Arundhati G, RIP

India was lucky to have Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, as the Indian Representative at the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva, in 1995-96 negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Her diligence in keeping abreast of the often secret meetings and machinations of the five so-called Non-Proliferation Treaty-recognized nuclear weapons states (P-5), kept India out of trouble. She thus thwarted the CD proceedings designed to corral this country into a Test Ban and freezing its nuclear weapons technology at the level of an unproven basic fission device. There were procedural moves devised by the P-5 and similar surprises US and its camp followers in Western Europe that were prevented from being sprung on the Indian delegation by Arundhati and her team. MOreover, her straight talking to her US counterpoint left Washington in little doubt what they were up against, which was capped by her ringing affirmation in the plenary voicing India’s final rejection of the CTBT, her now justly famous declaration that India would not sign that flawed treaty “not now, not ever”.

For those who care to know more about Arundhati’s finest hour, the most complete account of the evolving thinking of GOI and the P-5 machinations, and her maneuverings around the diplomatic booby-traps and mines laid by the dastardly Five in the CD, according to Ghose, is in my tome ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy’. She repeatedly referred to this book in her well-attended (and perhaps, last) public talk on “India and the CTBT Negotiations” at the Raja Ramanna-founded National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore,on Nov 29, 2015 (text at She “would recommend”, she told the audience, “that anyone interested in the discussions military, scientific and political at the time, refer to Karnad’s book (pages 370-390).This also contains information on the negotiations themselves, based largely on interviews with me, soon after my return from Geneva to India in 1997 when my memory was still fresh.”

No finer Indian diplomat held the fort so courageously in the international arena in the face of concerted attacks. But the real hero, per Arundhati, was the prime minister who, at that crucial moment in time, was HD Deve Gowda, often derided by his opponents and the media as a PM who quite literally slept on the job. Except he had the earthy and instinctive understanding about the roots of national power, and once the stakes were outlined to him that signing the test ban treaty would close off India’s chances of ever becoming a nuclear weapon state, with great certitude he verbally instructed Arundhati, back in Delhi for consultations, to reject the CTBT outright.

Considering how most of the influential circles in the capital leavened by the advocacy of the strategic community elite headed by K. Subrahmanyam — its “doyen” and his acolytes in the govt, IDSA, and the media, among them the late Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (Retd), and which advocacy was backed by the then chairman, atomic energy commission, R. Chidambaram (and still adviser S&T to PM), had prepared the political and public relations ground for India affixing its signature to the CTBT, a nervous Ghose asked Deve Gowda for written instructions to that effect. Thus armed, Arundhati sallied forth to Geneva, there to bury the CTBT.

What ifs of history — what if a supposed sophisticate or a West-leaning pol had been PM (say, Rajiv, or Inder Gujral, or Vajpayee — or the de facto PM at the time, the late Brajesh Mishra, or Manmohan Singh or, dare we mention, Modi?)– not Deve Gowda, he’d not have hesitated to order Arundhati to sign on the dotted line, and thereby permanently strategically crippled India.

It must be recalled that those who promoted CTBT signature also led the charge on the N-deal with the United States, and those who opposed the CTBT were the same small handful of us — one or two strategic analysts and the old guard from Trombay — the late PK Iyengar, AN Prasad, A. Gopalakrishnan, who just as vehemently campaigned in 2005-2008 against the nuclear deal with the United States, which from the beginning has sought to shackle India and, with the nuclear deal, succeeded to a considerable extent. (See our collated public writings in the latter episode in the book ‘Strategic Sellout: The Indian-US Nuclear Deal [2009]’). We relentlessly pounded GOI’s movement towards and its eventual succumbing to US pressure and blandishments. Again the strategists pushing for the deal were Subbu, Jasjit, and that caboodle in the official corridors, the media, and now doing duty in Western thinktank (Carnegie, Brookings, IISS) branches setup in Delhi to shape GOI’s policies. Not surprisingly, just about every thing that’s going wrong with that N-deal, CSC, including the perils of the buys by Modi of the six cost-prohibitive, untested and unproven Westinghouse AP 1000 reactors after his most recent US visit, which purchase, hazards-wise, could prove calamitous, was prophesied by the deal’s critics (See ‘Strategic Sellout’).

The point that Arundhati — a confirmed disarmament-walli by the way, repeatedly confessed to me, and something she alludes to in her NIAS talk, is how unprepared the Ministry of External Affairs is to negotiate on technical issues, such as anything related to nuclear, which requires some very serious domain knowledge. And why it is imperative to have permanent institutional mechanisms where the technically proficient scientists and engineers are in periodic consultations, so that Indian diplomats at the negotiating end and by way of MEA’s institutional memory. are brought up to to speed on where not to give way, where to cede ground, grudgingly, and the bulk of issues that are non-negotiable and if put on the table how carefully to configure legal escape routes and safeguards to always leave open the option for the country to ease itself out of tight corners and onerous treaty commitments.

Having quickly realized that neither of us was going to be able to convince the other on N-disarmament and big power-driven arms control measures, where we were invariably on opposite sides of the argument, our mutually respectful relationship settled into a breezy, jokey, affair. Whenever we met I’d good naturedly rib her for her “naivete” and she’d throw up her hands in mock horror at my “love of the Bomb”. The wonderful thing was that our differences only spurred us to tap each other for information and insights, though the traffic was mostly one way. Plainly said, what I know about MEA’s attitude to disarmament and how it evolved, and about the workings of DISA (disarmament and international security affairs) Division in that ministry was gleaned from her. She kept up with the goings-on in MEA and especially DISA as current officers in that Division are in one way or another her proteges or have matured under her influence penumbra.

Many of us knew of the cancer consuming her. But because she didn’t make too big a fuss about it, many of us who met her now and then didn’t either. Cancer or not, she wouldn’t give up her cigarettes or the tiny ‘Altos’ lozenges she chewed on. She was a fixture in the seminar/conference circuit relating to India’s nuclear policies. That stopped earlier this year. And then the day before yesterday we heard she had passed on.

Arundhati will be sorely missed — a Wonderful old Gal with real fighting spirit. RIP.

About Bharat Karnad

Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, he was Member of the (1st) National Security Advisory Board and the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and author, among other books of, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy', 'India's Nuclear Policy' and most recently, 'Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)'. Educated at the University of California (undergrad and grad), he was Visiting Scholar at Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
This entry was posted in Asian geopolitics, China, disarmament, domestic politics, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Politics, nonproliferation, nuclear industry, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, nuclear power, Nuclear Weapons, society, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, Weapons. Bookmark the permalink.

23 Responses to Arundhati G, RIP

  1. If India had not exploded the nuclear Bomb in 1998 and become a declared nuclear Weapons state then India-America friendship or alliance whatever may not have begun.If India has not exploded the bomb then Pakistan would have also not exploded the bomb in 1998.Pakistan became a nuclear weapons state in 1998 and that led to the explosions in New York.This created a dynamic that led to India-US nuclear deal.

    So it’s good that you supported the nuked of 1998!!!!

    • Shaurya says:

      Pakistan had a device in 1984 and a weapon by 1987. Their weaponization preceded India’s. India essentially reacted to the Pakistani weaponization program.

      • Not true. Read my book — ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security’ — the only authoritative take on the program based largely on Indian AEC sources. We had dumb, aircraft dropable, nuclear ordnance not long after the 1974 test. The formal order (Rajiv’s) for weaponization happened in 1988.

      • &^%$#@! says:

        @BK: The device based on the 1974 test required an An-12 transport a/c to be the delivery platform.

      • Shaurya@ — Actually, no. Pakistan had a serviceable device-cum-weapon only by end 1987. In 1984, Pak was racing to acquire the capability from China, whence the desperate boast by AQ Khan to Kuldeep Nayyar at the time of Op Brasstacks, an orchestrated interview that the Indian journalist held back (to the enormous disquiet of the Zia ul-Haq regime who had hoped to have it out soonest), because he (Nayyar) was shopping it around for top dollar and finally got it from the Observer (London).

  2. If India had not tested nukes in 1998 , then most probably Pakistan also would not have tested nukes in 1998.But Pakistan did test nukes in 1998 and became the first and the only Islamic country to posses nuclear weapons.

    Now that will lead to the ultimate de-nuclearisation and cutting and Chopping of Pakistan into 3-4 pieces.

    If patriots like you had not supported and advocated India’s Nuclear tests in 1998 then pakistan may have had a more secure future!!!!

  3. Venkat says:

    It is good to know we have had nationalists irrespective of their political leanings or other so called deficiencies at the highest level. It is these leaders that created an ecosystem that allowed us develop strategic technology. Strange considering the cream (the toppers of civil services ) actually have no clue on the notion of national interest or is it that simply do not care. Something to ponder on, maybe more of our ambassadors should be political appointment like in US.

  4. Shaurya says:

    Bharat: Arun Shourie should be included in your small group of opponents of IUNCA.

  5. MS says:

    She was an unsung Hero of India, then.

  6. mayura says:

    It is heartening to note the H D Devegowda who everybody made fun of had the guts to stand up to the international community and refuse to sign the CTBT. As a kannadiga I am really proud of him today. He is a mere diploma in civil engineering (drop out) and when you compare him to some of our leaders who are educated abroad and who suck up to the west, comes as a whiff of fresh air.

  7. Vivek says:

    but current situation of India is equivalent to signing CTBT. Now India cannot do any test in future to modify TN design after signing 123 agreement with US as part of indo US N-deal

    • &^%$#@! says:

      True! India can now be construed as being a de-facto signatory to the CTBT. This situation which commenced by signing of the 123 agreement, was virtually “set in stone” but by the executive order of dubious legality that countermanded an Act of Parliament (the supreme law maker of the land).

    • India will have test a bomb again when it will have test a bomb. Treaties are only kept and and abrogated based on necessity. Treaties and what ever only have an effect of delay and cost.

      In any compulsion you have do what you have to do choices are two 1) Proactive 2) Reactive. Kala(time) forces you to do the right thing. There is a ‘cost’ to be paid whatever is the lesser cost you will pay.

      Given the resources India has, it will inevitably rise, it will also have a lot to lose hence a lot to defend. I don’t think anybody doubts this. The top dogs will only slow the underdogs rise with constraints.

      We are currenlty assuming that nuclear weapons are ultimate weapons but in future there would be need for different kind of weapons. Clearly given the impact to technology in our lives cyber warfare is going to be first strike weapon in future wars, and lay man can tell. There are other future weapons to be developed too.

      I hope that clarifies….. Apologise for the tone of my argument I am only a layman.

      • &^%$#@! says:

        @Primeargument: Thank you for your learned, realistic, and reassuring clarification. One can now lay to rest any and all concerns.

  8. manofsan says:

    What’s happening on Uttarakhand border with China? Why are the Chinese acting up now?

  9. &^%$#@! says:

    @BK: Typo in your article. It should be R. Chidambaram and not P. Chidambaram.

  10. ~!@#$%^&*()_+ says:

    Off course there would be other weapons to be developed, all things considered. It is also understandable that the But to simply accept that the “top dogs will only slow the underdogs rise with constraints” is to court civilizational disaster. For the most part that has been the case in our History and the results today show the lags during those times.

    Unfortunately for us there are only flashes in the pan kind of systems/people/institutions, most of whom are also subject to Kal (death).

    Unless a system is developed that is over and above this rigmarole, things are going to be very hard for us.

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