Arihant to fire K-15 very soon

Posted on February 8, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

As part of its weapons firing tests, the Arihant SSBN will go out to sea and very soon fire, submerged, the 750km range,solid fuel, K-15 SLBM, some two years after the last (from 20 meters) underwater pontoon launch off Vizag. Since the first test firing in 2008, 4-5 missiles have been launched from the underwater pontoon pad. Hopefully, DRDO will follow up the forthcoming one by firing other longer-range SLBMs in quick order. There’s just too long an interval between missile test-firings and hence delays in their induction. For instance, an Agni-5 test launch was slated for sometime in Oct-Nov 2015 but hasn’t taken place yet. In any case, the triggering of K-15 from the Indian SSBN will be a nice end-event, in a manner of speaking, to the IFR, though to make a much bigger strategic splash a China, for example, would have gone in for a more “in your face” timing of this launch to just around the time the fleet review got underway.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, society, South Asia, Weapons | 6 Comments

Arihant SSBN pulled from IFR

Posted on February 6, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

It was announced yesterday in the nick of time, on the eve of the International Fleet Review, in fact, that the indigenous Arihant SSBN would not be seen, leave alone showcased in the event at Vizag inaugurated this morning. Small mercy this, but the boat was pulled from the Review altogether, with an aircraft carrier now placed as the lead Indian ship. It suggests the surfacing of good sense in NHQ, which initially thought nothing of exposing the country’s most decisive and invulnerable strategic weapons platform to the prying eyes of friends and adversaries alike, and changed tack (perhaps, because some senior naval officers picked up on the note of alarm in a previous blog on this site — what to speak of the inherent imprudence and foolhardiness of this action in not keeping the SSBN under deep wraps). Fortunately, the naval brass had not invested their ego in the earlier decision and, the mistake once pointed out, was corrected without ado. It has enhanced their reputation for strategic mindedness.

This is all to the good. Now the Navy can be preoccupied with scrutinizing the PLAN ships and submersible of the Chinese flotilla sauntering into our port and oceanic backyard and, on the side, carry on splendidly at the IPR with impressing states — both friend and foe, influencing littoral states on the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in particular, and generating goodwill.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Weapons | 1 Comment

Tejas is operationally ready, Mr Parrikar. Now order IAF to induct it.

Posted on February 5, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

This afternoon a Tejas flown by Group Captain Madhav Rangachari, fresh from the aircraft’s stirring display in Bahrain, went up over the firing range in Pokharan and successfully fired the Israeli Derby air-to-air BVR missile integrated into its fire control system. With this test the indigenously designed and developed Tejas Light Combat Aircraft having test-fired all kinds of missiles and dropped air-to-ground ordnance, is actually ready for active service.

It had earlier already test-fired the short-range Python air-to-air missile in Op Iron Fist several years back and, in more recent war exercises, dropped laser-guided bombs and dumb [gravity] bombs. It has also fired in ground tests the high-kinetic energy ammo-firing 23mm GsH cannon. With the British firm, Cobham, moreover, finally delivering on a few of the 200 or so units of the radome ordered — which delivery delay has unduly stretched out the aircraft’s certification process, the LCA is ready for operational service. Trying out external fuel probe with actual mid-air refueling will happen soon but is, in any case, extraneous to the short range air defence mission of the Mk-1 & 1A variants of this aircraft and shouldn’t stop the IAF from giving it an FOC (Final Operational Clearance).

Having failed in the past to subvert and undermine the development of the aircraft in small and big ways, IAF has now taken to making all kinds of mostly feeble excuses to postpone induction of the Tejas. Until now when there’s no excuse left, especially with one of its own ace fliers, Rangachari, proving the plane’s brilliant flying qualities publicly at the Bahrain Air Show, which the IAF has studiously kept away from saying anything about because it cannot credibly pooh-pooh them. The aerial testing of the fuel probe, 23mm GsH cannon, and the Cobham radome can follow the FOC by IAF.

Indeed, it is only only with the indigenous Tejas that IAF has been so punctilious in demanding that the aircraft comply fully with every last ASR. Mirage 2000 was allowed to enter active IAF service without being armed with any A2G or A2A missiles, and for the first several years in 1 Squadron and 7 Squadron thereafter featured nothing by way of armament than its 30 mm cannon, which made this aircraft good for very little. But, hey, that’s a French plane! Now consider how sophisticated air forces handle new aircraft. The US fighter aircraft the F-35 Lightening-II has joined frontline squadrons without, however, being “battle ready”. Meaning that such faults as may be discovered in the underway “initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E)” will be rectified subsequently in the aircraft already in service. This incidentally is the normal procedure followed by all major air forces. IAF is apparently not among them because left to itself it will be in no hurry to grant Tejas FOC.

Hence Defmin Manohar Parrikar has to step in. He can choose to be led by the nose by IAF, or use his common sense, see what’s being done by other air forces the world over, and order IAF immediately to give FOC to Tejas. And in parallel, he should instruct HAL to get into a ramped up production mode, with a whole string of MSMEs being transferred Indian origin technologies for them to produce and improve, and to procure TOT on imported components and assemblies in the Tejas, or hand them over for reverse engineering to a multitude of Indian enterprises. Normal ministerial prompting won’t do. Because IAF, seemingly insensitive to the indigenization imperative, has time and again shown by its actions that importing aircraft now constitutes its institutional DNA.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Culture, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Israel, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, society, South Asia, Technology transfer, United States, US., West Asia, Western militaries | 13 Comments

FGFA deal by Feb-end & why Rafale is going nowhere fast

Posted on February 4, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Real-life hare and tortoise story. The hare is the French Rafale combat aircraft, the tortoise the slow but steady Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). The tortoise is about breasting the tape — with the deal likely to be signed by this February end, i.e,, within the next few weeks.

While the Rafale flashily and ostensibly made an end-run around the various onerous procedural and substantive requirements attending on the IAF’s MMRCA acquisition process, when Prime Minister Modi, ill-advisedly, tried to give France and its vendor Company, Dassault Avions, an unfair advantage by publicly committing to buying 36 Rafales off the shelf, the sheer unaffordability of this fast-dating aircraft which, this blog and my writings have been pounding on about, has put the brakes on achieving the deal anytime soon. It is stuck at the last mile, so to say.

This is no bad thing to happen considering there’s no money to pay Paris, which wants the money up-front. Because, consider the vast quantum involved. At the time Rafale was shortlisted, I had alerted the readers to the fact that the final bill will be nearer $40-$50 billion for 126 aircraft and, all told (inclusive of the costs to construct the infrastructure, such as air-conditioned hangars, etc. as have been built for the Mirage 2000 squadrons in Gwalior), a unit price of $246 million billion. The Rs 63,000 crores the Modi govt has set aside for 36 Rafales works out to $227 million per aircraft. Except, France will not permit any Indian-designed weapons, such as the BVR Astra air-to-air missile, or the Brahmos cruise missile, to be integrated into the Rafale. But it will integrate American-sourced armaments, which is what IAF favours! Meanwhile, Russia has vetoed arming the French Rafale in Indian inventory with the Brahmos. So the Rafale is checkmated, rendered a pretty useless weapons platform unless the Modi govt approves the untested Brit-French-Italian consortium MBDA-made Meteor, which is yet to be operationalized, or buys US-weapons which will have MTCR-induced constraints on range, etc., at the expense of Indian missiles that will loosen the reliance on imported armaments.

But trust the apparently strategically stupid IAF and a compromised MOD to push the Rafale even if this supposed MMRCA will end up being completely non-lethal and harmless. The only bit of hope is that the original notion entertained by Defmin Parrikar of buying double the number of Su-30MKIs for the same number of Rafales and minus the cost of any new infrastructure, etc., will under the circumstances, begin to gain traction, especially in light of Russia’s earnest and positive attitude to transferring FGFA codes, flight control laws to India.

The final FGFA deal that is expected to be signed and worth $3.7 billion will involve the fly-in into India of three FGFA PAK FA aircraft for IAF to begin flying them and for TAC-D in Gwalior to begin writing the manual for tactics, etc., and the transfer of flight control laws and open[air]-frame design to enable ADA to modify the aircraft architecture to suit Indian requirements and source codes, including for the fire control system.

But where India’s procurement contracts are concerned, there’s always and inevitably a foul-up, the downside. There’s one in the FGFA agreement as well. The wondrously incomprehensible and myopic aspect of this deal is the rejection by IAF-MOD of Moscow’s extraordinarily generous offer to have its Saturn jet engine design bureau (that resulted from the merging of the Lyulka and Tumansky design bureaus) jointly with Indian counterpart (GTRE) develop a powerful new era jet power plant — something no other country will deliver on and, despite promises, certainly not the technology hyper-protective US. But, as reported elsewhere, India will instead buy the Saturn AL-41 engines whole to power the Indian-modified FGFAs! It fits in with IAF-MOD thinking of keeping India forever tied to the apron strings of foreign vendors.

An astute Defmin would have seen through this and imposed a corrected decision on IAF-MOD. Apparently, that hasn’t happened, even though, one suspects, that given Parrikar’s partiality to economical options and his measured assessment of cost and benefit — as regards, say, the Su-30MKI as MMRCA instead of Rafale, he is the one speeding the FGFA project along.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons, Western militaries | 16 Comments

Why phase out Tu-142s? Get more of them.

Posted on February 1, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

The Indian Navy seems desperately eager to acquire an all-P8i Poseidon fleet and phase out, as quickly as affordable, the eight multi-role Tu-142 long range turboprop aircraft currently deployed in MR, ASW, and anti-ship (AS) roles out of the naval airbase at Arrakonam. This must be a fairly recent decision to retire the Tupolevs acquired in the 1980s because, not too long ago, the navy had procured from Ukraine a modified rotating system of weapons carriage in its bomb-bay to enable easier, more effective, delivery of ordnance. Much of that investment is thus wasted. But it is a bad move for another reason. While an additional eight P-8is have been ordered from Boeing, these will not all be inducted for another 5-6 years. Meanwhile, Russia has made it known it has 20 of the newer version of the Tu-142, which can be modified with the rotator system-equipped bomb-bay and fitted to fire the Brahmos AS cruise missile in case India is interested, and which could be secured for a reasonable sum. So, instead of just one P-8i MR squadron, India could trade in its eight for the newer Tupolevs and buy eight more of the same and constitute a second MR/ASW/AS Tu-142 squadron.

This is also by way of a precautionary measure. One can never tell when Washington may decide to over-ride contractual obligations and, with legislative prompting, cutoff spares and service support for the Poseidon fleet, and leave India stranded w/o any MR/ASW/AS complement, which will happen if there’s no fallback option. Remember how the Sea King unit was grounded in the aftermath of the 1998 N-tests when sanctions were abruptly imposed because, even though the helicopter was UK-sourced, it had a US component that Washington expressly denied the Indian Navy?

It is strategic thinking. If one is dependent on imported arms — then best to secure the same genus of item — if it is at all feasible — from rival vendor camps. (For those who’ll see in this recommendation an inconsistency — won’t securing French Rafales reduce dependence on Russia, etc, the difference is that the alternative to Rafale is the indigenous Tejas Mk-II.) With PLAN growing its presence in the Indian Ocean in the future, there’s no such thing as too many long range MR/ASW/AS warfare aircraft. And we better not get into a position of vulnerability where any particular vendor country can shut down so critical a capability.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons | 6 Comments

Navy’s carrier design blunder and future of SHAR air wing

Posted on January 30, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

On Indian Navy again. A knowledgeable source notes that the Vikrant-class carriers, starting with IAC-1, being built at the Hindustan Shipyard in Kochi, have a grievous design flaw that need immediate rectification, failing which they will be disabled from participating effectively in amphibious actions. Specifically, the carrier lacks the ability to support such operations. In contrast the INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes) has multiple davits (crane-like machines) that help host four LCVPs (landing vessels) and carry a complement of 750 Special Forces troops with equipment. The new Vikrant-class has no such capability. Other than as escort to provide air cover in expeditionary, or from-the-sea, kind of operations, they lack the multi-role capacity for different kind of seaborne missions. At a time when specialized, single mission, platforms are cost-prohibitive, there’s no option — even at this late date — than to suitably modify at least the follow-up carrier of the same class. Until that happens, the navy will have to consider if somehow keeping the Viraat operational for purely amphibious operations and as anti-submarine warfare ship, which twin tasks were the original remit of the Hermes, makes sense.

Then there’s the matter about the Viraat’s Sea Harrier air wing. Where and how will it be deployed? It perhaps could be shifted to the flagship, INS Vikramaditya. Additionally, the Vikrant-class of ACs could be modified to make it more lethal by having it carry large quantities of Cruise missiles, like the Brahmos or, better still, K-15/Shouryas in containers — an innovation the Russian Navy has already implemented. The question then becomes whether the carrier hull can take it, or will it need considerable strengthening. Cruise missile-arming will make the Indian-made carriers more versatile in an environment where one can expect a much larger, more potent, PLA Navy presence in the Indian Ocean in the years ahead.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Russia, russian military, South Asia, Special Forces, Weapons | 7 Comments

Has Indian Navy brass gone stark raving mad?

Posted on January 24, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Basking in the afterglow of the electrifying Tejas at Bahrain, we are back to the more familiar strategic mistakes the military has tendency to commit. The shock here is that it is the Indian Navy — which has always had an inherent strategic sense, which of late has been faulting on a couple of issues (such as going in for 80,000 ton plus-class carriers to accommodate the US-given EMALS — electro-magnetic aircraft launch system which, as argued in my previous writings and in my new book, will end up grievously hurting the national interest.

The immediate problem is with the CNS, Admiral Robin Dhowan, announcing that the indigenous Arihant SSBN will showcase the Indian naval complement at the 2016 Presidential Fleet Review (PFR) to be held next month in Vizag, where some 50-odd navies will be sending their ships (http://idrw.org/ins-arihant-to-be-showstopper-at-international-fleet-review-ifr/). This boat is now at the on-board weapons-firing test stage after successfully negotiating harbor trials and deep sea-diving phases, as prelude to induction in fleet operations,

SSBN spearheading a fleet review??? Have Dhowan & Co. gone stark raving mad? A reasonable question to ask considering the Chinese PLAN will be sending a flotilla of surface ships and a submarine or two. Nothing would make PLAN happier than have the Arihant right there for them to assess, and in maneuvering to the review position in the van giving away its cavitation and some sonar signature (even if it doesn’t submerge) and other metrics for both the Chinese surface and submersible fleets hereafter to key into their threat data bank connected with their fire control systems for easy identification and counter-actions. This is ridiculous. And, how long do you think it will be before PLAN passes on the Arihant-related target information to the Pakistan Navy for use by the Agosta Bs in its inventory? Beyond the pride Arihant will no doubt induce in the top naval brass by putting Arihant on show, and the frisson it may generate at the review with every adversary and friendly participating navy trying to get a fix on the Indian SSBN, what exactly is sought to be achieved by NHQ?? Considering how careful the navy has all along been in not even exposing the Kilo SSKs to US naval scrutiny in the Malabar exercises until the last one, going so public with the SSBN is nothing short of strategic disaster that bids fair to heedlessly endanger operations of the Arihant class of ships once they get fully seaborne, with the first boat pulling long distance patrols armed with nuclear-tipped missiles starting in 2017.

Time to swallow pride Mr. Dhowan and do the right thing: Pull the Arihant from the PFR, pronto, lest you eliminate even that slight strategic advantage an unexposed Indian SSBN poses PLAN and Chinese interests west of Malacca! If the CNS doesn’t relent, it is time for the defmin Manohar Parrikar to show some political leadership for a change, rather than acquiescing in every damn-fool measure instituted by the military services even when these violate common sense, and ORDER the navy to keep the Arihant under heavy wraps, especially from prying eyes at the 2016 PFR.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, civil-military relations, Culture, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Military Acquisitions, Missiles, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan military, society, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Weapons, Western militaries | 18 Comments

Dimwitted BAS organizers re: Tejas — but visuals here

Posted on January 23, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

For more private phone camera recordings of the Tejas performing on previous days in Bahrain, see
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CackdUGFfFg and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSY72-PIiR8 — both with very clear views of the Tejas making a low pass and then going vertical Charlie. These visuals are what we have to make do with considering the BAS organizers stiff-armed the Tejas today which, incidentally, again pulled a tight 350 metre turn at 160 knots — bravura stuff!. (As soon as I get visuals of todays LCA performance, will put it up. It won’t be long!)

After being primed, ready to watch Tejas being put through its impressive paces — got on line by 4:30 PM IST, was tearing my hair out watching instead some dimwitted Bahraini (?) bimbos interview all manner of persons ranging from the UK military to mostly circus performers — magicians, rope-dancers, even as 6:10 passed and one heard Tejas taking to the skies, and the camera settled on passing shots of the Indian LCA pulling hard maneuvers — 8g turn, etc., before abruptly moving back to the bimbo on the dais for another ridiculous exchange, and then seemingly reluctantly back to cover the Tejas landing after its aerial stint.

The organizers of the Bahrain Air Show are obviously to blame and this visual neglect of the Tejas was apparently by design — there’s no other explanation. Because not long before LCA’s time slot, the camera lovingly followed every little twitch by many other aircraft, the last oh which was a French Mirage 2000! Is it too outre to infer that the French and the Pakis (and possibly the Chinese) jointly pressed the BAS organizers to truncate the live broadcasting of the full Tejas session?? Consider their stakes and the context.

Plainly nobody expected Tejas to come out so well, and prove itself beyond doubt as a low cost 4+gen fighter that developing countries (particularly in the neighbourhood, Iran, Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the extended Indian Ocean region) may easily cotton on to if the Indian govt showed even the slightest strategic sense to sell it.

Paris and the govt of Francois Hollande is biting its nails, trying desperately to somehow get Delhi to sign the contract for the 36 Rafale combat aircraft in a deal that is manifestly unaffordable for India. Would the Quay d’Orsay want the Tejas to upstage the Mirage on show in Bahrain and, by extension, its successor the Rafale, by broadcasting to a discriminating audience in India just how good India’s own, locally designed fighter aircraft really is, and begin sowing doubts in the minds of Modi, Parrikar, and company about the Rafale contract on the anvil??

Then there’s Pakistan. As mentioned in an earlier blog, it hightailed its JF-17 Thunder jointly produced with China right out of BAS for fear of being shown up in very adverse light. But this fear seems to be stalking the French as well because the Tejas has gone, as a source said, from being “an oddity” to the real thing that can upset a lot of calculations in great many vendor states peddling military hardware. And Pakistan Army personnel are the palace guard protecting the sunni emir, Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, from the shia majority in Bahrain and if GHQ Rawalpindi says cut up the live videocast of Tejas at BAS, it’s a small price to pay to keep the minders of the praetorian guard happy.

And China must be aghast to find India coming up so fast with its Tejas. It has an open field with no competition. Suddenly it finds that its cut-rate combat aircraft, Soviet/Russian knockoffs mostly, may not be able to cut the mustard in the export market. Every incentive for Beijing then to concert with Islamabad and Paris to get BAS organizers to play ball.

Posted in Afghanistan, Africa, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Central Asia, civil-military relations, Culture, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, indian policy -- Israel, Iran and West Asia, Iran and West Asia, Maldives, Military Acquisitions, Myanmar, Pakistan, Pakistan military, SAARC, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Sri Lanka, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Weapons, West Asia | 11 Comments

Urgent! See Tejas perform live! LCA impact

Posted on January 23, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Tejas while scheduled to be front stage and centre at the Bahrain Air Show at 1810 hrs (6:10 PM) Indian Standard Time on the last day of the Bahrain International Air Show, the Indian fighter may actually go up 10-15 minutes earlier, as the flight displays have been faster paced than the programme had planned.Catch Tejas live at http://www.bna.bh/portal/tv/ch55!! Get on line by 1745 hrs (5:45 PM) IST.

Several things have become apparent about the Tejas:

(1) The buzz about Tejas is in the form of general wonderment among the community of aviation experts and professionals present at the Sakhir air base hosting BAS: How come no one has heard of the Indian Light Combat Aircraft ere now and, considering what a great aircraft it is proving to be, whose idea has it been to keep this gem under cover, far from the gaze of international aerospace circles???

And three technical/performance aspects relating to the Indian LCA’s display have really impressed everybody in Bahrain:

(2) The turning radius of roughly 350 meters compared say to the US F-16’s 426-428 meters and the F-16, mind you, is virtually the gold standard for agility in combat aircraft. This means that in a dogfight Tejas could get inside of F-16’s loop and get on its tail more effectively than the US aircraft could do anything to avoid getting blown out of the skies.

(3) The low-speed handling characteristics of the LCA (necessary for effective prosecution of air-to-ground missions) has been a standout attribute, courtesy its compound delta wing (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LlEJRqVMYpY). This is what the
experts are talking in hushed tones about, especially as it is manifestly better than those in the same mission profile of the French Mirage 2000 in the IAF fleet, and comparable to the French Rafale IAF is pining for and which Prime Minister Modi, with little forethought, has committed himself to buying at an exorbitant price of some Rs. 63,000 crores for 36 aircraft with weapon load, i.e., Rs 1,750 crores per aircraft with NO technology transfer whatsoever!! In other words, the country could buy 14 Tejas Mk-1 for the cost of JUST ONE Rafale!! So, what are IAF’s reasons again for hitching a good part of India’s defence acquisitions budget to this buy? Go figure!!!

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, civil-military relations, Defence Industry, DRDO, Europe, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian ecobomic situation, Military Acquisitions, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons, West Asia, Western militaries | 3 Comments

Indo-Russian relations on ‘Latitude’

Posted on January 22, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Two television discussions on the state of Indo-Russian relations (16-17 January, 2016), and earlier, on Indo-US and Indo-Russian strategic partnerships (June 5, 2015) on the Maroof Raza-hosted television programme – ‘Latitude’ on Times Now TV at
http://www.timesnow.tv/Road-ahead-for-Indo-Russian-ties/videoshow/4484358.cms, and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvg5m3I8CwQ.

Posted in arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Military Acquisitions, nuclear industry, Nuclear Weapons, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, russian military, society, South Asia, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US., Weapons | Leave a comment