Is the Naval air force better, more nationalistic than IAF?

Posted on June 20, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

There are curious goings-on in IAF when it comes to its dealing with indigenous and Russian aircraft. Is the Indian Air Force so institutionally set against the Tejas aircraft that it will go to any extent to delay its clearances and thus derail the programme, and to show up Russian aircraft as unworthy of India’s custom? Consider the evidence.

Cobham Aviation Services of UK was contracted to supply the quartz radome for the LCA radar. It is four months overdue, but the penalty clause has not been invoked. Why? Because an authoritative source says, the IAF has let it be informally known to the supplier that it doesn’t want an accelerated progress of the Mk-I lest it be ordered by the Govt to buy larger numbers of this aircraft, and so delays would be countenanced.

Further, considering the IAF’s attitude Cobham has also turned down ADA/DRDO’s request for 3-4 internal fueling probes to enable this aircraft to get an FOC (final operational clearance) for the Mk-I. No probes, delayed FOC.

The IAF is mortally afraid that buying into the Tejas will mean jettisoning the possibility of getting Rafales beyond the 36 mooted by the PM in G2G mode, which the IAF has its heart set on. It doesn’t want anything to come between the service and a big Rafale fleet in its inventory, especially as Vayu Bhavan is not certain that the def minister Parrikar will even realize the 36 aircraft buy from France.

Another piece of evidence: How come the IAF has so much trouble with its MiG-29 fleet (and its Su-30MKI fleet also), when the two squadrons of MiG-29Ks with the Navy have experienced very few problems, considering the maintenance regimes are virtually the same for the IAF’s version and the naval MiG-29K?

So, the niggling question arises: Is the Indian Navy’s air force simply better than the IAF in servicing, upkeeping, and operating advanced combat aircraft, meaning is it just a better operational force? Training regime-wise, the navy relies on the basic Indian-made HPT-32, a basic jet trainer,before the trainee pilots are tasked to conversion units before deploying to operational squadrons. Meanwhile, IAF has besides the Indian-made trainer aircraft, repeatedly shown its disregard and disrespect for the indigenous HPT-40 trainer project on the anvil by buying a series of trainers — the Swiss Pilatus, the British Hawk, and it is said, has even expressed interest in yet another advanced trainer, the American Textron Scorpion (with most such buys justified also in terms of their use in counter-insurgency jobs, which of course, it is never called on to perform)!!! May be the IAF is an air force perpetually stuck in the trainer mode — a tendency visible since the stewardship of the service by ACM (retd) “Charlie”Browne, now enjoying the Norwegian fjords as our ambassador there, rather than being a serious and meaningful air force our adversaries fear. How else to explain the greater proficiency of naval pilots flying and readying to fight over a more difficult medium — the sea, when the trainee pilots are sourced from the same manpower pool? There must be something the Navy is doing right the IAF isn’t.

And, in the light of the Navy’s enthusiastic financial support for the LCA and its taking ownership of developing the naval version of the Tejas, whether it is also not the more nationalistic service, eager to promote indigenous products and defence industry in contrast to the IAF which, when not whining about Indian products and always finding fault with the LCA, does everything possible, in cahoots with vested interests in the Defence Ministry and other parts of the govt, to undermine indigenous efforts?

In the event, perhaps, the Indian Navy’s aviation wing is in line for an expanded mission and role in the extended Indian Ocean region.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Culture, Defence Industry, domestic politics, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons | 37 Comments

Fair again!

Posted on June 18, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Christine Fair of Georgetown University, Washington, DC, is proving to be a far more trenchant critic of Pakistan’s strategy of asymmetric warfare — terrorism under the nuclear overhang policies, and more persuasive than any Indian analyst, and more convincing to the US policy establishment than the Indian Embassy working on the margins can ever be. See her piece of clear writing available at:

False Equivalency in the “Indo-Pakistan” Dispute


Her larger case is that the “false equivalency” between India and Pakistan assumed by US policymakers when assessing the situation in South Asia ends up unfairly dividing the responsibility for bad things happening in this part of the world equally between the two countries. Fair argues that at the bottom of Islamabad’s risk-acceptant policy of constantly needling India is its confidence that the US will always come to its rescue. If Washington corrects its posture by warning that it would not intervene in any crisis initiated by terrorism perpetrated by Pakistani supported outlaws, the problem would end because then there would be no one to save Pakistan if Delhi decides to retaliate and Islamabad would be forced to jettison its confrontationist policy. Christine’s case is built around the UN Resolution 47 of 1948, the fact that its conditions have never been met by Islamabad, and the false cultural history (of Muslims mistreated under Hindu majority rule and constituting a separate nation) and flawed Muslim demographics in the subcontinent at the core of the Two Nation Theory, which is the ideological undergirding of the Pakistani state.

In my writings over the last thirty years, I have analyzed the “false equivalence” aspects of America’s South Asia policy (and Western policy, generally) and its deleterious outcomes but from the perspective of the manifest inequality in every respect and the sheer disparity in the size, potential, and capabilities of the two countries which, in realpolitik terms, should have been decisive in influencing Washington’s thinking but wasn’t because short-term benefits and Pakistan’s utility as a “frontline” state ( in the Cold War, and in anti-Islamic terror and Afghanistan military campaigns since) over-rode strategic good sense.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Culture, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Pakistan nuclear forces, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Terrorism, United States, US. | 6 Comments

AQ Khan, yoga supporter!

Posted on June 16, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaign to bring universal acceptability to Yoga — reflected in the declaration by the UN of the International Yoga Day — and to popularize yoga at home, especially among the large Indian Muslim community, has, perhaps, got unexpected support with Abdul Qadir Khan, ex-Bhopal and so-called “Father of the Pakistani Atom Bomb”, though he was responsible for no more than stealing centrifuge technology to enrich uranium from the URENCO plant he was working in, in Europe.

In his op-ed published in ‘The News’ (Islamabad) yesterday (June 15, 2015) on “Prayer and Health” (at http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-323701-Prayer-and-health ), AQ Khan pretty much repeats/supports what many Hindu leaders are saying that namaz involves various yogic asanas (postures). AQ is here quoted in extenso:

“Namaz, a ceremonious and sedate prayer, is a combination of yoga-like movements and meditation, with the additional advantage of mild isotonic exercise. This leads to a sense of discipline, continuity, physical and mental health, atonement, composure and constraint of body and soul. Religion and ritual have always played an important role in the daily routine of human beings. Whether Hindu, Christian or Muslim, people seek alleviation of their problems through their rituals and convictions. This assists in experiencing great physical and intellectual endurance in the long run.

“Regular prayer is mandatory for every adult in Islam and an earnest disciple will pray conscientiously to the Almighty five times a day, as ordained in the Holy Quran. Apart from the spiritual nature of prayer, this ritual relieves a person from stress of work and other problems and gives him/her repeated unconscious breaks to rejuvenate their physical energy, alleviate mental stress and sooth the soul, enabling work to again be taken up without tension. It also requires regular ablution for physical hygiene before rituals can commence. Namaz at divided intermissions helps keep the body in an appropriate physical and mental state.

“Breathing in a correct manner during namaz ensures that all the bodily systems, both physical and mental, maintain an even balance. At the same time, this also helps to make the person feel relaxed. The yoga-like movements help maintain physical and intellectual fitness. The fundamentals of yoga, which are probably about 5000 years old and have been practiced in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, are divided into various categories. Ashtanga yoga consists of yama, Niyama, Asana, Pranayama, Pratyahar, Dharana, Dhyana and Samdhi.

“When examined closely, one finds a strong resemblance between the rituals of namaz and the routines of yoga. During namaz one is unconsciously performing yoga thereby reaping the benefits of maintaining physical and intellectual equilibrium. Namaz and yoga are both genuine rituals that keep one physically and mentally fit. However, namaz goes a step further in also assuring spiritual health as well.”

Well, well, well,…!

Posted in Culture, Indian Politics, Pakistan, society, South Asia | Leave a comment

Assessing India’s foreign & military policy, and Modi’s initiatives

Posted on June 13, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Bharat Karnad interviewed on India’s Foreign and military policy especially vis a vis China and Pakistan, and Prime Minister Modi’s initiatives in the external realm, by the London-based Oval Observer Foundation involved by its own account in “strategic engagement” and which [is] “an action platform for economic, social and political issues related to emerging markets and high growth nations. Established in early 2014, the Foundation provides a continuous engagement platform to stakeholders interested in increased growth in emerging economies.” The podcast uploaded to the net on June 2, 2015, may be accessed at:
http://ovalobserver.org/Podcast/oval-powertalk-ep-7-bharat-karnad/

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Australia, China, China military, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Japan, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Tibet, United States, US., Vietnam | Leave a comment

Does the Myanmar SF strike redefine Indian policy?

Posted on June 11, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Listen to Bharat Karnad comment on the Myanmar strike by the Indian army
WHETHER IT REDEFINES INDIA’S COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY AND MORE, at
http://cprindia.org/news/4435
—-
(text of above)
Q: The Myanmar strikes are in the news right now. Do you think it is redefining India’s counter-terrorism policy?

A: Yes, I think it is. Earlier it was a passive mode where you did not really react in the manner you did this time. This is definitely a new approach by the government wherein they are going to retaliate in a very hard fashion if there is a terrorist attack by anybody across any border. So it effectively opens up possibilities against China (since it is a disputed border) and Pakistan as well.

The not so good thing that has happened is that it has taken an anti-Pakistan note because of our usual habit of reducing everything down to Pakistan, and in a sense it defeats the larger strategic purpose that we are trying to signal. Unfortunately, former Colonel and current Minister of State for Information & Broadcasting, Rajyavardhan Rathore, putting an anti-Pakistan spin on things in an indirect way has not helped either. Targeting Pakistan is not on because all it does is that Pakistan gets all worked up, everyone starts talking about a possible nuclear scenario, and the essential thing is lost.

Instead, what we are trying to say is – if there is a terrorist strike, we will respond to the strikes by eliminating the terrorists – the groups that are responsible for the strike. Very simple.

The other downside of the strike is that we have also put the Special Forces in the news by sharing their photographs. This is not done. Special Forces are special because they are incognito. Their photographs should never come out because they can become targets. These are secret missions. Now you have gone and said that the 21 Para commandos carried this out. You never let out which commando group did it.

Q: How important is it to have the consent, or the partnership of the country in which you are going to conduct the surgical strikes?

A: When the countries themselves recognise there is a problem, as the Myanmar government does, as the Bhutanese government earlier did wherein we carried out a similar operation in 2003 eliminating ULFA terrorists, then it is fine. This was in that league, where compliant states were aware of the problem and they also needed help to root out terrorist outfits, which had forcibly occupied space in their own land.

In Burma, the Khaplang NSCN faction for instance (which wants an independent Nagaland), has support from Kachin army, also known as Chin army, which in turn is supported by China. The Kachin or Chin army controls Northern-North Eastern Myanmar. This part of Myanmar is controlled remotely by China through the Kachin army.

This is a much larger situation than merely going across the Manipur border and hitting. It points out the rather grave possibility of bigger powers involved, and I am not talking about Pakistan, but China. This raises the question – would India respond, as we seem to have some evidence of the Khaplang NSCN faction being supported by China through the Kachin army, in a similar manner in Northern Myanmar? Interesting thought. That is what we need to worry about. Pakistan is a very minor issue. We always get side-tracked and that’s what we should avoid doing.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Bhutan, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Myanmar, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | 4 Comments

Devastatingly honest and revealing….

Posted on June 11, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

If there’s a one go to-source for insights into the Pakistan Army there’s nothing better than C. Christine Fair’s ‘Fighting to the End: Pakistan Army’s Way of War’. Christine is quite a remarkable scholar having braved some extraordinary threats, such as by ISI of gang rape! In fact she talks about this and generally about the contents of the book, and her take on how and why the Pakistan Army “persists” in banging its head against the wall of trying to wrench Kashmir from India, despite sustaining a bloodied head, contusions, and skull fractures! The reason, she argues, Pakistan is able to engage the US and extract all manner of largesse from Washington, including military arms and assistance to try and address, what Christine believes are entirely spurious security fears of Pakistan (vis a vis India), is by threatening to become a failed state or to use nuclear weapons in hostilities invariably provoked by Pakistan!!! Watch this and learn https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMgijhexkqE !

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Geopolitics, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Pakistan nuclear forces, society, South Asia, United States, US. | 1 Comment

Encouraging a Gripen push, feeling out Russia on Su-35s

Posted on June 10, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

The Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD) is nothing if not completely confused about just how to handle the aftermath of the instantaneous decision by PM Modi in Paris to buy 36 Rafales for the spurious MMRCA slot. Assuming the PM’s word is taken as a firm commitment, then the country will be paying a whole lot of monies for very few aircraft, especially if as Parrikar has said, perhaps reflecting the roiled thinking in MOD and PMO — that there simply are not enough funds to buy more Rafales off the shelf nor to even go in for ToT. In this situation, it’d be reasonable to assume that Modi will have to back down, and tell Paris, er, sorry, but I misspoke! And for GOI to begin thinking entirely anew on the topic of augmenting fighter squadron strength fast.

This conclusion is derived from a couple of developments. (1) The Swedish defence minister Peter Hultqvist is in town, with a virtually single point agenda that Stockholm has been encouraged to if not push than at least air in Delhi. Sweden wants India to offtake the Gripen NG (new generation), flight control laws, source codes, advanced production technology and all, and the rpoduction house of Modi’s choice — HAL, pvt, the whole shabang package for nearly as much money as Delhi is willing to pay for the 36 Rafales, about $8 billion! And (2) in parallel, an IAF-MOD team is revealed by Russia & India Report, a Russian news outlet and hence credible about happenings at the Moscow end, in its story datelined June 2, as negotiating for joint production of the Su-35 (http://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/06/02/india-russia_move_towards_co-production_of_defence_equipment_43451.html ). [Amending: I mentioned wrongly that the Su-35 combat aircraft is what the Strategic Forces Command had asked for as the manned bomber leg of the nuclear triad, a request turned down by the Manmohan Singh regime. It was, of course, the Su-34. Too many ac numerals floating around in my head!]

The Eurofighter option has not gained traction despite very determined canvassing efforts by Berlin and London, because it is just as expensive as the Rafale, but with many more operational kinks to resolve.

Could these developments suggest that Parrikar and Modi are using the Rafale buy as leverage to soften up Sweden and Russia for better terms on the Gripen NG tech for incorporating into Tejas Mk-II and fast-tracking its production with Swedish help from Saab, the Gripen maker, and Moscow re: the Su-35 as the IAF’s main combat platform, especially if this is conjoined to Moscow’s promise to upgrade all Su-30 MKI engines to Sukhoi-PAK/FA engine standard? But all this is affordable only if Delhi finally and irrevocably trashes the Rafale.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Military Acquisitions, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Weapons, Western militaries | 24 Comments

Selling the rope that will hang you — US’ China policy

Posted on June 10, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Specialist sites yesterday reported that the PLA General Fan Changlong will be hosted by the US military, taken around sensitive military installations and weapons platforms for a week, including the CVN USS Ronald Reagan, Naval Station North Island, the recruiting centre of the US Marine Corps, Fort Hood, notionally HQrs of the US 1st Cavalry Div and 1st and 2nd Armrd Divs, but better known as the testing ground for all of US army’s latest weaponry, and the Boeing factory in Seattle, possibly the P-8 and F-15 production lines.

Where China is concerned, there’s no such thing as innocuous visits. Expert in picking up pointers on how to do their own things better, Gen Fan and his team will be absorbing what they see and are told.

If the idea is to win trust, such visits won’t do it. In fact, nothing will, because ultimately every little thing that’s learned will be turned against what the Chinese plainly regard as a manipulable and gullible adversary. But this sort of open-ness is a specifically American characteristic. Recall what Lenin said in 1920-21 about the industrialist Armand Hammer seeking to sell all kinds of things, from lead pencils to high technologies to the then young revolutionary Soviet Union in the process of implementing its NEP (New Economic Policy)? The capitalists will sell you the rope to hang them, Lenin had then observed, even as he bought all that Hammer had to offer!

In the present situation, the US is trying desperately to court China in the hope it will get on the duopoly track implicit in Xi Jinping’s new paradigm for “big power relations”. Except the age when a single or a two power-tandem could run the world is long gone. Beijing seems no more to understand this than Washington.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, Russia, United States, US. | Leave a comment

Taking out NSCN killers in Myanmar

Posted on June 9, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

From the sketchy info available that the media has put out, what is known about the Northeast insurgent movements, and about the safe havens in northern Mayanmar the NSCN factions use with impunity, secure in the belief they’d not be hunted down to these remote sites — several things can be deduced about the Special Forces (SF) operation to wipe out members of the Khaplang group who killed 18 personnel of the 6 Dogra Regiment in an ambush.
1) It was not one of the small tactical actions involving small SF teams that are mounted from time to time by army theatre commands across live borders to take out a culvert here, blow up an amo depot there.
2) It was a bigger unit operation that was meant to signal to internal and external adversaries that a resolute India is determined to prosecute telling retaliatory kill missions, whenever merited.
3) If it was a deep penetration mission, it would perforce be a joint operation with IAF helos providing quick means of infiltration to targeted locations well inside Myanmar and for exfiltration.
4) Indian military has long had the target coordinates for use in such strike ops.
5) The Khaplangi killers, supported by PLA, would have been prompted by their Chinese intelligence minders to cross the border and hit the patrolling 6 Dogra detachment.
6) It is unlikely Yangbon was given prior notice of this action, but may have been told of it immediately after the successful completion of the mission. This because Delhi is aware that certain members of the Myanmarese ruling junta are partial to China, and the Chinese would have been alerted who, in turn, would have warned the targeted Nagas about the impending Indian action.
————–
So much for the operation itself. The surprising thing is the reaction of an ex-COAS — did I hear Shankar Roy-Choudhary right? — who wagged an admonishing finger, labeling such actions “adventurist” and “dangerous”. Adventurist?? Hitting back hard, is adventurist? That such thinking prevails at all within the military shows just how inactive-passive the military leadership has, in fact, become. And just why any proactive or harsh retaliation by SF is so little used by India as a policy instrument. One of the pet themes I have flogged for over 30 years now is that neither the Indian govt nor the Indian armed forces really perceive SF as tools of strategic purpose and impact.

Incidentally, the Myanmar SF op, falls not in the realm of the strategic, but in the category of the extended tactical and is of the same ilk as the one launched in Bhutan some years ago against Assamese rebels, except that was conducted with the full knowledge and assistance of Thimpu).

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Bhutan, China military, civil-military relations, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Politics, Internal Security, Myanmar, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | Tagged | 2 Comments

Contested Waters: China and India Adrift on a Sea of Animus

Posted on June 8, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

The World Oceans Day celebrates the seas as a boon for mankind. It may soon turn out to be a bane for Sino-Indian relations. The problems are many and centre around the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) as the sea area and seabed stretching 200nm from the coast and island territories, including the 12 nautical mile (nm) strip of water hugging the coasts of countries deemed sovereign territory, exclusively for the coastal country to mine and drill for offshore oil and gas.

South China Sea Contest

In a world where traditional energy and minerals sources are depleting fast, such resources are highly prized and as between states with extended coastlines and contested island territories, ever-elongated EEZs are reduced to a confusing welter of overlapping claims that are difficult to resolve because they are almost impossible to disentangle. EEZs do not, however, prohibit or limit in any way the right of free passage through these waters for merchant marine and even warships of all countries in peace time. But peace depends on how emphatically a country seeks to enforce its claims.

At the recent Shangrila Conference in Singapore, the head of the Chinese Navy Admiral Sun Jianguo talked plainly about the possibility of adding to the 2,000-odd acres of new “islands” brazenly created in mid-South China Sea by Beijing in violation of international laws and legal understandings. China dumped massive amounts of earth, sand, and silt, cemented these huge manmade outcroppings, and used them as air fields and impromptu naval bases, and has threatened to impose an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the area. Both the “islands” and the ADIZ are, however, capable of triggering war.

With the enhanced EEZ measured off these ersatz islands, China’s claims to all of South China Sea, Beijing believes, are incontestable. The extraordinary and entirely illegal cartographic actions notwithstanding, Admiral Sun averred that China had actually “exercised enormous restraint”! If this is restraint, many wonder what Chinese loss of self-control would entail. Such territorially expansionist policy involving the “near waters” is justified on the basis of millennial claims of this maritime region once being a Chinese “lake”.

The India Tangle

How is India affected by such shenanigans? For one thing, India has concessions and invested in oil fields in the very waters off Vietnam which China thinks it owns. Direct confrontation with China is likely also because Vietnam is being built up militarily by India in the manner Pakistan has been by China – to be a deep thorn in the side of the other. India needs only to transfer nuclear-tipped missiles to Hanoi to equilibrate the situation.

Besides, per geostrategic logic the more China is kept busy minding its marine backyard the less it may be inclined to open a front in the Himalayas and, even less, in the Indian Ocean. India and China as the rising powers in Asia, and the narrow straits – Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda – oceanically separating them, make for a picture of a giant dumb-bell with the two countries weighing down the two ends, with India at least for the foreseeable future having the naval edge west of Malacca, and China east of it.

Strategic Interests

As in most strategic matters, India woke up late to the military and economic significance of dominating the surrounding ocean, having been lulled by the view that the Indian peninsula jutting out into the sea like the prow of an aircraft carrier could easily muster overwhelming force by sea and air in the Sunda-to-Simonstown arc, which Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean cannot thwart.

India’s military advantage has been gradually eroded though by Beijing successfully cultivating littoral states and island nations with economic and military aid and infrastructure assistance (in pursuance of its “maritime silk route” strategy), until now when with Chinese-run Gwadar heaving into sight, China is positioned to give a good account of itself.

To augment its seaward economic heft India, on the basis of sedimentary and other scientific evidence and the extended continental shelf-principle, sought approval in 2010 from UNCLOS for nearly doubling its EEZ, stretching to 340nm into the sea from the mainland and its island territories (Lakshdweep, Minicoy, Andaman & Nicobar), thereby reserving substantial portions of the seabed for exploitation beyond the 2,708,139 sq kms already in its fold (versus 3,119,309 sq kms for China).

In the event, China’s deep sea mining ventures and aggressive naval patrolling in the Indian Ocean are to India what Indian naval flotilla sailings and oil exploration efforts off Vietnam’s shore are to China – ready provocation and cause for conflict.
——
Published in the Quint, June 8, 2015, at http://www.thequint.com/2015/jun/08/contested-waters-china-and-india-adrift-on-a-sea-of-animus

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Pakistan nuclear forces, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Technology transfer, Vietnam | Tagged | 4 Comments