ITBP — best paramil, rising with new roles

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) is the best para-military around, with very good operational ethos and habits. Recognizing its abilities, the Modi government has decided to put it in charge of the country’s border with Myanmar. In fact, the 15 new battalions  that the Assam Rifles (AR) — India’s oldest paramilitary organization, is raising will now go to ITBP instead, even as it takes control of the border with Myanmar, and tries to shut off the flow of arms to rebel movements and insurgents active in the northeast. A Cabinet note formalizing this enlarged role of ITBP coupled with pullback of Assam Rifles from border policing has been prepared and will be put to the Cabinet for approval very soon.

This shock of Assam Rifles, officered by the army, no less, has hit Army HQrs, which has not come to terms with its officers and the AR’s established modus operandi being directly blamed for the continuance of tribal insurgencies in that region and is, understandably, resisting the move.  Army’s loss of face aside, the failure of army led AR in the last few years has become so pronounced, a drastic solution is believed necessary. Of special concern was intelligence that army officers deputed to the AR were a mostly compromised lot. As much to blame were the Assam Rifles’ method of basing its units some 40-50 kms behind the actual border, which only helped the unhindered movement of insurgents, arms and ammo. This in turn kept the insurgencies oxygenated. There’s, moreover, enough evidence with the government to suggest that the flow of Chinese arms into the northeast was facilitated by China through the Kachin Army it controls in northern Myanmar.

The government examined ITBP’s performance not just on the Tibetan border, but also its sterling successes in one of the worst Naxal-infested areas, the Narayanpur District of Chhattisgarh. Some eight  ITBP battalions are deployed there and has resulted in the Marxist guerilla fighters in that area being on the run, desperately avoiding fights. The reason for this, it is realized, was because of ITBP tactics. Firstly, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the main force in anti-Naxal ops, sticks to the roads in the hinterland and uses lorries for movement. Owing to their road-boundnes, Naxalites routinely mine these country roads, blow up truck transports carrying CRPF units, register mounting casualties, and hurt the morale and emphasize the ineffectiveness of government forces. Further, the ease with which the Naxal cadres operate and their aggression in tangling with CRPF only burnishes their reputation with the local tribal people, firms up their support among the latter, and reinforces Naxal control of the ‘Red Corridor’ running from the Andhra region all the way north to the Nepal border.

ITBP personnel, on the other hand, used to walking  and preparing to fight in mountainous terrain — there being no roads or other infrastructure in the Himalayan uplands, have no problems in establishing their presence and wrenching back control from the Naxals in the areas its units are posted to. Deploying for 2-3 weeks at a time on long range patrols, ITBP jawans and officers live off the land, move rapidly and stealthily  in the jungles, and hunt down and eliminate Naxal fighters. Unused to such tactics by these foot-mobile government forces, the Naxals run because they can’t match the ITBP firepower either. Thus, the areas assigned to  ITBP soon become devoid of  Naxals. A DG, Chhattisgarh, reportedly mused rather loudly that if he had sufficient ITBP units, his state would be rid of these home-grown ideological insurgents  in double-quick time.

Further, AR’s inflexible strategy of staying back from the border is in sharp contrast to the ITBP’s of installing itself right on the border it monitors. This impressed the PMO as did  the other attributes (some of which are discussed above). These aspects taken together convinced Prime Minister Modi that ITBP was the force to rely on to seal the Myanmar border, prevent the rebels from easily replenishing their arms & ammo stocks owing to its support base across the border, choke off the insurgencies, and compel the rebel groups to come to the negotiating table.

This is all very good, and ITBP deserves all the kudos. But it has nested problems the government should address. As its name suggests ITBP is meant for the Indo-Tibetan border, its skills and competences honed for the specific Himalayan milieu. Dissipating its role and mission by pitting it against Naxals, the northeastern insurgents, etc. is to end up blunting its core expertise, and diminishing its utility. India needs more specialist forces on Line of Actual Control (LAC), in the main, because the Chinese PLA believes there are no big wars, only small wars that become big. In other words, the country and government need to strengthen ITBP, make it a genuinely powerful force on China border to ensure that should small-time hostilities be initiated by PLA, they remain small. ITBP’s usefulness should, in fact, be enhanced by (1) recruiting Tibetans from the exile community in India, and (2) the officers in particular given Mandarin language training in order to make them proficient in handling small scale Chinese contingencies, generating intelligence, and having the capacity to gauge Chinese intentions, all on their own. In other words, ITBP should be assisted to become an even more consequential China border force.

If, however, the ITBP ethos and tactics are prized, then why not depute on short term basis the specialist ITBP officers to run Assam Rifles, and to lead counter-insurgency state police and CRPF units in the fight against Naxals? Their task will be to train AR, CRPF, et al to become more like ITBP in their fighting skills and methodologies, and to get the jawans from these latter units off their butt, off trucks, and on foot for long term deployment without much logistics support, in the jungles of Central India to finish off the Naxals once and for all, and to shut down the flows of everything, including armed rebels, from Myanmar. This is the best solution.

On its part though,  ITBP morale is hurting because, for all its efficiency and effectiveness, it is controlled by Indian Police Service officers occupying top posts, rather than allowing the Force’s own encadred officer corps to fill these positions and run ITBP. This is cause for much heart-burning and discontent, and the Modi government will be well advised to pay heed. IPS officers, like their counterparts in the Indian Administrative Service to which most of the IPS recruits aspired, have become a generalist cadre with no specialist skills or domain expertise, and generally muck up things as IAS members do elsewhere in running very disparate agencies of government with only minimal understanding of what they should ideally be doing. If ITBP is a good force, it will become even better if their own officers are given the opportunity to run it. And because, ultimately, it is the quality of officers that distinguishes one paramil org from another, one thing you don’t want is a thoroughly disaffected ITBP officer corps.

About Bharat Karnad

Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, he was Member of the (1st) National Security Advisory Board and the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and author, among other books of, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy', 'India's Nuclear Policy' and most recently, 'Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)'. Educated at the University of California (undergrad and grad), he was Visiting Scholar at Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
This entry was posted in China, civil-military relations, corruption, Culture, Decision-making, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Indian democracy, Indian para-military forces, Indian Politics, Internal Security, MEA/foreign policy, Military/military advice, Myanmar, SAARC, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism, Weapons. Bookmark the permalink.

30 Responses to ITBP — best paramil, rising with new roles

  1. andy says:

    Pretty much an eye opener as to why the naxal menace still thrives and why the CRPF cannot turn the tide against them.Also explains the high casualties suffered by the CRPF over the years due to ambushes.What more could a guerrilla outfit ask for than to have an adversary who is loath to soil his boots in the jungle preferring instead to be cooped up like sitting ducks in their trucks.

    The ITBP certainly deserves all the accolades and hopefully the other para mils will learn from them that there is no substitute for boots on the ground and smart but gruelling tactics.

    The CRPFs tactics remind one of the mughal army that moved ponderously about on the Deccan being constantly harrased by the fast moving Maratha contingents.We know who triumphed between the two.

    • Saurabh says:

      CRPF has not turned the tide against naxals.. you know that ITBP is also deployed in naxalites area for almost a decade now… And has no major encounters till date… They are non active… Non productive and not effective..
      Deeds speak more then words… Tell me one single encounter of ITBP.. OPS which has inflicted good casualties on naxalites…
      crpf has neutralised at least 100 times more naxal caders then ITBP… you can check on records of MHA..
      CRPF suffers more casualties because they are in the core area and are actively fighting and are not following the playing safe tactics of ITBP and BSF..
      those who will kill will suffer casualties too..

  2. Ravi Kumar ponoth says:

    The travails of CRPF are clearly attributable to the “police” culture of conducting operations enforced on the cadre officers of the CRPF by the IPS officers in order to restrict its operational ethos at the level of an Armed Police Force. The BSF and ITBP could save themselves from this design to some extent as their cadre officers were trained differently and their roles were unlike “policing”. The previous government at the centre also should share the blame for the damaging the stature of these Armed Forces of the Union by playing up to the IPS strategy of re-designating these Armed Forces as CAPFs, which they are not constitutionally or by way of tasking. Hope the present government wakes up to the fundamental requirement of assigning the command of all Armed Forces of the Union to their respective cadre officers, who are better trained , groomed and motivated, in order to redeem their lost operational glory rather than leaving them in the hands of short term actors whose basic areas of expertise, loyalties and concerns lie elsewhere !!!!!

    • Saurabh says:

      What a joke when you say that officers in BSF and ITBP are trained differently… All the forces are deployed in LWE… BSF and ITBP have not even a single good operation in LWE area… In last almost a decade..
      Casualties in CRPF is more as they have been operating in the core area also that they have inflicted naxal casualties much more than together done by BSF and ITBP together…

  3. Indian says:

    This article shamelessly states that the IPS officers do not understand the ethos of the force. What a joke. Am outsider like this writer can understand but much more qualified IPS officers cannot!
    I have unearthed massive corruption in ITBP and have recovered almost 7-8 crs from these robbers(insiders) and recently 1.5 crs kerosene was recovered unaccounted in Leh. I wonder if the highly efficient and dedicated insides would have down it.
    22 crs was lying unadjusted in the pension accounts of constables since 2004. I got it all accounted in 2 months in December 2014 for which Appreciation letter was issued to me.
    These are all documented events. Come have a cup if tea and I will give you all details.
    It us due to such things that these people oppose IPS officers and not because of our inefficiency or their own competency. Ask any constable and he will give you a true picture currently in ITBP.

    • Kashish says:

      Sir what are your views on organised corruption in police? By pointing on pilfrage in ITBP in kerosene oil you can’t go away with highly corrupt police machinery.. Time has come for IPS to mend their ways otherwise they will be thrown from deputation in different deptts, where they come to just pass time..

    • Arvind says:

      I fully agree with you. There is rampant corruption in the force specifically by cader officers. Thank god it administered by IPS otherwise ITBP would have literally gone to dogs if left on their own.I being in MHA am privy to lot’s of complaints and enquiries.

    • EM says:

      Hiding behind the pseudonym for Exposing corruption. Quite ironical.

  4. Nij says:

    To the point article. Kudos to the writer.

  5. sarabjeet says:

    Mr Bharat,
    Shockingly an article from you lacking research and credence.I am stating the same as I have had aclose association with Assam Rifles, ITBP and Army, well effeciency and efficacy of an organisation cannot and should not be based on some instances, certain points meriting consideration are:-
    1. A well known fact is that Insurgency and smuggling thrive only because of support from multiple stake holders especially POLITY.
    2. Deployment of a unit and formation are directly dependent on the available lines of communication and support system for troops, with grid being ensured.Best fit option is resorted to keeping in mind the available ressources and level of insurgency.
    3. Why deploy CRPF in Naxal affected areas if ITBP is soo good.
    4. Is it a sinister ploy by the polity and IPS lobby to raise ITBP and deploy to facilitate their votebanks job employment, create additional seats for IPS officers in field areas or to facilitate their designs related to nefarious activities whic Assam Rifles may not be plyable to.
    5. Why an extermely efficient and effective force like ITBP is shying away from their primary role of Indo -China Borders, yes they are deployed however at an average of 150- 200 km behind the LAC, why not like IA on the borders.
    6. Naga and Manipur insurgency is a sham, Insurgency is a name given to the North East MAFIA groups who indulge in Tax collection, smuggling gun running etc.
    7. Why not deploy ITBP such an effecient force in J&K along LC we will see total clean up of terrorism.
    You may like to reconsider your views and carry out a realistc check on the ethos and functioning of various PMF/ CAPFs before making sweeping comments which directly affect morale of the forces

    • As I am given to understand, ITBP would be happy to have its op-ambit restricted to the Indo-Tibetan border. It is government’s call to deploy them wherever it thinks it can do the job. I should have stated that smuggling of arms, drugs, etc. through any border and especially the one with Myanmar cannot, of course, happen, without the facilitation by the civilian administrative apparatus overseen by political parties and leaders in the northeastern provinces.

  6. Saurabh says:

    This is what comes up when people sitting in Delhi try to write about something they have no idea… The writer needs to study before putting his comments… CRPF is the best force to counter naxalites… Which they have proved time and again… No other force has even 10% of operational achievements as CRPF has in LWE area… CRPF has been using GPS for Navigation in jungles and other OPS areas and not using any pathways and roads… Of which no other force is capable… Long duration.. Self sustaining OPS is only the capability of CRPF…
    The casualty in CRPF is also higher as they are in the core area… Others are on the fringes in LWE area’s … All the forces deployed are doing their best…
    The writer needs to have a bit of homework done before writing such inmature article..

  7. ASHOK says:

    Proud to be an ITBP SOLDIER

  8. Ashish says:

    I was astonished to see this post today morning. I actually happened to witness the elections happening in Manipur this time. I also witnessed the way the ITBP units were getting inducted and believe me i have never seen such lethargic drills till date in my life. They were not aware of the situtation and plus were too scared to move out. The best example would be that they even got scared when someone from a villager who told them that if they didm’t let him pass there would be an ambush waiting for them ahead. The ITBP guys came running back to Assam Rifles company to rescue them. In my opinion Assam Rifles is the best bet we have to curb insurgency in Manipur. Govt should realise this soon and take preventive actions before the non-tactical ITBP faces a huge loss in terms of life. This is the bitter truth and the sooner it is accepted the better it will be. Manipur insurgents unlike the Naxals are far more disciplined and their behaviour and drills are as good as that of a normal Army. So sending ITBP to replace AR units is the biggest mistake of this govt., and this decision will have to be reversed within 3-4 months of the induction of ITBP.

  9. Joshua says:

    Why at this stage such issues are being raised against an organisation which is the oldest PMF in the country and has proved it’s worth time and again? Why two organistions, with distinct and specified roles, being pitted against each other? Moreover, the suggestions are contrary to the” One Border One Force” concept of the GOI and willfully denigrate an esteemed organisation which has been aptly named as “Sentinels of the North East” and “Friends of the Hill People”.
    Since its raising in 1835 the force has been deployed in the NE. Post Independence Assam Rifles has proved its worth, be it containing the insurgency, relief during natural calamities, maintenance of law and order or providing sucour to the locals in the far flung areas where the Assam Rifles Jawan is the only government representative.

    • Apna says:

      Quote ” since raising it in 1835 “.
      Do we Indians not feel shame in keeping the name and tradition of such military units and regiments whose life history mostly consisted of killing Indians and promoting slavery?
      All the Sikhs were inducted into the then army because they betrayed India in 3rd battle of panipat to first war of independence i 1857 .We still celebrate that regiment and others too !
      Indians have no sense of irony or pride.

      • Shaurya says:

        Wrong lesson. The soldier’s job is to fight and fight they did, gloriously. The role of the BIA in the two world wars is an example. Instead of shame on the soldier, let it be shame on the foreigner but inherit our soldiers. They are our very own. But do agree some traditions and symbols can change.

        Once India did have a credible national alternative the soldier did question the foreigners and it is this doubt in the foreigners mind of not being able to rely on the native soldier that largely compelled the foreigner to leave. Do not make the mistake of disparaging the soldier, let alone entire communities.

        Two refs to read: What does a soldier fight for? – Samuel Huntington and India’s war – Srinath Raghavan

  10. pappa PS says:

    Excellent article . well taken.

  11. Rupam says:

    Regarding the Chinese aggression i think rather than supporting for freedom of Tibet, India should rather support for Tibet joining the union of India and becoming a part of it. If we look in the past with all its nobel intentions even after so much generosity to our neighbours even then the one’s to suffer is always India and the one’s we helped later become our enemies and point fingers towards us. Prime eg. Bangladesh and how it has become a hotbed for radical islam and terrorism. Not only this the people of Tibet will also be guaranteed the benefits that come from becoming part of India. Moving on to secure the border a new command specializing in mountain warfare should be made in Indian Army and the ITBP should be expanded in size and should form a large part of the army to counter the chinese. Further the army should focus on battalions that are experts and specialize in asymmetrical warfare in different regions. All of this also needs to coordinated with the Navy, Air Force, Para-military, Other security forces both civilian and military. After Tibet it should be followed by joining of Xinjiang province and then Bangladesh to India. Now many will say that how do you stop the menace of Islam in these parts, well although it is difficult but not impossible, India because of its culture has been able to assimilate other communities peacefully and for all the ugly parts they can be eliminated by swift action by the armed forces. This should be further followed by retaking of POK and joining of Balochistan and Sindh to the Indian Union. The reason i say this is because if these are left independent not only will they be susceptible to the invasion of ISIS and radical islam from the west but also might act in a way not in the favour of India. Also i think that the there should be only one ministry for the defence of the country namely internal and external. The reason i say this is because not only will this save time in inter force joint operations also because any internal and external security threat is always linked to each other and not separate. Also the posting of troops should be interchanged in such a way so that the personnel working in the field understand the nuances of how one event can be linked to another. Another point i think the armed forces should stop acting as a disaster response team. A separate organisation should be formed particularly for that work. The armed forces are meant to defend the countries boundaries, acting as a disaster response team deviates from its area of work and puts pressure on its resources. All of the above will have to be done with efficient and higher military spending and higher recruitment in the armed forces coupled with more specialized training for jawans and officers.

    I do not understand why many people in our country say that nuclear weapons are for preventing war and bla bla bla, even former armed forces veterans espouse this and say that India should always exercise restraint even when we are the one’s who are affected.
    I think one of the reasons for this is the basis of rank progression in the armed forces, say the time taken to become a colonel is 15 years, these may be applicable during peaceful times but to say that India at present is in peace with its neighbours is total bullshit. The experience of a captain or major in the battlefield is of no use after may be 10 years(even a year is too long a time where situations can change anytime). The heads and seniors of the armed forces should not be old people who often go with the flow of the system but young minds who can bring their immediate and much needed experience on the table for national security. A civilization as old a India has not been able to survive because there were people like Gandhi etc. who always say India won independence through peaceful measures, but for rulers like Chandragupta Maurya, Shivaji, Peshwa Bajirao, Lalitaditya Muktapida, Vikramaditya etc. who were ruthless in annihilating the invaders at the borders.

  12. &^%$#@! says:

    I believe the ITBP needs to be left where it currently is, and remain a compact and sector-specific unit. It is felt by many that man for man, the ITBP is possibly the best fighting unit on either side of the border.

  13. Anant J M says:

    When ITBP was raised it was conceived to be a guerrilla force to fight against the Chinese army occupying Indian territories. Taking cue from the success of guerrilla forces of Mao, traditions and ethos of ITBP was developed to be extremely people friendly – unlike many other forces currently in discussion. This particular reason is fundamental in success of ITBP in various areas be it anti naxal operations or any other deployment. Wherever ITBP is deployed it has commanded huge respect from local population. Looking holistically, the success of ITBP in anti naxal operations shouldn’t be judged by ‘kills’, its an elusive idea as number of cadres killed didn’t necessarily mean that problem is solved. ITBP has done commendable job in winning the hearts and minds of people in naxal affected areas. To give a hint as to why ITBP suffered negligible casualties in ANO, was it because ITBP plays safe? No, it was the people of the land, who in order to save their ‘beloved force’ from any harm gave hints of imminent dangers lying ahead. The way of the sentinels of Himalayas should be adopted by other forces as it could prove to be a game changer in situations where historical wrongs were done knowingly or unknowingly. I reckon that the time has come when the forces should learn this fundamental success mantra of the humble men of ITBP. Giving a small glimpse of what ITBP does –

    • Saurabh says:

      ITBP is a failure in anti naxal operations…i have spend decades in LWE area… Don’t tell me that local population give you information about naxalites and you don’t get trapped and prevent loss of men…
      If you are given an intelligence you should have gone searching for them instead of rushing back in the safety of camp..
      Fact remains.. ITBP is not effective and is with its no risk no gain policy trying to save his face by saying that they are trying to win hearts…you are soldier man… You are not a social worker…
      Let it be a force don’t make it a NGO dedicated to win hearts..

      • Anant J M says:

        What an irony! You’ve spent 10 years in ANO and still lacks a modicum of guerilla warfare.
        It is well known that the CRPFs effectiveness came from the CoBRA units, utilising the small team concept and the tactics of the Greyhounds.
        Coming to the CRPF, I must say that the erstwhile Crown’s Representative Police have faced the brunt all through. I understand that the force which was brought to use only when things had gone way out of control had to develop the most ruthless tactics to get things in order.
        CRPF has become very crucial for maintenance of law and order because of the utter failure of long term government policies and strategies. The 365 days 24×7 deployment of CRPF in the most troubled regions has certainly eaten its way through the working culture and methodologies. The sudden bursts of expansion and raising of units have had a diluting effect. Every sane person could imagine how difficult it must have been to maintain and preserve good operating practices in such a behemoth of an organization. Nevertheless, CRPF had proved to be useful in innumerable occasions but we cannot overlook the fact that the effectiveness of certain way of functioning had its own demerits which were going to be counter productive in the long run – Kashmir is a glaring example.
        Coming to ITBP, it has proved its credentials in whatever task given – securing the highest mountains of the world, defending key installations in Afg. and in India, VIP protection, anti naxal ops., Training K9 squads of other orgs including CRPF, providing trg to police org for UN missions the list can go on.

  14. Bana says:

    Any counter insurgency operations, as per my understanding are people centric and are conducted with local support. Intelligence generation for effective counter insurgency operations is in the population centre, as also for any insurgent group to survive local support is essential.
    The strategy has always been to control the population centre to counter insurgent movement, therefore deployment of force at these locations and not along the IB. If any reaction required in the hinterland it would have been difficult for movement of force as most of the place along the Indo-Myanmar no road exist. All the major counter insurgency operations have been conducted in the hinterland till late and non at the border.
    This strategy has paid off with most Underground Groups having shifted their bases/ camps across the IB.
    It has been due to the relentless efforts of Assam Rifles the insurgency in the NE has been contained and states such as Tripura and Mizoram and major parts of Assam have been peaceful for long.
    It would not be fair nor just to compare any region or force which is deployed there with any other force / region without considering all the factors and ground realities. NE region just cannot be compared with any other region of the country. Similarly, no two states in the NE region can be compared with each other as they are unique and distinct.
    Such comparison are dangerous without having studied and considered the ground realities.

    Any counter insurgency operations, as per my understanding are people centric and are conducted with local support. Intelligence generation for effective counter insurgency operations is in the population centre, as also for any insurgent group to survive local support is essential.
    The strategy has always been to control the population centre to counter insurgent movement, therefore deployment of force at these locations and not along the IB. If any reaction required in the hinterland it would have been difficult for movement of force as most of the place along the Indo-Myanmar no road exist. All the major counter insurgency operations have been conducted in the hinterland till late and non at the border.
    This strategy has paid off with most Underground Groups having shifted their bases/ camps across the IB.
    It has been due to the relentless efforts of Assam Rifles the insurgency in the NE has been contained and states such as Tripura and Mizoram and major parts of Assam have been peaceful for long.
    It would not be fair nor just to compare any region or force which is deployed there with any other force / region without considering all the factors and ground realities. NE region just cannot be compared with any other region of the country. Similarly, no two states in the NE region can be compared with each other as they are unique and distinct.
    Such comparison are dangerous without having studied and considered the ground realitie

  15. Maximus says:

    “if he had sufficient ITBP units, his state would be rid of these home-grown ideological insurgents in double-quick time.” Rethorical question: can you solve a social problem with military means only?

    • ~!@#$%^&*()_+ says:

      That quote comes from DG, Chhattisgarh who would be justified in saying that. It is his job to fight it out with the overt militarized disloyal aspects of a social problem. Let alone the country, these militants are not loyal even to the people they profess to be fighting for. So unless these maoists lay down arms there should be no let up and this whole debate about methods is justified and so is the DG in expressing his professional view.

      Additionally and without denying the fact of a social aspect of the naxal problem, may be we should be careful about giving out the impression that the whole naxal problem as, in its base, a social problem. Parts of the country have suffered equally worse but killing others in the same country was never accepted as an option. The maoist militants and naxal sympathizers in the tribal areas are not one and the same. The urban naxalite is again an entirely different animal.

      As I admit the social problem cannot be brushed aside too. For a country where the privileged section is loyal more towards their respective favourite foreigner and imports have ended up as the mainstay of the economy, there really is no hope for the future. The whole country will end up as an indebted sharecropping bonded labour. Remember just a few days back in Banaras, ek so pachees karor ka PM was extolling the virtues of tourism as an employment generator compared to manufacturing. In such a difficult situation with completely subverted priority list, some sections of the country will off course, have it worse compared to some others. But by no means this is going to be a permanent affair. Things have been changing in a permanent way too in favour of, the country as a whole.

      Also as a solution the larger body of population has been very accommodating and understanding of the problems generated by our huge populations and poor resources – mainly through a well accepted tradition of migration. And this is not fake migration where the migrant of his own volition feels forced to confirm. If large social groups have felt denied in some manner then they have migrated – Rajasthan and Uttarakhand are established examples in early and recent history. Even otherwise internal economic migration of smaller sections, is a reality from poorer states to richer states. These migrations have kept the people both from revolting or in the alternative getting boiled alive like the frog, like in some other countries. This migration is also not stigmatized given that a migrant eg. from Chattisgarh is accepted as useful even while he decides to being his own personal Chattisgarh along with him.

      • Green says:

        Shame on Indian Army Officers. They r loosing their battles bcoz of their own ego’s n inefficiency. I don’t know how these people will fight war if declared.
        For God sake do something to save the oldest forces in history.

  16. Subhas says:

    Best decision for India govt.

  17. Sabkaa Maalik Ek says:

    I am pretty astonished to see “sometimes rational but most of the times a senseless debate” on an issue like which is better force and who can finish LWE or self proclaimed expertise in warfare. I have served in most of the terrains and but do not claim to be an expert since canvas is huge and we are humans. Success comes after lots of hard work and once again you have to determine how do you measure it? CRPF is certainly a bigger force and has loads of experience in fighting insurgency. In fact post kargil war, CRPF was the lead agency for Internal security duties. They have achieved a number of successes in sorting out enemies of nation and have contributed immensely towards nation building. Most of the Forces are almost same on their tactics and equipping policy and since the authorities have tried to maintain uniformity among these forces, we have started witnessing constantly decreasing standards. Our founding fathers were not so fool so as to establish different forces for different purposes. Terrain, climate, task analysis, local ground realities were among few factors to be considered before taking decision in this regard. All these forces have developed some domain specific expertise over the years and best would have been to allow them to grow within that domain and achieve excellence. Unfortunate is that the vested interest of a particular, powerful section have evolved baseless theories to damage the roots of such magnificent forces, which has eroded the domain excellence from ITBP, CRPF or any such similar organizations. My sincere advice to all enthusiastic supporters is that please try and look little deeper and you will appreciate my honest intents. Do not put avoidable words on public forums by comparing one force to other or likewise. Apply the power of logic and discuss that why the border guarding and internal security mechanisms are not being consolidated for strengthening the security of India. What best can be done to improve our reactions with ultimate destination towards active response? Why are we keeping the command related matters on tender-hooks and still mixing all issues with clear aim of divide and rule? Discussion at tactical level is alright however without developing a strategical vision, not much will change. ITBP has its area specific professionalism and so has CRPF, BSF or CISF. Idea should be to consolidate our experiences for a better result to strike at our enemy effectively.

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