ECFR ‘Black Coffee Morning’ event in London

Posted on November 1, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

For readers of this blog residing in the UK, and especially the London metropolitan area, you may be interested in the following event to be hosted by the European Council on Foreign Relations, UK Chapter, Nov 9. The invite is pasted below:
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European Council for Foreign Relations
Black Coffee Mornings

‘How should the West regard India in a multipolar world?’

With Bharat Karnad, Professor in National Security Studies, Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi)
Chaired by Anthony Dworkin, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR
Monday 9 November, 08.30-09.30 (registration from 08.15)
Venue: New ECFR office, Kings Buildings, 16 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JJ (map)

RSVP: london@ecfr.eu

The European Council on Foreign Relations is delighted to invite you to an on the record, invitation-only discussion with one of India’s most renowned security experts, on the occasion of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the UK.
Since economic liberalisation of the early 1990s, India has been feted as an emerging great power. How should the West, and in particular the UK, work with India on the world stage? Does India deserve to be looked upon as a world leader?
Bharat Karnad is Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research (CPR). He is the author of Why India is not a great power (yet) (October 2015).

Anthony Dworkin is a Senior Policy Fellow at ECFR. He is currently serving as interim research director for ECFR.

We very much hope you can join us. Places are limited, and will be allocated on a first come, first served basis. We might allocate a limited number of seats for each organisation when demand for a specific event is high. Please confirm your participation as soon as possible by email to london@ecfr.eu. For more information about the work of the European Council on Foreign Relations please visit http://www.ecfr.eu or follow us on Twitter @ecfr.

Mark Leonard
Director
European Council on Foreign Relations
twitter: @markhleonard
——–

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, Indian democracy, Indian ecobomic situation, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Western militaries | Leave a comment

London book event

Posted on November 1, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

My new book — Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), is to be launched by the Royal United Service Institution, London, on Nov 9, at 6 PM; venue is 61, Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET. Blog followers and others interested in South Asia/Asian security affairs in the London metropolitan area desirous of attending it may please complete the formalities by registering at
https://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E5624D33141755#.VjV1G0196Uk

The event will involve a panel discussion on the theme of the book involving the Head of Security Studies at RUSI, Rafaello Pantucci, RUSI Research Fellow Shashank Joshi, and the author.

Hope to make your acquaintance at the event.

Posted in Indian Army | Leave a comment

UNSC membership — wrong emphasis at I-A summit

Posted on October 26, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Delhi, predictably (in that that’s how much MEA/GOI is not clued into trends into mainstream African thinking), is fluffing it even as the grand show Modi is hosting for African countries gets underway. Modi and, only hours before the inaugural session, external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj’s emphasis on getting the African bloc to strongly back India’s candidature for a UN Security Council permanent seat by coupling it with the placement of an African nation in the same forum, couldn’t be wronger.

African states, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are in the gimme mode and are looking for Indian investment in industrial and, its power areas — education and software sectors, and offering their natural resources as inducement and incentive, also as a means of setting up India as a counterweight to China in the extractive industrial sphere. Most of these states don’t give a fig about the UN — nothing but a useless talkshop. They’ll be disinclined and distinctively chary about getting in on this Indian campaign full bore because it will only exacerbate the differences and the divisiveness inherent in choosing between South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt to represent the continent in the UNSC. They’d rather not get into it, if they can help it. So, for New Delhi to push for a consensus backing for India and an Africa seat makes little sense because even if there’s wide support for India among the African nations, there’s no agreement whatsoever about the African candidate. Here the competition divides up between the states constituting the Muslem North, and the black states south of the Sahara, and then between whom to back — Pretoria or Lagos?

It would have been more sensible for Modi govt to not have made much of this issue, concentrating instead on the mining concessions India can utilize and the related infrastructure projects it can finance, and particularly stress security linkages with offers of military training, exports of Indian made armaments, and establishing the Indian military presence in embryo on the East African littoral.

Then again, there’s no point in expecting anything strategically farsighted from the MEA-directed Indian foreign policy.

Posted in Africa, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, Culture, Defence Industry, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, UN, Weapons | 2 Comments

Black Africa — not on MEA’s “radar”

Posted on October 25, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

On the eve of the India-Africa Forum Summit involving 54 states from that continent lying across the Ïndian lake, some home truths need to be acknowledged. While our foreign policy rhetoric and public posture has been pro-Third World, in the essential interests and thrust of Indian foreign policy New Delhi has been anything but attentive. African states have been the worst sufferers from Nehru’s time, primarily because relations with black states segue into the traditional subcontinental varna prejudices — fair & lovely, dark & ugly, etc, manifested also in the routine discrimination faced by African students in Indian colleges and universities. In the Indian Foreign Service, not surprisingly then, its members kill each other and scruple to nothing to wrangle a posting to even minor West European outposts, what to talk of prize billets in Washington, NY, San Francisco, and London, an African posting is seen as career death!

From the beginning, the MEA’s treatment of black African states has been condescending and patronizing– the very attitude, ironically, Delhi has always been over-sensitive about when dealing with white, Western countries! Indeed, so disinterested has the Foreign Office been in sub-Saharan Africa that not long ago when Mozambique and Tanzania offered India the richest iron ore vein in East Africa to mine on condition that it also build a 700 km railway line from site to the coast — which would have been needed anyway to carry the mined ore to Indian ships — the Indian ambassador who had worked these govts and secured the concession was told gruffly by the MEA Desk that “[Black] Africa is not on our radar”!

This and other opportunities that MEA/GOI has squandered over the years are detailed and analyzed in my new book — ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’. A particularly egregious example in the book of how Delhi turned down a security role on the East African littoral concerns Mozambique. Being satisfied with the perimeter security provided the African Union Summit by the Indian Navy, Maputo was keen that India help it found and equip its navy, including officering it at the highest echelon, and has permitted an Indian radar station to be set up on its northern coast as part of the surveillance grid IN oversees in the Southwestern Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy was jumping at this chance to gain enormous goodwill, have a demonstration effect elsewhere in the littoral, and to project power. But, yea, MEA negatived it!!! And we are now talking about contesting this Africa space with China where strategic opportunities have been witlessly ignored and neglected? PM Modi expects this same Foreign Office, manned by diplomats who look down on black African states to suddenly turn around, and realize his grand plans? Well, Good Luck, 7, Race Course Road!

Posted in Africa, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, domestic politics, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Indian Politics, society, South Asia, United States, US. | 3 Comments

Invite for Mumbai launch of book

Posted on October 24, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

For those blog readers residing in and around Mumbai, pasted below is the invite to the Mumbai event to launch my book — ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’hosted by the Asia Society, India chapter, at the Nehru Centre, Worli at 6 PM. The original invite accessible at http://www.asiasociety.org/india. Unfortunately, the technical capability for audio/video recording is unavailable for this event.
———-
Asia Society India

Is India Soft Selling its Hard Power?


Pictured Above: Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)

Economic growth, demographics and soft power are all cited to substantiate India’s potential “great power” status. One of the factors that receives relatively little attention, however, is India’s military might. As nations manoeuvre the waters of geostrategic decisions, extending their influence through hard power and realpolitik, is India being left behind? Could greater vision and strategy in India’s military capabilities reinforce national objectives as it moves toward attaining the status of a “great power”? Join us as Bharat Karnad, Research Professor, Centre for Policy Research and Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh, Former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command explore this crucial aspect of foreign policy in a conversation centered on ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’.

Bharat Karnad is Professor of National Security Studies, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and author of ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’. One of the foremost national security strategists of India, he has been a member of the National Security Advisory Board, the Nuclear Doctrine-drafting Group, and Adviser, Defence Expenditure (10th) Finance Commission, India.

Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh was commissioned into the Indian Navy in January 1966, Vice Admiral Singh PVSM, AVSM, specialised in gunnery and missiles. Before taking charge as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Naval Command, he was FOC-in-C, Southern Command. Among his various afloat and ashore appointments have been the command of five ships including the frigate INS Ganga and the aircraft carrier INS Viraat.

Speakers:

Bharat Karnad,
Research Professor,
Centre for Policy Research

Vice Admiral
Madanjit Singh,
Former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Western Naval Command

Date: Wednesday,
28 October 2015

Time: 6:30 pm
Registration & Refreshments: 6:00 pm

Venue:
Hall of Harmony,
Nehru Centre,
Dr. Annie Besant Road,
Worli, Mumbai 400018.

Admission: Free

RSVP Required:
asiasocietyindiacentre
@asiasociety.org

Join Asia Society
For more information regarding membership at Asia Society, please do visit our memberships page.

Asia Society India Centre 2nd Flr, Ramon House HT Parekh Marg 169 Backbay Reclamation, Churchgate, Mumbai Maharashtra 400020 India
Copyright © 2015 Asia Society India Centre, All rights reserved.
http://www.asiasociety.org/india

Posted in Indian Army | 6 Comments

Raining trouble

Posted on October 23, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

When it rains, it pours has never been truer than it is now for India.

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in Moscow to prepare the ground for Prime Minister Modi’s state visit in November, got a proper, if cold, reception. Her defining Russia as India’s closest friend did little to temper the message that, according to sources, was conveyed by Kremlin that Delhi’s taking Russia for granted will hereafter come at a cost. Swaraj was told, for instance, that unlike his other tours, the Indian PM while in Russia can expect no frills and hoopla — just business-like meetings shorn of all ceremony. Secondly, that while Moscow was, by and large, attentive in the past to Indian security concerns, it cannot afford India a veto on arms supplies to Pakistan — starting with the sale of attack helicopters and MiG-35 combat aircraft. Thirdly, depending on how things progress or don’t, Russia’s participation in sensitive strategic DRDO and DAE projects will be re-thought, as will the offer on the table for a while of the second Akula-II class SSN, the Iribis, that Moscow had agreed to upgrade to Akula-III standard before leasing it to the Indian Navy.

Given its own leanings, the BJP regime is thoughtlessly pandering to the Indian military’s institutional tilt and desire towards Western armaments and, hence, Western arms suppliers, without calculating the strategic costs to the country of going over so completely to the other side, as it were, simply boggles the mind. If Modi really believes that the US and Western European states will happily insert themselves in technology-transfer and indigenous tech-development role that Russia had heretofore specialized in, he has a rethink coming sooner than he believes. In the interim, until that light switches on, an awful lot of goodwill and policy ground for foreign and military policy maneuver will have been lost.

It is providential, in fact, that Pak PM Nawaz Sharif’s trip to Washington has happened at the same time as Swaraj’s to Moscow. It points to precisely the problems India, loosening its links to Russia, will face in dealing with a US now confident that Delhi has nowhere else to go.

Consider the ‘2015 Joint Statement By President Barack Obama And Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’ dated Oct 22, 2015 (accessible at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/22/2015-joint-statement-president-barack-obama-and-prime-minister-nawaz) at the end of Nawaz Sharif’s parleys with Obama in Washington. The US Government has acquiesced in describing Pakistan “as one of the largest Muslim democracies [that is utilizing] its influence in support of peace, security, development, human rights across the world” and the US-Pak relationship as “enduring”, and “bilateral defense cooperation” as “robust”. While recognizing Pakistan’s role, albeit inferentially, in containing terrorism by referring to “Pakistan’s positive efforts to counter improvised explosive devices” — THERE WAS NOT A HINT ANYWHERE OF TERRORIST OUTFITS TARGETING INDIA, SUCH AS LeT LED BY THE ABOMINABLE HAFIZ SAYEED, NURSED BY PAKISTANI AGENCIES AND OPERATING OUT OF PAKISTANI TERRITORY.

In the most telling portion of the Nawaz-Obama. Statement, under the sub-section “Strategic Stability, Nuclear Security, and Nonproliferation”, the two leaders “acknowledged the importance of regional balance and stability in South Asia” and, in an obvious dig against India, talked of the need for “uninterrupted dialogue in support of peaceful resolution of all outstanding disputes.”

Worse still from the Indian national interest perspective, the US kept its options to assist Pakistan militarily and otherwise keep its hand hot in South Asian affairs. In this respect, the Statement, most significantly, recognizes “the importance of regional balance and strategic stability in South Asia”, thereby accepting the point Islamabad has always made that “regional balance” is what leads to “strategic stability” which construction, it turns out equates Pakistan with India, and is a license for America to assist and help Islamabad by whatever means to maintain a “regional balance” in the subcontinent. The transfer of the most advanced Harpoon antiship missiles, fast patrol craft able to launch durable motorized rubber dinghies for sneak attacks of the kind mounted by terrorists on Mumbai 26/11, and six F-16s is the down payment on this US line of advance. Incidentally, this merely amounts to reviving an old US policy but one that’s been kept alive by the Washington thinktanks, such as Henry L. Stimson Center, which has provided one of its senior staffers (Joshua White) to the Obama NSC, whose South Asia head is Peter Lavoy, a known Pakistan sympathizer and one of the Americans who early preached reconciling to a nuclear-armed Pakistan by plying it with American largesse!

Combine this considerable Pakistani political-diplomatic success with India being unmoored from its historical Russian military technology anchor, and one can see India heading for a strategic crash-landing. Tighten your seat belts!

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Culture, Defence Industry, domestic politics, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian democracy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, nonproliferation, nuclear industry, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, Terrorism, United States, US., Weapons | 11 Comments

Letting a desperate Dassault off the hook

Posted on October 22, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Today’s papers carried reports on 50% Rafale offsets amounting to $4.5 billion or Rs 30,000 crore (“Rafale deal:France agrees to meet 50% of contract’s worth in India’s related sectors” http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rafale-deal-france-agrees-to-invest-50-of-contracts-worth-in-indias-related-sectors/articleshow/49487260.cms) — evidence that just the initial procurement cost of 36 of these so-called MMRCA is $9 billion as revealed in my preceding article in this blog dated Oct 19, with not an iota of tech-transfer, mind you.

The problem with the current indistinct offsets policy, and this is where the let-off is going to happen, is that what programs/projects to invest in and what indigenous capacity to build-up is left entirely to the French in this case to decide. In the past it has led to US defence companies writing off costs for “seminars and conferences” and the like against the offsets obligations. This offsets provision has not been tightened and Paris will feel free, for example, to consider its 5%-10% equity, via DCNS, in the Pipavav Shipyard, and similar extraneous expenditures as part of the Rafale offsets! It is — Heads French win, tails India loses!

The 50% offsets should be on the recurring expenditures on servicing and support for the lifetime of the aircraft $21 billion — minus upgrade costs — not on the $9 billion, meaning, fully $10.5 billion or Rs 75,000 crore should be extracted from Dassault as verifiable investment specifically in the aerospace sector programmes designated by DRDO. Otherwise the whole deal will be a dead loss. Recall that China got the whole production line and technology from McConnell-Douglas as a predicate for buying 100 of the latter’s medium range transporters in the 1980s — which seeded the aviation industry in China. But then Beijing knows where Chinese interests lie, and will move heaven and earth to protect and advance them. Delhi is in the business of enriching other countries at the expense of India!

All high-value armament deals are tense, nail-biting, poker games, except GOI invariably plays them as the perennial ingenue and amateur would — extracting nothing in exchange, in effect make one-sided transaction benefiting foreign states. Rafale as combat aircraft is no great shakes — it cannot even match the Su-30MKI in service with IAF for a decade. India should insist on Dassault transferring the entire production line along with the ancillary aerospace industrial capability as condition for buying this oldish plane. There’s still time because until the contract is signed GOI is in the driver’s seat — as I have written elsewhere; once it is signed Dassault will gain upper hand, and India can go cry in its cups.

Def Min Parrikar who is proving himself a weak and confused leader obviously cannot publicly over-turn PM Narendra Modi’s plainly quixotic announcement of the 36 Rafales-buy. But he can still ensure the demise of the Rafale deal by insisting that either India gets virtually the entire Dassault store to take the Rafale off France’s hands, or the PM goes over his head and the Cabinet’s in opposition to MOD’s advice, which Modi won’t do as he has enough political troubles which, incidentally, will only multiply once negative Bihar election results begin rolling in Nov 8. Then again, whether BJP wins or loses in Bihar, India is the big loser in the Rafale deal simply because the Modi govt won’t stand up for the national interest. And this is the way of a “nationalist” Indian government?!

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Cyber & Space, Defence Industry, domestic politics, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian democracy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Politics, Military Acquisitions, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons, Western militaries | 7 Comments

Grand ambitions, muddled planning

Posted on October 19, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

The impression created by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meetings with western leaders is that India will buy any de-rated military goods offered. His announcement about purchasing 36 1980s-vintage French Rafale planes to meet the Indian Air Force’s requirement for ‘medium multi-role combat aircraft’ (MMRCA) wrong-footed defence minister Manohar Parrikar, who favoured the bigger, more versatile and economical Su-30 — superior to the Rafale in all roles, including nuclear delivery.

In the US, accords for more C-17 transport aircraft and helicopters — all, incidentally, stripped of sophisticated sensors and communications gear were signed. The HDW 214 diesel-electric submarine selection for the navy’s Project 75i featured in the talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel — except that the ‘214’ is an ‘export’ variant of the advanced ‘212’ and, hence, without features like the non-magnetic hull to render detection by magnetic anomaly detectors difficult.

Such defence transactions supposedly promote Modi’s ‘Make in India’ scheme. Not clear how, considering they resemble the old policy of licence-manufacture. Absent the hard decision to end arms dependency by marshalling resources nationally, scrapping the “L1”— lowest tender — system and similar impedimenta, and permitting the private sector to utilise the defence public sector facilities, New Delhi will continue to rescue slumping western defence industries, while preventing indigenous design-to-delivery capabilities from getting off the ground.

Rafale is also part of the anti-Russian tilt — justified in terms of the spares shortages endemic to its supply chain. Except, the 30-40% down-time of Su-30s and MiG-29s, for instance, is comparable to that of the Mirage 2000s, Jaguars, and Hawks in Indian employ. In any case, the problem with the spares is more easily mitigated than prospective grounding during crises of whole fleets should European suppliers, succumbing to US pressure, cut off the spares flow, as happened in the past.

India’s aim to win friends by promising big armament buys may win goodwill. But it lasts only until the next big defence deal is lost by a vendor state, when the squeeze is put with threats of arms transfers to Pakistan, as Russia is doing with the proposed sale of attack helicopters and MiG-35 combat planes to Islamabad.

Among the deals none is more outrageous as regards cost and disutility than the Rafale deal. The reported negotiated price of $9 billion for 36 Rafales and another $6 billion for mid-life upgrade — for a total of $15 billion — is being used by the IAF as a wedge to compel buys of 44 more Rafales. This amounts to $250 million per aircraft, roughly the price-tag of the US 5th generation F-35 fighter-bomber. Using Parrikar’s metric of three Su-30s for the price of one Rafale, the $9 billion will fetch IAF 108 Su-30s or almost seven squadrons (instead of two Rafale squadrons). Further, because this plane is produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., it will spur local production and provide a fillip to ‘Make in India’.

Then there’s an aspect relating to the life-time programme costing that has escaped attention. It involves a system of complex calculations the IAF and defence ministry ostensibly used to make the MMRCA decision. By this reckoning the cost calculus actually gets more skewed against the Rafale. The $15 billion up-front acquisition cost constitutes only 30% of the lifetime costs. Maintenance and servicing will account for the remaining 70% of programme expenditures.

It explains the fierce competition to sell fighter jets because a country once hooked keeps paying multiples of the procurement price. In the event, the realistic bill for just two Rafale squadrons is $27 billion with upgrade (at current value) without technology transfer. Is Parrikar aware of this, and the government prepared for a humongous outlay on meagre fighting assets?

IAF’s import orientation can be fixed by giving it the charge of, and making it responsible for, the indigenous Tejas programme — deliberately belittled by its brass. This, combined with the jettisoned import option, can produce startling results. Recall that import denial led to India getting world-class Agni missiles.

Consider a Rafale-less force-structure: 108 additional Su-30s — rated the best combat aircraft in the world which could, by 2020, augment the 14 squadrons of this plane already in service, along with squadrons of the upgraded Mirage 2000, MiG-29, and Jaguar. For short-and medium-range air defence, the bulk aircraft is obviously the home-made Tejas Mk-1A and Tejas Mk-II.

Equipped with an Active Electronically Scanned Array radar they will, like Rafale, be 4.5 generation, but more agile and cheaper to buy and upkeep, and seed a sustainable Indian aerospace industry. In single combat a Rafale can beat the Tejas, but a Tejas swarm can down a bunch of Rafales anytime; meaning quantity will prevail when the qualitative difference is marginal.

Moreover, with air warfare transitioning into an era of multi-purpose drones — something the “fighter jock”-driven IAF seems unprepared for — the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project with Russia becomes redundant. The savings of Rs 50,000 crore can, with China in mind, be invested in leasing extra Akula nuclear-powered attack submarines and the new Tu-160M2 strategic bomber India needs but the IAF, incomprehensibly, is allergic to, or in developing and fielding advanced drones, more nuclear-powered submarines, and multiple-nuclear warheaded long-range Agni missiles.
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Published in the Hindustan Times, Monday, Oct 19, 2015 under two titles — the print copy had “Grand ambitions, muddled planning”; the HT on the net had “India rescuing western defence firms, not developing domestic ones” accessible at http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-rescuing-western-defence-firms-not-developing-domestic-manufacturing/story-v3doOxDUxqUMGNAVHwJjDK.html

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Culture, Defence Industry, domestic politics, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Weapons, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, society, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons, Western militaries | 11 Comments

Going slow on Brahmos to Vietnam?

Posted on October 17, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

The more one hears of things happening in the Modi government the more dispirited one gets. After his meeting with Obama, who frowned upon the destabilizing aspects of India’s Brahmos supersonic cruise missile transfer to Vietnam, the prime minister, per sources has instructed MOD to slow down the process of delivering this indefensible missile to Hanoi. The fact that he didn’t outright cancel the deal is a consolation — however small. Modi’s pandering to the US has been mentioned by me in a recent past, but this is ridiculous. Instead of making life as difficult for China, GOI seems to be easing off on the pressure and that too on Washington’s say-so. The problem here is that Obama and Xi Jinping have for some time now been pussyfooting around the possibility of a two power concert running the world. Instead of doing every thing possible to undermine it — Modi thinks India’s greater good lies in being party to this arrangement. Nothing will more definitely shrink, in a practical sense, India’s strategic space and hinder its great power ambitions than being reduced to a cog in the mighty US-China machine. And yet this is the path Modi seems to have embarked on. This despite the most predictively obvious outcome of a Brahmos-armed Vietnam — of detering the powerful Chinese South Sea Fleet warships from even venturing outside its secure breakwater bases at Sanya on Hainan Island. No better antidote/counter can be conceived for the Chinese dreams of a “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean basin. Now India stands to have Vietnam’s trust and confidence in Delhi erode. It remains to be seen if Hanoi will respond positively to China’s invitation to ASEAN navies to join PLAN in exercises in the disputed South China Sea waters, as a means of defusing the situation there. If Vietnam does accept Beijing’s gambit, it’ll be the first indication of its making peace with China on Chinese terms — a hideous consequence of India’s lily-livered strategic approach. India’s position is in no way recouped by its agreeing to having Japan join in the annual Malabar naval exercise with the US Navy. Meanwhile, the US is increasing its own political-military leverage in Hanoi by arming Vietnam, even if with less lethal armaments, the aim being to get Vietnam to rely on the US as security anchor while winning brownie points from Beijing for restraining Delhi from helping Vietnamese full-tilt.

The still more devastating irony to digest is that the Bharatiya Janata Party, which flashes its “nationalist” credentials, has been most responsible for rendering India vulnerable to Western depradations. Recall that it was the Vajpayee regime that stopped the open-ended nuclear testing with announcement of the “voluntary moratorium” in 1998 and followed it up, under Washington’s pressure, to scale back the country missile capabilities by diverting the effort of the Advanced Systems Laboratory, Hyderabad, from its ICBM development by insisting on prior development and fielding of the 700 km Agni-1 SRBM, when all Pakistani targets could be engaged with Prithvi missiles or firing the Agni 2 missiles at depressed trajectories. Manmohan Singh Congress regime only followed up with the absolutely destructive nuclear deal that has all but finished off India’s thermonuclear aspirations and, simultaneously,decapitated Bhabha’s 3-stage plan for energy self-sufficiency (natural uranium fueled reactors in the 1st stage, breeder reactors in the 2nd stage and thorium-fueled reactors in the 3rd stage) by siphoning off funds from the breeder and thorium reactor programmes to buying inordinately expensive imported reactors run on imported enriched uranium fuel. The opening for such denouement was provided by the BJP govt preparing the ground with the NSSP (Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership).

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Culture, Defence Industry, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Japan, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, nuclear industry, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, nuclear power, Nuclear Weapons, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Vietnam, Weapons | 4 Comments

Agni-4 test firing postponed ‘coz Modi in US

Posted on October 12, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

It is learnt that the fifth test-firing of the Agni-4 IRBM — and the second after induction as the land-based component of the Strategic Forces Command, that was long ago scheduled was cancelled/postponed by the BJP government because the firing date fell during the time Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in the US. This reflexive pandering to Washington on the one side and China on the other (by, for instance, conducting a joint Indian army-PLA exercise in Kunming at the same time as permitting Japanese warships to participate in the annual Malabar naval exercise with the US Navy, but disallowing the Australian Navy that too wanted to get in on this exercise) suggests that much of the early confidence about Modi standing up squarely for the national interest even if this meant stomping on toes, was a misread. Modi is turning out to be only a showier version of Manmohan Singh!

In any case, contrast the Modi regime’s genuflection to that of Iran under Hassan Rohani. It test-fired the Emad IRBM (apparently an extended-range Shahab-3) capable of carrying nuclear warheads knowing fully well it would be hauled up for defying the nuclear agreement with the US and a UN Security Council Resolution prohibiting the development of Iranian missiles capable of nuclear-ordnance delivery. The Iranian defence minister Hossein Dehghan preempted any criticism from the US and other Western quarters by saying “We don’t seek permission from anyone to strengthen our defence and missile capabilities.” No government in Delhi seems able to muster up such a refreshingly solid and straightforward stance of protecting the country’s sovereign imperatives? Any bets on which country — Iran or India — will be feared and respected by one and all?

Unless its foreign and military policies become disruptive and its attitude to international relations less risk-averse, and it relentlessly advances by any and all means the national interest by, for starters, initiating open-ended thermonuclear testing parallel with frequent test-launches of the Agni-5 IRBM, including the MIRV-ed variety, and the full-fledged Agni-6 ICBM, India, it is argued in my latest book — ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ will remain an inconsequential, middling power, content with stifling Pakistan! The awful thing is our rulers seem quite satisfied with this reduced aspiration — a standing they misrepresent as ‘great power’.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, Australia, China, domestic politics, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, indian policy -- Israel, Iran and West Asia, Indian Politics, Iran and West Asia, Japan, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Northeast Asia, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, society, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, US., Weapons, West Asia | 10 Comments