India’s NSG dream

PM Manmohan Singh’s Special envoy on disarmament and nonproliferation, Ambassador Rakesh Sood, and myself discussed the Seoul NSG fiasco in the Maroof Raza-hosted program — Latitude, on Times TV aired June 23, 2016. The video of the program available at
http://www.timesnow.tv/Indias-NSG-dream/videoshow/4490712.cms

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Air-launched Brahmos — Southeast Asian counter to China’s bullying

The air-launched Brahmos supersonic cruise missile was recently flight tested for the first time off a Su-30 MKI platform at the Nasik air base. A short video of the Brahmos-armed Su-30 MKI taxing for take off on https://twitter.com/livefist/status/746585004784816129. A still better video of the event at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4iZ-M2Jujg

With India’s formal entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime, the last excuse for delaying the immediate transfer/sale of quantities of this missile to Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia who have strongly expressed an interest in having this weapon in their arsenals, is now gone. Without further ado or loss of time, defence minister Manohar Parrikar should order transactions for the Brahmos to get underway right away. Between the land-based (in coastal batteries) and the air-launched versions of this missile in the Vietnamese, Indonesian, Philippine and Malayasian land and air orders of battle, the Chinese armed forces can be stopped dead in their tracks. Vietnam Air Force has Su-30MKs in its fleet whose flight control computers can be readily configured — as has been done with the IAF Su-30MKIs — to fire the Brahmos.

Perhaps, Moscow held off permission for dealing the Brahmos to our friends in Southeast Asia until recently because Russia was awaiting India’s entry into MTCR and the removal of all legal hurdles. With the barriers now removed, Parrikar’s MOD better get going. There’s no time to be lost because an exasperated Vietnam has already complained to New Delhi about its tardiness regarding the supersonic missile sale, with Hanoi actually giving an ultimatum of end-2016 by which time it expects a contract to be signed and for the training and other support aspects of the Brahmos program to be initiated.

If, as I have advocated, a Kolkatta-class destroyer or, at the very least, an indigenous (upgraded Shivalik class — Project 17A) frigate is offered Hanoi, at cost price if not gratis, to Vietnam, of course, but also to the Philippine, Indonesian and Malaysian navies, the returns on such a venturesome policy will go through the roof. At a minimum, the powerful Chinese South Sea Fleet and, even more, the Indian Ocean-specific “Fourth Fleet” (joining the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets in China’s naval rollcall) based in the Sanya base on Hainan Island will be well and truly grounded. In fact, it will be risky for any naval armada to negotiate the narrows with the Brahmos trident — coastal batteries, and the very mobile air-launched, and ship-fired, leave alone for a largely untested PLA Navy. For China then to offer provocation to or bully any of the smaller disputants in the South China Sea will mean Beijing risking humiliation — the sinking of, say, a Guangzhu-class guided missile destroyer with a single Brahmos broadside hit launched from any one of a number of platforms in the region.

Incidentally, the flotilla embarked for the Malabar naval exercise off Okinawa is led by INS Satpura, a Shivalik-class frigate that littoral states will have a chance to examine up close (when the flotilla exercises with the various navies in the area during its return passage).

In the aftermath of the NSG fiasco in Seoul, this is the right sort of actions as payback and to equilibrate the strategic situation in China’s neighbourhood, raise the potential costs to Beijing, and make India’s intentions of limiting China to short of the South China Sea, clear. And this we should do quietly, without the usual media hullaballoo. But, alas, it is precisely the political vision, will, and gumption driving such actions that are absent in Modi’s government which, like its predecessor regimes is looking for India to do little itself but increasingly relying on Washington to take on China.

Consider also that just 50 Su-30MKIs (out of Car Nicobar base or staging out of, say, INS Baaz air strip with extended runway) in Campbell Bay, can stop any aircraft carrier battle group from any country venturing into the Indian Ocean, or at any other oceanic choke point to the east and the west.

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Diplomatic mishap at NSG Seoul

It was an astounding misread of the international political situation for the BJP government to believe that just having Prime Minister Narendra Modi do rounds of his now trademark personalized diplomacy would get India a ticket into the Nuclear Suppliers Group at its two-day plenary in Seoul. It is one thing for Modi to be convinced about his own persuasive powers. Quite another thing for the Ministry of External Affairs mandarins, with Foreign Secretary K. Jaishankar in the lead, to go along with the PM’s conceit without alerting Modi to the near insurmountable barriers in place visible to any level-headed analyst and made perfectly plain by Beijing’s repeated negative pronouncements.

Did Modi really think that a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Tashkent and Jaishankar’s attempts at changing the minds of the other holdout states — Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, Brazil, and Turkey, would prove anything but futile? Two days back Sartaj Aziz, PM Nawaz Sharif’s foreign policy adviser, had telegraphed this with his statement that Pakistan had succeeded in firming up the opposition to India’s NSG membership. As usual, he was taking more credit than was due his diplomatic efforts. The problem was/is with the different reasons for their holdout by the six countries. Let’s see what these are and decide whether India’s chances will brighten with time.

China WILL NOT budge until India begins seriously to strategically discomfit it with counter-leverage and counter-pressure. Such leverage/pressure has come its way with India formally becoming a participating state in the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime). China has been seeking an entry into MTCR since 2004. New Delhi can hereafter veto China’s membership in MTCR, and should do so. Secondly, it should fast-track the sale/transfer of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile not just to Vietnam that has desperately desired it for years, but also the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei the states disputing China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. MTCR membership means that India’s Brahmos transactions with these states and any other country that has any problems with Beijing and wishing to acquire this deadly and indefensible missile, are instantly legitimated, and will not draw sanctions for either India, the supplier, or any of its customer states.

And then India should resist all initiatives for an exchange Beijing may propose — its lifting NSG veto for India’s doing the same in MTCR. Because the fact is NSG is not all that important for India considering it has already secured a waiver in 2008 as part of the nuclear deal and can engage in nuclear commerce and trade without let or hindrance. As to why MEA is set on NSG entry and has pushed Modi into making such a big deal of it, resulting in the PM getting a whole lot of egg on his face is a mystery. A well-connected commentator attributes this entire diplomatic mishap to the “devious” view of many in the MEA that pushing Modi into canvassing China, would up the stakes and Beijing’s formally resisting India’s NSG membership will confirm its status as an adversary country and justify to the domestic audience the government’s policy of siding with the United States to contain it in Asia.

But such an undiscriminating slide towards the US will actually lose New Delhi leverage with Washington. The more India holds back and joins the US only sporadically — so the US govt does not take India for granted as it is inclined to do, the better it will be in terms of serving and furthering the national interest in the long run. Moreover, the more agilely New Delhi manipulates its security cooperation with dibs and dabs of military-to-military linkages with the US, the more Beijing will feel impelled to accommodate India as a means of preempting/preventing New Delhi’s going over more fully to America’s corner. That’s how the game of great power politics is played, and was so done by Nehru in the Fifties. But since then and especially in the new Century MEA seems to have lost that ability abetted in recent years by Modi’s personal West-leaning preferences.

As regards Brazil — envy and jealousy are very much part of its stance towards India. Brasilia did not have the wit or the strategic wisdom to not sign the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and hence its passage to weapons status has been for ever barred. Now it confronts India as a nuclear weapon state, and cannot stomach it considering its nuclear programme too is pretty advanced. As regards Ireland, Austria and New Zealand, the Indian govt had obviously hoped they would take their cues from the US and fall in line at the Seoul plenary. That has not occurred because they feel unwooed and therefore unmoved. Switzerland got the full treatment with the Permanent Mission in Geneva at the cutting edge (not the embassy in Berne) and yet the Swiss did not follow through on promised support. Its position at Seoul that it still had to liaise with Berne hints at second thoughts or cussedness. In any case, it reveals, as does Modi’s confabulatory procedure with Xi, the limits of personalized diplomacy.

Then there’s Turkey and India has hit a brick wall. Like China, it has hyphenated India and Pakistan and has opted for joint entry into NSG. And, by the way, it will not relent even if China ever does.

Considering all the factors laid out above, can anyone make a convincing case that India needs to expend an additional iota of diplomatic-political capital on trying to get into NSG? The answer is a resounding NO. But Modi and MEA seem bent on it. Figuring that out will tell you just why India is where it is and points to the Indian government’s lack of understanding of what hard power is and how it works. It is not a coincidence that some 52 years after India reached the nuclear weapons threshold in Feb/March 1964 but decided deliberately not to speedily acquire a nuclear arsenal, New Delhi still thinks its abstemiousness in not proliferating indigenously developed nuclear materials, expertise, should win India rewards!!!

That’s not what the harsh world of international relations is about, I am afraid. One had hoped that with Modi’s advent there would be an injection of realism in our foreign policy approach and attitude. That hasn’t happened. Instead, Modi seems to have fallen in — as he has done elsewhere in government by relying on civil servants, with the old MEA way of doing things: Depending, in the sadly famous words uttered by a character in Tennessee Williams’ play ‘A Streetcar Named Desire”, the needy Blanche Du Bois — “on the kindness of strangers”. Except, in the external realm, all countries are strangers and never kind.

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Washington — Heritage Foundation panel on ‘India’s Asia-Pacific outreach and relations with China’

In the lead-up to the Modi visit, there was a panel discussion in Washington, DC, at the Heritage Foundation May 25, 2016 on “India’s Asia-Pacific Outreach and relations with China” involving Lisa Curtis of the Heritage, Jeff Smith of the American Foreign Policy Council and myself. The video recording of this event is available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVKmxZeNVOk — [it was apparently moved here from the main Heritage Foundation site at
http://www.heritage.org/events/2016/05/indias-asia-pacific-outreach–and-relations-with-china

[Unfortunately, the presentations of other than those speaking from the lectern, is not very audible and needs to be ramped up by those cueing in.]

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Jiang Zemin for the gallows & Xi as supremo — what does it portend?

In August last year, there were newspaper reports that the former President and Chinese Communist Party party boss in 1989-2002, Jiang Zemin, and his two sons were “placed under control,” meaning a sort of house arrest, with restrictions on their freedom of movement. They are charged with corruption. That was a preparatory stage to what has just happened — Jiang has been formally arrested as prelude to a kangaroo court imposing a death sentence, possibly by firing squad.

This development has not no far been reported by any media outlet anywhere but was intimated to an acquaintance by his high-placed Chinese contacts. House arrest followed by formal arrest, court, and death is a pattern last suffered by the former party security chief, Zhou Yongkang. President Xi Jinping has thus succeeded in dismantling the parallel power structure Zemin had set up overseen by Zhou, by finally getting rid of the principals in it.

If true, Zemin’s elimination altogether from the scene, suggests that (1) politics in autocratically ruled China is a zero sum game: If you lose it you also lose your head, (2) this event together with the earlier removal of the two vice-chairmen of the powerful Central Military Commission controlling the Peoples Liberation Army — Guo Boxiong and especially Xu Caihou, who were supposedly responsible for denuding Xi’s predecessor in office, Hu Jintao, of any real power, marks the emergence of Xi as the Jefe Maximo (maximum leader in Latin American parlance) who has suppressed all resistance to his authority and rule in China. It will mean a China hereafter moving as per Xi’s dictates. Is that good or bad for India?

Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave the impression of considerable personal warmth in his relations with Xi (manifested during the latter’s state visit to India in 2015). Modi obviously believes that Xi is a reasonable man he can do business with. Except, and this is the Damocles’ sword hanging over Xi, that a future successor could do to him what he is doing to Jiang and his cohort, and accommodating New Delhi on a slate of issues that require resolution, ranging from delineation of the disputed border to Beijing’s vetoing India’s entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group and the UN Security Council, could give his potential adversaries a reason to hang him. So, like his predecessor Jiang (when he arrived in Delhi in 1996) for whom he proved the nemesis, Xi will be more inclined to take than to give and on territorial matters to concede not an inch of China’s real estate claims in Arunachal Pradesh.

But Modi seems partial to hugs and embraces as mean of preempting resistance. It won’t work with Xi, as is already evident from how firmly Beijing has held on to its line on all issues, most recently on India’s membership in NSG. Both National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar were deployed to cajole and convince Zhongnanhai but returned home, as the Chinese spokesman revealed, after being heard out. MEA Minister Sushma Swaraj’s take that China is not opposed to India’s entry per se says more about New Delhi’s cupidity than to Beijing’s resolve. Modi will obviously converse with Xi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

But Modi (and the Indian government) will once again discover the fact that Beijing is stirred into respecting it when an opposing country shows fight, such as Vietnam, not when it seems willing to cut a deal.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, Latin America, society, South East Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Vietnam | 6 Comments

With the F-16 Deal Stalled, Are Days of US-Pakistan Bonhomie Over?

According to Sartaj Aziz, Adviser on Foreign Affairs to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, relations with the United States have hit a nadir. There are two reasons for such dire assessment. One, Islamabad has failed to secure appropriate assurance from Washington that it wouldn’t willfully breach Pakistan’s sovereign air space. On May 22, an armed American Predator drone killed Mullah Mansoor, alleged leader of the Haqqani faction of the Pakistan Taliban in North Waziristan.

America had held Mansoor responsible for the relentless attacks by his outfit on the US forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s response was a muted one, owing to the fact that the drone was, perhaps, launched from Jacobabad air force base, part of which has been occupied for many years now by the US military (which is permitted by a logistics support agreement of the sort that India is preparing to sign with the US).

How the Deal Went Sour?

The deal for the F-16 fighter planes that were on the verge of being delivered by the US supplier, Lockheed Martin, to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was suddenly pulled up short. This development happened because of the last minute US Congressional intervention that required Pakistan to pay up in full the total cost of some $700 million for eight of these aircraft.

A punitive action by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, specifically by one of its members, Senator Bob Corker, who at a stroke of his legislative pen, led to the removal of the US government subsidy of $270 million underpinning this contract. With the subsidy provision gone, Pakistan deemed the aircraft just too expensive for it to buy. Islamabad has indicated it will manage by purchasing used F-16s from Jordan.

Reason Behind the Corker Initiative

The background for the Corker initiative was that Washington wanted to impress the visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and assure that the US meant business and was willing to tamp down Pakistan’s role in nursing terrorist groups and deploying them in neighbouring countries, namely India and Afghanistan.

This display of American anger may also have been a means to pressure Islamabad into releasing Dr. Shakil Afridi incarcerated in a Pakistani jail. It was Afridi who had informed American intelligence agents about the presence of the Al-Qaeda supremo Osama bin Laden in a fortified building outside the gates of the Pakistan Military Academy in Abottabad, leading to his elimination (‘Operation Geronimo’) by the US Special Forces in May 2011.

It is, however, important for Washington that Pakistan augments its fleet of F-16s, because doing so reassures Islamabad that the US will continue to ensure maintaining a certain “strategic balance” across the subcontinent – the historical geopolitical game the US has been engaged in since 1947. It is this equation being upset and the supposed “balance” that Aziz is bitterly complaining about.

US Assistance Will Continue

The US has been munificent in its aid and assistance package that in the period 2002-2015 fetched Pakistan $5.4 billion in arms transfers and other military aid and an additional $30 billion in economic assistance (inclusive of reimbursements for the support and services provided by the Pakistani military for the US’ armed presence in that country and for the staging of US military operations in Afghanistan).

The US will ensure that as part of such aid in the next few years, the special equipment for all-weather and night operations and radar/area suppression weapons that the new F-16s were to have on-board will be available for fitment on the ex-Jordanian F-16s once they join PAF.

F-16s by themselves pose no great threat to India. Except, and this is the insidious part of the US game, the Pakistani F-16s have been technically enabled by the US to fire the anti-ship Harpoon missile against ground targets. Meaning that both the F-16s and the maritime use Harpoon missiles on board can be used in any conflict across land borders with India. This is why the Indian government protested vehemently to the US against the sale of this lot of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan.

Snapshot: Denial of F-16s to Pakistan
•Pakistan fails to seal a deal on the sale of eight F-16 fighter jets, as the two countries fail to reach a consensus over financing,

•The $700 million deal was supposed to be financed partially by the US, an offer that was turned down by the US Congress.

•Senator Bob Corker, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee objected to the subsidised sale.

•The U-turn by US is meant to impress India and put pressure on Pakistan in order to release Shakil Afridi, the doctor who had helped CIA track Laden.

•What worries India is incessant supply of arms by the US to Pakistan, which the latter justifies in the name of war against terror.

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The above piece was published in online magazine ‘the Quint’, June 18, 2016, and is accessible at http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/06/18/with-the-f-16-deal-stalled-are-days-of-us-pakistan-bonhomie-over-sartaj-aziz-abbotabad-osama-bin-laden-bob-corker

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India and NSG Membership

There was a discussion June 14, 2016 on ‘India and NSG Membership’ on Rajya Sabha TV program — India’s World, involving former Ambassador Rakesh Sood, retired Cmde Uday Bhaskar, and myself. Interesting stuff. For those interested in viewing it, it is available at

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's Pakistan Policy, nonproliferation, nuclear industry, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, nuclear power, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan nuclear forces, SAARC, South Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Weapons | 1 Comment

Modi’s US policy: Embracing Washington comes at a price

In the address to the United States Congress on June 8, Prime Minister Narendra Modi described the evolving global situation as a “war of multiple transitions and economic opportunities, growing uncertainties and political complexities, existing threats and new challenges” which, contrary to his advocacy of closer relations with the US, make it imperative India retains its “strategic autonomy”, policy options, and the freedom of manoeuvre.

India and the US do share “interests and concerns” and China is the main worry. Except the US is distanced from China by the Pacific Ocean and inclined, therefore, to accommodate Beijing, while for India it is an immediate and potent threat best kept in check by India joining in a coalition of rimland states — Asean, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, with the US featured as an extra-territorial balancer. Regarding terrorism, the US will pressure Pakistan only about suppressing the Haqqani Taliban active in Afghanistan.

In technology cooperation the reality is starker. In a decade of high-flying rhetoric, not a single R&D project has materialised. But expensive technology extraneous to India’s naval needs — the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) for aircraft carriers is offered in the hope its sale will help amortise US investment in it. But India’s priority — American assistance in designing and developing a combat aircraft jet engine, is made contingent on India first buying 90 1970s-era F-16s/F-18s off the shelf, and producing another 200 aircraft under licence. This is called ‘Open Sesame’ for high-technology trade in the future.

Given the thrust of the US technology cooperation, it is imprudent to even contemplate imperilling ties with Russia, and doing without the leased Akula-II nuclear-powered attack submarine and Russian involvement in strategically sensitive programmes, such as the Arihant SSBN. Besides, given that the bulk of the conventional armaments with the Indian armed forces are of Russian origin, an aggravated Kremlin could shut down Indian capabilities if it chose to. Indeed, Moscow has already given notice it will rethink its role in sensitive Indian defence projects and about leasing a second Akula if New Delhi signs the “foundational” accords formalising a security relationship with Washington.

But India has pressed ahead and finalised the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). It seems to be only a differently worded version of the standard Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement detailed in the US Defense Department’s Directive 2010.9 of April 28, 2003. The reimbursement of costs will require Indian base commanders, as has happened in Pakistan that has a logistics support agreement with the US, periodically to justify to US authorities the quality and costs of the support and services provided. In Enclosure 2 of this directive, Section E2.1.10 spells out the “Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services”, inclusive of “base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), [and] storage services”. This refers to the pre-positioning of stores and supplies and constitutes a basing provision. Implicit is the fact of the US providing security for its assets and personnel, necessitating parts of Indian military bases coming under US control and violating Indian sovereignty. Should India assume the responsibility for protecting such US military presence in India, the Indian intelligence agencies, armed forces, central and state police, and the paramilitaries will face an internal security nightmare to pre-empt and prevent attacks by domestic and international Islamic terrorist outfits on US personnel. The situation could get politically fraught very fast.

The explanation that the Indian military will be able to access far-flung US bases begs several questions: Whether the Indian military mounts many out-of-area operations and, if they mean to, wouldn’t a more cost-effective long-term solution be Indian bases in the Agalega Islands of Mauritius and on the northern Mozambican coast, an agreement with Sultan Qaboos to stage out of Oman, and independently to use Nha Trang in Vietnam, and Subic Bay and Clark air base in the Philippines — all options available to India?

Americans anticipate that with LEMOA in the bag, the other two “foundational” accords — Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) — will follow. Indian officials claim CISMOA’s usefulness in counter-terrorism activity. But it is something Russia is wary of, as it will allow the US to plug into the communications system linking Indian aircraft to submarines, enabling remote spoofing of the communications hardware in the Akula SSNs. This is too risky for Moscow not to consider a pull out, which move could end in firming up a formidable Russia-China-Pakistan triad. With India and US getting together, China will be more determined to deny India entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, leave alone as permanent member into the UN Security Council.

The prime minister’s appeal for US investment in India’s manufacturing sector too may not work out to our advantage just yet. He seems unaware that the Obama administration initiated the “in-sourcing” policy using coercive tax measures to compel American companies to bring back capital invested abroad and to create jobs in the US. So, how did New Delhi get the impression that Obama means to benefit India? Sure, the US would happily continue importing Indian talent, nurtured at the Indian taxpayer’s expense, to do technology work.

The problem is with Modi’s personalised diplomacy wedded to his vision for the country as a subsidiary power. He further believes that India should make friends and that friends mean well. Except, Western leaders will be friendly, but ultimately pocket contracts worth tens of billions of dollars (for six nuclear reactors, in Obama’s case), and otherwise advance their national interests, leaving India to wax eloquent about shared democratic values.
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Published in the online Hindustan Times, June 15, 2016 at http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/modi-s-us-policy-embracing-washington-comes-at-a-price/story-bz1lVPJRQEq31RbC3j7XnK.html; and Hindustan Times with title “The perils of a tight embrace” at http://www.hindustantimes.com/comment-newspaper/the-perils-of-a-tight-embrace/story-JMONNEXtA0g0FYhxINtQDI.html

Posted in Africa, arms exports, Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Defence Industry, DRDO, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian democracy, Indian ecobomic situation, Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, indian policy -- Israel, Iran and West Asia, Internal Security, Iran and West Asia, Japan, Military Acquisitions, Northeast Asia, nuclear industry, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, nuclear power, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Relations with Russia, Russia, russian assistance, SAARC, society, South Asia, South East Asia, Strategic Relations with South East Asia & Far East, Strategic Relations with the US & West, Technology transfer, United States, US., Vietnam, Weapons, West Asia | 2 Comments

Making a great power omelet

A review of my book ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ by Sandeep Unnithan, published in India Today dated May 25, 2016 and accessible at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/why-india-is-not-a-great-power-bharat-karnad-books/1/677612.html
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A security hawk writes a masterful compendium of India’s strategic failings.

Diplomacy without arms, the 19th century Prussian soldier-statesman Frederick the Great once observed, is like music without instruments. India’s foremost national security hawk Bharat Karnad insists that India has stood the Frederickian analogy on its head- its orchestra can make big music, but uses just the piccolo to produce small notes.

In this masterful compendium of the country’s strategic failings, including the inability to field a robust military-industrial complex and, consequently, hard power, Karnad dives deep into military misfires like a 2001 project to provide a ‘simputer’ for infantry soldiers. Failures that have cascaded into a conundrum- a UN Security Council seat aspirant is today also the world’s largest arms importer. He’s quick to identify the problems: a void in strategy, geostrategic vision and other factors like pusillanimity, absence of strong leadership and a stifling bureaucracy.

Karnad was an early advocate of China and not Pakistan being India’s long-term strategic adversary. He harps on the absence of China-specific deterrents like thermonuclear weapons and strategic fortitude to stand up to its northern neighbour.

If India is indeed to become a great power, it needs to discard its please-all policy, become more disruptive in the manner of A-list powers who break eggs to make great power omelets for themselves.

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's strategic thinking and policy, Indian Army, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, South Asia, UN, Weapons | 9 Comments

How important is it for India to be part of NSG? — Rajya Sabha TV discussion

There was an interesting discussion on the Rajya Sabha TV panel discussion show — ‘The Big Picture’ on the subject of ‘How important is it for India to be part of NSG?’ aired on Saturday, June 10, 2016, involving G. Balachandran of IDSA, former Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar, Nandan Unnikrishnan of ORF, and myself. It is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qkoc42v1bsc

Posted in Asian geopolitics, China, China military, Culture, disarmament, domestic politics, Geopolitics, Great Power imperatives, India's China Policy, India's strategic thinking and policy, nonproliferation, nuclear industry, Nuclear Policy & Strategy, nuclear power, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, Pakistan nuclear forces, South Asia, Strategic Forces Command, Strategic Relations with the US & West, United States, US. | Leave a comment