AAP ka BJP!

Posted on December 9, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The best thing would have been for BJP to win 36 seats in Delhi and for AAP to be a vigilant opposition. It would have compelled BJP to try and install a good e-governance system they have promised in double good time to showcase to the people of the country the things they would do once in power at the Center post 2014 general elections. It would have drawn voter support by the millions and entrenched BJP as the party of government for at least the first half of the 21st Century in the manner the Congress Party was in the latter half of the last Century.

It would be best for BJP not to be tempted into securing a split in the elected 8-member Congress MLA group — something Kejriwal & Company of AAP would devoutly wish to happen. Because then AAP will have a double-barreled gun at the heads of the two main national parties as being in cahoots when the general election campaign comes round soon enough.

Apparently, the Dr Harshvardhan-led BJP MLAs understand the pitfalls of such an approach and are simply not bidding for power, forcing the Lt Governor of Delhi, Jung, to run a hopefully politically neutral President’s rule regime for the next six months, by when a re-election would be called in the capital region to coincide with the national elections that cannot be held any later than May 2014 and save additional expenses to the state.

AAP is a political phenomenon alright — but its ambitions of doing in India at-large what it was able to pull off in Delhi may be to take on a near impossible task. Delhi is a territorially compact and, therefore, electorally manageable proposition. The vast expanse of country outside it may not be as readily amenable to AAP’s charms. In any case, there isn’t the time needed for AAP — even though they seem to have a skeletal active party structure at least in the large urban concentrations. The difference though is that the motivated middle class in the capital is a pampered lot with time and resources on its hands and keen to hang on to the goodies doled out by the state — like the significant cut in electricity rates Kejriwal has promised; whence the massive volunteer effort on Kejriwal’s behalf. The same situation doesn’t obtain elsewhere making the mounting and sustaining of a like country-wide operation very difficult. Even so, there’s little doubt the AAPis have spawned fear in the heart of the traditional politicians who until now were confident in their machinations to milk the system for all it was worth, to benefit disproportionately from it and, opportunity arising, to raid the public till by various means. Such politicians and politics would understandably be completely averse to the processes of transparency in government that Kejriwal extolls and AAP says it represents.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Indian Politics, Internal Security | Leave a comment

$2 Billion and counting…

Posted on December 3, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Documents by Agusta-Westland in an Italian court dealing with IAF’s scam deal for the AW 100 helicopter for VVIP use, mention “the Family” in political India which had to be paid off for the deal to go through. The talk of the head of the numero uno ruling dynasty raking in the monies — a big portion of nearly every deal GOI has been involved in since Manmohan Singh was hoisted into power in 2004, including all the scams starting with the Commonwealth Games scandals, is unabating. If there’s so much smoke surely there’s fire somewhere.

The Huffington Post’s compilation of a list of the world’s richest leaders on Monday, Dec 2, 2013 seemed to bolster this suspicion of unconstrained corruption, as featured in it was the President of the Congress Party Sonia Gandhi in the $2 Billion category — richer by some $600 Million than the Queen of England, Liz-II! It drew a tart comment that this denotes India’s “progress”! Interestingly, a day later (i.e., on Dec 3, 2013) the H-Post removed Sonia G’s name from that List, saying this info was taken from a third party source and was not verifiable. But then most of the other persons listed did not/have not publicly owned up to such wealth either. So, what’s different about Sonia G?

In any case, of the 203 comments on this story in the H-Post, see — http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/29/richest-world-leaders_n_4178514.html — many reacted to Sonia G’s name in the List with a “Hey, tell us something new”!-attitude, most of them speculating that the name removal was because of (1) GOI pressure, (2) H-Post being paid off to remove the name, and/or (3) a powerful lobby in New Delhi.

Posted in Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, South Asia | 3 Comments

ADZ violations — Chinese and Indian reactions

Posted on December 1, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Most countries announce their Air Defence Zones (ADZs).The idea being to demarcate the air space as an early warning system. Constant surveillance over the zone pinpoints intruder aircraft on possibly suspicious missions. If well inside the ADZ, fighter aircraft are scrambled and the intruding aircraft intercepted and either politely escorted to outside the Zone or forced down for interrogation of its pilots and even examination of the aircraft and its on-board “spying” technologies.

On one such mission in April 2001, a US EP-3 elint aircraft off Hainan Island coast was engaged by two PLAAF J-8 IIs, with one of the latter trying perhaps to force the issue flew too close to the US plane had a glancing collision. The Chinese fighter went down with the pilot, the damaged US EP-3 was forced down on Hainan, the crew was held for several days, and the plane for many weeks during which time the Chinese scrutinized and perhaps even disassembled the communications eveasdropping technologies before the plane was returned AFTER the US had issued an aopology.

Fast forward some 12 years, PRC declares an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) Nov 23. Two days later, US B-52 bbrs make a deliberate run into the ADIZ, followed by Japanese and South Koreab airforce combat aircraft the next day. Whereupon Beijing now deploys combat aircraft for active patrolling and, instead of challenging PRC action, Obama Admin quietly advises American airlines to comply with the Chinese ADIZ requirements, to avoid untoward incidents. [See the NYT story at http://nyti.ms/1exqRJH ] So much for Washington sticking up for Asian security interests against China!

The more important thing is the Chinese reaction to the intruding surveillance aircraft in 2001 and its strong response to the wilful violation of its ADIZ by military aircraft of the US and its prime Asian allies. What a contrast to India and IAF’s passivity in the face of provocative and routine buzzing by elint and nuclear sensor-laden US aircraft close-buzzing the Kudankulum and the Kalpakkam complex. India and IAF have done nothing. But then Manmohan Singh regime has made it a habit to do nothing, lest an incident is precipitated. Why should anyone take India seriously?

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China military, civil-military relations, Cyber & Space, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, Indian Air Force, South Asia, United States, US., Western militaries | 4 Comments

Confluence of Interests on Seas

Posted on November 29, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

There’s certain symmetry in INS Vikramaditya’s imminent assumption of the flagship role in the Indian Navy, the launch in Japan of the Izumo, quaintly described as a “flat-top destroyer”, and the Japanese Emperor Akihito’s second state visit to this country.

Shinzo Abe made Japan’s strategic interest plain in 2010 in an address to the Indian parliament entitled “Confluence of Two Seas” — the Indian Ocean and the East Sea, and the intertwining of the maritime destinies of the two states. These separated expanses of water permit India and Japan to work together to stretch China militarily at its extremities. A similar coupling of Japan and the United States, sealed by a treaty relationship, has made the latter a fixture in the Far Eastern power balance and security architecture post-1945. From the Japanese perspective, America has been and is the security anchor. However, in the future Tokyo apprehends that the burgeoning economic and trade relationship will result in a faltering American will to protect Japanese interests, such as in the dispute over the Senkaku/Diayou Island chain. It is for that inevitable day when the US economic interests in China will dictate American strategic choices that Abe — the most nationalistic and strategic-minded of post-War prime ministers — has been trying to prepare his country for. Whence, the importance now being accorded India by Tokyo.

Actually, India is in a situation analogous to Japan’s. From the Nineties when P V Narasimha Rao initiated the opening to the West in the guise of globalising the economy, the United States has become more central to Indian policymakers, and India’s foreign, and even domestic, policies. Thus, home minister Sushil Kumar Shinde, instead of ordering a targeted intelligence operation to take out Dawood Ibrahim, who is hiding in plain sight in Karachi, by whatever means and at any cost, had no qualms indicating he had approached the US Federal Bureau of Investigation to corral this transnational criminal and terrorism funder. The Congress party-led coalition government, in like vein, rather than mount a concerted effort for a counter-cyber operation, readily admitted that US agencies had cyber-penetrated the Indian system and, in effect, advised that because the country can do nothing to prevent such cyber offensives, it may be best to accept it as a fact of life — a variant of the Central Bureau of Investigation director Ranjit Sinha’s counsel to women experiencing rape, to lie back and enjoy it. And, starting with the nuclear deal, prime minister Manmohan Singh suggested by indirection that India’s strategic security deficit against China will be made up by the US when such commitment, as the Japanese are beginning to find, grows iffier by the day.

The immediate escape for India from a bad security situation getting worse is the over-reach that a bumptious Beijing is prone to. Out of the blue, on November 23 it announced an “air defence identification zone (ADIZ)” in the East Sea. It is an airspace version of the “nine dot line” expansively delineating its sea territory that encompasses the legitimate claims over the Exclusive Economic Zones of neighbouring states — Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan in the South China Sea.

More ambitious still, just as the “nine dot line” seeks to demarcate a mere closum (closed sea) controlled by China, the ADIZ attempts to make the free airspace way off the Chinese coast a Chinese concern, attempting to shut down international air traffic other than on its terms. Indeed, in announcing the ADIZ the Chinese authorities demanded that all non-commercial aircraft submit their flight plans and maintain continuous radio contact whilst in the area. The next day Tokyo scoffed at the ADIZ, calling it unimplementable and two days later the Americans proved it by deliberately sending two unarmed American B-52 nuclear bombers over the Senkakus encompassed within the ADIZ. Beijing may not bring the issue immediately to boil. Rather, its plans seem oriented to the medium-term future. By 2030 when it may actually be in a position to enforce the ADIZ, the 2013 announcement of the zone will come in handy to establish its “historic” claims on this airspace.

It is imperative, therefore, that just as Indian naval ships ignore any notions of the nine-dot line Indian military aircraft too should now be tasked to fly frequently through this ostensible ADIZ without giving notice to mark out India’s right of free passage in this airspace for all time to come. It should be followed up with more full-fledged Indo-Japanese naval and air exercises in the Sea of Japan to bolster the point of free air and maritime space, unconstrained by Chinese claims.

The whole thrust of military co-operation with Japan, at least in theory, is to put China on notice not to swing against one or the other country. It is a warning that will grow teeth if New Delhi were to speedily take up on the Japanese offer to produce in the Indian private sector the Shin Miewa US-2 maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft that is also an excellent platform for mounting from-the-sea Special Forces actions.

But the defence ministry under A K Antony has been so infernally sluggish in taking decisions and then making the wrong choices, there’s every danger that this strategically significant Japanese proposal — the first of its kind by Tokyo under its “peace Constitution” which bars arms exports and sales — too will grow cobwebs before it is acted on.

Japan’s bulking up security co-ordination with India could prod its economic reorientation away from China. Japan was the source in 2012 of $122 billion worth of Foreign Direct Investment, most of it to China. As of now, Japanese companies are sitting on a “cash pile” worth a massive $2.4 trillion. India can be the prime investment destination for these funds, especially as the Indian government has plans for infrastructure development costing $1 trillion. But Tokyo has to be motivated to channel these monies India-wards and intensified security co-operation can be that raison d’etre if only New Delhi had the wit to realise it.

Alas, the Congress party-led coalition government has shown it is bereft of any such understanding.

[Published in New Indian Express as “Confluence of Interests on Seas”, November 29, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Confluence-of-Interests-on-Seas/2013/11/29/article1916715.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy, Military Acquisitions, South Asia, South East Asia, Special Forces, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Technology transfer, Weapons | 12 Comments

Bharat Ratna for thwacking a ball?

Posted on November 17, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The prevailing mass delirium since the onset of the Cricket Test-series against West Indies has mercifully ended. The country can now return to normalcy. While I don’t grudge Sachin Tendulkar his Bharat Ratna — yet another instance of the Indian government following the street rather than its own best instincts, the bar for this highest civilian honour has certainly been lowered to the ground level. Now just about anybody can aspire to it for doing almost anything! I mean, if a person adept at thwacking a leather ball with a piece of wood can get one a Bharat Ratna, why not for the champion guli-danda player, say, doing his far more difficult task of physical dexterity?

No, the political calculation behind this conferral is more important. The Congress party-led UPA Govt of Manmohan Singh’s conferring the Ratna on Tendulkar is yet another instance of its clutching at straw to retrieve its sinking political situation. It hopes, wishes, prays that giving the Ratna to Sachin will fetch it votes. After all, it made such a big thing of nominating this cricketer to the Rajya Sabha, didn’t they?

Successful sportsmen have been amply rewarded and in this age of glamorous advertizing Sachin’s banking some $260 million — putting him among the top ten sportsmen, earnings-wise, would appear to prove that the game is surfeit with financial rewards, so much so they wouldn’t hanker for political gongs as well. Because let’s at least be clear about one thing that Bharat Ratna is mainly and ultimately a political award given by the govt of the moment for whatever small or big returns. In an election year, the Congress party hopes that this appreciation will convert into votes.Sonia Gandhi and cohort running the Congress must consider Indian voters to be daft. Or, are they?

Posted in Indian Army, Indian Politics, South Asia | 32 Comments

The flop ‘S-doctrine’

Posted on November 16, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Optics are often as, if not more, important than the contents of foreign policy in an age of instant impact and political reverberations. Despite rendering seminal help and material assistance to the Mahinda Rajpaksa regime to eliminate the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and close out the civil war in Sri Lanka, India finds itself on the outs with Colombo.

The Sri Lankan government and people had plainly hoped to use the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) to showcase the country’s return to normalcy and the international mainstream, such summits being less important for what they achieve- which is usually very little- than because they give the host country the chance to preen itself on the world stage. With the event now robbed of its sheen and Rajpaksa denied his moment by an absconding Indian PM, New Delhi should brace for a payback with interest. China will, as usual, be the beneficiary. The CHOGM fiasco highlights the Congress coalition’s inchoate foreign policy and, for his role in it, undermines finance minister P Chidambaram’s credentials as PM to replace the hapless Manmohan Singh in an unlikely concatenation of future events.

If Manmohan Singh is remembered at all it will be for his personal qualities of servility and cravenness, his failure to push through the slate of economic reforms, and his uninspired views on what India can and cannot do in the external realm. Late in his tenure, the prime minister articulated the principles that have guided his foreign policy, which his former media adviser Sanjaya Baru, a trifle grandly, labeled “The Singh doctrine” (Indian Express, November 6, 2013).

Speaking to the heads of Indian missions, he said that the creation of “a global environment conducive to the well-being of our great country”, is the “most important objective”, followed by globalising the Indian economy, creating “stable, long-term and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers”, working with the “international community to create a global economic and security environment beneficial to all nations”, and forging connectivity with the subcontinental states. These principles came with the warning that foreign policy had to be configured not “merely by our interests, but also [our] values” with “democracy and secularism” helpfully identified as the values dictating policy direction and content.

With abstractions to handle-how is “well-being of the country” to be translated into a foreign policy metric, pray? -and improbable guidelines to hew to – would emphasizing secularism not require India to de-rate our relations with avowedly Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, say, in which case, how would the country cope with denial of access to Saudi oil and to Chahbahar, the Iranian entrepôt to Central Asia? – the audience of Indian ambassadors would have struggled mightily to make sense of this mushy presentation by the prime minister. It fuels the suspicion that Manmohan Singh doesn’t even understand the basics of foreign policy and diplomacy and the extent of practicability in this realm. What the “Singh doctrine” does do is bring confusion in its train.

Unsurprisingly, this “doctrine” without any delineation of national interests and any hints about the utility of military power, coercive use of force, or the emerging geostrategics that are tilting against India, seems entirely disconnected from the harsh reality of international relations where might is right. It presumes an ideal world in which interstate discord is absent as is interstate violence, and there’s no clash of national interests- as in a large, well-behaved, family- that cannot be conciliated. Thus, the injunction to craft “mutually beneficial relations with all major powers” assumes firstly that India’s national interests are aligned in the same way with all of them and to the same degree and, therefore, that China, for example, will not take amiss a security initiative with the United States. In a similar vein is the desire for a “global economic and security environment beneficial to all nations” -which, other than seeking to replace the United Nations is, in practical terms, a near nonsensical policy predicate. Has New Delhi, unbeknownst to the rest of us, taken the theka (contract) for the security of “all nations”?

Hearing such claptrap mumbled by Manmohan Singh in his usual low-decibel monotone, many of the envoys on the back benches would have dozed off, those in the middle rows tuned out, and those stuck in the front seats trying to look thoughtful, because transforming unimplementable rhetorical flourishes into actual policy measures is impossible business. No wonder, faced with such an exercise, “the foreign ministry and the foreign policy establishment” in the last decade behaved, according to Baru, as “a debating society” in which “everyone was holding forth on grand principles and no one devoting time or attention to getting things done the way [the Prime Minister] wanted” leading to a “wayward” policy. Did the MEA denizens have a choice, considering these “principles” read like a laundry list of dos and don’ts an international do-gooders’ society would happily own up to?

Meanwhile in the real world, India’s foreign policy is tanking. Bangladesh will be lost to the BNP-Islamist combo because Manmohan won’t shove Mamata Banerjee’s objections to the Teesta River Accord and the rationalisation of the border, aside. The Northeast will be lost to China because he won’t order the environment ministry under Jayanti Natarajan against taking a wrecking ball to the defence ministry’s plans for fast-tracking the construction of a border road network, and to Arunachal Pradesh’s plans for dams and hydroelectric projects to make it a prosperous, energy-surplus, state.

And MEA’s pigheaded refusal to permanently create an international shindig over reunification of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir with Jammu and Kashmir as the only unfinished business of Partition has ensured, moreover, that India’s claim to all of the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir is eroding fast, what with the transportation links being erected by the Chinese at their normal breakneck speed through Baltistan to Chinese-occupied Tibet.

At this rate, the Singh doctrine will leave for a successor government a foreign policy cupboard as bare as the treasury (courtesy the UPA regime’s slate of wasteful and corruption-feeding populist schemes).

[Published as “Toothless foreign policy of PM” in New Indian Express, Nov 15, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Toothless-foreign-policy-of-PM/2013/11/15/article1891050.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Central Asia, China, China military, civil-military relations, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Ocean, Indian Politics, Pakistan, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East | Tagged | 3 Comments

Technically proficient value-add to ‘Stop wasteful military deals’

Posted on November 10, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Reproduced here is the in-depth, technically proficient, response by @ersakthivel published in the New Indian Express to my “Stop wasteful military deals”. I am so much better informed now after ingesting his incisive comments.
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IMHO the 200 Kg ballast must have been placed simulating excess weight component that will need to be added as new requirements arose which is a standard practice in any test flight program. For example if IRST needs to ne added to Tejas mk-1 . Then we can replace this ballast with IRST equipment . In the same way this 200 KG extra weight will also replicate the performance of MK-2 .Since in the same way it will simulate the fuselage plug to be added for MK-2 to increase it’s weight. SO he is not far off the mark when he says this. may be he did not give detailed explanations but it is more or less correct. Riaz Khokar in his critical article about Tejas mk-2 expectations also referred to this 200 KG ballast weight in tejas mk-2 and feigned ignorance of it. he should know any way that it simulates the excess weight that may be added in future if IAf asks for further additions.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 11:58

http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Stop-wasteful-military-deals/2013/11/01/article1866740.ece?pageNumber=3#commentsList

Since the many weight saving exercise were carried out already reducing the weight of the mk-1 close to a ton this ballast if it is still used in mk-1 will simulate the excess weight of the mk-2. Who did all the IOCs and FOCs for SU-30 MKI? The sukhoi guys? No. Even before the SU-30 MKI was finished as a product IAF put money into it based on the performance of base line version of Su-30 . Without getting so many OCs a squadron of less tested F-35 are already opertating. Also russian airforce is gearing up to introduce without insisting on so many changes and 2300 flight tests spanning 14 years , Just four or five prototypes of PAKFA are up in the air with older engines originally not meant for it. The new engine for PAKFA is yet to get certification. Then how can the Russian airforce introduce PAKFA next year with fewer than 1000 sub standard test flights with fixtures on the air frame and old lesser power engines on which it is running now?
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 12:01

SO the author is correct on this count as well. wiki states the Range 850 KM and ferry range 3000 KM for tejas MK 1. MK 1 can fly 2X850 Km =1700 KM . If MK 1 can fly 1700 KM than certainly MK2 with additional 40% fuel can at least fly more than 50 percent long distance. Since reserve fuel back up levels will be the same for mk-1 and mk-2 along with the fact it is the take off and sharp manoeuvres which eat up most fuel not cruising at a comfortable fuel burn ratio as per design. After all GE404 is a highly fuel efficient engine and GE 414 IN S 6 goes one step further and it is more advanced than the older engines on RAFALE. So MK2 will have close to 75 % of Rafale’s range in normal design load normal internal fuel condition in which most of the IAF missions are carried out.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 12:02

You can’t go lugging tons and tons of extra fuel (bullock cart level close combat performance config )into heavily defended PAk and Chinese air space defended by F-16 newer blocks and Chinese Flanker versions in the same way french are flying over next to no defence air spaces of male and Afghanistan. So even if IAF attempts to fly with such heavy external fuel tanks on the first blush of contact with defending fighters those fuel tanks will be dumped. Fuel capacity of 2 engine Rafale with a few more tons of extra empty weight is 4700 KG against the few tons lesser weight single engine LCA MK2 which has 3000 to 3400 KG of internal fuel. So for normal combat missions which demand high close combat performance with full internal fuel only tejas mk-2 will have almost close to the same range as RAAFLE. In addition tejas mk-2 has air to air refuelling in buddy mode as well . Mk2 can carryout 80 percent of the missions which Rafale can.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 12:04

And we have extra super Sukhois FGFAs to cover the remaining 30 percent. With the French already wiggling out of TOT commitments with “HAL —no good” certificate close to 30 billion dollar expenditure is a sheer waste of money on a redundant acquisition, if you consider the sky-high upgrading price for Mirage 2000 will repeat itself for RAFALE. Then we can operate close to 250 tejas mk-2 and 50 extra Super Sukhoi fighters which has complete TOT including engine in our hands. And last but not the least tejas mk-2 will have even lower wing loading with comparable TWR and a a ten percent higher top speeds of mach-2 meaning that tejas mk-2 has better designed air frame using the latest composite tech with close to 60 percent of it’s weight in composites as suggested by CEMEILAC. it will have the same long range BVRs and same powered ASEA radar with matching antena dia as RAFALE.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 12:06

Some people are misquoting the clean config RCS of tejas mk-1 as a third of mirage -2000. But the proper quote that can be read from B. Harry’s piece in “Vayu” on tejas is “Tejas will have a third of clean config RCS of the latest 4th gen fighters in design phase. When this comment was made only TYPHOON and RAFALE were in the works, not Mirage-2000. So with no canards and more aerodynamic and RCS optimization that will take place for tejas mk-2 along with far lesser physical dimensions than the TYPHOON and RAFALE you can rightfully expect tejas mk-2 to have far lesser clean config RCS than the RAFALE as well. Also the single engine of tejas mk-2 will release more than 40 percent lesser heat energy into the atmosphere. It means a substantially lesser IRST detection range as well. So for the close to 20 percent shortfall in range over RAFALE Tejas mk-2 has some very significant advantage over RAFALE in home air space defence as well.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 12:07
http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Stop-wasteful-military-deals/2013/11/01/article1866740.ece?pageNumber=4#commentsList

The ASEA for tejas mk-2 is also getting ready with foreign collaboration as well. And tejas mk-2 will always be upgradable with whatever longer range BVRs supplied in future from Russia for FGFA as well. As we are doing the avionics and radar integration on FGFA we can port these close to 200 KM range BVRs on tejas mk-2 as well with no hefty fees and least hassles. That’s what the test pilot Suneth Krishna said that tejas is a modular fighter easily upgradable in batches as all it’s design knowledge is here. The weapon load is never a problem we can operate 3 Tejas mk-2 for the cost of one RAFALE with far lesser per hour operation cost as well. That means for the same price we will have three RAFALE sized ASEA radars with three EW suits along with 21 pylons carrying close to 30 air to air missiles if dual rack launch pylons are added in future.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 12:08

So even though making a few mistakes like naming the HPT 40 as HJT 44 and mistaking the comments of french pilots as test flight comments the author is correct by and large. If at all the author mentioned the rejection by IAF of HPT-35 effort by HAL then there would be more questions to be answered. For more info on tejas mk-2 go to defenceforumindia tejas mk-2 thread
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 12:16
http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Stop-wasteful-military-deals/2013/11/01/article1866740.ece?pageNumber=5#commentsList

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Relations with Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Weapons, Western militaries | 21 Comments

Informed reaction on Rafale a/c to AVM Subramaniam’s response to ‘Stop wasteful military deals’

Posted on November 10, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Reproducing here the very well-informed reaction by @ersakthivel to AVM Arjun Subramaniam’s response article — “Ündermining national security” in New Indian Express at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Undermining-national-security/2013/11/07/article1876105.ece to my ‘Stop wasteful military deals’ NIE op/ed of Nov 1, 2013. It will help inform the interested public and advance the public debate and discussion on the Rafale deal.
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I want to know what type of brainstorming went on between IAF and HAL for decades which could not solve the fuel pump issues of HPT-32? And Why with base repair depots good enough to design and make a MMRCA class fighter and assemble a Pliatus level trainer , IAF cpuld not rectify the fuel pump issues of HPT-32 And why did Arjun Subramanium failed to mention about the HPT-35 which too was developed at the behest of IAf by HAL was not pursued with interest by IAF for close to a decade ? it was shelved because IAF did not show any interest. It was this decade long delay by IAF which did not approve the HPT-35 proposal from HAL which led to this sorry state pf importing Pilatus while designing tejas!!!!!!!!!! Ajai Shukla and many other writers have pointed this out in many blogs. It is not Bharat Karnad alone.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:12

In fact this sorry state of affair between HAl and IAF which led to the shut down of Marut (the GOI refused to pay a princely sum of Rs 5 Cr to bristol Siddley to develop a higher power engine for Marut , which latter led to the DPSA contract and induction of Jaguar)led to the creation of ADA to design tejas as a multi disciplinrry team of many labs across the country collaborating and succeeding on Tejas. So how can we justify the stalling of the efforts on Marut mk-2s engines for want of a princely sum of RS 5 Crs!!! lso every one knows that corruption and acquisition of hardware goes hand in hand in indian defence purchases.So you just can not accuse Bharat
Karnad of casting aspersions of the “sky high credibility of defence purchases” which were highlighted by TATRA truck scam, Agusta westland Scam and the recent scrapping of LUH purchase by Army. So in a decision of 20 billion dollars purchase in a democracy few inconvenient questions have to be answered.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:15

And the CLAWS [flight Control Laws] of LCA is top class and conversation between test pilots of India , france and Israel could have highlighted this. this is what Bharat Karnad implied when foreign test pilots praised tejas handling abilities, Kota harinarayna the designer of tejas has said that USAF test pilots remarked that the F-16 flies much better with tejas control laws. SO it is not uncommon for pilots to know a thing or two about Claws without even flying it from discussion with fellow pilots on few parameters based on the test flight points that were being opened up in flight envelope. SO it was no bunkum by Bharat Karnad. Jaguar deal is one of the worst scams in IAF, if you wnat to know the details please go to the following link called TKS tales wordpress
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:24

This is what TKS tales tells about the original jaguar before DARIN upgrade. All these problems were rectified by local talent in DARIN upgrade . The main source of inaccuracy in an inertial navigation system stems from the drift of the gyro reference platform due to unavoidable bearing friction and of course from manufacturing defects. Many technologies were tried out to reduce gyro drift. One of the techniques was to immerse the gyro assembly in a fluid bath reducing the apparent weight of the gyro and thus reduce friction and drift. This was known as a ’floating gyro’ system. The Idea was good but its execution was difficult. Fluid leak from the container, especially in hot environment, was a constant headache. Unfortunately, its performance on the field fell below the expected level. It was not accurate enough and it was very hard to maintain. When we became interested in the Jaguar as our potential DPSA, the performance of the NAVWASS was our main discouragement.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:26

Gradually, it had become clear to the vendors that though we were impressed by the Jaguar, we were not so impressed by the NAVWASS. BAe s sales pitch therefore got modified and an impression was generated that if we wanted an upgraded inertial system incorporated into the Jaguar, it could and would be done easily. Ferranti was, at that time, developing an inertial system based on their version of the dry gyro. Their platform named DINS1084 was on the Tornado. And this light , medium , heavy analogy of classifying the fighters based on weight category is not fit for the new multi role age. french are standardizing on the so called medium RAFALE with no light or heavy component and Russians have only heavies called Su-35 and PAKFA with no medium or light component. the US will have whole sale F-35 single engine fighter . So can any one classify it as medium or heavy or light?
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:30

http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Undermining-national-security/2013/11/07/article1876105.ece?pageNumber=4#commentsList

More by @ersakthivel:

The fuel fraction (percentage of weight of fuel divided by eight of the fully loaded fighter)is what determines the range of the fighter. The ferry range of all fighters like Mig-29, RAFALE Mirage-Tejas which all have varying weights is more or less the same.So for normal combat loads with normal fuel config they will all have normal ranges. Also a fully indigenous produced Su-30 MKI is already available for long range bombing. Then what is the need for medium range RAFALE which will have 10 or twenty percentage range advantage over tejas mk-2 at a huge forex outgo of 20 billion dollars? Also FGFA is slated to come in in a decade. Then what role will RAFALE do which can not be performed by combination of tejas mk-2, SU-30 MKI(upgraded to super sukhoi status) and tejas mk-2? So this medium class is totally unnecessary classification designed to fool the inexperienced political leadership and aviation enthusiasts.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:31

If more weapon weight is needed we can use two tejas mk-2s in place of one RAFALE if both have the same range .The real question is what does IAF gain by inducting so called 20 ton class RAFALE as a meium weight fighter ?The french are standardizing on on all RAFALE fighter force with twin engined 20 ton RAFALEs Meanwhile russians are standardizing on 30n ton twin engined PAKFA and Su-35, The US is inducting single engined F-35 in large scale. Unlike IAF the above mentioned airforces need to fly long distances to fight the enemy. It is not the case with IAF.Where most of the targets are well with in short range. And when it comes to air defence of Indian airspace tejas mk-2 will have no shortfalls compared to RAFALE on account of range or weapon load. Also work is already going on ASEA radar miniaturization and LRDE has fair experience in it.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:34

And we are no longer under crippling western sanctions so we will find partners on that count with no restrictions. Even RAFALE has just put on ASEA radar for trials. We don’t how fully developed it really is PAF is going for 120 light class Jf-17, are all these airforces buy any light medium or heavy fighter that is missing from their fleet from any third country? Certainly they won’t do such a stupid thing . Fuel fraction (weight of fuel/loaded weight for normal combat sorties in design weapon loads)determines the range not the fighter being named light or heavy. if tejas mk-2 has same fuel fraction as RAFALE it will also have th same range. Most probably it will end up ten to twenty percent shortage in range nothing big, Also we can employ three tejas mk-2 with 15 ton weapon loads with same radar diameter and long range BVR missiles of RAFALE for the cost of one RAFALE.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:36

So no shortage when it comes to weapon load. Infact tejas mk-2s will deliver double the weapon load with three times more sensor capability if costs are taken into account MMRCA contract originated as a proposal to buy 126 Mirage -2000 in the late 90s. To avoid the single vendor situation GOI asked it to be a global tender in 2004. Before that there was no long felt need in IAF for so called 20 ton medium weight fighter. tejas mk-2 will have at the most a twenty percent shortage when it comes to weapon load and range requirements over RAFALE. But ordering a few more squadrons of very low priced(because of the 100 percent indigenization) Su-30 MKIs in super Sukhoi versions or increasing the numbers of FGFA to by a few squadrons will be equal to having RAFALEs. Certainly there is no such thing that Su-30 MKi, Tejas mk-2 and FGFA combine can’t do that RAFALE can!!!
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:37 Reply to this Report abuse
If you spend the same 20 to 30 billion (considering high maintanece cost)in the two coming decades on such tejas mk-2 and and a few extra squads of FGFA or Su-30 MKI IAF can improve its attcaking capability in a substantial manner. We can have more than 300 fighters in such combo compared to just 126 RAFALEs for the same cost. Also the MMRCA contract was changed form life cycle cost based buy to per unit fly away cost mid way. And the winner Dassault which entered the competition knowing well that the HAL is to be its local partner is saying HAL is unfit for the job. if a a no experience private sector firm gets choosen by dassault as local partners then all the TOT norms go for a toss. The MMRCA was not an original need . It was born from the 126 Mirage-2000 buy proposal which was shot down because of single vendor situation by MOD in 2004 , thus it became MMRCA. If MOD promptly accepted the 126 mirage-2000 buy from IAF there would be no MMRCA.
Posted by ersakthivel at 11/09/2013 19:39

http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Undermining-national-security/2013/11/07/article1876105.ece?pageNumber=5#commentsList

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Cyber & Space, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Pakistan, Pakistan military, russian assistance, russian military, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Weapons, Western militaries | 2 Comments

Stop wasteful military deals

Posted on November 1, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

Reduction of the Rs 4 lakh-crore fiscal deficit will require a drastic winnowing of defence expenditure programmes. The wasteful military procurement system that fetches, as it were, as much chaff as grain, offers obvious targets for excision. Among them the egregiously wrong-headed deals for the Swiss Pilatus PC-7 turboprop trainer and the French Rafale MMRCA (multi-role, medium range combat aircraft).

Consider IAF’s priorities: It bought PC-7s for $1.5 billion, an amount the Chinese Air Force spent to secure the entire production line from Russia of the latest, most advanced, Tu-22M3M strategic bomber! This Pilatus purchase, moreover, was approved by defence minister A K Antony at a time when Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore, had its new HJT-44 turboprop trainer up and ready. Brazening out such mindless splurges, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne advised closure of the HJT-44 line to enable purchase of more PC-7s!

IAF has at most tolerated licence-manufactured foreign fighter planes but sought stubbornly to kill off indigenous combat aircraft projects. In the past, it buried the Marut Mk-II, the low-level strike variant designed in the 1970s by the highly talented Dr Raj Mahindra, who won his spurs under Kurt Tank, designer of the Focke-Wulfe fighter-bombers for the Nazi Luftwaffe and of the original HF-24 at HAL, buying the Jaguar from the UK instead. History repeats itself.

French and Israeli pilots who have unofficially flown the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) have gone gaga over its flying attributes. The Tejas will come equipped with an indigenous AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar — the heart and the brains of any combat aircraft, enabling it to near-instantly switch from air-to-air to air-to-ground missions. The Flight Control System (FCS) of the Tejas is so advanced, it can deal with the sort of turbulence in flight that its counterpart onboard the Eurofighter — supposedly technologically superior to the Rafale, plainly cannot, as per an expert familiar with the FCS in both aircraft. This deficiency nearly ended in disaster for the Eurofighter on several occasions but was not disclosed by EADS to IAF during the jockeying for the MMRCA contract. The larger, heavier, longer range Mark-II variant of the near all-composite Tejas, in fact, fills the bill of “MMRCA”. An LCA version of Tejas has already been flown weighted down with ballast to mimic the Mk-II plan-form. The fact that the Mk-II variant was coming along well was known to the IAF-MoD (ministry of defence) combo. So, how come the tender for MMRCA was not terminated midway?

The Mk-II’s chances were scuppered by IAF-MoD on the ground that Tejas was not operational. But the LCA has been prevented from entering squadron service after it obtained the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC)-1 last year, because of their insistence that IOC-2 and subsequent clearances be done by HAL rather than permitting the clearances to be obtained by the designated Tejas squadron, flying the aircraft, at the Sulur base in Tamil Nadu. The latter procedure will allow our fighter pilots to test the plane’s flight envelope and performance, and to provide feedback to designers — normal practice of advanced air forces inducting a new locally-produced aircraft. Further, rather than restricting the initial off-take to just 46 aircraft, MoD should order the full complement of 7-8 squadrons worth of Tejas to facilitate economies of scale and the farming out of work by HAL to private industry, thereby growing it. In the interim, additional “super Sukhois” could have been procured for a total force of some 70-plus of these planes, inarguably the finest combat aircraft now flying.

The fact is the original price tag for the MMRCA deal of $12-15 billion is set to balloon to $26-30 billion. Why? For one thing, having won the MMRCA contest, the French company, Dassault, doesn’t want to abide by the contract requiring the plane to be manufactured at HAL under license with transfer of technology (TOT). Dassault maintains it cannot guarantee Rafales made in India unless its chosen private sector partner, Reliance Aerospace, is tasked with its production. The arrangement with Reliance, however, is to have it import all of the most high-value assemblies and avionics as “black boxes” for the duration of the Indian production run, keeping over 500 French firms employing a workforce of 7,000 people, according to a French newsletter, L’Úsine Novelle, in the clover for the next few decades!

The real kicker here is the fact that while India will pay for full TOT — amounting to tens of billions of dollars — no meaningful technology (flight control laws and source codes) will, as in past such deals, ever actually get transferred. New Delhi as always will pay up, not caring whether India gets what it paid for or not and, even less, whether it will ever become self-sufficient in arms. It may be better to simply buy 126 Rafales off the shelf if the IAF deems it such a critical need, when it is not, rather than pay through our ears for technology we won’t get.

The conjoined Mk-II Tejas-Super Sukhois option will make Rafale redundant, and is the reason why those Indians who have pocketed French baksheesh (which totals a very hefty sum, indeed) will resist it. But for the country’s good, the best thing that can happen is that the Pilatus and Rafale contracts are immediately junked.

What about self-sufficiency that our politicians and uniformed brass keep yakking about? Alas, that’s only public speeches and posturing. When has the government ever insisted, or compelled the military to go with, a home-made product at the expense of a foreign item, and the armed services told that otherwise they would have to make do with nothing at all?

Militarily ignorant political leaders are easily stampeded into making capital acquisitions owing to public fear of a “growing gap” in aircraft, tanks, or whatever, generated with the help of a gullible media. Rather than laying down an iron law favouring indigenous hardware Antony, like his predecessors, has played into the institutionalised distrust of the Indian military of indigenous weapons platforms. IAF is merely the worst offender.

[Published in the New Indian Express, November 1, 2013 at http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Stop-wasteful-military-deals/2013/11/01/article1866740.ece

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Relations with Russia, russian assistance, russian military, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Western militaries | 22 Comments

US boat on elint mission?

Posted on October 21, 2013 by Bharat Karnad

The US boat, SV Seaman Guard Ohio, had apparently multiple missions. The arms drop to some nefarious Indian customers was discussed in the last blog. The other possibility, according to some experts who picked up the radio transmission of the boat, suspect a far more elaborate and strategic mission with the boat being equipped with powerful communications equipment able not only to eveasdrop on Indian naval (?) communications traffic but also to generate electronic intelligence (elint) on Indian missile launches that are planned in the immediate future, among them an Agni-IV, and Agni-V and the Nirbhaya 1,000 km cruise missile. Who knows, the equipment on this vessel may also be capable of, and was perhaps tasked to, try and jam the guidance system and otherwise subvert the planned test-firing profiles. In any case, truth would be known only if NTRO, NIA, with the assistance of, say, TCS were to take hold of the communications equipment on Ohio and, as the Chinese would do in such a situation, disassemble it to learn of its capabilities, and by way of a blueprint to reverse engineer the same.In any case, under no circumstances should this boat be allowed to leave Indian control, even if the men, who are not really important in the larger scheme of things, are repatriated. But we must, at a minimum, find out what’s in the innards of that ship and familiarize ourselves especially with the on-board communications/elint, missiule telemetry reading paraphernalia, and anything else we may find in it. It has trespassed into Indian waters, broke Indian laws. So, it is for us to learn what the ship was up to and do whatever needs to be done to gain knowledge of its electronics/elint suite. But will the Congress party govt at the centre and in Kerala show some chutzpah or, as is its wont, buckle under at the first sign of Washington’s ire?

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Missiles, Terrorism, Weapons | 2 Comments