Biden trip and the issue of “rebalancing in Asia”

US Vice President Joe Biden will be in Mumbai and Delhi, July 22-24, and is expected to reinforce the message sent by American trade and commercial interests who hope to gain greater traction in the Indian market, by reiterating the issues last raised by the visiting Secretary of state John Kerry. On the basis of Finance Minister Chidambaram’s and Commerce minister Anil Sharma’s Washington trips, GOI has already eased up in certain areas. But no grand concessions will be made in the context of the US government not easing up on the issue of the mobility of skilled labour in IT and other sector and the vexed matter of H1B visas.

This only highlights the differences within the US policy circles about just how to deal with India without also dealing with Pakistan. These differences were emphasized by the public disagreement between two recognized experts — Steve Cohen of Brookings and Ashley Tellis of Carnegie. At a recent launch of the former’s book — ‘Shooting for a Century’ (nice play on words) — a pessimistic take on the future of Indo-Pak relations, Cohen called if not for re-hyphenation than to treating South Asia as a single policy unit, without considering the complications arising out of falling back on the old ways of thinking that do not take into account the quite enormous and widening disparities in every respect between the two main subcontinental states. Tellis, more realistically, affirmed that that the United States has ‘no intrinsic interests’ in South Asia beyond ensuring India and Pakistan do not come to nuclear blows — which, as I have argued, is about as plausible as present day UK having a nuclear exchange with France for very different sets of reasons, of course!

Indeed, the evolving US rebalance to Asia substantially washes its hands off South Asia in particular, and the Indian Ocean in general — a case I have detailed in my forthcoming book — ‘India’s Rise: Why It’s Not a Great Power (Yet)’ to be published in Sept/Oct (2013) in Washington by Potomac Books (formerly Brassey’s). It is therefore left to India as the central power in the Indian Ocean region to decide whether it wants to continue being tethered to the small-weak-but-great-nuissance of a Pakistani state, or act the big power in the extended Indian Ocean region (encompassing Central Asia on the landward side) and largely shut out China from straying to west of the Malacca Straits.

Power vacuum is being created by the US pulling out of Afghanistan, more fully than earlier indicated by Washington. The skeletal US Special Forces presence in that country and the perpetuation of the ‘drone war’ against the Taliban is neither here nor there, subject as these will be to US calculations of short-term gain.

Whether Biden will explore these kinds of topics of salience to India and the other countries of the region is doubtful. That they will not be resolved to anyone’s satisfaction is a certainty.

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, Central Asia, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Ocean, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Special Forces, United States, US., Western militaries | Leave a comment

Unprepared for anything

There are three unalterable constants when natural and man-made disasters strike in India – there is almost always a prior alert or intelligence report that is ignored, local administration and police and government generally at all levels (local, state, and central) disappear from the scene, and the army fills the breach — the only orderly presence engaged in saving people and restoring a semblance of order. The recent Uttarakhand floods featured the three constants as had the earlier natural disasters, such as the horrid cyclonic storms that lashed the Odisha coast in the late 1990s. The question is two-fold: Why are alerts and prior intelligence invariably disregarded by the government – as evidenced, once again, in the Bodh Gaya bombing — and why do official organizations dematerialize from the impacted areas at just the point in time when they are most needed?

The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is, of course, a bad joke. Previously housed in the rundown public sector Centaur Hotel (near the airport) but now occupying a swanky blue glass building in South Delhi, it does little other than provide sinecures for politicians and post-retirement jobs for superannuated bureaucrats and the like. NDMA also guzzles public funds — to the extent of Rs. 864 crores in the last fiscal, makes paper plans for managing disasters, but once disasters actually happen, there is nary a hint on the ground of plans having been implemented, and the usual helter-skelter recovery efforts, ensue leaving the NDMA trawling for excuses. In the Uttarakhand case the NDMA Chairman, Shashidhar Reddy, a Congress Party honcho, blamed the agency’s failure on not getting the Doppler radars to detect the formation of cloud-bursts! There being no system of accountability, excuses and finger-pointing is the norm in the wake of diasters.

Some disasters are wholly the product of the way the government system routinely (mal)functions. The 1999 hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu to Kandahar by way of Amritsar was preventable. Indeed, the military, para-military forces, and various civilian outfits had practised pre-empting just such an incident, including stationing a truck in front of the aircraft to prevent it taking off, and thereafter mounting action by commando to infiltrate the aircraft and rush the hijackers. This training exercise was codenamed ‘Sour Grapes’. But when the plane landed for refuelling in Amritsar, the predictable happened. The lessons of the exercise were forgotten, and the emergency committee commandeered by the then National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra couldn’t communicate with Amritsar, the only order getting through was to the Army formation surrounding the Raja Sansi Airport to stand down, do nothing as the plane was refuelled and flew off with the Islamic extremists cocking a snook at the country.

The response to every new uncontained disaster is the same old bureaucratic solution – new committees and organizations to add to the layer upon layer of bureaucracy piled up over the years that gum up the works and complicate authority lines and decision-making. Thus the 26/11 episode was followed by the mooting of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (of the kind the CIA has) as the apex body to coordinate, collate, and process intelligence data streaming in from a plethora of agencies. Except the National Grid (Natgrid) was already established for this purpose.

It leads one to ponder the worst — the horrendous consequences and the aftermath of, say, a nuclear attack. Over the last 15 years, when addressing military audiences on nuclear doctrine and strategy, I have made it a point to bring up the little matter of the “No First Use” (NFU) principle embedded in the country’s nuclear doctrine. It elicits knowing laughter when I tell the officers that for a country that is unable to handle a seasonal phenomenon, such as “a Monsoon strike” that can be predicted to the hour and reduces Indian cities to extended lakes, to imagine it can absorb a nuclear first strike, and retain its wit and wherewithal to launch a retaliatory counter-strike as decreed by the Indian nuclear doctrine is, beyond fantastical to, in fact, be delusional!

And yet, the NFU is one of the central pillars of India’s nuclear strategy requiring that, notwithstanding any intelligence of an adversary planning a surprise nuclear attack, Indian strategic forces will have to bide their time, wait patiently for the enemy to first vaporize an Indian metropolis, say, at his convenience, before a nuclear missile salvo is permitted to be fired in retaliation. The country’s institutional/systemic weaknesses and the government’s inability to keep its head and nerve in a crisis of any kind, should have been factored into drafting the nuclear doctrine, and NFU discarded at that stage, but it wasn’t. The NFU, incidentally, was hotly debated by the doctrine drafting group in the National Security Advisory Board and incorporated any way for all the wrong reasons and without reference to an absent civil defence system and infrastructure.

NDMA, incidentally, is tasked with drawing up plans for dealing with nuclear bombed Indian cities or, more plausibly, the triggering of radiation diffusion devices (“dirty bombs”). Hopefully, NDMA has stocked up on the anti-radiation potassium idodate pills and, perhaps, has made plans for evacuating people and, in case of alerts being available, of removing large parts of the population, for instance, to the tunnelled portions of the track on which the Metro trains run – such tunnels being perfect underground nuclear shelters. Except, such evacuation/safety measures will have to be repeatedly practiced by the people and conducted by NDMA, with the tunnels being provisioned with sufficient food, medicines, etc.

But civil defence exercises to train city folk on what to do, where to go, and why to avoid mass hysteria, panic and pandemonium have not so far been undertaken by NDMA in any city, and the first time its plans will be rolled out is only post-nuclear attack. Then, it will be discovered that everything which works well on paper, in actual practice, will go horribly wrong. In the event, people will be left free to deal with this cataclysm the best they can, mostly on their own.

[Published in the ‘New Indian Express’ July 12, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Unprepared-for-anything/2013/07/12/article1678942.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian para-military forces, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism | 1 Comment

America’s trump card in the subcontinent

The Four-man “Abottabad Commission” to inquire into reasons why the US Special Forces could hunt down Osama bin Laden, swoop down all the way from Jalalabad on his safe-house just outside the gates of the Pakistan Military Academy, kill him, and spirit his body away for disposal without the Pakistan Army, intel services, and state and local police being any the wiser, submitted its report. What it has to say is unimportant because it was predictable. After all, with the Pakistan govt’s first reaction immediately after the raid having been that no agency of state and not the military had any hand in this operation, it would have been silly to expect this commission to actually hold anyone responsible, least of all the ISI. Though it was the DG, ISI, Lt Gen Shuja Pasha’s understanding with the Americans that US govt agencies could prosecute their drone war inside Pakistan — apparently, the paper-thin diplomatic instrument Washington used to send in its SF raiders into Pakistan, which included the Pakistani commitment to standing-down its radar units. How else to explain US helicopters even if with stealth rotary features, etc negotiating some 200 kms of Pakistani territory from the Afghan base to Abottabad and back — a mission that lasted over three hours, going entirely undetected by any Pakistani ground- and air-based sensors? Moreover, however stealthy, the helicopters still make an infernal amount of noise which nevertheless still didn’t alert anybody in the PMA compound and nearby Divisional HQrs?! If the Paki intent was to put up a fight — which of course was never intended — the land forces in and around Abottabad had enough time — nearly half an hour from the time the first SF troops landed in the bin Laden compound to one of the copters going down to raiding team egressing — to engage the US SF. The most important aspect of the Commission’s report, however, is elsewhere in Pasha’s reporting to the Commission about what he was told by a US intel official: “You are cheap…you can be bought for a visa.” Ouch! But, isn’t that the trump card the Americans always play in India as well — the VISA?

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Special Forces, United States, US., Western militaries | Leave a comment

More on ASMP-A, Brahmos, HCM MIRV-ed warheads

Missed a zero! With hypersonic cruise glide MIRVed warheads (not glide-bombs) on A-5 and successor A-6, the range actually is increased by 2000-3000 kms (not 200 kms as mentioned in my previous blog on the subject). So, an 8000 km A-5 becomes a near ICBM with 11000 km range (tho’, strictly speaking, 12000 kms range defines ICBM).

Further on ASMP-A, it can go supersonic at low altitude but isn’t maneuverable at these heights because its MiG-25-type air-intakes would be pulled sunder. At tree-top height it, in fact, becomes a “dumb bullet” that a mobile target can avoid, rendering ASMP-A vulnerable to interception. Brahmos, on the other hand, can pull an S-maneuver at very low altitudes. This was proved in the 2nd Brahmos test in the desert, destroying a target 20 kms away with pinpoint accuracy after relying on the Russian Glonass GPS. (The first Brahmos test failed, it may be recalled, because the US GPS it was using to cue to target “blinked” at a crucial moment in time in its flight path.)

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Cyber & Space, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian para-military forces, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US. | 2 Comments

India’s nuclear amateurism

Secretary of State John Kerry reminded New Delhi that the United States expects India to toe its line on non-proliferation and get a move on in signing the Missile Technology Control Regime, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. One hopes New Delhi will not give way on any of these issues even if membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is the prize because, as it is, the Indian nuclear deterrent is grievously handicapped. First, by untested, unproven, thermonuclear weapons with design flaws no amount of simulation can correct, whence resumption of testing becomes imperative, and secondly, matching this hardware deficiency are the “software” problems – doctrinal weaknesses and inadequate understanding in government circles of nuclear weapons and strategy.

The latter aspect was illustrated by Shyam Saran, Convenor of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former Foreign Secretary holding forth last month (May 3) on nuclear issues and, predictably, making a hash of it. Considering a Chinese military unit was holding Ladakhi real estate then, Saran went off on an anti-Pakistan tangent instead! It confirmed the suspicion that the government is unable to differentiate issues of strategic importance from lesser concerns and, as regards nuclear security, is all at sea. Informed Pakistanis promptly dismissed it as “bluster”, deeming India “a blundering nuclear power”.

At the heart of Saran’s talk was the wrong take on nuclear matters that has calcified into a strategic gospel in official quarters, courtesy the late K. Subrahmanyam, starting with the belief that nuclear testing is incidental to the credibility of the deterrent, evident in his canvassing for India’s signature on CTBT in 1995-96 which Saran rightly said “would have permanently foreclosed [development of] a credible and fully tested nuclear deterrent”. Except, the problem of untested hydrogen weapons persists owing to the no-testing predicate of the India-US nuclear deal supported by Subrahmanyam and Company, and negotiated by Saran. It reflects the cavalier disregard for nuclear testing which is particularly stark in the context of the Field Director of the 1998 tests, K. Santhanam recommending the re-testing of a rectified thermonuclear weapon design because the one that was tested failed.

Saran’s plea to “make public” the official nuclear doctrine, which he said was virtually the draft produced by NSAB in 1998, was of a piece with his asking for an annual numerical accounting of the country’s nuclear forces. He didn’t pause to wonder why no other nuclear weapon state to-date has disclosed its nuclear doctrine, and why China and Pakistan are unlikely ever to reveal their weapons inventory details. The public release of the draft-doctrine to win points for transparency with America and gain traction for the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), was an appalling mistake by the BJP government that the Congress regime converted into the wrecking ball of the Indo-US nuclear deal, which destroyed the integrity of the country’s dual-use nuclear energy programme.

Ambiguity is at the core of nuclear deterrence and dissuasion. It isn’t advanced by making the doctrine an open document, even less by revealing weapons strength. Having disclosed the doctrine, however, the strategic initiative passed to the adversary states with the good sense to divulge nothing. China increased the “daunting uncertainties” for India by bringing conventional missiles under the control of its Second Artillery nuclear forces, and Pakistan developed the 60 km Nasr (Hatf IX) guided rocket.

The dense fog of ignorance of nuclear deterrence matters blanketing Indian government circles has eventuated in a hollow strategy emphasizing “massive retaliation” as response to tactical first use of nuclear weapon by Pakistan (on Indian armour, say, inside Pakistani territory). Promising massive nuclear destruction as retaliatory action, in the circumstances, only undermines the credibility of the Indian deterrent as it violates the principle of proportionality, which is the essence of “flexible response”. A version of this concept — “punitive response” was central to the original NSAB draft-doctrine. Owing to the usual mix of abominable advice and mindless attitudinizing lashed with deep illiteracy on these issues, “punitive response” was replaced by “massive retaliation”. All it did was spur accelerated production of weapon-grade plutonium, warheads, and missiles by Pakistan which an India, fixated on Pakistan and “minimum” deterrence, finds unable to match, what to talk of China! Truth is massive retaliation cannot doctrinally coexist with the “minimum deterrence” notion the Indian government seems wedded to. That is common sense but try telling it to the glib talkers in official quarters.

Much was also made by him of commentaries concluding India acquired nuclear weapons for status and prestige, not for reasons of security. But why is this conclusion wrong considering India reached the weapons threshold with its plutonium reprocessing capability in early 1964 but did not weaponize after China exploded an atomic device in October that year, and with the military humiliation of 1962 as backdrop? Contrast this with the single-minded, no-nonsense, threat-propelled, Chinese and Pakistani programmes to obtain meaningful nuclear arsenals fast, even as the Indian weapons programme meandered, its progress hampered by dreams of disarmament last manifested in the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan.

That the Indian government has time and again veered off into the murk of nuclear power politics without being equipped for the task is due to the generalist diplomats and civil servants playing at nuclear strategists. Saran admitted that the country had suffered from bad advice to “defer the acquisition of a nuclear weapon arsenal as long as there was still hope that the world would eventually move towards a complete elimination of these weapons”, and that it was “undeniable” that “mistakes [were] made, sometimes opportunities [were] missed or our judgements were misplaced.”

The cumulative debilitating effect of such rank bad, and amateurish, counsel is reflected in the manner India is strategically handicapped today. It indicates a fool’s world our diplomats (especially, denizens of MEA’s Disarmament Division that Saran served in), senior civil servants, political leaders and increasingly senior military officers hewing to the government line, live in. Elimination of nuclear weapons, really?

[Published in the New Indian Express, June 28, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/indias-nuclear-amateurism/2013/06/28/article1655987.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Politics, nonproliferation, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Pakistan nuclear forces, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Western militaries | 29 Comments

France loading ASMP-A on Rafale

Now what do we hear? There’s tantalizing talk of France offering, as sweetener for the Rafale MMRCA deal still hanging fire, the Air-launched ASMP-A (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee) cruise missile. The twin objective could also be to displace the Brahmos with the argument that ASMP-A at one ton weight can be carried by MiG-21 (but these are being quickly wasted out of IAF) and even the Tejas LCA (which is simply not possible). Besides, as those in the know point out, the Brahmos may be heavier at 3-ton weight but in no other parameter is it outperformed by the ASMP-A. For instance, the French item can go supersonic in only certain flight regimes (such as high altitudes). The ASMP-A, it may be noted, has also been offered to China. Great business this — make oodles of money arming all sides against each other! But the ASMP-A riding on Rafale is a sign of desperation. But also a means for the entire $22 billion deal to go down easier. Well placed sources particularly refer to the fact of the French having paid up, ahem!, the “commissions” to every one up and down the Indian system starting at the political apex, and expect the beneficiaries will now do their bit.

The ASMP-A offer encompasses the larger issue of foreign arms suppliers doing every thing in their power to kill off indigenous projects –in this case the highly regarded Brahmos made in collaboration with Russians, and the even more local DRDO programme for “hypersonic” cruise missile with the platypus nose which’s coming along nicely and, many knowledgeable people say, will add an additional 200 kms to MIRVed nuclear warheads as glide bombs on A-5 and the coming A-6.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer | 2 Comments

Kerry and India surrendering its strategic options

A nearly full house at the Stein Auditorium, Habitat Centre, last evening (June 23) heard US Secretary of State, John Kerry, talk like Al Gore — about the desperate need to preserve our pristine environment with clean energy! It took up two-thirds of the time of a lecture billed as “Indo-US strategic partnership”. Had he come out and said that the US has shale gas to spare and would gladly export it to India to reduce its dependence on Iran — that would have been a theme in keeping with the billing. But he didn’t do that.

He prefaced the hardcore of his speech by saying that India and the US were not at all interested in containing or balancing China, or any such thing. And he pleaded for improved India-Pakistan relations, before pitching for more defense sales, of course, lauding India for having more C-17s than any other country in the world, and made the obligatory bow to collaborate in developing “defense systems” that GOI requires foreign visitors to iterate before signing the next big armament import deal!

But, more importantly, he talked, as expected, of India joining with the US in promoting the nonproliferation agenda — he specifically mentioned India’s signing the missile technology control regime (MTCR) and India buying “Westinghous-GE-Toshiba nuclear power plants”, almost in the same breath as he talked of Washington pushing for India’s membership in the nuclear suppliers group (NSG), and other technology-denying cartels. It is clear that India’s NSG enrollment depends on New Delhi getting on board MTCR, CTBT, etc., and buying American reactors. Now we formally know what the carrot is for New Delhi to give up its strategic maneuvering space. And damned if that isn’t just the way the Congress party Manmohan Singh regime is thinking (as stated in previous blogs)! Well, goodbye, India’s strategic options of transferring nuclear missiles to Vietnam, et al to permanently discomfit China as Beijing has done India!! And, India should prepare to junk its Civilian Nuclear Liability Act 2010 (because any purchase of American reactors will require limiting liability of the reactor technology supplier to $300 million — which was expressly negated by the Indian law). Manmohan Singh is therefore going to go the executive order-route to affect reactor sales to American satisfaction while upending an Act of Indian parliament. Cele ve’.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, Defence Industry, disarmament, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, nonproliferation, Northeast Asia, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, South Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US. | 1 Comment

Further on the Prague agenda context for Manmohan S’ possible moves

I ought to have mentioned that Manmohan Singh regime’s moves to sign CTBT and get going on FMCT is in the context of Obama’s declaration in Berlin yesterday that he’d like to negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin nuclear drawdowns to the 1,000 weapons-level. Like the reductions negotiated so far in the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), most of the weapons that go off-line will not be decommissioned in the sense of being destroyed but very likely moved to the category of weapons that will be disaggregated and stored in separate sections with plutonium cores kept separate, etc., all of which nuclear armaments can be speedily reconstituted if the situation so demands.

It also needs to be pointed out that originally the Obama White House had thought of unilateral reductions to the 300 weapons level but then thought better of it. Putin is unlikely to agree to any such shrinkage of the Russian weapons inventories, in the main, because the large nuclear arsenal today solely defines Russia’s strength and power. This means that this initiative is going nowhere.

But it will be enough to kickstart Manmohan Singh’s attempt to “disarm an unarmed” India as the Late KC Pant once aptly and ironically described all Western arms control and disarmament efforts.
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P.S. On an unconnected subject, why is the United States, in its haste to depart Afghanistan, not gifting its fleet of massive mines-resistant trucks costing a million dollars a piece to its local ally Afghanistan, or even Pakistan, which would benefit from such transport, rather than reducing it to small scrap metal at considerable expense? What a waste!

Posted in Australia, disarmament, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, russian military, South Asia, United States, US. | 5 Comments

India’s nuclear security imperiled by Manmohan Govt

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh so desperately desired a Washington visit to retrieve what little remains of his, originally slight, reputation, that he quite literally invited himself to America, forcing Obama to extend an official invitation for sometime in September this year. The nuclear deal was Manmohan S’s political apogee which “ächievement” he may wish to embellish by this time furthering Obama’s Prague agenda. Early in his first term, Obama, it may be recalled, called for nuclear disarmament in Prague — expression of which sentiment was enough to win him the Nobel Prize for Peace, especially as he articulated no plan other than calling for strengthening of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and for nuclear summits every two years!

An important aspect of beefing up the NPT is getting India (Pakistan and Israel) to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for the negotiations to get underway for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. The FMCT talks are, however, being stalled by Pakistan at the UN Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Islamabad’s case is that an FMCT is fine as long as all the fissile material produced by all the nuclear weapons states up to the present is accounted for and brought within the ambit of the draft-FMCT. It will require nuclear weapons states verifiably to state exactly how much fissmat is there in their respective national stockpiles before the negotiations begin — which, of course, is opposed by NPT-5 because it will reveal the potential or real size of their nuclear weapons arsenals.

The fact is Pakistan’s stand helps India, affording it the time (as it does Pakistan) to produce weapon-grade plutonium at as breakneck a speed as is allowed by national facilities to ensure it doesn’t get caught short by the time an FMCT eventually surfaces, some years down the line. Being deadly serious about its nuclear security, Pakistan is working the two Chinese-transferred dedicated military plutonium producing reactors at Khushab and the one at Chashma at full tilt. India on the other hand is its usual complacent self. It has only the 100 MW Dhruva in Trombay and, with the 49 MW Cirus decativated courtesy Manmohan’s nuclear deal with the US, the second 100 MW WgPu unit in the atomic research centre in Vizag (Vishakhapatnam) going on stream only sometime next year (2014) — nearly two decades after PV Narasimha Rao had approved the building of a second such Pu reactor, India will be limping way behind even Pakistan in terms of stockpiling weapons-usable plutonium.

In this context, common sense would suggest that New Delhi’s policy ought to be slyly to encourage Pakistan to continue stifling any possibility of an FMCT emerging out of the Geneva forum with frequent use of its veto, while pushing the eight CANDU reactors outside the IAEA safeguards net into full low burn-up mode to output WgPu, and speeding up the commissioning of the Vizag reactor in order to beef up the extant holdings to a sufficient level to reach near fissmat parity with China.

And it has to resist the kind of near-idiotic stance adopted by Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai in Geneva when he seemed to want FMCT talks urgently to get underway, which’s plainly not in India’s national interest. It has to be borne in mind that India’s fissmat goldings, other than meeting the manifold increases in weapons strength for unforeseen contingencies in the future, will have to be large enough to accommodate open-ended, iterative, N-testing that will have to be ordered later, if not sooner, by the Indian Govt, though sooner would be preferable.

In this context of a paucity of Indian fissmat, it is ridiculous of Mathai (speaking for the Manmohan regime) to if not openly side with Pakistan than at least to not conspicuously come down on the side of the P-5 driving this treaty. But this last is precisely what Mathai did, saying “There is an agreed mandate for the commencement of the negotiations” and India does not favour amending it. This may win brownie points with Washington but hurt India centrally.

There may be a nefarious game that Manmohan seeks to play when in Washington. Following up on his Govt’s position on FMCT, he may agree to India signing the CTBT, without ratifying it — the sort of solution Bill Clinton had suggested to Narasimha Rao in the Nineties. It will mean India having to adhere to the main plank of the CTBT which is not to test again, especially because there’s no provision of ratification as such in the Indian system, only for a no-confidence motion. Any damn fool PM can sign any wretched treaty and compromise the country’s security and victimize Indian national interests by doing so. It will be like the July 8, 2008 Parliamentary drama all over again with crores being gifted to MPs and the likes of Mulayam Singh once again citing the so-called “Father of the atom bomb” — APJ Abdul Kalam, which parentage an honour-bound rocket engineer with minimal knowledge of the Bomb such as one believed Kalam was, ought to have rejected but didn’t, and using this to again side with the Manmohan Govt to once and for all cripple the Indian nuclear arsenal. It will win Manmohan S Obama’s and America’s eternal gratitude but will be a parting kick he delivers to the country ere he betakes himself to the Rajya Sabha or, more permanently and profitably, to a sinecure at an elite university in the West. An economics chair at Harvard or Oxbridge for Manmoahn, did you say?

It is the preparatory work for such a game-plan that may be proposed to the visiting US Secretary of State John Kerry and which the latter may be asked to flesh out from the American side by his opposite number, Salman Khurshid, when they meet for the “strategic dialogue” in New Delhi on June 24, 2013.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, disarmament, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, nonproliferation, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan nuclear forces, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US. | 5 Comments

Kerry’s stilted agenda

US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit for a strategic dialogue with his counterpart Salman Khurshid is unlikely to fetch much by way of results in the most part because, with general elections looming, almost any issue with an American stamp has the potential for blowing up as another in a series of Manmohan govt’s capitulations.

News reports talk of US manufacturers being exercised about the revamped Indian rules and regulations encouraging local content and, therefore, local manufacture and industry at the expense of imports. Washington getting huffy about this is ironic considering the Obama Administration has done everything within its power to realize precisely this as a way to spur the manufacturing sector in the US and generate employment — the very reasons for New Delhi subscribing to it as well.

Pharmaceutical exports to India is the other American peeve. With Indian Courts ruling that life-saving drugs can be more cheaply and plentifully produced here, whatever the transgressions of US patent laws and intellectual property rights is a more problematic issue. But if the US
pharma Cos. are mainly interested in profit — not production in bulk at an affordable unit price then isn’t the humane premise of medicine and affordable medical treatment undercut?

Re: foreign policy issues — Af-Pak, curiously, is where there seems to be a convergence of policies. New Delhi, in fact, risked Kabul’s alienation by rejecting President Hamid Karzai’s request for military support in terms of exports of artillery and Mi-17 helicopter spares and servicing support guns in order not to derail the rapprochement the new Nawaz Sharif govt in Pakistan has promised at the very outset. India, moreover, has been proactive in sending an Indian team to negotiate not just export of LNG but also some 500 MW of electricity for which purpose Islamabad appears ready to erect the wherewithal for coupling the grids. But India will also agree to increase its development aid to Afghanistan to ensure the Karzai regime is not completely bereft of assistance and support once the US/NATO forces begin leaving in 2014. The problem is India cannot afford to lose goodwill in Afghanistan, which’s central both from the natural resources point of view and from the perspective of sustaining an active Central Asia policy.

The more strategic aspects of the agenda are elsewhere, however. One is the 2010 Indian civilian nuclear liability Act passed by Parliament exposing the reactor and associated technologies supplier(s) to unlimited liability. It has pretty much shuttered the US from the high-value reactor sales to India, which was the basic motivation for the George W Bush Administration to make the almighty push to realize the India-US nuclear deal that was heatedly opposed by a few of us here for gutting especially the weapons-related aspects of this country’s nuclear energy programme. Not sure what the Manmohan Singh regime that nearly fell in the no confidence vote in July 2008 can do about the N-liability law on the books other than ignore it with an executive order but do so at its own electoral peril. This won’t happen.

The other matter is increasing defence sales. The trouble is Washington will not be happy and satisfied unless India meets 100% of its military needs from American sources. And this when lack of trust remains an issue. And every major piece of military hardware imported from any country puts off the aim of self-reliance by years. And when there’s no US give whatsoever in terms of transfer of technology. And India is inexorably turned into a client state.

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