Babu Vs. Leader

Posted on August 15, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Juxtaposing the addresses of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from the Red Fort and the Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi in Bhuj on the occasion of Independence Day, the differences and sort of leadership they provide could not have been any starker. That Modi had in fact set up this comparison was at once great political theatre and a straight forward invitation to the people of the country to judge the quality of competing BJP and Congress party leaderships on offer come the next general elections.

On one side was a weary lifelong bureaucrat and, by his own definition, än “accidental prime minister” hoisted and retained in the post by Congress president Sonia Gandhi owing to ten years of leadership drought which, considering that the designated dynastic heir Rahul Gandhi has not used to flesh out his creds, will continue with another appointee — possibly Finance Minister Chidambaram filling in for Manmohan should the Congress somehow return to power, however unlikely the prospect. Chidambram replaces a frustrated Pranob Mukherji who chose a tenure in Rashtrapati Bhavan than fight the losing fight of trying to convince Sonia that his show of prime ministerial ambition on the death of Indira Gandhi was an aberration, on the Congress totem pole!

So one saw Manmohan Singh with his trademark but understandable hangdog look reading mechanically from a speech written by PMO underlings, tiredly mouthing the same uninspiring phrases he has regularly repeated from his first speech in 2004 from the red fort ramparts — the usual “ÿeh karna hai, woh karenge” which raises the question “bhai, aap ne kiya kya hai in nau salon me?”. Indeed, Manmohan acted as if he was not the steward of the country’s destiny responsible for doing if not nothing than achieving very little of any note in the past decade. The speech by, in the words of a vapid TV program host, “one of the greatest economists in the world”!, delivered in his usual monotone, was boring to the point of pushing a national audience into depression, and the shoal of captive schoolchildren herded into place, to distraction.

In contrast, Modi, with his record of over 10 years of Gujarat governance in tow, openly mocked Manmohan with his flowing oratory and targeted attacks on the Congress PM’s flawed and failed agenda. Modi’s substantive critique of the Food Security Bill the day before highlighted his ability to marshal facts and figures w/o referring to notes, and to offer substantive policy alternatives. It segued in with his ringing slogan — a good one for the next elections — “Naya soch, nayi umeed” (New thinking, new hope) of the BJP. In fact, his demand that the Congress govt define the “limits” of tolerance with respect to the Chinese and Pakistani violations of the Line of Actual Control and the Line of Control respectively, is clearly an attempt to draw the “lakshman rekha” transgressing which, he hinted, would elicit a strong response from a Modi-led BJP govt post-next elections, and clearly roused a military community that has had enough of the Manmohan govt’s pussyfooting. Of course, Modi will need more carefully to delineate his set of options. He’ll do well to be more aggressive with China, while being more covert vis a vis Pakistan, for the obvious reason that kutayudh (covert warfare) can more competently and beneficially accomplish objectives against the Pakistani state, while the Chinese menace requires a mix of more direct military treatment and agile regional and international coalition-building.

Anyway, the differences were evident between a govt apparatchik and nominated Member of Parliament who hasn’t in his career ever been elected even a dogcatcher (to use an American idiom) and a genuine mass leader with strong roots in grassroots politics with his fingers on the political pulse of the nation who understands how to inspire people and, more importantly, how to deliver on political promises. To every new problem, Manmohan has the same old kneejerk solution — a new govt committee or commission giving employment to retired babus, even as Modi has a practicable solution — whether it is reaching the Narbada River water to hinterland farmers, or enabling the remotest villages to access electricity. It is talk and slogans backed by deliverables versus more sloganeering (more “Garibi hatao” anyone?), dynastic politics, and corruption. Where’s the contest?

Posted in China, China military, civil-military relations, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Politics, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Terrorism | 2 Comments

Fire in weapon/weapon fuel downs Sindhurakshak

Posted on August 14, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The explosion on board the Kilo-class Russian submarine with the Indian Navy, Sindhurakshak, in Mumbai last evening, according to a veteran submariner, was due to fire in the forward weapons section of the boat carrying the Klub-S anti-ship missile and a land attack missile launchable from torpedo tubes. The villain may be faulty weapons engineering or, more likely, the highly unstable and combustible missile fuel that caught fire, igniting a larger explosion in the weapons hold that ripped through the submarine and sank it with 18 crewmen on board at the time. It could have been lot worse. The explosion could have happened at sea, with the boat underway on patrol. The naval source couldn’t hazard a guess as to why it happened, saying it shouldn’t have, and there’s no obvious reason for it.

This is speculation on my part but it is possible a small leak of the fuel in the proximity of an electric shortcircuit or some other small fire, blew up into an uncontrollable conflagration. Considering the vessel had just returned after an expensive Rs 480 crore refit in a Russian shipyard, this incident is even more puzzling. After all, such a refit would have involved a thorough going over to identify wear and tear and rectification. This only
makes the event curiouser, and calls to mind the devastating fire, again in the weapons hold, of the Russian nuclear attack submarine, Kursk, in July 2000.

Necessarily, all Kilos will have to be called in and “benched”as it were, until expert diagnosis pinpoints the source of trouble, or the shortfalls in this submarine’s refit program. Until then, the navy’s sea denial capability will be considerably thinned out in the Indian Ocean. Damn!

Posted in India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, russian assistance, South Asia | Leave a comment

Danger from Hong-10

Posted on August 13, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Following up an earlier blog about China buying the entire Tu-22M Bacfire production line lock, stock and barrel from the Russian Kazan facility for a mere $1.5 billion (when our redoubtable air force has spent more than that amount on a propeller trainer aircraft!), the Chinese discovered that some of the manufacturing jigs secured from the Ukraine (which was part of the Tu-22 assembly line) simply fell apart. This the Chinese, working 24/7, have sought to get around by setting up their own jigs, and otherwise to get the aircraft project underway. The Tu-22 that will emerge — designated Hong-10 — is what a source said was a souped up “M ++” version. It will come complete with an AESA air-to-air and surface attack radar, and ability to fire surface-attack long range cruise missiles from its rotary weapons platform nestled within the H-10 fuselage, etc.

Apart from helping realize the Chinese defensive/offensive design of using the Backfire in tandem with the Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles to attack US carrier groups, and force them out of the second island chain and push them to the line of the “third island chain” of the Hawaiian islands, the Tu-22 poses a mortal danger to India. The PLA will not anymore be hampered by the problems of embarking ordnance-loaded aircraft from the high-altitude air bases on the Tibetan plateau on attack missions. These can now be launched against even Indian peninsular targets from deep within the Chengdu MR.

It is a capability this analyst has been advocating IAF should have, but is something the determinedly sub-strategic-minded air force leadership has time and again passed up, preferring planes with lesser range instead. India was first offered Tu-22 in mid-1971 but the mission to Moscow under Air Marshal Sheodeo Singh chose the MiG-23 BN, despite a squadron of the Tu-22s with IAF roundels painted on them being parked at a military air base outside the city ready to fly to India. Worse, as I have detailed in my book “Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security”, IAF played dog in the manger and prevented the more strategically-oriented Indian Navy from acquiring this aircraft! India could have bought up the Tu-22 production line anytime in the last two decades — it being so offered by a cash-strapped Russia. It would have provided India with a manned option for strike sorties against targets in deepest China and anywhere in the extended Indian Ocean region. When, oh God!, when will our air force, operating in an open strategic medium acquire a strategic mindset?

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, South East Asia, Technology transfer | 3 Comments

Unforgiving take on past

Posted on August 11, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

(Review of Lt Gen V.K. Nayar’s book, ‘From Fatigues to Civvies: Memoirs of a Paratrooper’, Manohar, 2013; Rs 1395/-)

Lieutenant general V K “Tubby” Nayar (Retd) is among a rare breed of military officers. Despite being outspoken with his seniors in service and wearing his inability to suffer fools gladly on his sleeve, he made it to the top ranks of the Indian Army which in recent years has, unfortunately, begun to resemble other government services where flattery and sycophancy earn good “Çonfidential Reports” and ensure career dividends.

Originally a Signals officer, Nayar, after persistent pestering of his bosses, managed a transfer to his desired regiment — the elite Maratha Light Infantry (MLI), securing a billet with 2 Para (3rd battalion, MLI, converted to paratroop infantry). 2 Para was dropped over Tangail in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, less than six months after Tubby, to his eternal regret, had handed over command.

But thereafter Nayar missed nothing, being in on the anti-Sikh riots in the capital when, as additional director-general, military operations, he pleaded futilely with then chief of the army staff, general Arun Vaidya, to appoint him the general officer commanding Delhi area in order quickly to show force and deter the rioters; Operation Bluestar; and, the 1987 Operation Brasstacks. As the Western Army commander, he was tasked by army chief general K Sundarji to write and conduct the massive exercise, without being made aware that Brasstacks was to be a cover for an armoured thrust into Pakistan — Operation Trident, which II Corps was supposed to execute after peeling off from Brasstacks. It was a complicated deception manoeuvre to facilitate Trident, except it was so bungled by Sundarji that the commander of II Corps, the estimable Lt Gen Hanut Singh, was surprised by this new plan requiring his large formation to wheel around mid-exercise and rush pell-mell into battle on the hoary Rahim Yar Khan axis — something he was entirely unprepared for! Nor did the Western Air Command have any hint of war, with its head, air marshal M M Singh, confessing to Nayar that his fleet of Jaguars was low on droppable ordnance!

It helps that as a memoirist he has a sharp memory and can recall details of conversations and incidents from 40-50 years ago involving his colleagues and seniors. While he has nothing but praise for the men and officers he commanded, his unvarnished take on his seniors is refreshing for its withering honesty. The late General Arun Vaidya is described as lacking in “moral courage” and General K Sundarji is dismissed as “big talking and blustery”— more show than substance who, Tubby fears, set a bad example for junior officers to emulate. And he reveals the self-aggrandizing tendencies routinely realised by IAS officers at senior levels of government. There was P K Kaul, for instance, who as defence secretary opposed the establishment of the National Security Guard (NSG) as redundant to the need, as the finance secretary rejected it on the basis of paucity of financial resources, but as the cabinet secretary approved the NSG because it would be controlled by him!

The biggest impression Nayar made, however, was as general officer commanding 10 Division in Manipur and Nagaland where his commonsensical approach, sense of fairness, and respect for the tribal folks and their traditions won him respect of the people and leverage with the underground leaders. On one occasion when prime minister Indira Gandhi was to make a public address and the intelligence bureau and state police had warned they couldn’t guarantee her safety, Nayar approached Zuevo Sema heading the “Naga National Army” to sanitise the area! In fact, Nayar’s impact on the northeastern states was such he was appointed governor of Manipur, and given additional charge of Nagaland, after his retirement. But true to his record and reputation, he resigned, unwilling to do the dirty political work of the Congress party-led central and state governments.

Nayar’s memoirs, moreover, engagingly evoke the camaraderie, and sense of honour and duty that still drive the Indian Army.

[Published in the New Indian Express, Magazine section, August 11, 2013
at http://newindianexpress.com/lifestyle/books/Unforgiving-take-on-past/2013/08/11/article1725009.ece

Posted in civil-military relations, guerilla warfare, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian para-military forces, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, South East Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | Leave a comment

Failure-bound maritime strategy

Posted on August 9, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The public perception of the Indian army being smacked around on the border by China needs correction. Actually army units with the Leh-based XIV Corps do “power patrolling”, matching the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) move for aggressive move, including active use of drones, something not publicised by an incomprehensibly reticent Indian government. Thus, while it is known, for example, that the camera installed in the post on the Chumar heights was destroyed by intruding PLA troops, what isn’t is the fact that it was quickly replaced by the Chinese with a new surveillance system once they were told that five of their cameras in similarly exposed sites would be destroyed in retaliation.

The negative impression of a lax and unready army has gained traction, leading to murmurings of a 1962-type of disaster in case of war with China, which’s wrong. An indecisive Indian government has constrained the Indian army with its delayed decision on the offensive mountain corps and the painfully slow construction of border roads and military-use infrastructure. But notwithstanding China’s advantages in these and other respects, the PLA is in no position to overwhelm India’s defensive formations arrayed in depth, even less maintain an attacking force in the field in the face of sustained Indian aerial strike power. It has only 11 Ilyushin-76s for heavy airlift, relies on the antiquated Yak-7 variant of An-32 — the staple of the Indian transport capability as well and, unlike the Mi-26 in Indian employ, has no heavy lift helicopters for tactical support.

The problem is fundamentally of a strategic nature. With China clearly utilising its repeated provocations to benchmark escalatory steps — from push to shove to widespread hostilities to limited war to however improbable, general war, the question is what is the most appropriate Indian strategy if the violence is ratcheted all the way up? The Indian government seems persuaded by the “theatre-switching” maritime strategy of a naval riposte to Chinese aggression in the mountains. According to the estimable Rear Admiral (Retd) K Raja Menon (“A mountain strike corps is not the only option”, The Hindu, July 28, 2013), the ` 60,000 crore sanctioned for an offensive army mountain corps is a waste of money, which ought to have been spent on beefing up the navy’s Sea Lines of Communications “interdiction capability” instead in order to obtain “a stranglehold on the Chinese routes through the Indian Ocean”. Threaten a cutoff of energy and natural resources from the Gulf and Africa, put its exports-driven economy and prosperity at risk and, voila! goes this argument, Beijing will pull its punches landward.

Convinced about the efficacy of “maritime strategy for continental wars” — a subject he has fleshed out in a book — Menon builds his larger case on Britain’s historical experience of utilising the Royal Navy to contain European continental powers. Except, as empirical evidence shows, a maritime strategy can overcome only island nations (such as Japan in World War II) but by itself can at most seriously discomfit, not stifle, major land powers enjoying interior lines of communications. Even Britain had to rely ultimately on Marlborough, master of the forced march and tactical maneuvering, to settle the early 18th Century Wars of the Spanish Succession in the decisive land battles at Blenheim, Ramillies and Malpalaquet, against the condominium of France and Spain, both boasting formidable navies which, along with the Royal Navy, did little during this period than indulge in “cruising wars”.

An exclusively naval response by India to a conflict in the Himalayas initiated by China is problematic for a host of practical reasons. In a “limited war” launched by PLA, sinking a few Chinese warships found east of the Malacca Strait, or sinking or capturing Chinese merchantmen on the high seas is surely not enough recompense for loss of valuable territory in Arunachal Pradesh and elsewhere along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and from which the Chinese forces are unlikely to withdraw as they did in 1962. So, the status quo ante will not be restored on land as it will be on the seas. There’s, moreover, the little matter of India’s ability to impose a “total exclusion zone” on the entire Indian Ocean to prosecute an unbridled guerre de course (war on commerce). Alas, a navy of 50-odd capital ships by 2030 will be inadequate for this mammoth task. Then there are the lesser issues of identifying Chinese carriers and targeting them and other ships, possibly under friendly flags plying the China trade. If the latter are to escape the torpedo and only quarantined, eventually to be released, it’ll mean even less cost to Beijing.

Secondly, while a few Indian ships could almost instantly get underway, an all-out effort will require four-to-six days of hectic preparation as stores and assets are marshalled, battle groups constituted and, based on intelligence, an interdiction grid established, during which time the PLA could rack up singular, irreversible, successes in the mountains. Indeed, the Chinese could well achieve their limited war aims before many Chinese naval ships and merchant marine can be found and sunk, and the Chinese economy impacted. The time factor could be further distended if, as is likely, the conflict begins with the usual border incident or two before the PLA chooses to escalate. At what point in this escalation sequence will the Indian government, notoriously timid in using armed force, decide the country is in a war situation necessitating implementation of the maritime strategy? Thirdly, unlike India, China has built up strategic reserves of oil and minerals; these will last longer than the limited war will endure and before India’s maritime counter can have effect.

Any military campaign against China will perforce be land-based with a maritime strategy as subsidiary. India, therefore, has a desperate need for capability to mount offensives on the Tibetan plateau provided by specially-equipped mountain corps. At a minimum, India requires three such corps, not just one. However, Menon’s suggestion that the rugged American A-10 Warthog fixed-wing aircraft, rather than armed helicopters, be considered for close air support is more interesting.

Published in the ‘New Indian Express’ Aug 9, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/Failure-bound-maritime-strategy/2013/08/09/article1725052.ece

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Micro-wars as murderous business on LOC

Posted on August 8, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

With the media-generated mass boo-hooing attendant on the killing of the five jawans of the Bihar Regiment on the LOC in J&K, some core issues are being lost sight of. Firstly, as I have mentioned in a previous blog, such murderous attacks are virtually the norm followed by both the Indian and Pakistani forward deployed army units. Indeed, such strikes on targets of opportunity are encouraged by unit commanders to showcase the offensive-mindedness and battle-readiness of troops under their command, to give the troops otherwise bored by routine patrolling and similar tasks something aggressive to do to keep their fighting spirit stoked, and to earn merits for the ‘paltan’ and self with the higher command. There’s no point in mass hysteria and political frothing at the mouth every time there’s such an incident.

Secondly, pointing fingers at Pakistan is useless because there’s no knowing which side initiated such grisly acts in the first place long many years ago that set in motion the action-reaction sequence and has become a form of on-going, undeclared, war on the LOC. Call them micro-wars, almost guerilla actions, in a time of ostensible peace between the two countries, the waging of which, clearly, has the sanction of the Headquarters of the two Armies and, indirectly, of the two governments. These micro-wars involve not just mainline units but also often, Special Forces units, penny-packeted as army reserve, Northern Army.

Thirdly, if this is a pattern of violence on the LOC, shouldn’t the Indian Army by now have modified their patrolling procedures to prevent stragglers, to have the troops not strung out over an area, and create patrols of critical size so they cannot be easily ambushed? Shouldn’t units on notice for deployment on LOC be trained in such tactics and patrolling regimes? The Army has obviously been remiss in not modifying the attitude and mode of operating on the LOC of the forward units, despite the frequency of such incidents.

And finally, why should the larger peace process with Pakistan be derailed on account of this atrocity? As in the case of China, it shows up this country’s linear mindset when the complex reality demands a different policy tack. We can have trade, cultural exchanges, even military hotlines but also continued acts of border frictions, tyargeted intelligence operations, and strategic posturing with China as much as with Pakistan. We all better get used to it. The pity is neither the Indian people nor the government and military seem up to the task.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Pakistan, Pakistan military, satellites, South Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | 14 Comments

Creaky MiG-21 bison, weakened air defence

Posted on August 7, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The near-antique MiG-21 bison (not bis! updated correction, sorry folks) still perform frontline service with the Indian Air Force, except the creakiness of these short range air defence combat aircraft is telling. The air frames are beginning to fray. Mindful of this situation, an order has gone out to pilots in the six to seven squadrons in the IAF featuring this aircraft not to pull stressful maneuvers lest these flying machines fall apart in the skies. The MiG-21 bison, it may be recalled, underwent an upgrade. The trouble is the upgrade does not replace the air frame — the same old air frame is retained, only new rivets are inserted, the rust wherever accumulated is removed, and other cosmetic changes made. Thus, we have a nearly fifty year old air frame in employ in its various versions, including — it is hard to believe — according to one source the FL version. Pending induction of the Tejas LCA, MiG-21 bison is the bulk air defence aircraft. If the bis isn’t able anymore to fight in a meaningful way it is disadvantaged against newer planes the adversary can muster — and here I am not talking about the Fizaya (Pakistan Air Force) which is in far more difficult straits, but the PLAAF elements China can readily mobilize in the Chengdu MR. Unless the Tejas program is fast-forwarded, India will be in trouble.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Military Acquisitions, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia | 3 Comments

Show dogs vs pit bulls and tension in the army

Posted on August 5, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The unprecedented phenomenon of the carefully planned and orchestrated succession (I railed against) that fetched General Bikram Singh his promotion as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) is coming home to roost. There’s enormous tension between the army chief and his field commanders, who have little respect for a “political General” and resent his being hoisted on them and the fighting forces. The last such general, it may be recalled, was the little lamented BM Kaul appointed by his uncle and PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, to lead the newly constituted IV Corps during the short China War in 1962, and the next one too, Lt Gen Suhag,the present eastern command head who, in the Bikram manner, has been emplaced in line for shoehorning into the COAS-ship (this despite a vigilance case not hindering his elevation as GOC-in-C, Eastern Army) once Bikram finishes his tenure.

This has been particularly evident in the strained relations between the Northern Command and Bikram Singh. The issue came to a boil, and has been simmering ever since the April 2013 PLA armed intrusion into the Depsang Bulge. The army headquarters (AHQ) did nothing to temper the impression created of Indian army units being smacked around by the Chinese when the reality was that units of the Leh-based XIV Corps were all the time countering the Chinese, move for move, with “power patrolling” of their own. It came to a head when, even tho’ the Northern Army commander Lt Gen Parnaik was in Delhi, he was not asked to brief or even to assist in the briefing of the Defence Minister AK Antony and NSA Shivshankar Menon that COAS Bikram himself undertook to do, and from which Parnaik was entirely frozen out. So Bikram hogged the limelight, showcased his supposed grasp of the unfolding situation which the relevant army commander actually understood far better. Post-Parnaik, a reluctant Chachra, abruptly moved by Bikram from the Western Command chieftancy in Chandimandir to helm the Northern Army, bad blood between Udhampur and AHQ has continued. An additional reason for Chachra’s ire, it is snidely said, was his unhappiness with being moved to the hotspot from his Chandimandir perch, where he was happily passing time doing little other than supervising the completion of the construction of his bungalow in Gurgaon!

The problem of an army chief who isn’t respected by his commanders is a serious problem that will continue for several more years with Suhag in train. Indeed, there are disturbing parallels between Bikram and Kaul — both of them loquacious to the point of distraction, specializing if in anything than public relations — Kaul handled publicity material for the Eighth Army in the Maghreb; Bikram was army spokesman during the Kargil imbroglio — more show dogs than pit bulls. More on that some other time. It is a problem that’s seriously affecting the army. The seams are showing.

Posted in China, China military, civil-military relations, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army | Leave a comment

French frankness and Defence hard-sell

Posted on July 26, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The French Defence Minister Jean Yves Le Drian at a talk in IDSA straightforwardly presented some of the points in the ‘Defence and National Security White Paper 2013’ (the last such document was issued in 2008). He emphasized the fact that both India and France prized “sovereignty” and “Strategic autonomy” as a strong basis for “convergence” of values, etc. He hard pitched the Rafale MMRCA (how Dassault Avions has had an India connection since the sale of the Ouragon fighter in the Fifties), and highlighted joint projects with DRDO on the anvil — scorpene SSKs, and short range missiles, and promised more such joint development and collaboration projects, but expressly ruled out any cooperation in the cyber war field which he said has to be done on a “national” basis.

The talk became fairly convoluted, however, when he sought to draw personal linkages with India — he was born, he said in a port-side district in Brittany called India, where a ship christened ‘Orient’ was being built for trade with India! This mercifully came at the very end and the connection sought to be made was bit of a stretch. More interestingly, he drew attention to the defence cooperation connection in the 18th century when the Anglo-French war in Europe had its repercussions in India where the French colonialists led by Dupleix clashed with their British counterparts — with the French naturally supporting native kings (Tipu Sultan) fighting the British, or who relied on French military advice and training (Ranjit Singh).

Le Drian sounded almost rueful about a lost “älternative world” had the French lorded it over the English. Of course, like the Pondicherrians, or is it now Puducherians (which sounds like an abuse!), instead of the English language, we’d all be speaking French and been a part of the Francophone cultural universe. The problem is would the French have not been more reluctant to let go of India than Britain, and how hard would they have resisted? The record suggests that like in Indo-China and Algeria, Paris would have been loath to let go of India and the parting would likely have been violent. On the plus side,the post-independence Indian leadership would not have been infused with the nonsense of Gandhian nonviolence and pacifism and general complacency that has so crippled Indian foreign and military policies post-1947, and we’d have had the satisfaction of winning freedom the hard way — not handed us by the Brits on a platter. This last was not because of Gandhi’s satyagraha and other myths, but because of the vulnerability of the Raj from a politically more alive Indian Army, which during WWII was being subverted by the pull of Netaji Subhas Bose’s militant nationalism.

But back to the present, to a direct question about whether France, unlike in the past, would help India develop its armaments design capacity — yea all the pesky things like source codes, flight control laws, and stuff like that, the French minister replied that Paris would be happy to help India acquire “command of manufacture” of weapons! In other words, France would be damned if it was going to set India up as an independent and autonomous producer of whole weapon systems. At least he was frank, because elsewhere in his address he added that “India’s security supported French economic interests”. In other words, the inter-governmental mechanism that the French have mooted is essentially to ensure transfer-of-technology only for manufacture. Thus, as far as France is concerned it’s business as usual, the same old “client-supplier” relationship Le Drian promised to overturn, staying firmly in place!

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, South Asia, Special Forces, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Western militaries | Leave a comment

Need to harden China policy

Posted on July 26, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

It is possible the Chinese may have bitten off more than they can chew. Beijing has rubbed three main countries of the Indo-Pacific region — Japan, the United States and India — the wrong way. This new triple entente constitutes a formidable coalition in the Indo-Pacific region to keep Chinese aggressiveness in check and will be difficult for Beijing to fend off.

China’s historic bogeyman, Japan, has sent Beijing a clear signal. The Japanese people have just given, perhaps, their most nationalistic post-War prime minister, Shinzo Abe, a majority in the upper house to go with the two-thirds majority his Liberal Democratic Party enjoys in the lower house, mainly because of his strong stance against a bullying China. To add to recent provocations in the Senkaku Islands area, Beijing ordered most of its flotilla, which had taken part in a massive joint exercise (“Joint Sea 2013”) with the Russian Pacific Fleet involving 19 warships, to return from the north by deliberately cutting west through the Soya Strait separating the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido and the Russian Sakhalin Peninsula, steaming round the Japanese archipelago and crossing the Tsushima Strait between the southern Kyushu Island and the Korean peninsula.

China exploited Japan’s limiting its sea territory (from the 12km) in the Soya narrows to 5.6km to facilitate the passage of nuclear-armed ships of the Yokosuka-based US Seventh Fleet. In the context of growing tensions, Tokyo’s Defence White Paper pointed to China’s attempts to “change the status quo by force based on its own assertion [of territorial claims]” — don’t we know it! It was followed up with Japan “nationalising” some 400 small, outlying islands and rock outcroppings that almost doubled its sea territory to 4.47 million sqkm and hinted at a deliberately proactive defence policy.

In the process of decamping from Afghanistan, the United States is seeking to implement its “rebalance” strategy involving a military build-up in the Far East. Indeed, with the extant Chinese maritime disputes with Japan and the countries of the Southeast Asian littoral, especially the Philippines in mind, the commander of the Seventh Fleet, vice admiral Scott Swift, recently warned China against succumbing to “the temptation to use coercion or force in an attempt to resolve differences between nations”.

Two of the three pillars of the Indo-Pacific security architecture that can stabilise the evolving “correlation of forces” are solid. The third is India — the confused laggard in all matters remotely strategic. As usual, New Delhi is thrashing around clueless, despite being repeatedly smacked around by China. The incident in April this year in Ladakh’s Depsang Valley was not a one-off thing. Mid-June the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units again crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC), ransacked the Chumar observation post the Chinese at the time of the earlier event had wanted dismantled. Except, this facility is actually a strategically-located post at a height affording a panoramic view of the PLA disposition in the valley below, and which the Indian Army had rigged up for remote 24/7 photo-imagery. The PLA intruders destroyed this surveillance system. As if to prove that such armed intrusions are going to be a monthly occurrence, on July 15-17 and again last week, and then on July 21, PLA troops violated the LAC.

What was most worrisome about these developments were the Indian Army’s initial reactions. It supported the ministry of external affairs’ (MEA) contention of the Chumar post as a “tin shed”, dismissed the June incident as “minor”, and passed off the first July PLA intrusion as “banner drills” — an innocuous unfurling of banners. It is as if the Army Headquarters (AHQ) was trying hard to avoid a rumble with the PLA in the face of the Chinese military’s determined bids to rub India’s nose in the dirt. Elsewhere, at the same time, Beijing was detected funnelling fake Indian currency through the Pakistan ISI gateway to destabilise the Indian economy. And still the Indian government believes China plays by Queensberry Rules.

AHQ’s “shrinking lilly” stance may have been due to the MEA’s insistence that Chinese feathers were best left unruffled with the talks on July 23-24 to negotiate a “border defence co-operation agreement” (BDCA) on the anvil. However, responding with alacrity and in kind to aggressive Chinese patrolling of LAC would have signalled a more forceful Indian posture and provided Indian negotiators leverage more than MEA’s girly policy of complaining, and sobbing in our sleeves. New Delhi may not have agreed to China’s condition that as part of the deal for peace and tranquillity Tibetans trying to escape their PLA-occupied homeland and into India be rounded up and handed back to Chinese authorities — the sort of understanding Beijing extracted out of the Nepalese government. But where else has the MEA stood its ground? Adding more sites for “border personnel meetings” and “hot lines” between AHQ and PLA command, or between the theatre commanders, etc. will not stop the Chinese troops violating the LAC at will. The only counter to PLA incursions is aggressive and like provocative actions by Indian units up to the Indian claim line but with adequate force-surge capacity, which Army needs to build-up, pronto.

Such an approach, however, goes against the callow policy of the Manmohan Singh regime. While the MEA minister Salman Khurshid in the run-up to the BDCA talks stated that the government was working “for peace as much as for tough times”, in practice it seems inclined to achieving peace the easy way — by appeasement. Instead of instituting them against China, tough, punitive, measures are used to cow down small states. With Khurshid expressly helming the effort reminiscent of Rajiv Gandhi’s economic blockade of Nepal in the late 1980s, Bhutan was brought to heel by threats of ending a gas subsidy. Rajiv succeeded in alienating Nepal then, Khurshid has upset Thimpu now. It is certain Bhutan too will nurse a grudge, which Beijing will exploit. Acting cowardly where China is concerned and as a bully with our other neighbours has resulted in geostrategic opportunities the Chinese quickly capitalised on to shrink India’s regional profile, relevance and standing.

[Published in the ‘New Indian Express’ July 26, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Need-to-harden-China-policy/2013/07/26/article1701926.ece

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