Bad Policy, Geostrategics Will Go against India

Prime minister Narendra Modi goes to China weighed down by traditionally bad geostrategics and even worse policy.

Consider the underway Chinese initiatives in India’s neighbourhood—the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to access the warm water port at Gwadar, submarines and combat aircraft to Pakistan, the Qinghai-Lhasa railway with a loop-line to Xigatze on the Nepal border, the “maritime silk route” and the “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean, the old silk route connecting China with Central Asia and Russia majorly through Kazakhstan, investment in infrastructure and extractive industry in Afghanistan, and the BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) scheme worked out of Kunming to provide the fast industrialising western provinces an opening on the Bay of Bengal. These developments are enveloping India in a geostrategic mesh—the essence of Wei-qi, an ancient Chinese board game and template for Chinese statecraft.

In Wei-qi, the objective is to fill as many of the squares on the board with one’s pieces, the corners inwards, to crowd the adversary and leave him little manoeuvring space and freedom of action. Using trade, aid, military assistance, and cultural exchanges with countries around India and farther afield, China means to influence India’s policies by influencing these states that otherwise fall naturally within the Indian strategic penumbra.

What is the Indian geostrategic model to compete with Wei-qi? From ancient times the Hindu sense of the subcontinental space bounded by the mountains, deserts, and the seas is that of Jambudwipa—the great big island state. It is hardly surprising that its outlook has been insular, and friends and foes conceived on the basis of geometric determinism dictated on the basis of a simplistic formulation of the mandala, codified in the Arthashastra. The mandala concept of concentric circles—the inner-most circle comprising adversaries, followed by a tier of friends, the next outer circle again of enemies, and so on has ensured maximally-riled neighbours. Whatever its utility in pre-historical India of perpetually warring kingdoms, the mandala scheme virtually disabled rulers from envisaging distant threats, because vast intervening spaces made perceiving nations far from the homeland as friendly or adversarial difficult, whence the preoccupation with smaller, weaker, adjoining states—a foreign policy affliction to this day. Wei-qi obviously scores over the less engaged mandala-infused approach (non-alignment, strategic autonomy).

Against a more equal rival such as the United States, however, Wei-qi turns, in effect, into a classical balance-of-power game, with moves countered by corresponding moves to deny the opponent spatial domination. Against a strategic vision deficient-India that, for instance, did not respond with alacrity to China’s nuclear missile arming Pakistan by prompt transfers of nuclear and conventionally warheaded missiles and major armaments to Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries on the Chinese periphery, Beijing will always have the upper hand.

The new thing Modi brings to the table is his boundless confidence and ready wittedness. An impactful incident of Modi’s diplomacy that few know about occurred during Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit last September. With the intrusion of an armed unit of the People’s Liberation Army in the Chumar sector of the disputed Aksai China region as backdrop, Modi asked Xi if the PLA in China dominated the political leadership in the manner the army does the government in Pakistan. Cut to the quick Xi professed ignorance of the intrusion, but PLA troops pulled back the next day.

This little episode no doubt induced in Xi respect for Modi, particularly for the manner in which the message was conveyed, complete with the derisory allusion, and in light of the history of PLA provocations as accompaniment to high-level meetings. Recall that China invaded Vietnam in February 1979 on the day external affairs minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee reached Beijing, a symbolic slap and a warning to India that it may be next! But can the personal regard Xi has for Modi be converted into real benefits for India? Doubtful, because Chinese leaders, pickled in the brine of China’s centrality in the world, are not swayed by flummery. For them the strategic end-state matters, not small profit from marginal attributes.

The larger picture is still more worrisome. Deng Xiaoping’s 1991 guideline—“hide your capability, bide your time”—has been given the heave-ho. Xi has apparently determined that China’s economic and military capability is sufficiently muscled to flex it and that now’s the time to begin challenging the United States for supremacy in Asia. This is evident in the growingly aggressive military measures—naval patrolling in far-off waters, announcement of the air defence identification zone in the South China Sea, embedding of sonar buoys around the disputed Senkaku Islands to monitor Japanese and US warship traffic, and by rendering potential partners of the US, such as India, less effective once Beijing starts acting decisively in Asia-Pacific.

This is the reason why despite Modi prioritising the resolution of the border dispute, the 18th meeting in late March this year of the Special Representatives—National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and the former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi—achieved nothing. This outcome was preordained, because keeping a border solution dangling keeps New Delhi in check. Then again Beijing has had to do little for Indian governments to unilaterally cede ground on the Tibet issue—surrendering of inherited Indian rights in Lhasa, recognition of Chinese suzerainty, then sovereignty, “One-China” policy, stapled visas, in return for zilch (unless Beijing’s infirm acceptance of Sikkim as part of India is considered a big deal). But this is the recessive China policy the ministry of external affairs has flogged, and Modi has not retracted.

Modi will get investment but only if India stays with the Chinese line on Tibet, and the lopsided, neo-colonial, $75 billion trade—Indian minerals for Chinese finished goods—and a skewed balance-of-payments problem that cost this country $37 billion last year. This imbalance will not be dented by increased Indian exports of vegetables, fruit and, ironically, in the face of the brouhaha over cow slaughter, of beef. The fact is the China-assisted infrastructure build-up, a rousing welcome for Modi in Xian, and a hall full of screaming Indians in Shanghai do not compensate for India’s strategic reduction.
Published in New Indian Express, May 13, 2015 at

About Bharat Karnad

Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, he was Member of the (1st) National Security Advisory Board and the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and author, among other books of, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy', 'India's Nuclear Policy' and most recently, 'Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)'. Educated at the University of California (undergrad and grad), he was Visiting Scholar at Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
This entry was posted in Afghanistan, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Central Asia, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian democracy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Ocean, Japan, Maldives, Missiles, nonproliferation, Northeast Asia, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Pakistan nuclear forces, Russia, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Sri Lanka, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Tibet, United States, US., Weapons. Bookmark the permalink.

5 Responses to Bad Policy, Geostrategics Will Go against India

  1. AAYUSH's says:

    Despite having a lot of laverages against china India has been reluctant in pushing it’s concerns to chinese. But the current status that china enjoys leaves little room for maneuvers. Also, we are having heavy dependence on chinese manufactured good in electrification, communication and many other sectors.
    Currently china doesn’t have much to give security challenges to India and we should be confident of ourselves. Let them have freindship with pakistan,let them enjoy it like US has. No matter what they do, they can only dream about containing India. They have so much internal problems that it is unlikely that there would be any adventure near border.
    As for giving arms to vietnam, it is complicated. How can we be assure of permanent freindship with vietnam, also why to draft our policies as reaction to chinese policies. We should first develop our own competence in arms production and only then venture in such deals.
    We should start countering chinese from the position of strength not from the position of weakness. Our strength depends on our economy, quality of life, human resource ,environment etc.
    As far as chinese investments in Indias periphery is concerned, there are no permanent freinds in international politics. There can be change of heart for India with our economic development. India is directly attacking the only laverage china is having over countries around the world. India is trying to develop manufacturing base. Only India can challenge china in that space and no matter how much chinese government gives it’s industrialist freebies, indian businessmen won’t let them win easily.
    This has become an issue,of strategic importance for many countries around the world as they look forward to decrease their dependence on china.
    So, india is attacking at the root of chinese strength, we are not quite, government may be .

  2. Atul says:

    There are couple of inconsistencies in the article.

    First, India doesn’t export beef to any country. It exports buffalo meat in the name of beef. So that’s not an issue. Second, Modi is under no illusion that China presents a greater threat in the longer term. However, there is no reason why India should not increase its trade and investment relations with China. Even Japan and US, with such intense rivalry, are neck-deep in Chinese economy. So are all ASEAN nations. Moreover, Chinese have about USD$ 4 trillion of foreign reserve and a slice of that pie in India as investment is always welcome, though without any attached Chinese laborer. Finally, too much alarmist attitude in foreign policy is not good. Let Pakistan think and behave in that manner. India is not a small time island or city state. India is a civilization-state with a mighty military and nuclear weapons. So, it can play ping-pong game between great powers pretty well and one can see that happening now. Indian objective is the build up of Comprehensive National Power and for that, tension-free growth in next 20 years is the urgent necessity.

    Let Modi go to China and see what comes out of it. As it is, the clubbing of the visit with Mongolia and South Korea is a message that China is not the only important state in that region.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.