Nuclear effects of Agni-V

Posted on October 4, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), Hyderabad, along with the other project in mission-mode, Advanced Technology Vehicle (the nuclear-powered ballistic missile-firing Arihant submarine, SSBN), are the two jewels in the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) crown. Under high-class chiefs R N Agarwal, Avinash Chander (recently promoted to head DRDO), and now G K Sekharan, ASL has rescued DRDO’s reputation, of course. But it has, with the second launch of the Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile on September 16, also saved the credibility of India’s strategic deterrent with thermonuclear pretensions from being completely eroded.

But, first, why is India’s claim to thermonuclear status mere pretence? Well, because, Dr R Chidambaram, the one-time chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and, for the last decade, adviser on science and technology to the PM, despite being a scientist doesn’t believe in collecting empirical data! Along with strategic enclave stalwarts like the late K Subrahmanyam and the school of thought the latter spawned, he urged the Narasimha Rao government in the mid-90s, for instance, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, arguing that the data collected from the single 1974 8-12 kiloton (KT) nuclear test was quite enough for the country to have an adequate deterrent and that India need never test again.

After the BJP government ordered the 1998 Shakti-series of nuclear tests anyway, and consistent with his previous advocacy, Chidambaram averred that the obvious malfunctioning of the thermonuclear weapon design tested in 1998 notwithstanding, India can rectify the flawed design and even update the weapons inventory by simply using computer simulation. By this standard, the Indian Air Force ought to operate combat aircraft entirely computer designed but never test-flown, and the army to induct an artillery piece that came out of a computer-assisted design shop but not test-fired. His unexplained and incomprehensible antipathy to nuclear testing has made a mockery of the country’s strategic wherewithal. On this issue, however, it is difficult to know where Chidambaram’s counsel ends and prime minister Manmohan Singh’s inclination to stick with the “no testing” central predicate of the nuclear deal with the US, begins.

Consider this: China has conducted over 80 tests to India’s six tests in all. It has advanced technology such as inertial confinement fusion (to replicate thermonuclear explosions in miniature) and a Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility (to simulate and study the implosion of an atom bomb triggering the combustion of the thermonuclear fuel), which India lacks. Chinese computing speeds will reach some 100 petaflops (million-billion functions per second) by 2015 while Indian super computers at present are at the 250 terraflop (trillion functions per second) level. With all these advantages, China has embarked on a new round of nuclear arsenal modernisation and US weapons designers have warned that without new tests the performance of American nuclear arms cannot be guaranteed. New Delhi, in contrast, has all but sworn off nuclear testing, whence its boast of the Indian deterrent featuring high-yield thermonuclear weapons in the 125KT-275KT categories risks an enemy calling India’s bluff and borders on foolhardiness. So, that’s the problem: An Indian 275KT fusion bomb may, by fluke, reach the full yield or, as is more likely, produce yields anywhere between the high figure and the fission trigger level of 20KT! It’s this appalling uncertainty about the effects of the Indian thermonuclear weapons that’s created a real operational dilemma for the Strategic Forces Command.

The ASL retrieved this intolerable deterrence situation somewhat with the accurate, lightweight, Agni-V missile. This Agni will eventually be all-composite, including the casing and rocket motors made of Kevlar-carbon-carbon, Guidance on Chip for terminal accuracy, and distributed communications nodes through the length of the missile to minimise wiring. As the two tests of this missile have proved, using the Russian Glonass GPS and the on-board inertial guidance system and ring laser gyroscope, 15-20 meter CEP (circular error probable — a measure of accuracy) at 5,500km range has been achieved. Moreover, armed with 4-8 MIRV (Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles) warheads — a technology permitting a single missile to carry multiple bombs for dispersed targeting that has been a “screwdriver’s turn away” from being test-ready but whose testing has not been approved by Manmohan Singh, the Agni-V range can be extended to intercontinental distances.

In any case, even before this precision targeting capability was proved, official strategists trying to justify the test-moratorium began claiming that Agni missiles with single or MIRVed 20KT fission warheads will be just as daunting for any adversary, and that the strategic credibility and clout of India’s deterrent is, therefore, not in doubt. MIRVed Agni missiles do afford the strategic forces certainty of impact and versatility but 20KT warheads are not prime dissuaders.

Missile accuracy at extreme range is fine but it is only the high-yield, preferably, high-yield thermonuclear armaments that really matter. The sheer scale of destruction promised by a single incoming megaton (MT)-warheaded missile can be guaranteed to induce the worst sort of dread in, and impose immense psychological stress and pressure on, the adversary state’s leadership, something the relatively small yield 20KT bomb simply cannot do. In any test of wills, the country armed with the 20KT weapons will fold before a state with MT weapons, call off the confrontation and, whatever is at stake, accept a compromise on the former’s terms.

Then again, the Indian government has little understanding of conventional and, even less, nuclear deterrence when dealing with a powerful foe. In fact, India is so self-damagingly Pakistan-fixated on both counts it does not see the folly of training strategic weapons on a tactical-level threat. India is also an exception to the rule of nuclear weapons states nursing high-yield fusion arsenals. The standard issue warheads for the long range Dong Feng missiles being one megaton or 3.3MT, China can deter America. Weak-kneed Indian governments have not shown the gumption to resume thermonuclear testing to obtain a host of safe, proven, and reliable fusion weapons including the MT type to deter China.

[Published in the ‘New Indian Express’, Oct 4, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Nuclear-effects-of-Agni-V/2013/10/04/article1817217.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, nonproliferation, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan nuclear forces, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command | Leave a comment

Peasant woman!

Posted on September 29, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

There’s no question but that Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did refer to his Indian counterpart, idiomatically, as a “dehati aurat” (peasant woman) for complaining about Pakistan-supported terrorism to the US president. In the Punjabi context, if there are differences to be sorted out you handle it directly, man-to-man, not go running off, crying to a third party for justice. This is straight forward stuff that Narendra Modi picked up on. There are two aspects to this episode.

The first question is did Sharif thus describe MMS or not? Hamid Mir of Pak’s Geo TV and Barkha Dutt of NDTV breakfasted with Sharif when this little event happened. It is always fun for reporters enjoying the license to unconditionally quote politicians to alight on the most risque, sensational, or controversial phrase or thought. This was the intent no doubt for Mir to reproduce it on twitter — which is how it was revealed to the world and was used by Modi as a rhetorical hook to hang Manmohan on. Perfectly legitimate. With the Indian media — in the wake of the Modi speech in Delhi to a vast and enthusiastic audience in hundreds of thousands — pouncing on it, the desi reporter Dutt, suddenly realized she was in a soup. Why? Because Modi had also added that the Indian journalist hearing this insult should have, at a minimum, walked out which, of course, Dutt didn’t do. Now, what would any person who was in Dutt’s position do, if he/she discovered that her behaviour was attacked by Modi who might be next PM? You would quickly try and retrieve the situation for yourself by tweeting that, in fact, the Pak PM made no such offending remark in the first place, thereby shifting the onus on to the Pakistani reporter to back her and defuse the situation, or stick to his original tweet and be held responsible for creating a diplomatic-cum-political ruckus. Which’s exactly what the quick-thinking Barkha — who has been in other troubles (recall Radiia tapes?), did.

The more significant thing is the Indian government’s penchant during Manmohan’s tenure to run to Washington every time there’s a hint of trouble with Islamabad, asking Uncle Sam to discipline the unruly Pakistanis for creating some terrorist disturbance or the other in Kashmir. For God’s sake, how can you then turn around and ask the same US govt to not interfere in India’s internal or bilateral matters (with Pakistan)? This is the point behind Modi’s jibe that Manmohan entirely deserves Sharif’s insults because he puts up so effortlessly with lots worse from the Gandhis — mother and son every day of his stay at 7, Race Course Road. But that’s common knowledge.

Posted in Indian Politics, Pakistan, South Asia, Terrorism | 1 Comment

Walking the plank

Posted on September 28, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Rahul Gandhi’s vituperation against the Ordinance to save convicted members of parliament and helping them hang on to their seats is the equivalent of Prime Minister Manmohan, as the captain of the sinking ship of the Congress Party government, being prodded on to the plank. The question is will a man, who has shown a special facility for following orders, serving the Gandhi Family while maintaining a sphinx-like countenance, muster the necessary self-respect to jump off the plank. This analyst has found it hard to see any intrinsic merit in this man, and yet seeing him treated with so much brusqueness and contempt by the Congress Party’s budding political master, at once elicits scorn for the weak-minded and muddled person that Manmohan is, and pity for him. He knows he has long outlived his political utility, but being rudely shoved on to the sidelines must be something new for a man who has a great capacity for absorbing insults. I really believe that, despite everything, Dr Singh will carry on in his position — his basic babu/bureaucrat-instincts kicking in, to continue in 7, Race Course Road for another few months, rather than bring matters to a head. He will be prevailed upon by Sonia Gandhi to stay on — better to have a proven political cipher reduced to nothing as PM (who is adept at swallowing dishonour), than risk general elections alongside the state elections, because that would be to court a double blow.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Indian Politics, South Asia | 1 Comment

Politicising an apolitical military

Posted on September 24, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

A day apart, there were two contrasting views about the “apolitical” Indian military. Yesterday Lt Col CR Sundar, President Tamil Nadu BJP ExServicemens’ (ESM) Cell, emailed me a note sent off to others well in which he said, that ex-Servicemen, to quote him “should shed the veneer of being apolitical and take to directly involving ourselves in politics” and that BJP is deserving of their consideration because “of their nationalistic outlook, candour, integrity of showing equal concern to all religions and their unfailing support for the Indian Armed Forces.” His comment was apropos ex-Army Chief General VK Singh sharing the dais with Narendra Modi at an ex-Servicemen’s rally in Rewari, Haryana, Sept 15 called to demand “one rank, one pension”.

Then Col Sundar said “Monetary benefit is not everything” and that ESM should get involved in grassroots politics and stand for elections panchayat-level up. “Lawmakers such as MLAs and MPs don’t just happen”, writes the colonel. “Today’s councilor is tomorrow’s MLA. Today’s MLA is tomorrow’s MP. Only if we cultivate the grass root today can we have enough lawmakers to be able to change the laws where required and better enforce those that are existing.” The senior retired officers, he concludes, are simply “not smart enough to comprehend the possibilities.”

This morning in a Times of India op/ed former CNS Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) conceded the growing disrespect shown the Indian military as reflected in its “leadership [being] publicly excoriated and humiliated with regularity and snidely accused of disloyalty, by proxy, through media” for which he blamed the political class and especially the Defence Ministry bureaucracy. He, however, suggested that ESM keep off involvement in electoral politics because owing to their “umbilical” links to their respective services they may, he feared, end up politicizing the military “by osmosis”.

To better address ESM grievances and avoid these from being presumably parlayed into participation in active politics, the Admiral recommended that the Department of Ex-Servicemen’s welfare in MOD be headed by a retired senior officer and manned by ex-military personnel, which is an excellent solution.

But ADM Prakash avoided the basic theme underlying Colonel Sundar’s note and something that few people have seriously considered: Should ESM from a voluntary citizen army be content with merely voting for political parties of their choice and canvassing solely for additional monetary benefits in their retirement package, or should they as citizens get squarely into electoral politics and, hopefully, by a process of reverse-osmosis, clean up the stinking rat-hole that is Indian politics today? It is, of course, possible, even likely that former soldiers, sailors and airmen once in will succumb to the temptations and the lure of easy money available to persons in political posts. But, hearteningly, the record so far is of upright ESM being upright politicians! Consider the likes of Major General BK Khanduri, former Roads and Transport Minister in Vajpayee’s cabinet and later CM of Uttaranchal Pradesh. There was not remotely a taint of wrongdoing against his name, and did he not perform far better than cradle-to-death professional politicians? The upright and no-nonsense ADM Vishnu Bhagwat (Retd.) likewise got involved in Janata Party politics in his native Bihar.

The point to make is something larger. The ESM can no longer be on the sidelines and complain like everybody else that the current lot of corrupt and venal politicians is running India into the ground and ruining what remains of its prospects. They can choose to campaign for more than some extra rupees in their bank accounts at month-end by way of retirement dues; they can work to change the system from the inside rather than looking in and getting appalled by what they see by doing nothing about it.

An ‘apolitical’ military is a fine thing and so it should remain. But the pathological fear of the Indian military among the Indian political class and bureaucracy is unwarranted. This fear was institutionally seeded by Jawaharlal Nehru who apprehended the virus of army coups d’etat staged — the first time in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan in 1958, infecting the Indian military. Some fifty years later that apprehension ought to have been moderated by the political class, but it hasn’t been.

The fact is India could do with many more Khanduris and Bhagwats at the central level, and more ESM at the state, town, and village government levels, who by dint of character and inflexible values begin cleansing the system and righting the ship of state that is beginning to take a lot of water.

Posted in civil-military relations, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia | Leave a comment

Manmohan agenda to please USA

Posted on September 20, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Prime minister Manmohan Singh canvassed furiously for almost a year for another state visit and a meeting with the US president. It is revealing that the Barack Obama administration initially showed little interest, not convinced that it needed to expend political capital hosting a head of an Indian government on its way out. But Singh’s insistence on a valedictory trip was persuasive because of the gifts he promised Washington.

Singh’s first trip as PM to Washington in July 2005 rode on the George W Bush regime’s geostrategic assessment of India’s importance in the unfolding strategic scene in Asia and America’s geopolitical desire to cultivate India as part of a hedging strategy against China. This was a situation tailor-made for New Delhi to extract an equitable deal in terms of easing US-led restrictions on commerce in high-technology and nuclear goods. Instead, it was Washington, exploiting the pronounced Indian desire for a rapprochement at any cost with the US, which imposed conditions on a strategically dim-witted Manmohan Singh dispensation resulting in extraordinary concessions as part of the nuclear deal. The bulk of the dual-use natural uranium-fuelled civilian Indian reactors were thus pushed into the International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards net, and continuing with the test moratorium has ensured the flawed fusion weapon design cannot be rectified. India’s claim of high-yield thermonuclear weapons status in the event is a hoax. But it achieved for the US, temporarily at least, its long-standing non-proliferation goal of curbing India’s nuclear capability. However, the US hasn’t delivered on the quo for the Indian quid: India does not enjoy the “rights and privileges” of a “nuclear weapon state” promised in the July 8, 2005, Bush-Manmohan Singh Joint Statement, and has not gained entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but New Delhi hasn’t complained.

Faced, moreover, with high deficit and unemployment at home, Washington has turned the Indo-US “strategic partnership” into an essentially transactional relationship with the nuclear deal being used to bully and badger New Delhi into buying high-value American goods. Worse, Obama has encouraged punitive legislative initiatives at home against outsourcing by American companies to India — even coining the pejorative “Bangalored” for it — and to limit H-1B visas to Indian software engineers, which will hurt the Indian information technology sector — one of the few still bright spots in the country’s otherwise bleak exports picture. Even the terrorism-related intelligence sharing has been turned into a mostly one-way street, with India benefitting little from it.

Any other prime minister faced with such evidence of bad faith would have been wary of dealing with Washington.But not our Manmohan Singh! He seems happy to be in a play scripted by Obama. Among the gifts he will carry to the US are (1) a “commercial contract” to buy Toshiba-Westinghouse AP 1000 enriched uranium-fuelled reactors, with the Indian monies reviving a comatose US nuclear industry even as the indigenous advanced pressurised heavy water reactor programme is starved of funds, (2) an undertaking, contrary to a cabinet decision, to replace cheap refrigerants used by Indian industry and military with expensive eco-friendly refrigerants that while ensuring windfall profits for a few US companies holding the patents will undercut the consensus agreement reached at the climate summits that Western countries will subsidise green technology in developing states, and (3) contracts for another $5 billion worth of military hardware (15 Chinook heavy lift helicopters, six additional C-130J medium-lift transport planes, 22 Apache Longbow attack helicopters, and 145 M-777 light howitzers) on top of defence deals of over $8 billion already in the bag.

It isn’t clear just how any ruse to obtain American reactors, in whatever manner Section 17 of the Indian Nuclear Civil Liability Act 2010 is interpreted, can empower the Nuclear Power Corporation to limit the liability of the supplier in case of nuclear accidents owing to faulty technology, which the Indian law expressly bars. Surely, an executive order can’t overturn Indian law or legitimate, via the backdoor, adherence to the Convention on Supplemental Compensation limiting liability to $300 million, as demanded by Washington. Any such deal, therefore, is headed for the Indian courts where it will be voided. But Manmohan Singh cares less — he won’t be there to face the consequences of the mess he has created.

As regards the newfangled refrigerants, what’s galling is the PM took this decision and signed the G-20 summit communiqué containing the stratagem to undermine the Copenhagen Summit agreement despite MEA’s warning that, besides hurting the Indian military forces, such a move would lessen pressures on the US to reduce carbon emissions. Indeed, it mirrors the manner in which Singh signed the July 5, 2005, Joint Statement with Bush that was opposed by Dr Anil Kakodkar, then chairman, atomic energy commission. For Singh, his trips to the US seem to be occasions to sell India short.

The Prime Minister’s solicitousness towards America may have many reasons, but two spring to mind. Firstly, as he himself revealed in his statement on the coal scam in the Rajya Sabha, the recent G-20 summit in St Petersburg and the like is where he is accorded respect as an economist and leader which he doesn’t get at home. The US has endowed his participation in such prestigious forums, moreover, with value less because of Manmohan Singh’s eloquence or in expectation of any nuggets of economic wisdom he might let drop — after all president Bush only half-jokingly confessed he couldn’t understand a word the Indian PM said to him in all their meetings! — but because Singh has served the US interests well.

This brings us to the second, more salient reason: Because no Indian government since 1947 has bothered comprehensively to articulate and grade India’s national interests, Singh has treated it as a floating value, and felt free to adopt Washington’s metrics to define India’s interests on critical issues. This policy stance, accompanied by American flattery and high-gloss diplomatic frippery Washington excels in designed to turn any Third World leader’s head, is something Singh apparently finds irresistible.

(Published in the ‘New Indian Express’, Friday, Sept 20, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Manmohan-agenda-to-please-US/2013/09/20/article1792977.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, disarmament, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian ecobomic situation, Military Acquisitions, nonproliferation, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Terrorism, United States, US., Weapons | 4 Comments

A-5’s ballistic apogee

Posted on September 17, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

In the wake of the second Agni-5 launch, DRDO chief Avinash Chander confidently averred that India had an ICBM capability. On what basis did he assert this? Experts see it this way: the first stage fired for 90 seconds, getting the missile to 40 kms, the second stage separated at the 155 second stage, getting the A-5 to 110 kms altitude, and the third stage separated after firing for the next approx 135 seconds to reach the missile into space and outside of the earth’s pull, with the built-up momentum taking the A-5 to its ballistic apogee of around 600 kms, and achieving reentry speed of around 6-7 kms per second. Such an altitude was required to depress its 8,000 km lateral range to around 5,500 kms, and is commonly reached by ICBMs, such as the Russian Topol-M, flying depressed trajectories.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Cyber & Space, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Missiles, russian military, South Asia | 3 Comments

Great going A-5!

Posted on September 15, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Avinash Chander, DRDO chief and former head of ASL, Hyderabad, pronounced 2nd test firing of Agni-5 a success. He didn’t elaborate. But he must be particularly happy with several aspects. Firstly, with how well the second stage, 2 m dia composite motor functioned. Two, how nicely the GOC (guidance on chip) once again permitted the missile to attain 10 meter CEP. And most of all, as was pointed out by someone who noticed it in the first launch and which could possibly be seen when the video is released of the 2nd launch, the very rapid climb rate of the missile — characteristic of a submarine-launched missile or an anti-missile defence missile (!!!). It suggests a new propellant with higher specific impulse or, alternately, greater pressure generated in the chamber and, therefore, newer frame design. Going good, A-5!

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Defence Industry, DRDO, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, South Asia, Weapons | 2 Comments

Thumbs up for A-5

Posted on September 14, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Agni-5 IRBM is expected to be fired a second time tomorrow from Wheeler on a depressed trajectory into the Indian Ocean. There are some important issues to consider about this missile. While it’ll eventually be an all-composite (kevlar) system, the unit to be launched Sunday, Sept 15, retains an all-steel first stage including rocket motor, with the second stage, casing, motor and all being composite. While head of DRDO, Avinash Chander, has talked of canisterizing Agnis, including Agni-5, this second launch will be a straight-up launch to collect more data on various aspects of the missile system in flight and to be reassured that the very successful first launch in April-2012 was not a fluke! Moreover, while ASL, Hyderabad, has a lots of experience with the 1 metre dia missile system (on Agni-2 & 3), A-5 is 2 metre dia missile configured to reach 8,000 kms and carry 3-7 MIRVed warheads to extend its reach to ICBM range. Thumbs up for A-5!

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Defence Industry, DRDO, Great Power imperatives, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, South Asia | 10 Comments

Obama — saving face

Posted on September 10, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

After all the heightened drama,war noises, and threatening talk emanating for the last several weeks from Washington of mounting punitive attacks on Syria for Damascus’ alleged úse of chemical weapons (CWs), President Obama seems all set to accept a so-called compromise engineered by Moscow in cahoots with Bashar al-Assad whereby the Syrian govt will surrender its stock of CWs. This is about as plain a face-saving ruse as one can invent when finding oneself, as Obama did, in an impossible political situation. The American people by a decisive majority (59%) have said they do not accept even proven CW-use as provocation for war against Syria. Following the public’s mood, the White House discovered that the US Congress too had stiffened in opposition, and not all the political canvassing and badgering has moved both these sets of opinions an iota. Obama may have saved his face but he is, as a consequence, much reduced. Indeed, many American political pundits have even ventured that this political defeat means the beginning of the phase of Obama’s tenure in office as a lame duck president. And he still has another four years to go!

The fact is the success in hunting down and killing Osama bin Laden apparently filled the US President elected the first time around on an anti-war plank with visions of himself as a great commander-in-chief who relies on instinct to achieve military glory. Except, the American people have had enough of wars on the thinnest of pretexts and will not anymore countenance deployment of the US military to swat flies that turn out to be a nest of gnats. The failures in fighting the al-Qaida-Taliban in Afghanistan and assorted sunni and shia outfits in Iraq has, perhaps, cured the US of believing that there are any more such things as “small wars”. “Small wars” in the Philippines and in the Caribbean in early 20th Century made the reputations of presidents such as Teddy Roosevelt. In initiating similar adventures George W Bush departed a diminished president and Obama is on track for a similar denouement, if he doesn’t mend his ways.

Moreover, assuming there was a popular will for another war, this time in Syria, which could have gotten out of hand with Russian missile destroyers and Russian personnel manning the S-300/S-400 anti-aircraft batteries to blunt the first wave of the expected USAF attack sorties, and the Chinese flotilla of three missile destroyers also in the mix, apart from Britain and France, a reluctant set of NATO allies, and no great support elsewhere for any aggressive American action, where is the money to prosecute the operations? A minimum of a billion dollars a month for the Syrian theatre at a time of deep defence budgetary cuts makes for daunting circumstances. It persuaded Leaders from Obama’s own Democratic Party to counsel caution. Ironic isn’t it that in the event the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, showed Obama the way out?

So, in the wake of all this, it is status quo ante — Bashar Assad stays on in Damascus with renewed Russian military support. Israel which had hoped to ride on Obama’s desire for war by launching missile strikes on Syrian targets, has perforce to back down. And the Syrian rebel army is left, as they should have expected, to the tender mercies of Assad’s forces with tepid materiel assistance trickling in but not enough to upset the military equation. The rebels may still fight on but with progressively bleaker prospects.

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, China military, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, Missiles, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, United States, US., Weapons, West Asia, Western militaries | 4 Comments

Zubin and his Childish enthusiasms

Posted on September 8, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Zubin Mehta, conductor of perhaps the finest orchestra in the world, the Berlin Philharmonic, is happy he made music to bring solace to the people of Kashmir. Had he followed up with the kind of reserve he maintained in the run up to the Srinagar event, he’d have been lauded for his stress on the healing qualities of great Western music rendered by top grade musicians. But he had to open his mouth and spoil the effect. There’s something childishly silly about Mehta’s ventilating his thoughts, among which was the nugget that Article 370 has been a boon and ought to be retained in perpetuity because as he said “can you imagine” what all the settlers from elsewhere in India would have done to the beautiful surroundings of the Valley had 370 not been there to prevent just such a catastrophe?!

Obviously, Mehta, who has spent most of his life outside the country, mostly in salubrious climes, from his personal perspective, considers aesthetics more important than the national interest or the fact of this offending Article in the Constitution turning the Kashmir dispute into a suppurating wound that has become septic after 60-odd years of obvious non-treatment. What is desperately needed is ridding the Constitution off this bothersome provision. May be Zubin saw how his home city of Mumbai has been converted into a vast and expanding slum with shanties and lean-to colonies occupying every spare bit of space in that island city — populated by precisely the kind of outsiders all over, including from the Maharashtra countryside, he does not wish to see flooding into Kashmir — the “Switzerland of Asia”.

But what does Mehta care that Art 370 keeps the dispute with Pakistan simmering and the status of this province within the Union distinct and separate, providing legal license to certain natives of Kashmir to keep their agitation going, even as the people of the Valley survive on handouts from the rest of the Indian people who financially support their “separateness”. The largest quantum of subsidies transferred by the Centre to any Indian state is Kashmir.

The more troubling question is the Motivation of the German Govt to finance this little cultural do amidst the beauty of the Shalimar Gardens in Srinagar. Indeed, before approving of any such event, did the MEA at all wonder about the purpose of it? Did somebody in that Ministry not consider the fact that allowing such an affair would not so much put a stamp of international approval on the relative peace prevailing in Kashmir at the present time as confirm Kashmir’s disputed status and its standing as an issue that can spark conflict between India and Pakistan? Are none of the MEA officials aware of the interest and the effort of the West European “do gooder” states — UK, France, and Germany, to try and slyly push for international mediation on Kashmir?

What Kashmir needs is not just expeditious abrogation of Article 370 but grants of lands all along the LOC to ex-Indian Army soldiers on the condition that the title to these pieces of strategic real estate can only be sold and ownership transferred to other ex-military men. This will, as I have argued in my writings, create a defensible buffer zone preventing the crossovers by terrorists, so-called “azadi”-seekers, and Islamist extremists from POK. It will once and for all put closure on the Kashmir dispute with the Pakistanis having their slice of Kashmir. Remarkably, GOI/MEA these days does not even mention POK as being disputed territory, which only leads the International public to believe that what’s being contested is only Indian Kashmir. More evidence of MEA being on the ball!

Posted in Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's Pakistan Policy, Indian Army, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, South Asia, Terrorism | 5 Comments