Earlier this week there was sustained interaction with an Israeli team of former militarymen, policy persons, and researchers including a fighter pilot from the July 1981 sortie that preemptively took out the Iraqi reactor — Osiraq, that was about to go critical. The Israeli concern this time around was, of course, Iran. [Chatham House rules were the norm, so cannot identify the Israeli or the Indian dramatis personnae.]The point the former fighter pilot made very convincingly was not that aerial strikes to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities would prevent Tehran from pursuing a weapons capability, but rather that such a strike would, at a minimum, delay Iran’s securing nuclear weapons and could also deter that country from pursuing the weapons option owing to the well-founded fear that the capabilities would again be hit once they reached a certain dangerous threshold, reducing their nuclear weapons project to a hopeless, Sisphyean task that will eventually be so frustrating, the Iranians will give up the effort. Had we this kind of Israeli mentality, we would have joined the Israelis to repeatedly attack Pakistani nuclear weapons complex every time it approached certain level, until Islamabad got the nessage. This option is not practicable any more. But it was readily available during the 1970s and early 1980s when Pakistan was cobbling the N-weapons capability tohgether centrally with Chinese design and material assistance, and America, helpfully, looking the other way. Washington needed Pakistan as base to mount the jihad against the Soviet occupation troops in Afghanistan, remember? [In Greek mythology, Sisyphus tried to steal fire from the Gods and was punished by having repeatedly to roll a large boulder up a mountain only to see it roll down once he had managed to get it almost to the top.] What an exhilerating change this is from hearing our diplomats and official types constantly bellyache about Washington not doing this, not doing that, not doing nearly enough to rein in Pakistan, its terrorist activities, etc. Well, how about the Indian government doing something about it, such as ordering covert ops to remove Hafeez Saeed from the scene, instead of relying on the $10 million US bounty to reel him in, which won’t catch this fish. Then again, Indians are talkers, and Israelis are doers — the great difference that cannot be bridged.
Search
Categories
- Afghanistan (178)
- Africa (64)
- arms exports (343)
- asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific (314)
- Asian geopolitics (823)
- Australia (81)
- Bangladesh (58)
- Bhutan (57)
- Brazil (9)
- Central Asia (192)
- China (552)
- China military (489)
- civil-military relations (452)
- corruption (104)
- Culture (393)
- Cyber & Space (83)
- Decision-making (392)
- Defence Industry (395)
- Defence procurement (46)
- disarmament (76)
- domestic politics (345)
- DRDO (306)
- Europe (395)
- Geopolitics (748)
- geopolitics/geostrategy (103)
- Great Power imperatives (772)
- guerilla warfare (97)
- India's China Policy (504)
- India's Pakistan Policy (393)
- India's strategic thinking and policy (774)
- Indian Air Force (495)
- Indian Army (503)
- Indian democracy (210)
- Indian ecobomic situation (389)
- Indian Navy (427)
- Indian Ocean (277)
- Indian para-military forces (56)
- indian policy — Israel (34)
- indian policy — Israel, Iran and West Asia (135)
- Indian Politics (413)
- Indian state/administration (14)
- Indo-Pacific (56)
- Intelligence (77)
- Internal Security (238)
- Iran and West Asia (125)
- Islamic countries (31)
- Israel (52)
- Japan (137)
- Latin America (27)
- Maldives (53)
- MEA/foreign policy (331)
- Military Acquisitions (446)
- Military/military advice (331)
- Missiles (268)
- Myanmar (40)
- Nepal (26)
- nonproliferation (138)
- North Korea (37)
- Northeast Asia (138)
- NRIs (20)
- nuclear industry (70)
- Nuclear Policy & Strategy (313)
- nuclear power (56)
- Nuclear Weapons (306)
- Pakistan (437)
- Pakistan military (371)
- Pakistan nuclear forces (102)
- Relations with Russia (195)
- Russia (328)
- russian assistance (207)
- russian military (145)
- SAARC (252)
- sanctions (6)
- satellites (34)
- society (575)
- South Asia (807)
- South East Asia (197)
- space & cyber (31)
- Special Forces (97)
- Sri Lanka (57)
- Strategic Forces Command (133)
- Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East (212)
- Strategic Relations with the US & West (476)
- Taiwan (31)
- Technology transfer (295)
- technology, self-reliance (32)
- Terrorism (207)
- Tibet (117)
- Trade with China (4)
- UN (74)
- United States (536)
- US. (532)
- Vietnam (115)
- Weapons (492)
- West Asia (137)
- Western militaries (202)
Subscribe via RSS
Archives
- June 2022 (3)
- May 2022 (4)
- April 2022 (5)
- March 2022 (10)
- February 2022 (3)
- January 2022 (2)
- December 2021 (4)
- November 2021 (4)
- October 2021 (3)
- September 2021 (3)
- August 2021 (6)
- July 2021 (4)
- June 2021 (3)
- May 2021 (4)
- April 2021 (10)
- March 2021 (5)
- February 2021 (6)
- January 2021 (6)
- December 2020 (5)
- November 2020 (5)
- October 2020 (5)
- September 2020 (8)
- August 2020 (7)
- July 2020 (8)
- June 2020 (10)
- May 2020 (7)
- April 2020 (5)
- March 2020 (5)
- February 2020 (7)
- January 2020 (6)
- December 2019 (5)
- November 2019 (4)
- October 2019 (4)
- September 2019 (6)
- August 2019 (6)
- July 2019 (5)
- June 2019 (8)
- May 2019 (10)
- April 2019 (3)
- March 2019 (9)
- February 2019 (8)
- January 2019 (7)
- December 2018 (9)
- November 2018 (10)
- October 2018 (2)
- September 2018 (12)
- August 2018 (9)
- July 2018 (5)
- June 2018 (7)
- May 2018 (8)
- April 2018 (6)
- March 2018 (3)
- February 2018 (6)
- January 2018 (9)
- December 2017 (6)
- November 2017 (6)
- October 2017 (6)
- September 2017 (8)
- August 2017 (10)
- July 2017 (10)
- June 2017 (9)
- May 2017 (4)
- April 2017 (8)
- March 2017 (8)
- February 2017 (8)
- January 2017 (9)
- December 2016 (12)
- November 2016 (10)
- October 2016 (11)
- September 2016 (11)
- August 2016 (15)
- July 2016 (13)
- June 2016 (15)
- May 2016 (9)
- April 2016 (19)
- March 2016 (11)
- February 2016 (11)
- January 2016 (19)
- December 2015 (10)
- November 2015 (24)
- October 2015 (11)
- September 2015 (8)
- August 2015 (6)
- July 2015 (13)
- June 2015 (14)
- May 2015 (11)
- April 2015 (11)
- March 2015 (3)
- February 2015 (7)
- January 2015 (5)
- December 2014 (4)
- November 2014 (4)
- October 2014 (5)
- September 2014 (3)
- August 2014 (7)
- July 2014 (6)
- June 2014 (9)
- May 2014 (5)
- April 2014 (5)
- March 2014 (4)
- February 2014 (7)
- January 2014 (10)
- December 2013 (8)
- November 2013 (6)
- October 2013 (7)
- September 2013 (13)
- August 2013 (17)
- July 2013 (7)
- June 2013 (11)
- May 2013 (7)
- April 2013 (4)
- March 2013 (6)
- February 2013 (10)
- January 2013 (7)
- December 2012 (6)
- November 2012 (6)
- October 2012 (5)
- September 2012 (6)
- August 2012 (9)
- July 2012 (5)
- June 2012 (5)
- May 2012 (11)
- April 2012 (12)
- March 2012 (11)
- February 2012 (9)
- January 2012 (6)
- December 2011 (8)
- November 2011 (6)
- October 2011 (28)
- September 2011 (2)
Sir
In spite of Israel being the second largest defence supplier to India why do you think that some Organisations (particularly Islamic and Communist) vehemently oppose any sort of bilateral ties with Israel.They even held protests and agitated when Ariel Sharon visited India-whereas the same groups never oppose any talks or the proposal of bilateral cooperation with Pakistan (even though ISI openly supports all kinds of support (logistic and intellectual).What can be the reason ?
Actually, in recent years anti-Israel demonstrations have been few in number. Perhaps, the Islamic and Communist orgs you refer to understand the danger to them from pursuing their anti-Israel agenda too far — it would tax the tolerance of the majority and, in th context of the military supply situation, be seen as anti-national. This they cannot afford to have happen.