Christine Fair of Georgetown University, Washington, DC, is proving to be a far more trenchant critic of Pakistan’s strategy of asymmetric warfare — terrorism under the nuclear overhang policies, and more persuasive than any Indian analyst, and more convincing to the US policy establishment than the Indian Embassy working on the margins can ever be. See her piece of clear writing available at:
Her larger case is that the “false equivalency” between India and Pakistan assumed by US policymakers when assessing the situation in South Asia ends up unfairly dividing the responsibility for bad things happening in this part of the world equally between the two countries. Fair argues that at the bottom of Islamabad’s risk-acceptant policy of constantly needling India is its confidence that the US will always come to its rescue. If Washington corrects its posture by warning that it would not intervene in any crisis initiated by terrorism perpetrated by Pakistani supported outlaws, the problem would end because then there would be no one to save Pakistan if Delhi decides to retaliate and Islamabad would be forced to jettison its confrontationist policy. Christine’s case is built around the UN Resolution 47 of 1948, the fact that its conditions have never been met by Islamabad, and the false cultural history (of Muslims mistreated under Hindu majority rule and constituting a separate nation) and flawed Muslim demographics in the subcontinent at the core of the Two Nation Theory, which is the ideological undergirding of the Pakistani state.
In my writings over the last thirty years, I have analyzed the “false equivalence” aspects of America’s South Asia policy (and Western policy, generally) and its deleterious outcomes but from the perspective of the manifest inequality in every respect and the sheer disparity in the size, potential, and capabilities of the two countries which, in realpolitik terms, should have been decisive in influencing Washington’s thinking but wasn’t because short-term benefits and Pakistan’s utility as a “frontline” state ( in the Cold War, and in anti-Islamic terror and Afghanistan military campaigns since) over-rode strategic good sense.