Urgent! See Tejas perform live! LCA impact

Posted on January 23, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Tejas while scheduled to be front stage and centre at the Bahrain Air Show at 1810 hrs (6:10 PM) Indian Standard Time on the last day of the Bahrain International Air Show, the Indian fighter may actually go up 10-15 minutes earlier, as the flight displays have been faster paced than the programme had planned.Catch Tejas live at http://www.bna.bh/portal/tv/ch55!! Get on line by 1745 hrs (5:45 PM) IST.

Several things have become apparent about the Tejas:

(1) The buzz about Tejas is in the form of general wonderment among the community of aviation experts and professionals present at the Sakhir air base hosting BAS: How come no one has heard of the Indian Light Combat Aircraft ere now and, considering what a great aircraft it is proving to be, whose idea has it been to keep this gem under cover, far from the gaze of international aerospace circles???

And three technical/performance aspects relating to the Indian LCA’s display have really impressed everybody in Bahrain:

(2) The turning radius of roughly 350 meters compared say to the US F-16’s 426-428 meters and the F-16, mind you, is virtually the gold standard for agility in combat aircraft. This means that in a dogfight Tejas could get inside of F-16’s loop and get on its tail more effectively than the US aircraft could do anything to avoid getting blown out of the skies.

(3) The low-speed handling characteristics of the LCA (necessary for effective prosecution of air-to-ground missions) has been a standout attribute, courtesy its compound delta wing (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LlEJRqVMYpY). This is what the
experts are talking in hushed tones about, especially as it is manifestly better than those in the same mission profile of the French Mirage 2000 in the IAF fleet, and comparable to the French Rafale IAF is pining for and which Prime Minister Modi, with little forethought, has committed himself to buying at an exorbitant price of some Rs. 63,000 crores for 36 aircraft with weapon load, i.e., Rs 1,750 crores per aircraft with NO technology transfer whatsoever!! In other words, the country could buy 14 Tejas Mk-1 for the cost of JUST ONE Rafale!! So, what are IAF’s reasons again for hitching a good part of India’s defence acquisitions budget to this buy? Go figure!!!

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Military Acquisitions, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons, West Asia, Western militaries | 3 Comments

Indo-Russian relations on ‘Latitude’

Posted on January 22, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Two television discussions on the state of Indo-Russian relations (16-17 January, 2016), and earlier, on Indo-US and Indo-Russian strategic partnerships (June 5, 2015) on the Maroof Raza-hosted television programme – ‘Latitude’ on Times Now TV at
http://www.timesnow.tv/Road-ahead-for-Indo-Russian-ties/videoshow/4484358.cms, and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvg5m3I8CwQ.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Military Acquisitions, nuclear industry, Nuclear Weapons, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons | Leave a comment

Tejas doing its thing in Bahrain!

Posted on January 22, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

For the clearest visuals of the first formal Tejas session at the Bahrain Air Show yesterday afternoon, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=SR88zf50vAU. Fast forward to the 2.56 minute mark of the 13-odd minute long video. These are truly great moments for the Indian designed fly-by-wire 4.5 gen multi-role combat aircraft! What a way to make entry into the international fighter market. Way to go Tejas!!!

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy, society, South Asia, Weapons, West Asia | 1 Comment

LCA maneuvers in Bahrain and Tejas’ immediate prospects

Posted on January 21, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

The stalwart fliers who will be piloting the two Tejas LCAs at the Bahrain Air Show (BAS) every afternoon post-lunch in the time slot 1300 hrs- 1600 hrs for the duration of the BAS are, from the Navy — Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar, presently head of the National Flight Testing Centre, Bangalore, and the service’s chief test pilot, Captain Shivnath Dahiya, and from the air force, Group Captain Madhav Rangachari.

Today is the first BIG day for the LCA and Maolankar and Rangachari will be at the controls. According to an unimpeachable source they “will perform (at the very least) a square loop, two rolls, a steep pitch up, a low speed pass combined with half roll and a loop.” This should quieten the doubters in IAF, MOD, and GOI and indeed prompt everyone in the procurement decision loop to trust in Indian talent and R&D programmes. Defmin Parrikar should capitalize on the Tejas impact at BAS, and instruct the ADA, DRDO, et al to transfer in full and without ado the technologies they have developed, ideally, to an Indian private sector defence industrial consortium to produce in large numbers and with hugely improved production quality (something HAL never achieved over the decades which, perhaps, was the reason for IAF’s reluctance to accept indigenous stuff), more realistically to a slate of Indian private sector firms with HAL, may be, retaining the prime integrator role. The ramped up Tejas production will meet both the country’s needs and a rapidly cultivated export market. The priority foreign customers should be Sri Lanka and Malayasia who, with slight Indian persuasion, opted out of their initial decision to tap Pakistan for the Sino-Paki JF-17 Thunder, followed by other neighbouring states, including Bangladesh, Myanmar and members of ASEAN. Vietnam, in particular, will be especially motivated to exploit the fighting qualities of the Tejas to the max.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh, China, China military, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Iran and West Asia, Military Acquisitions, Myanmar, Pakistan, Pakistan military, SAARC, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Sri Lanka, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Technology transfer, Weapons, West Asia | 2 Comments

1st video of the Tejas at Bahrain

Posted on January 20, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

For the first video of the Tejas performing aerobatics at the Bahrain Air Show, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=oQ_ZnWbQk74, or slightly better at https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=oQ_ZnWbQk74 .

One can (1) see right away why the PAF chose to withdraw the Sino-Paki JF-17 Thunder from the show, (2) understand why potential customers would be very interested in a relatively light multi-role plane that will not cost buyer-states their GDP, and (3) wonder at IAF’s and MOD civilian bureaucrats’ distaste for this indigenous combat aircraft and if it is not the usual inducements — the pleasures of Paris/etc, secret offshore accounts, offers of “scholarships” for suddenly “brilliant” progeny in prestigious universities and/or placements in well paying jobs in MNCs/FSIs in the West packaged with residential permits, that are at work.

If Defmin Parrikar still does not appreciate the strategic value of the Tejas (and its variants) as the mainstay combat aircraft of the IAF for as long as warfare by manned weapons platforms lasts, which is not too long into the future, as the seedbed for a genuinely Indian aerospace industry, and as an enormously prized product whose export potential is vast, then he might as well retire to Goa where he will at least do no harm to the national security interests.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Culture, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Iran and West Asia, Military Acquisitions, Pakistan, Pakistan military, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons, West Asia | 2 Comments

Tejas — Pak Thunder(bird) fearing comparison/competition in Bahrain, pulls out

Posted on January 18, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

The word is the Pakistan Air Force has decided to pull its MiG-21 Chinese derivative — JF-17 Thunder(bird), built at the Kamra Air Complex from the forthcoming Air Show in Bahrain. (For the list of aircraft on static and dynamic –flying–display, see http://www.bahraininternationalairshow.com/trade/Content/Aircraft/5_7/.) It suggests that PAF both fears comparison with the Indian Tejas, flying under DRDO (not Indian Air Force) aegis, at the air show — they were allotted the same exhibition pad (Number 15) to park the planes in — and competition in terms of flight performance at the show. There were some doubts about the Sino-Pak JF-17 taking to the skies, now it will not even be seen in Bahrain. Discretion being better part of exhibiting a fairly antique combat aircraft, it would have been damned difficult for PAF to sing their plane’s praises and maintain a straight face while seeing the 4th-Gen Tejas pull tight 8-g turns above them, and otherwise impress with its manoevereability and stealth attributes that the Thunderbird can’t match. It would have highlighted the generational difference between these two aircraft. The PAF is apparently prepared to forfeit the unrefundable half a million dollars to reserve exhibition space than risk exposing their bird to expert criticism, and negative contrasting with the Tejas.

Incidentally, of the three test pilots that will be putting the 5th and the 7th of the Tejas prototype series deployed to Bahrain, two are from the Navy, emphasizing the Navy’s belief in and support for the indigenous navalised version of the Tejas aircraft under development. The Navy needs to be commended; IAF needs to hang its head in shame.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy, indian policy -- Israel, Iran and West Asia, Iran and West Asia, Military Acquisitions, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, SAARC, society, South East Asia, Weapons, West Asia | 21 Comments

Terrorists’ Edge: India’s Systemic Disorder Exposed in Pathankot

Posted on January 15, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Suppose there was perfect “intelligence”, advance notice of the time, place, and date of a terrorist attack. Suppose further that all local state and central organisations, police at different levels, and paramilitary and the armed services, were all in sync, had familiarised themselves with situations that may arise, and practiced the precise actions needed to thwart the terrorists. What would happen in this situation in real life? As evidence shows, there would be inter-agency chaos and jurisdictional confusion leading, inevitably, to delays and a muddled response.

In Pathankot, there was 24 hours’ notice about the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)-inspired terrorist event, and yet the jihadis managed, with ease, to breach the defence system. A few of them traversed the distance to the Pathankot air force base (AFB) in the local Superintendent of Police’s car, penetrated the AFB perimeter and holed up unmolested for a whole day to rest and recuperate in an unused shed not far from where the Indian Air Force planes were parked.

They embarked on their suicidal shoot-up mission that met with little initial resistance because the nearby Army Division didn’t act, assuming that a National Security Guard (NSG) unit was flying in from Delhi. Once deployed, the NSG lost a senior officer because he failed to take the elementary precaution of treating a dead jihadi as a potential booby-trap.

Lapses in Security

This episode also reveals the rot of corruption at all levels, especially the BSF, state police, and the AFB guard, and how easy it is for an intruder simply to buy his way into sensitive areas (according to news reports, fifty rupees procured access to the Pathankot base). It also brings to light the severely lax attitude to security (with no surveillance cameras on the perimeter and no cordon sanitaire, with habitation allowed just beyond the boundary markers.

A more egregious example of system breakdown was witnessed in December 1999 with the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight IC 814 by militants who obtained the release of Mahmood Azhar, the JeM chief, in return for the safe return of passengers. The awful thing was that just a year earlier exactly this situation was gamed, and a multi-agency ‘Exercise Sour Grapes’ carried out to practice moves to frustrate hijackers, such as parking a truck/tanker in front of the plane, disabling the plane by blowing out its tyres, and mounting commando action.

But, when IC 814 touched down at the Amritsar airport to refuel, all hell, predictably, broke loose. Every responsible head of agency in government from Chandigarh to Delhi lost his head, none of the practiced actions were implemented, the Punjab Police commando unit and Indian Army formation in the vicinity were asked to stand down, and the refueled aircraft took off, eventuating in the humiliating negotiation involving External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Taliban ruffians in Kandahar.

Lessons Not Learnt

Sandwiched between these incidents during the BJP governments was the still more devastating Mumbai 26/11 strike in 2008 during the Congress Party’s watch by a handful of seaborne terrorists. I had written then that, luckily, their Pakistani minders didn’t have another ‘Pearl Harbour’ in mind because the terrorists could as easily have blown up a large part of the navy’s Western Fleet, then lying at anchor 500 meters away and 40 degrees off the jihadis’ approach line to the Gateway of India on an outboard motor-rigged inflatable dinghy.

So, the problem is not the party in power, or the incompetence of politicians at the helm, but the absence of operating procedures standardised across a spectrum of terrorist actions that every relevant police and intelligence agency at the local, state, and central government levels, as well as the paramilitary, NSG, and the armed services should adhere to strictly in counter-terror contexts anywhere in the country. The need is, therefore, urgent for a slate of counter-terror SOPs to ensure predictable, decisive, prompt, integrated and effective responses.

Why We Urgently Need the NCTC

Minus this, as in all terrorist-induced crises to-date, every agency will act separately according to its own bureaucratic lights and succeed only in getting in the way of every other agency doing the same. It advantages the jihadis and encourages their state-sponsors to rely on terrorism as asymmetric means of warfare to unsettle the Indian state and society at will.

Worse, there’s no nodal organisation, such as the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), to coordinate intelligence inputs, tailor the SOP-related actions to specific situations and to control all anti-terror operations. Mooted by the Manmohan Singh government after 26/11, NCTC is lying fallow. With neither SOPs nor an apex agency in sight, all such crises invariably end up being handled by the National Security Adviser of the day. Brajesh Mishra tackled the IC 814 hijack, MK Narayanan 26/11, and Ajit Doval Pathankot and each, in his own way, made a hash of it.

Snapshot

NCTC Can’t Wait Any More
•Pathankot terror attack raises the issue of severely lax attitude to security besides highlighting how easy it is for an intruder to buy his way in.

•Luckily terrorists behind Mumbai 26/11 strike didn’t have another ‘Pearl Harbour’ in mind with the navy’s Western Fleet being a few metres away.

•The need is, therefore, urgent for a slate of counter-terror SOPs to ensure predictable, decisive, prompt, integrated and effective responses.

•A large part of the problem can be addressed by institutionalising the NCTC to coordinate intelligence inputs and control all anti-terror operations.

——-
Published in ‘The Quint’, January 15, 2016; at http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01/14/terrorists-edge-indias-systemic-disorder-exposed-in-pathankot

Posted in Afghanistan, Asian geopolitics, Culture, domestic politics, Geopolitics, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian para-military forces, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, society, South Asia, Special Forces, Terrorism | 5 Comments

Watch out for the Tejas, Sakhir!

Posted on January 13, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Two Tejas LCAs should at this moment of writing be flying over the northern Arabian Sea for a refueling stop in Muscat before taking off for the Sakhir AFB, Bahrain. At the Air Show starting January 21, the Tejas will be parked on Pad 15 between pairs of the Pak-China product, JF-17 Thunderbird, and the RAF Typhoon Eurofighter. This is actually a wonderful placement for the obvious reason that visitors will be able to compare and contrast the antique nature of the ungainly, nearly 60-year old Sino-Pakistani knock-off of the ex-Russian MiG-21 on the one hand, and the 4.5 generation (when equipped with the 2052-based AESA radar), largely composites-made and hence immeasurably stealthier and beautiful-looking Indian Tejas, sporting smooth lines and modern design with, moreover, a larger operating radius on internal fuel and bigger weapons-carrying capacity available at around the same price as the JF-17, and the Eurofighter (designed by a consortium of the most advanced aerospace European countries, including Germany, UK, and Spain) with longer range but also a price tag some four times that of the LCA. Indeed, there isn’t a fitter aircraft for India to arm itself with at lower unit cost, and amortize its investment in the Tejas programme by creating a market for it in developing countries (by initially selling a few aircraft at cost price) and then growing the market with attractive deals and “friendship” payment modes.

No bad thing at all for the internationally-known aviation experts and cognoscenti generally to inspect what is potentially a great air defence aircraft India has produced inside of 35 years from a designing and industrial base that was reduced to zero with — and I repeat this — the KILLING in the early 1970s of the Marut HF-24 Mk-II by the Indian Air Force in the main. That the Tejas that will be put through their paces over the Shakhir skies will be flying DRDO colours, and will not be operating under the IAF’s aegis, shows the level of antipathy to home-grown aircraft of the Service’s leadership that has refused to-date to take ownership of it. (A comparison of the timelines: the US F-35, some 20 years in the making, is turning out to be an absolute lemon but is nevertheless being inducted into the US Air Force!) IAF’s treatment of the Tejas is a national shame, revealing to the world the Service’s outrageously regressive fixation on imported fighter aircraft and its resistance to anything indigenous. Once the praise and good notices start rolling in, however, IAF will rue the fact it didn’t back the LCA to the full.

End-note:

The Bahraini air show managers have apparently made the Tejas and JF-17 share the same exhibition space to spark interest in the regional and international media. But, along with the DRDO testing crew and maintenance personnel GOI has, by way of abundant caution, hopefully had the foresight to also dispatch a well-armed security team to mount 24/7 guard around the Tejas — the enormously capable Indian Navy’s Marine Commandos (MARCOS) would be best for this task — to augment whatever security is afforded the participating aircraft by Bahrain. Too many ill-wishers inside and outside the country, alas, have an interest in showing down the Tejas to not try and sabotage the Indian LCA in small and big ways and otherwise to spoil its international coming-out party.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Internal Security, Iran and West Asia, Military Acquisitions, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Russia, society, South Asia, Special Forces, Weapons, West Asia | 27 Comments

Hanut Singh dishonoured

Posted on January 12, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Just a few months after his death the memory of the late great Lt Gen Hanut Singh (CO, Poona Horsein 1971 ops; GOC II Corps 1987 Exercise Brasstacks) stands dishonoured. The Armoured Corps Centre and School, Ahmednagar, to honour its most reputable commandant and the army’s most renowned armoured commander in its history since independence, decided to memorialize the General — the epitome of competence in command, and of steadfast integrity and unimpeachable character, with an annual lecture. But this the finest of gentleman-officers the army has known finds that no one in the army or government wants to so remember him. Two high-placed persons who were approached to deliver the inaugural ‘Lt Gen Hanut Singh Lecture’ declined to do so. Finally, the former Vice Chief of the Army Staff Lt Gen Philip Campose, a mechanized infantry officer (1/8 Gurkha) has been roped in to give the talk scheduled for Monday, January 18.

In other words, not one stalwart from the BJP Govt or from the retired cavalry officer cadre could be found to do Hanut’s memory the honour it richly deserves. This is the fate suffered by the most exemplary of mobile warfare exponents in the Indian Army — he wrote the manual for armoured operations — and unarguably the most effective battlefield commander the country has seen. There lies Hanut then, with no one from even his own combat arm willing to publicly sing his praises for the service he rendered the army and country.

Feel really sorry and ashamed.

Posted in civil-military relations, Culture, domestic politics, Indian Politics, Pakistan, Pakistan military, society, South Asia | 3 Comments

Chasing the “bandicoot”: All tactics, no strategy, & a no change-regime (after Pathankot)

Posted on January 10, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inspection tour of the Pathankot air base yesterday — the scene of the usual, snafu-ridden, effort to subdue the infiltrating JeM terrorist team, and his endorsement of his NSA Ajit Doval’s handling of the crisis situation (“Noted with satisfaction the decision-making and its execution, the considerations that went into our tactical response. Also noted coordination among various field units”) suggests that, as that song in ‘3 Idiots’ went — “Aaall is welll!!”, nothing needs to be changed.

Implicit then is the belief that because everything worked tickety-boo there is no requirement for reviving the anti-terrorism centre (National Counter-Terrorism Centre) as the central decision-making and coordinating agency, and for instituting SOPs (standard operating procedures) that would apply across situations so every agency with interest/jurisdiction hews to the same response plotline rather than each organization going off on its own or, as happened in Pathankot, standing down, doing very little, awaiting instructions, and being aware enough of Doval to not take initiative for fear of upsetting whatever plan he may have up his sleeve.

In the event, the Pathankot response was a meandering one, wasted valuable time, involved misuse of available resources — airlifting NSG troops rather than using the army units in the immediate vicinity as the cutting edge of the effort (with the Lt. Col. heading the NSG effort ignoring the obvious possibility of the JeM militants boob-trapping their bodies to increase adversary attrition post-their elimination and losing his life in the bargain).

Perhaps, it was silly to expect things would be different after this newest terrorist event. Or that Doval would suppress his RAW/IB “field agent’s” impulses and not insert himself centrally into the proceedings, forsake direct control of the unfolding event by not dispatching NSG rather than working with the proximal army unit through the army line of command, and hence being forced to share the credit, rather than monopolize it. Of course, the downside of this approach is what actually happened — the profusion of command and control mistakes, and the confused ops to flush out and corner the JeM jihadis that prevailed, which is being laid at Doval’s door.

True, Modi had no option than to back Doval and the manner in which the latter tackled the unraveling events. After all as PM, he cannot be expected to be conversant with national security matters in any great detail. Which is all the more reason for PMs to pick persons as NSAs who are conversant with the larger issues in the strategic context. The danger of appointing policemen or militarymen to the apex position is reflected, say, in General Pervez Musharraf’s Kargil adventure — commendable tactics, bad strategy. The negatives were apparent — and so analysed in my new book ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ during another policman MK “Mike” Narayanan’s tenure as NSA to Manmohan Singh. Mike was mostly preoccupied with placing which policeman in what billet in RAW, IB, here and abroad, etc. When he did venture into the external realm, he ended up pushing the nuclear deal with the US to the detriment of the country’s thermonuclear pretensions and its deterrence stance.

Doval is more ambitious but his limitations are not dissimilar to Narayanan’s in that he believes every problem has a tactical, policing, small-time solution when, in fact, national security policy making should properly be concerned with an instinctive understanding of internal, regional and international developments that meshes with historical understanding of how circumstances may pan out. Doval has been nothing if not vocal. Hear his numerous videographed speeches on youtube.com, and what you come away with are ideas that have been there in the public realm for a while but now packaged with lashings of Hinduistic ideology and Pakistan-bashing.

And that’s the whole problem right there in a nutshell, isn’t it? Beating up on Pakistan rhetorically and in public speeches, promising retribution, is good theatre but does not make for sustainable national security thinking and policy, not when China is right there, standing with a club in its hands while Delhi chases the local “bandicoot” and ruffles the scenery.

The more debilitating aspect of the Indian reaction to the more important undercurrents is to rely on Washington to “read the riot act” to Islamabad and get it to to respond appropriately. Can there be a more de-spiriting and national self-defeating response than this?

Deal with Pakistan on its own terms with relentless covert warfare actions. Don’t squawk and complain, and act the supplicant, and plead with America to bring the Pakistanis in line. Seeking out Washington’s help in absolutely any circumstances is what Delhi should not ever do because it hands Washington the leverage to use against India. India should take care of its business by itself — the one thing Delhi and Indian governments/political leaders since independence have not done nor, after repeated bad experiences, have learnt to do.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Culture, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, guerilla warfare, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian democracy, Internal Security, Pakistan, Pakistan military, SAARC, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Terrorism, United States, US. | 6 Comments