if I’m wrong in this assessment of your position.

    Your grand strategic position is therefore, take on China directly and aggressively, be more confrontational with the U.S. (e.g., test thermo nuclear weapons immediately, dump the 123 agreement etc.), make peace with Pakistan and dump imports for desi weapon systems. Additionally, you also recommend India partner with countries like BRIS and Vietnam/Taiwan/Phillipines/Japan etc., most of whom are under the U.S.’ thumb.

    I see some major problems with this position. Firstly, taking on two of the world’s top powers simultaneously is not very smart. The fact that a great power like the U.S. is doing it with Russia and China simultaneously is not a wise move. So for a middle power like India to do it would be even less wise.

    Secondly, making peace with the current dispensation in Pakistan is not possible. They have been brainwashed for decades and the Pakistani military has been radicalised. It’s just not good strategy.

    Thirdly, to partner with middle powers who are heavily influenced by the U.S. while antagonising the U.S., is also not very feasible.

    Fourthly, to dump imports and force the Indian military to use sub par Indian weapon systems, while risking debilitating sanctions by taking on the U.S., AND expecting the Indian private sector to come through with top weapon systems – seems like a very tall order. If you have any experience with the Indian private sector, you will realize that it would be foolhardy to expect such wonderful results from it.

    Therefore, your grand strategy for India has many big holes in it. One should discard it – I would highly recommend this. This would be my honest and humble assessment.

    • The basics of my strategy (in the 1st part of your msg) is right.
      Have long said GOI and Indian militaryh’s inability to differentiate betweedn a nuisance and a threat has been at the heart of India’s security problem from the start, and especially after 1971. Have often used the metaphor of the gnat (Pakistan) — you can use an elephant gun to kill it and blow of your own foot, or use a rolled up newspaper! The rolled-up newspaper is what we are now, finally, begining to use — a good thing.
      However, your essential point that we can’t be confrontational with China and the US at the same time overlooks the emerging ‘cold war’ between these two powers, which last gives India a big leeway. I am all for partnering the US but also Russia against China, as also weaponsing the BRIS, the ‘Mod Quad’ and any other bilateral relationship in SE Asia and in the Gulf we can muster against China.
      Your fear of dealing with China while being hampered by indigenously designed and produced military hardware is shortsighted at best. But I have provided the solution for that in my 2018 book — Staggering Forward, which I suggest you also read! I have suggested forward placed atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) in likely channels of PLA ingress on LAC, backed by a shortfuse tripwire of Agni-1 SRBMs as 2nd echelo, etc. — all this precisely to nullify the conventional mil superiority China has and will continue to have until we test again and acquire ThN weapons. This is the use of N-weapons as symmetric means of deterrence — something that’s been successfully used by North Korea against the US and, need I remind you, Pakistan against us.
      Impose a total ban on imports, convert DRDO into an ARPA-type org, and let two competing def-industrial consortiums (formed by amalgating all DRDO labs/facilities) with Tata and L&T leading theow consortia — detailed in my Why India book you say you have read, but missed summarising, taking over the business. You’ll be surprised what they can do if they have the guarantee of R&D and manufacture at scale, and if allowed to be prime system integrators. Do not underestimate the power of profit and trust Indian talent — don’t be dismissive of it!

      • Anit says:

        Professor,

        I’m all for desi weapons production too. I just don’t have the confidence you seem to have in India’s private sector, having worked in India for a few years and currently also leading a business in AI/ML work with predominantly desis in an onshore/offshore model The skill sets are limited and there is a huge gap in strategic thinking, market needs assessment and developing solutions to meet those needs. The Indian workforce learns from US customers who want the most advanced solutions.

        Even companies like Tata lag and have required foreign talent to shape up. Therefore the process of desification will necessarily be time consuming. I also believe there is a lot of hype about the Indian private sector due to nationalist media reporting. Banning imports without having core engine technologies amongst others, antagonizing the U.S. while trying to do this and being aggressive with China simultaneously is something India just cannot execute. Maybe you think India can do such a thing. I just don’t.

        To your comment about the U.S. needing India to counter China – the U.S. would also like India and China to fight so that both weaken and it wins without fighting. Plus with a weakening a China, the U.S. does not need India as much. The risky strategy you propose could end up making the US the sole superpower for a long time to come.

      • Have also suggested getting retired foreign project managers. weapons designers, etc and have rued the fact the Narasimha Rao govt turned down Yeltsin Russia’s offer of the best from Arazmas 16. et al for our strategic weapons programs for virtually a pittance. A god awful missed opportunity. China took them — why it is America’s peer rival.

  11. nileshko says:

    Once you understand Indian politics as a) median two-digit iq politicians seeking votes of a low two-digit iq populace, b)high two-digit iq populace hoping to send their progeny abroad, and, c) high three digit iq populace jumping out the moment it sees the opening, everything starts to make sense. We’re the movie Idiocracy. And it’s going to get much worse as the low iq populace multiplies itself into 9/10th of the population.

    Aramane and his ilk are the result of a low-iq non-martial populace we’ve been producing for centuries.

    • Jaahil Jaat says:

      And what exactly is this martial/non martial race nonsense? There isn’t any martial race in India otherwise the land wouldn’t have been enslaved for centuries first by the Mughals and then by the British.

      The English invented the term martial race as per their divide and rule policy in India to get cheap cannon fodder for their army during the first and the Second World War.

  12. Jaggaa Jasoos says:

    Mr. Karnad I would like to have your opinion about the following man;

    https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/dev-raturi-from-uttarakhand-becomes-movie-star-in-china-read-his-story-4241484

    Fellow readers should also express their opinion about the aforementioned.

    The whole story of this man seems so fake and made up plus the fact that he is from Uttarakhand (like one of the most powerful person in Modi’s inner circle)

    I think this chap has been planted in China or he is being backed up by the Chinese intelligence. Chances are high that he might be a double agent.

    • Bhangaari Daada says:

      @Jaggaa- Nice research by you. After checking this man’s profile thoroughly I am cent per cent sure that originally he was planted (sent) to China by India’s current NSA and presently he is on the pay roll of the Chinese.

      He isn’t any Indian intelligence operative but works to further the interests of his above mentioned Indian Godfather in China.

  13. Bharat kumar says:

    sir are you delighted to see mirv on agni 5 successfully tested yesterday

  14. tony says:

    Why don’t India protect Taiwan like a leader instead of looking for help to protect itself. India does not need help. I would pity anyone even a coalition of every nation against India attacking it and holding territory.

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