Several conclusions in my previous blog (“Rogue Triad and H-Bomb Tests”) have been borne out. According to a source, it is confirmed that what was exploded was a fusion-boosted fission device of Pakistani design that was vetted/refined by Chinese weapons scientists. Officially, South Korean siesmic sensors read 4.7+ on the Richter scale, the US 4.9+, Japanese 5.2+, but the most reliable read is from the Russian station at Petropovlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula nearest to the test site with 5.3-5.5+ Richter. Petropovlovsk also has, according to this source, a radionuclide detection facility. While the Granite stratum of the Hamygeong test site dampened/suppressed the shock waves, the 5.5 on Richter translates into a certifiably estimated 20-30 Kiloton explosion. This, on the face of it, is a better performing design than the S-1 device tested in Pokhran on May 11, 1998. This should worry GOI enough for it to order resumption of N-testing, because now there’s no doubt whatsoever about Pakistan obtaining, centrally with Chinese help and assistance, thermonuclear armaments.
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Bharat Sir,
What was S-1′s yield ? About 25 kt ?
Indian government claim: 45-65kt
Western experts: 20-30kt.
Pakistan claimed back in 1998 that they detonated at least one weapon with 40kt yield, but western experts put all their test yields below 20kt. When it comes to weapon yields, India and Pakistan seem to be sitting in a same line.
With China’s technical advice and assistance, Pakistan may be ahead.
Indeed the NoKo/Pak test aooears to be that of a primary for a thermonuclear weapon. Similar to the S-1 parry, possibly.
Bharat Sir,
I just read one of K Santhanam’s interviews. He says S-1 was 20-25 kt. Since the secondary of S-1 had essentially zero yield, the primary was 20-25 kt (more or less like the current NoKo test).
Santy should know.
Sir,
The South Koreans have put a yield of 6kt. This test was certainly not a thermonuclear test. Yes it does represent an improvement for NoKo as its first two tests were duds.
As far as Pak is concerned, you have never spoken about how Pak moved from Uranium to Pu based weapons in the last 10 years. They have not even tested a Pu bomb. It can only be possible if there was more proliferation from China with Pu designs.
As far as my opinion goes, there is a major reliability issue with Pak nukes with no good test data. The west regards its tests as duds.
Pak is building bombs like crazy coz it knows they are not reliable and hopes that one of them explodes if it ever uses them. Their missiles reliability or the lack of it has been completely exposed. They kept claiming success while their missiles kept failing test after test.
Sent from my iPhone
That’s an interesting point you make about making as many bombs as possible just so some of them explode. Then again, the Khushab Pu dedicated reactors I & II have been operating — esp Khushab-I for some time, and China has been a constant companion, helping with ‘technical advice’ and both Pakistan and China have a close relationship with NoKo (with NoKo’s Nodong missile tech transfer to Pakistan).
There is also some sporadic information which I am inclined to believe that Pakistani scientists, engineers, technicians and military men have been present during some of China’s nuclear testing during the 1980′s. There is also some more information which I am also inclined to believe that the Chinese have tested at lease one device for the Pakistani’s either during the late 1980′s or 1990′s.
Our worst case estimate should be that Pakistan did get proven Plutonium fission bomb designs and/or ready made weapons from China, and have been pursuing the goals of Uranium bombs, as well as boosted fission, thermonuclear and tactical weapons. What we will actually do about it is of course is something I can only hope from a new government.
With the next few NoKo tests, Pak will have a proven TN of around 200 kt yield (current test appears in the same league as the S-1 primary). While we have only the unproven 125-175 kt thermonuclear weapons.
Does this give Pak nuclear superiority where they have a high probability of decisively winning a nuclear conflict ? Or does our deterrent stay where it is: credible vis a vis Pak for geographic reasons while not yet so against PRC (unless we test to confirm our TN) ?
The Indian strategic deterrent isn’t credible. It’s INCREDIBLE! Here’s the predictable Indian coolie response (international commitments, etc.., sob, sob,sob…..), which is a pathetic, disgraceful, and shameless alternative to a demarche to Washington DC,:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-korea-north-india-idUSBRE91B0DO20130212
It’s difficult to pin point who “vetted” the designs etc., but the Pakistani hand is evident.
Anytime one country in a conflict dyad has unproven, unreliable, weapons it is in trouble. This is as true nuclear-wise as in the conventional military sphere.
Pingback: India sees Pakistani hand in North Korear's nuclear test
Interesting and predictable:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/15/us-korea-north-nuclear-idUSBRE91E0J820130215
Sir, I would suggest that India needs to resume thermonuclear testing (with due regard for consequences of course) regardless of the DPRK/Pak test. Looking at the yield estimates of both the Pak and DPRK tests (seismic etc.) I am inclined to believe the lower estimates. However, that does not invalidate your point – India needs reliable Thermonuclear weapons.
As you indicated in your book India’s nuclear policy, the thermonuclear arsenal is not reliable and building a deterrent around fission and boosted-fission weapons is expensive in plutonium terms and is far from satisfactory.
I would ask you this – it is now 2013 – what is your estimate of India’s nuclear arsenal and Agni missile stocks ?
Thanks
Published figures suggest 90-100 weapons as strength of the Indian arsenal. This number is classified alongwith the size of the holdings of Agni missiles.
Sitting on past glories is just not enough because the enemy capabilities, by all means-beg,borrow or steal, are improving. India must look for new sites to conduct new tests. They could be under oceans where seismic activity is high or just with any other credible cover-up.
But all this talk is in vain unless we show some spine and resolve in the government.